

Project Fiche – IPA centralised programmes
Part II of the Horizontal Programme on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

1. Basic information

- 1.1 CRIS Number:** 2007/019-301
- 1.2 Title:** Assessment of needs and proposed activities to strengthen capabilities for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia including Kosovo (as defined by UNSCR 1244)¹
- 1.3 Sector:** 06.64 - Nuclear Safety
- 1.4 Location:** Tirana (Albania), Sarajevo (Bosnia & Herzegovina), Skopje (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Podgorica (Montenegro), Belgrade (Serbia) and Prishtina (Kosovo).

Implementing arrangements:**1.5 Contracting Authority:**

The European Community represented by the Commission of the European Communities for and on behalf of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia including Kosovo in joint management with the IAEA

1.6 Implementing Agency:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Office of Nuclear Security.

1.7 Beneficiaries:

Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia including Kosovo

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| 1.8 Overall cost (VAT excluded): | €250,000 |
| 1.9 EU contribution: | €250,000 |
| 1.10 Final date for contracting: | 30/11/2008 |
| 1.11 Final date for execution of contracts: | 30/11/2010 |
| 1.12 Final date for disbursements: | 30/11/2011 |

¹ Hereafter referred to as Kosovo

2. Overall Objective and Project Purpose

2.1 Overall Objective:

To contribute to combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in line with the provisions of EC recommendations and international instruments.

2.2 Project purpose:

To analyse the current situation regarding the capabilities for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in Western Balkan countries, and to identify needs of each country in terms of regulations, delivery of equipment (e.g. stationary and portal monitors), training of customs, police and other relevant organisations involved in the use and maintenance of the monitors.

2.3 Link with AP/NPAA/EP/SAA

The sectoral policies of the European/Accession Partnerships with Albania (2006/54/EC), Bosnia & Herzegovina (2006/55/EC), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2006/57/EC), the Montenegro (2007/29/EC), and Serbia (2006/56/EC) in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security all mention the strengthening of the fight against organised crime and trafficking. In addition the AP with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the EP with Montenegro specifically refer to nuclear safety and radiation protection issues.

2.4 Link with MIPD

The MIPD action entitled "Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection" mentions that "the Western Balkan countries (WBC) have the common feature of being vulnerable to illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources". The expected results from the implementation of the MIPD notably indicate "greater availability of instruments to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources". The MIPD finally specifies that the "best way to address these radiological issues is through a combination of Multi-beneficiary and national projects. Multibeneficiary projects will identify in more detail the extent of the radiological problems as well as the gaps and deficiencies, and then on this basis to define technical assistance projects that may be implemented either regionally (e.g. prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials in Western Balkan countries) or on a national basis". This is precisely the approach followed by this project.

3. Description of project

3.1 Background and justification:

Another common feature to all WBC is their vulnerability to illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources notably due to – in some countries - the weakness of national institutions which are conducive to organised crime. Although only few cases were reported so far by the media, indications from the police and national security organisations have given signals that smuggling of nuclear materials could or would be taking place in the WBC. As a consequence the international Community has developed and is coordinating proactive prevention activities, e.g. setting up of international databases and conventions in order to enhance the efficiency of the police. An important part of the international support consists of training experts in the field of detection of nuclear materials and radiation sources, and supply of equipment. The IAEA is again very active in this area. It is worth mentioning that the Phare nuclear safety programme has just started some activities in Croatia in providing this country with mobile detectors to be used by the police. Since 2004 the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) programme conducted by the EU Council is also developing specific actions in this domain through the IAEA. In this context, project No 3 of the

EU/IAEA Joint Action² concerning the “strengthening of states’ capabilities for detection and responses to illicit trafficking” has prioritised several countries for technical support and amongst others: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Serbia & Montenegro.

The confidential character of some of the information gathered by national security organisations makes the assessment of the extent of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources in WBC difficult. Financial support in fact relies on declarations from governments, the police and international organisations like the Interpol and the IAEA.

The screening of the situation regarding illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources existing in each Western Balkan country both in terms of regulations and practices has been extensively performed by the IAEA through the implementation of the abovementioned EU/IAEA Joint Action. Moreover, in some Western Balkan countries, the IAEA is supporting specific projects on the prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources. This means that a considerable documentation has been collected and analysed by the IAEA on that specific issue. Since information on security aspects is by nature classified, it cannot be made available to third parties. Therefore it was deemed worthwhile to use the IAEA expertise in order to make a clear assessment of the technical assistance and investment needs of the IPA eligible countries on the specific issue of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources.

3.2 Assessment of project impact, catalytic effect, sustainability, and cross border impact:

This project will result in a better knowledge and understanding about the needs of beneficiary countries to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. This project shall be implemented in line and close coordination with the other EC financing instruments that are addressing this issue. It may also impact on the content of the technical assistance projects that should be implemented within the framework of the nuclear safety and radiation protection action of the IPA regional programme from 2009 onwards. It has an obvious cross border impact.

3.3 Results and measurable indicators:

- Gaps and possible deficiencies of the regulatory framework on illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources currently in force in each of the six beneficiary countries;
- Status of the current stationary portal monitors that have been installed at the border crossing points (airports, harbours, railway stations and roads) as well as the mobile equipment being used by the customs and police services in each of the six beneficiary countries;
- Establishment of a list of services (support to regulatory bodies, and training to the relevant state organisations) to be provided to the beneficiary countries in order to significantly improve the protection of borders;
- Identification of the type and quantities of monitors – including communication systems – that should be delivered to the beneficiary countries.

3.4 Activities:

- Analysis of the current legislative and regulatory framework in force in each of the seven beneficiary countries that is covering illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, including planned legislation for the near future;
- Analysis of the status (in operation, under repair, worn out) of the detection devices that have been installed to protect the border crossing points (airports, harbours, railway stations and roads) for the detection of possible illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials;

² Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD

- Analysis of technical specifications and characteristics of the different detection devices that are currently in place;
- Analysis of the possible needs of the beneficiary countries in terms of regulatory support training, supply of transportable and mobile monitors, and stationary portal monitors;
- Preparation of possible future technical assistance and investment projects including determination of the technical performance of the radiation control systems to be possibly installed and/or maintained in good operation in the six countries and the corresponding cost.

3.5 Conditionality and sequencing:

N.A.

3.6 Linked activities

Over the period 2001-2006 – notably within the framework of the Phare nuclear safety programme several projects dealing with prevention and combat of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources have been programmed, namely:

- Border control of nuclear and other radioactive materials in Croatia (2005);
- Delivery of stationary portal monitors in Croatia (2006);
- Upgrading the regulatory infrastructure in the area of transport, import and export of radioactive material and improvement of the control over the illicit trafficking at the Bulgarian borders (2006).

In addition the Phare national programme, stationary portal monitors were delivered to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2002. In Romania, the delivery of stationary portal monitors would be in progress.

It is worth mentioning the important activities conducted by the Joint Research Centre on the technical performance of radiation detectors.

Finally as mentioned earlier the IAEA notably through the EU/IAEA Joint Action has implemented a number of activities that are related to the prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources;

- Creation of national customs guidelines for nuclear and radioactive material detection and response;
- Delivery of radiation control equipment for a limited number of selected customs checkpoints;
- Assistance in staff training for radiation protection and responses measures;
- Implementation of routine customs radiation control.

3.7 Lessons learned

Lessons learned from the implementation of the Phare programmes have shown that important efforts should be devoted to the determination of adequate technical specifications of the different kinds of detectors to be purchased and installed. The national authorities in charge of selecting and installing the necessary equipment should notably pay attention to the compatibility and detection ranges of the different systems that are existing on the market. It should be underlined that a too high number of false alarms may jeopardise the whole security system in place. Then communication between the different national organisations involved in the prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials should be carefully looked at. Finally appropriate national budgetary

means should be allocated to the maintenance of the installed equipment, otherwise the detectors can become readily out of operation.

4. Indicative Budget (amounts in €)

Activities	TOTAL COST	SOURCES OF FUNDING										
		EU CONTRIBUTION				NATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION					PRIVATE	
		Total	% *	IB	INV	Total	% *	Central	Regional	IFIs	Total	% *
Activity 1												
Contract 1	250,000	250,000	100	250,000								
TOTAL	250,000	250,000	100	250,000								

* expressed in % of the Total Cost

5. Indicative Implementation Schedule (periods broken down per quarter)

Contracts	Preparation for tendering	Signature of Contribution agreement	Project Completion
Contract 1	N/A	December 2007	30 November 2010

6. Cross cutting issues

6.1 Environment:

There are substantial environmental gains to the beneficiary countries by accomplishment of this project since a better prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources should decrease the risks of their malevolent use and thereby risks of contamination of the environment.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: Logical framework matrix in standard format

LOGFRAME PLANNING MATRIX FOR Project Fiche	Programme name and number: 2007/019-301	Part II of the Horizontal Programme on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection
Assessment of needs and proposed activities to strengthen capabilities for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia including Kosovo (as defined by UNSCR 1244)	Contracting period expires: 30/11/2008	Disbursement period expires: 30/11/2011
	Total budget: €0.25 million	IPA budget: €0.25 million

Overall objective	Objectively verifiable indicators	Sources of Verification	
To contribute to combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in line with the provisions of EC recommendations and international instruments.			
Project purpose	Objectively verifiable indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
To analyse the current situation regarding the capabilities for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in Western Balkan countries, and to identify needs of each country in terms of regulations, delivery of equipment (e.g. stationary and portal monitors), training of customs, police and other relevant organisations involved in the use and maintenance of the monitors.	Recommendations listed in the final report	Production of progress and final reports resulting from the project implementation. Mission reports produced by the Contractor in the six selected countries.	The relevant national authorities in charge of actions to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources in the eight selected countries are supposed to fully collaborate to the project, providing all necessary information and data in particular on the number, types and functioning of the different detection devices installed at their borders.

Results	Objectively verifiable indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaps and possible deficiencies of the regulatory framework on illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources currently in force in each of the six beneficiary countries; • Status of the current stationary portal monitors that have been installed at the border crossing points (airports, harbours, railway stations and roads) as well as the mobile ones being used by the customs and police services in each of the six beneficiary countries; • Establishment of a list of services (support to regulatory bodies, and training to the relevant state organisations) to be provided to the beneficiary countries in order to significantly improve the protection of borders; • Identification of the type and quantities of monitors – including communication systems – that should be delivered to the beneficiary countries. 	<p>Progress and topical reports</p> <p>Progress and topical reports</p> <p>Progress and topical reports</p> <p>Progress and topical reports</p> <p>Progress, topical and final reports</p> <p>Progress, topical and final reports</p>	<p>Documentation available in the relevant Ministries and State organisations of the six beneficiary countries, in the relevant services of the IAEA and in the archives of DG ELARG/D3</p>	
Activities	Means	Costs	Assumptions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of the current legislative and regulatory framework in force in each of the seven beneficiary countries that is covering illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, including planned legislation for the near future; 	<p>Establishment of a Contribution Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency</p>	<p>€250,000</p>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of the status (in operation, under repair, worn out) of the detection devices that have been installed to protect the border crossing points (airports, harbours, railway stations and roads) for the detection of possible illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials; • Analysis of technical specifications and characteristics of the different detection devices that are currently in place • Analysis of the possible needs of the beneficiary countries in terms of regulatory support training, supply of transportable and mobile monitors, and stationary portal monitors; • Preparation of possible future technical assistance and investment projects including determination of the technical performance of the radiation control systems to be possibly installed and/or maintained in good operation in the six countries and the corresponding cost. 			
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ANNEX II: Amounts (in €) Contracted and disbursed by quarter for the project

Contracted	Q3 2007	Q4 2007	Q1 2008	Q2 2008	Q3 2008	Q4 2008	Q1 2009	Q2 2009	Q3 2009	Q4 2009
Contract 1		250,000								
Cumulated		250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000
Disbursed										
Contract 1		150,000		50,000		50,000				
Cumulated		150,000	150,000	200,000	200,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000

Contracted	Q1 2010	Q2 2010	Q3 2010	Q4 2010	Q1 2011	Q2 2011	Q3 2011	Q4 2011
Contract 1.1								
Cumulated	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000
Disbursed								
Contract 1.1								
Cumulated	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000

Annex III: Reference to laws, regulations and strategic documents:

- Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection action of the multi-country MIPD programme;
- The EU/IAEA Joint Action on the implementation of the Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004;
- The Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management;
- The 1995 Law on radiation protection in **Albania**;
- The Federal Law of Protection from Ionising Radiation and Radiation Safety (1999) of **Bosnia & Herzegovina**;
- The Law on Radiation Protection and Radiation Safety and amendments (2001 and 2003) of the **Republic of Srpska of Bosnia & Herzegovina**;
- The Act on Protection Against Ionising Radiation 1999 and its 2003 amendment in **Croatia**;
- The Law on Protection against Ionizing Radiation and Radiation Safety (2002) in the **former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**;
- The draft Law on Radiation Protection and the Security of Radioactive Sources that will repeal Law 46/96 in **Montenegro**;
- The draft of the **Serbian** new Law on ionising radiation protection and on nuclear safety (2006) and existing **Serbian** Law on Protection against Ionising Radiation (1996);

Annexe IV: Details per EU funded contract

This project will be supported through a European Community Contribution Agreement with the IAEA in accordance with the FAFA.