

Leadership in times of crisis

I will start with the European [Foreign Policy Scorecard](#) that provides a systematic annual assessment of Europe's performance in dealing with the rest of the world. The ECFR scorecard assesses the performance of the EU institutions on 80 policy areas arranged around six key themes: China, Russia, Wider Europe, MENA, US, and multilateral issues. I think targets are suitable for study of **bilateral relations** rather than multilateral processes, but nevertheless, Scorecard offers a possibility to track these elements year on year. So there is some idea of a time span and therefore a timely process, but no idea on **complex processes involving non-state actors** such as Arab spring. Significant indicator for national policy makers is the question of how **relevant** is global governance and EU foreign policy for different **groups of states**. And how relevant is it for the **community as a whole**.

The formulation of European foreign policy and the performance of European institutions on the parameters of foreign policy presuppose that **we have set goals beforehand** and that we **measure outcomes against proclaimed goals**. According to my knowledge EU did not come up with the EU foreign policy strategy, even more, we do not have a mechanism to develop it. But, we do rely on intergovernmental negotiations when struggling over 80 policy areas. Of course, if we want to be coherent in the implementation of policies and the mechanisms we are using, we urgently need the foreign policy strategy. European foreign policy, carried out by EEAS, is dominated by nationally established norms for organization and operation, which is to some extent predictable, but not really suitable for this supra-national entity at the beginning of 21st century. We must not evaluate **performance of individual member countries any more**, because EEAS should become the **global player in the future**. Starting from global processes, where European foreign policy should feature prominently, I can see three broad goals.

1. The first is to **increase global security** together with our neighbours – main topics range from terrorism, environmental and energy security to cooperation with regional security and defence institutions. European security strategy should be somehow modernised and surpass global North-South relations and include the needs of the neighbouring countries.
2. The second broad objective is to **increase prosperity in the world** – EU has to maintain its active role in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals together with its neighbours. Climate policy, for example, must be seen as an instrument for achieving the seventh millennium goal rather than as an expression of European diplomatic skills on global level.
3. The third major objective is **increase of political leadership**. Globally, we are looking into an effective representation of the EU in the international organizations and waiting for the uniform EU response to crisis and outstanding events which cannot be achieved unless we perform on neighbourhood issues such as Ukraine or ISIL.

Security, prosperity, leadership.

These are three pillars of future European foreign policy strategy and real challenges for a **political generation of Europeans**. Is there any strategic choice for the neighbourhood countries to join the alliances with one of the big three EU players on one hand and one or two big BRICS players?

Here I would dig into collective behaviour of EU: **what is the collective identity of EU and what kind of values are turned into policies on the community level?** We could think of European values based on attitudes, geography, history, organisational culture, EU identity and such values as soft power approach, secularization, rule of law, parliamentary democracy, institutional character of EU, demilitarization in comparison to US etc. In case neighbourhood does not share the above mentioned values, we can expect that the **political elites will make alliances with other states or group of states**.

I would also look into the **real life problems of citizens and vulnerable groups of people in European neighbourhood. Their needs might profoundly differ from the EEAS diplomatic principles**. We have namely seen that small states are handing over global governance to the Community level, because they can not really be effective in managing global issues, given the limits of their atomised powers. Small states in the neighbourhood do not share such an incentive and there is no political will to follow EU leadership. In this case bilateral relations between EU countries and non-EU countries might gain the importance. Perhaps they choose different priorities on national level and they devote their resources to regional or local politics such as Eastern neighbourhood or Balkans development, whereas Slovenia and Croatia belong to both sub-regions. These niche projects must not be overlooked as they represent the soft fabric of international relations. There is also a pervasive notion of **the general decline of EU cross-border periphery, whereas the centre continues to export the crisis to its already-troubled periphery**.

Timing and finance are two resources which are difficult to balance at European level in order to achieve fine tuning between objectives and resources necessary to implement the prioritised goals. Unfortunately we failed in Union for Mediterranean, especially in Tunisia, and at the moment we are not thinking about the enlargement, which makes Western Balkans vulnerable to economic and political activities coming from other actors.