




## INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE (IPA II) 2014-2020

### MULTI-COUNTRY

Support to preventing and  
combating violent extremism  
in the Western Balkans



#### Action summary

The action aims to assist the Western Balkans in their efforts to prevent and combat violent extremism, notably by introducing the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) model and its approach in the Western Balkans and by carrying out small scale actions with specialised (international) organisations (in particular, Civil Society Organisations).

Its main objective is to contribute to curb security risks of radicalization, violent extremism leading to terrorism, and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters as requested by the EU Member States in their endorsement of the Western Balkans, building up on the Western Balkan Counter Terrorism initiative (one of the three pillars of the Western Balkan Internal Integrative Security Governance).

<b>Action Identification</b>			
<b>Action Programme Title</b>	IPA II Annual Multi-Country Action Programme 2016		
<b>Action Title</b>	Support to preventing and combating violent extremism (P/CVE) in the Western Balkans		
<b>Action ID</b>	IPA 2016/039-858.13/MC/ViolentExtrem		
<b>Sector Information</b>			
<b>IPA II Sector</b>	9. Regional and territorial cooperation		
<b>DAC Sector</b>	15130 – Legal and judicial development		
<b>Budget</b>			
<b>Total cost</b>	EUR 3 150 000		
<b>EU contribution</b>	EUR 3 000 000		
<b>Budget line(s)</b>	22.020401- Multi-country programmes, regional integration and territorial cooperation		
<b>Management and Implementation</b>			
<b>Management mode</b>	Direct management		
<i>Direct management:</i> <b>European Commission</b>	NEAR/D.5 Western Balkans Regional Cooperation and Programmes		
<b>Implementation responsibilities</b>	NEAR/D.5 Western Balkans Regional Cooperation and Programmes		
<b>Location</b>			
<b>Zone benefiting from the action</b>	Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia)		
<b>Specific implementation area(s)</b>	N/A		
<b>Timeline</b>			
<b>Final date for contracting including the conclusion of delegation agreements</b>	31/12/2017		
<b>Final date for operational implementation</b>	31/12/2020		
<b>Policy objectives / Markers (DAC form)</b>			
<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	x
Aid to environment	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	x	<input type="checkbox"/>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence

Trade Development	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
Biological diversity	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Combat desertification	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Climate change mitigation	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Climate change adaptation	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

# 1. RATIONALE

## PROBLEM AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

In addressing the high terrorism threat to Europe, preventing radicalisation remains at the forefront of our counter terrorism efforts. Preventing individuals from being drawn into violent extremism, and ensuring they receive the appropriate support, can play a valuable role in reducing support to terrorism.

Following up on its European Agenda on Security, the European Commission has adopted a new communication on the prevention of violent extremism (COM(2016)379): *Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism* (14 June 2016), which outlines specific areas where cooperation at EU level can bring added value. Increasing international cooperation is one of them, based on two complementary approaches: i) supporting law enforcement and human rights compliant responses to prevent radicalised individuals from committing terrorist acts and ii) stepping up engagement in preventive action, tackling the root causes of all forms of radicalisation that can lead to violent extremism.

The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) financed by the EU under the Internal Security Fund, unites over 2300 frontline and grassroots practitioners from around the EU working on prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE). Violent extremism and terrorism do not stop at national borders; neither should efforts to discourage and disrupt violent extremist propaganda and prevent the recruitment of future terrorists. The most effective prevention strategies stop people from getting involved in violent extremism or acts of terrorism in the first place. Practitioners include police, prison and local authorities, but also those who are not traditionally involved in counter-terrorism activities, such as teachers, youth workers and healthcare professionals. These are the individuals who come into daily contact with those who might be vulnerable to radicalisation such as religious, community, and youth leaders. Within the RAN Working Groups, frontline practitioners from different EU member states may share their extensive knowledge and first-hand experience with one another, discuss specific challenges, and peer review each other's practices. RAN is also a platform for the world of practitioners, researchers and policy makers to pool expertise and experience in tackling radicalisation. There are nine different working groups on specific themes: education, health, youth and communities, counter narrative, deradicalisation and local coordination.

The Western Balkans are not exempt from this threat. Not only are many EU foreign terrorist fighters using the region for their own travel en route to and from Syria/Iraq, but it is also being used to facilitate the flow of weapons. Furthermore, it is estimated that about 1,000 Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) from WB have travelled to Syria and Iraq, with a higher proportion of families and single women (as compared with other countries of origin). Whilst – as with most of Europe – the flow of individuals leaving for Syria/Iraq has eased over the past year, there has also been no noticeable increase in returnees to the Western Balkans (for which no reintegration programme exists). However, this might change as the situation in Syria declines.

The Western Balkans have recently revised or introduced new counter terrorism or P/CVE strategies, including legislative changes. Over 20 court convictions on FTFs were ruled in Bosnia, and few in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania, against former FTFs, as well as recruiters, financiers, and support network.

Extreme Islamists tend to keep a low profile on the public scene. Overall, they have a reduced activity in the political sphere. The role of some NGOs in promoting radical views is not insignificant, while the Western Balkans remains a route for terrorists travelling from Syria/Iraq to Western Europe.

Whilst the outward flow of FTFs from the Western Balkans might have eased, as with the rest of Europe, there is concern about individuals being radicalised from afar and launching their own attacks. An aggressive media campaign by Western Balkan extremists fighting with Daesh has urged those back home to launch attacks in their homeland and elsewhere.

Therefore, since the Western Balkans are also highly exposed to the threat of violent extremism, The Communication on the prevention of violent extremism of 14 June 2016, calls for increased EU engagement with third countries. More specifically, it recommends adopting two complementary work strands: i) supporting law enforcement and human rights compliant responses to prevent radicalised individuals from committing terrorist acts (law enforcement) and ii) stepping up engagement in preventive action, tackling the

root causes of certain forms of radicalisation that can lead to violent extremism (prevention). This approach is reaffirmed in the new EU Global strategy, which, similarly to the EU Enlargement Strategy, identifies the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and increasing violent radicalisation as major security threats and priorities for the EU's foreign and security policy.

The 9 February 2015 Council Conclusions (complemented by the JHA Conclusions of 17-18/12/2015) frame the EU's external action in the field of Counter-Terrorism (CT) and PVE, with a clear focus on the Western Balkans, Turkey and the Neighbourhood South. The EU action is organised around the following pillars: i) strengthening partnerships with key countries, including political dialogue, developing action plans and seconding CT/security experts to EU Delegations; ii) supporting capacity building in a wide array of security-related areas; iii) countering radicalisation and violent extremism; iv) promoting international cooperation; v) addressing underlying factors and ongoing crisis.

We need to assist the Western Balkans in their CVE efforts and encourage a multi-agency response that looks at a variety of interventions, and not one focused entirely on a heavy police response (which in some cases can prove counter-productive).

For instance under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the EU also supports the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) in Kosovo. Through its core funding mechanism, GCERF works in partnership and consultation with the governments, civil society and the private sector to support national strategies to address the local drivers of violent extremism.

With this in mind, the Western Balkan Counter Terrorism initiative (WBCTi) can be used as the coordinating mechanism to optimise the efficiency of Counter-terrorism and PVE activities. As of 2015, the *Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism initiative* (WBCTi) has represented a joint, coordinated approach to assistance and regional cooperation in WB. Its main aim is to integrate EU (Enlargement and Justice and Home Affairs) and international assistance and regional cooperation instruments in the counter-terrorism field, minimizing duplications of action and maximizing cost-benefit efficiency. It is supported by more than 50 EU and international actors under the joint umbrella of its current *Integrative Plan of Action (iPA) 2015-2017*<sup>1</sup>. The WBCTi is the first of the 3 Pillars of the wider policy concept – the *Integrative Internal Security Governance (IISG)*, intended to integrate the efforts of relevant donors and instruments in the region based on the same methodology for all 3 pillars. The other two IISG pillars are the *Western Balkan Counter-Serious Crime initiative (WBCSCi)* and the *Western Balkan Border Security initiative (WBBSi)*. The IISG concept is promoted by the EU Member States led by Slovenia and endorsed by the Western Balkans Ministers of Interior.

When selecting individual projects, events and trainings it will be ensured that these contribute to the objectives as set out in the WBCTi plan.

The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), a regional organization in SEE mandated to monitor the progress of the Beneficiaries, with thirteen Participants from the region (including all six Western Balkans jurisdictions), following the tasking given to it by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice and Home Affairs of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEEC), Secretariat tasks are delegated to the South East European Police Cooperation Convention Secretariat (SEE PCC), developed and started implementing the Southeast European Regional Platform for Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (SEE Regional CVE-FTF Platform for short). The Platform was formally established by the RCC Board, its governing body, on 15 October 2015. Its implementation has already started and some activities have been.

SEE Regional CVE-FTF Platform is linked with WBCTi. Some of the activities under the Platform (organised by the RCC) are incorporated into the WBCTi 2015-2017. In the activities already performed, in

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<sup>1</sup> Council of the EU 2015. *Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on the Integrative and Complementary Approach to Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans.* <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14986-2015-INIT/en/pdf>

order to create synergies, economize with scarce resources, and avoid unnecessary duplication, the RCC has already successfully cooperated with other stakeholders, such as the OSCE, the US, SEE PCC and the European academic and research community, investigative journalists, and civil society activists..

Numerous activities have already been or are currently being implemented to prevent and combat violent extremism in SEE, performed and/or supported by national authorities, international donors, foundations, etc.. The RCC has collected and analysed data on them in its survey of regional issues, initiatives and opportunities entitled “Initiatives to Prevent/Counter Violent Extremism in South East Europe”. With this the RCC also responded to the call that was addressed to it by the WBCTi. The aim of the survey was to identify gaps and unnecessary overlapping, and contains conclusions and recommendations. The survey was conducted through interviews with over hundred experts and stakeholders to understand their diagnosis of the challenge, to understand ongoing activities in PVE/CVE and to seek their recommendations for more effective domestic and regional initiatives. The survey summarizes this research exercise and is aimed at being a tool for the governments, international organizations and independent actors to better understand trends, initiatives and challenges across the region. The survey recommends improving the exchange of information and experiences on what is happening in each location and in the region, in terms of diagnostic analysis and current or planned PVE/CVE activities. But also to facilitate personal contacts and networks among appointed expert focal points to fill this gap. Depending on the actors and initiatives in each location, formal and regular consultation mechanisms – including independent experts and non-governmental representatives – should be established, with meetings at least twice yearly. This can then serve as the basis for more effective regional-level consultations. To effectively share information on PVE/CVE activities, information should be actively collected on a regular basis. It is foreseen that under this programme the RCC will continue to map the P/CVE and CT initiatives and players in the region. It will take the lead in gathering the political leaders to steer this process. This survey confirms the need to continue with the WBCTi coordination, since it portrays a highly diverse but scattered landscape. It also concludes that the level of consultation in developing the P/CVE strategies has been generally low.

It is crucial to draw on and complement the findings, insights and country specific recommendations of the RCC survey as well as the First Line project. This means that support to activities under this action should build on objectives and priorities set in the various CVE strategies and action plans, where they exist, and tackle the challenges as identified in both projects.

Despite significant results in understanding the factors underlying and enabling radicalization, Violent Extremism and FTF in the Western Balkan, there is a clear need for more numerous, comprehensive, and coordinated efforts to diagnose the problems and demonstrate effective prevention techniques. Better understanding of the phenomena is a precondition for effective work on preventing and countering them. Hence there is a need for research-based policy development that could help in target communities and individuals that are more easily susceptible to radicalization, and equip these with effective tools.

Furthermore, the Western Balkan authorities lack concrete and coherent programmes (with precisely assigned roles and responsibilities) aimed at prevention, de-radicalization, rehabilitation, reintegration and re-socialisation of ideologically radicalized individuals. Without such programmes national strategies on combating and prevention of terrorism remain just declaration of good intentions.

In short the action will address the following issues/needs:

1. Understanding of the conditions and circumstance that are present and/or still needed to deploy the RAN model in the Western Balkans;
2. Lack of sense, direction, purpose, and perspective for many young people, making them easy targets for VE propaganda and even FTF recruiters;
3. Lack of a bottom-up approach in addressing P/CVE, which empowers and equips local practitioners with the necessary government support and resource;
4. Weak local multi-agency responses to tackling P/CVE, which moves away from a heavy pursue-type approach, and encourages thought to be given to the most appropriate form of intervention, based on each individual's needs and vulnerabilities;

5. Low awareness on how to detect and tackle the VE threat by training practitioners, possibly through a 'train-the-trainer' type approach;
6. Poor cooperation and coordination between various international, regional, governmental, and non-governmental actors in P/CVE field in the Western Balkan, in order to avoid waste of finite resources, including time, and create synergies instead, as suggested by the WBCTi as a part of the Integrative Internal Security Governance Structure (IISG) in Western Balkans.

Moverover, it will support the creating of a Western Balkan RAN structure, bringing together counterparts to exchange best practices, led by a Western Balkan RAN Secretariat in order to ensure a sustainable and effective cross-border cooperation in this area. As part of this the programme will seek to secure the political support for a RAN-type approach and encourage national government's support in identifying local practitioners (such as First Line project as a component of the WBCTi).

## **OUTLINE OF IPA II ASSISTANCE**

One of the elements this action will build upon is the EU-funded First Line project (full title: "Practitioners dealing with radicalisation issues – Awareness raising and encouraging capacity building in the Western Balkan region"), which is based on the RAN model. This is a two year project (running from January 2016-January 2018), funded from the Internal Security Fund (ISF), and managed by Slovenia. The objective of this project is to raise awareness amongst first-line practitioners, to transfer knowledge, experiences and good practices to target countries in accordance with the EU RAN model which will help those countries when creating appropriate conditions to independently identify main threats, challenges, impacts, as well as opportunities while strengthening cooperation and involvement of all relevant stakeholders based.

Under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), a number of global P/CVE-specific actions have been launched around the world under the Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) programme. The STRIVE actions aim to facilitate innovative P/CVE projects in collaboration with local communities, to create conditions conducive to development, and resilience towards violent extremism. Within this Action the Western Balkans will be introduced to STRIVE taking advantage of the lessons learned with this programme, which could lead to the WB joining the initiative. Synergies and coordination will be ensured between the proposed programme and the above mentioned DEVCO's initiatives.

The programme also foresees in financing small scale pilot activities selected by the European Commission based upon recommendations by a panel of P/CVE experts grouped under SEE PCC/DCAF.

In short the following i.a. activities are foreseen:

- Further fact-finding and analysis of the conditions necessary for the implementation of the RAN model in the Western Balkans
- Raising awareness of the radicalization and VE threat in particular by carrying out Train the Trainers and e-Learning modules
- Strengthening of existing formats for exchange of information, training, cooperation, and coordination, notably via a Regional CT and CVE web-based platform
- Studies conducted, conferences and workshops held to feed policy recommendations and projects
- Support the gradual development of CVE action plans and sustainable multi agency structures. The need for broader involvement and consultation of all relevant stakeholders (as identified in the RCC study) should be factored in and where possible the projects and activities funded under this action should contribute to this.
- Support the First Line Response in developing a Western Balkans RAN-modelled structure, bringing together Western Balkans counterparts to exchange best practices in the areas of education, health, youth and communities, counter narrative, deradicalisation and local coordination, led by a Secretariat in order to ensure a sustainable and effective cross-border cooperation in this area.
- Preparatory work, establishment and functioning of the Western Balkan RAN, resulting in an action programme for its implementation

- Involving communities and enhancing resilience of these communities and society more broadly
- Aside from arranging working groups, the Secretariat should also report back on a frequent basis to the political level so as ensure a better understanding of how individuals are being radicalised, and the best form of intervention;
- Implementation of small scale P/CVE actions in the region

However, the support to individual projects will be part of a broader strategic endeavour supporting long term projects (addressing the shortcoming identified in the RCC report that the current focus is on short term deliverables, stressing the need for long terms projects).

## **RELEVANCE WITH THE IPA II MULTI-COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER AND OTHER KEY REFERENCES**

The 9 February 2015 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions (complemented by the JHA Conclusions of 17-18/12/2015) frame the EU's external action in the field of Counter-Terrorism (CT) and the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE), with a clear focus on the Western Balkans, Turkey and the Neighbourhood South. The EU action is organised around the following pillars: i) strengthening partnerships with key countries, including political dialogue, developing action plans and seconding CT/security experts to EU Delegations; ii) supporting capacity building in a wide array of security-related areas; iii) countering radicalisation and violent extremism; iv) promoting international cooperation; v) addressing underlying factors and ongoing crisis. As concern point ii, a CT expert with a regional mandate for the Western Balkans will take up his duties in the EU Delegation in Sarajevo as of October 2016.

In addition, the IPA II Regulation stipulates that the fight against organised crime (and thus also terrorism) is a priority for assistance.

The IPA II Multi-Country Indicative Strategy Paper<sup>2</sup> (hereafter referred to as Strategy Paper), notes that in the sector Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, the IPA II beneficiaries need to join forces and cooperate to fight organised crime. This involves strengthening cooperation with international law enforcement organisations operating in criminal justice, police investigations and witness protection, thus enabling effective exchange of information and evidence during investigations and prosecutions. There is a need of close cooperation and coordination with EU agencies, Member States and international organisations. Thereby the action will help address these challenges with respect to enhancing the understanding the nature and evolution of organised crime in the IPA II beneficiaries.

The action will contribute to the national priorities of the IPA II beneficiaries, in particular to the EU integration process. The outcome of the action will complement the EU Annual Reports, focusing on Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, freedom and security) of the EU *acquis*.

The action responds to the priorities stemming from the European Agenda on Security that prioritises terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong cross-border dimension, where an EU action can make a real difference.

Last but not least the action implements priorities identified in the Western Balkan Counter Terrorism initiative as endorsed by the EU and the Western Balkan Ministers of Interior.

## **LESSONS LEARNED AND LINK TO PREVIOUS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE**

As stated earlier fragmentation of the support, as well as lack of exchanging experiences and information risks to result in double financing, duplication of efforts and could even lead to counterproductive or conflicting actions. Furthermore, violent extremism is primarily viewed as a threat of the ISIL/*Daesh*. Other forms of extremism, such as domestic right-wing extremism, are noted as a secondary concern, if acknowledged at all. There is a tendency among interlocutors (particularly among officials) to state that what

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<sup>2</sup> C(2014) 4293, 30.06.2014.



is most needed to prevent/counter violent extremism is economic development and infrastructure investment. However, when discussing further, there is recognition that there is an ideological/worldview factor and deeper inclusion/alienation issues that must be addressed as well.

Independent experts noted that social exclusion, marginalization and a search for meaning/belonging are contributing factors to radicalization. There are few political trends in support of greater inclusion of citizens in social and public life, or to cultivate multi-layered and inclusive identities – in spite of the need for such policies.

The RAN approach is based on co-operation with Civil Society Organisations and governments. In a similar way the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund's work has taught us that its public private partnership with a multi-stakeholder governing Board binds donors, partners, implementers and beneficiaries to support consortia of organisations working at the community level to build resilience to violent extremist agendas. Both inclusive approaches are determinable for success in P/CVE actions. Also the lessons from STRIVE will be shared with the practitioners in the region, for their benefit.

All this requires proper political steering and active co-ordination, which the RCC can provide at political and the SEE PCC/DCAF at technical level (the RCC working primarily with national governments, other international and regional organizations, academics and researchers, and civil society, the SEE PCC with law enforcement agencies and experts).

## 2. INTERVENTION LOGIC

### LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

OVERALL OBJECTIVE	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS (*)	SOURCES OF VERIFICATION	
To contribute to curb security risks of radicalization, violent extremism (VE) leading to terrorism, and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF)	Number of radicalised extremism, notably FTF and returnees (rFTF) – both in and outside the IPA II beneficiary/region Number of VE attacks/incidents	Official crime data Research by independent researchers INCTEN, Interpol and Europol reports	
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS (*)	SOURCES OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
To assist the Western Balkans in their efforts to prevent and combat violent extremism, notably by introducing the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) model and its approach in the Western Balkans and by carrying out small scale actions with specialised (international) organisations (in particular, Civil Society Organisations).	Number of arrests, convictions P/CVE (including RAN) strategy papers and programmes drafted and implemented in the Western Balkans Projects carried out	Official crime data Research by independent researchers INCTEN, Interpol and Europol reports Strategies and programmes Project reports	Targeted IPA II beneficiaries are willing to work with CSOs and specialised (international) organisations and donors to tackle Violent Extremism Targeted IPA II beneficiaries are willing to top up the efforts with additional resources and staffing Free and frank exchange of experience, information, intelligence, etc.
RESULTS	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS (*)	SOURCES OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
<p><b>Result s:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The level of awareness and understanding of the radicalization and VE threat among the general public and in particular within the target groups is increased</li> <li>2. Western Balkan RAN approach is designed and under implementation (including a possible RAN satellite office)</li> <li>3. National P/CVE Action programmes are adopted and under implementation</li> <li>4. Group of P/CVE and CT experts are operational in the region, in addition to one RAN focal point per relevant IPA II beneficiary</li> <li>5. Regional CT and CVE web-based platform is operational</li> <li>6. Small scale P/CVE actions in the region are implemented</li> </ol> <p>As evidenced by an increase in calls for help/assistance/advise to prevent and counter VE and the rehabilitation of returnees but a decrease in the number of FTFs, and VE attacks/actions..</p>	Degree of understanding of push and pull factors Number of early warnings/calls to specialist help desks Number of VE actions/attacks/(r) FTFs Degree of readiness of CT and CVE web based platforms Degree of uptake of lessons learnt in policy recommendations and projects Degree of implementation of P/CVE actions Number of National P/CVE Action programmes developed and adopted Degree of RAN-readiness	Requests for more information and early warnings/calls to specialised help desks (web & telecom data) Official and unofficial data and estimated of (r) FTFs, VE attacks/actions, Web data on CT & CVE platforms use Policy recommendations/projects Governmental and Civil Society reports RAN organisation	Targeted IPA II beneficiaries will draft and implement national P/CVE programmes providing the necessary staffing and resources Targeted IPA II beneficiaries will do the necessary to coordinate and consolidate P/CVE actions

## DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES

Under this action following activities will be i.a. implemented:

### **1: Raising awareness of the radicalization and VE threat in particular by carrying out Train the Trainers and e-Learning modules – targeting in particular result 1:**

- Dissemination of positive/alternative narratives to counter VE through mass media, including internet and social media, in cooperation with investigative journalists, academics, and researchers taking into account lessons learnt from EU counter- and alternative narratives' campaigns.
- Fostering inter-religious dialogue, inclusion, tolerance into school curricula. Developing "tackling radicalisation in classroom" e-Learning modules for teachers.
- Informing and engaging health and social workers about P/CVE
- Training of P/CVE practitioners from the variety of specialisations (e.g. teachers, social, health and youth workers, probation officers, etc) using the train the trainer approach
- Preparation and execution of e-Learning modules

### **2.1: Fact-finding and analysis of the conditions necessary for the implementation of the RAN model in the Western Balkans; RAN feasibility – serving in particular result 2:**

- Understanding of the political appetite and willingness to engage in P/CVE work at regional, national, and sub-national levels;
- Deepening and refreshing already existing overview of the national approaches to prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) and counter-terrorism (CT)
- Understanding of the CT and P/CVE set-up within individual countries (jurisdictions) and partition of responsibilities at national/regional/local level leading to concrete and comprehensive national programmes;
- Indication of where the gaps are in their capability response to deliver effective P/CVE;
- A summary of potential risks, particularly those relating to legal obstacles and human rights abuses;
- Clarity on what other EU partners (and those beyond the EU) are already doing in the region so as to avoid duplication;
- Compilation of a list of interlocutors (potential members of future WB RAN-modelled structure) at regional and national level
- Training of P/CVE practitioners using the “Train the trainers” approach
- Preparation and execution of e-Learning modules

### **2.2: Preparatory work, establishment and functioning of WB "RAN approach" complementing RAN CoE and the First Line project – to achieve result 2:**

- One RAN focal point per country needs to be appointed to coordinate also the preparatory work
- In preparatory work, establishment, and functioning of Western Balkan RAN-modelled structure, full use should be made of the existing EU RAN and the ongoing efforts under WBCTi to establish national RANs in Western Balkans
- When Western Balkan RAN-modelled structure is established, “train the trainers” work (primarily face-to-face, not electronic) would be the core activity

### **3: Assistance in drafting national P/CVE action programmes – for notably result 3:**

- Definition of roles and responsibilities within the relevant authorities aimed at prevention, de-radicalization, rehabilitation, reintegration and re-socialisation of ideologically radicalized individuals
- Establishment of an information exchange and coordination plan
- Organise consultations with relevant organisations and experts to enhance the support for and thus implementation of the action programme

### **4: Studies conducted, conferences and workshops held to feed policy recommendations and projects – serving result 4 and 5:**

- Targeted and focused research in various aspects of P/C/VE will be commissioned to local CSOs, Think Tanks, Academia, etc.
- The results of existing and independently financed and conducted research work should be taken into account, disseminated, and analysed
- Future conferences and workshops should be targeted, regarding the participants, as well as envisaged results

### **5: Strengthening of existing formats for exchange of information, training, cooperation, and coordination, notably via a Regional CT and CVE web-based platform – focussing i.p. on result 5 but also 4:**

- Support for the work of the RCC SEE P/CVE-FTF National Focal Points Group as a main P/CVE coordination mechanism in SEE, helping the implementation of the Group's recommendations at regional, national, and local levels
- Using all existing regional security cooperation formats for an effective exchange of P/CVE-related information on bilateral and multilateral level, especially good practices and plans for forthcoming activities
- Upgrading/expanding a web-based platform to become the central “billboard” for P/CVE information exchange in Western Balkans
- Guide and provide ad-hoc assistance if needed to running P/CVE projects implemented in the region

### **6: Implementation of small scale P/CVE actions in the region – linked to result 6:**

- Creation of assessment and evaluation panels and procedures for the small pilot actions
- Establishment of a guidance mechanism and monitoring and evaluation approach to allow for adjustments and sharing of lessons learned and experiences

## **RISKS**

It is essential that all actors involved in P/CVE coordinate their activities open and transparent without any specific agenda's. The 'need to know basis' dogma needs to be replaced by the 'need to share' approach. This requires strong interpersonal relations, diplomacy and courage to be open and frank. It also means that the actors should be willing to share while closing the ranks behind the joint approach.

Moreover, those being involved in the actions, notably the final beneficiaries could be subject to verbal and even violent attacks. They could be accused of being puppets of the 'West'. Hence the visibility requirements need to be adapted in such a way to protect individuals and organisations.

Evaluating P/CVE activities, investigating the push and pull factors for violent extremism, and the constant changing political environment may urge the operators and donors to quickly change gear and/or direction of the activities. This flexibility needs to be incorporated in the activities whenever there is a need. The research

on the push and pull factors as well as the assessment of the results and subsequently impact of P/CVE activities is one of the key elements of the RAN approach and should be taken at heart in this action as well.

Being a rather new ‘discipline’ there are only a few experts/specialist organisations. Moreover since P/CVE is in the spotlight, it is more and more funding is rightfully being made available. This means that the experts/organisation may become overwhelmed. Their capacity to carry out the tasks should be kept in mind when preparing new actions soliciting their input. In addition, additional capacity (experts/specialist organisation) may be created using the additional funding, but due care has to be taken to involve the most appropriate persons and organisations with a long term commitment, excluding opportunists.

### **CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION**

Cultivating and enhancing the coalition of organisations and persons (both international and national) on P/CVE is crucial. The support of the national authorities to adopt and deploy the RAN approach depends on the willingness of the authorities and civil society to work together. It requires that the authorities design concrete and comprehensive programmes on P/CVE. The action will help the relevant IPA II beneficiaries in this work but this work can only be successful if the political will for this exists. In case this is not being evidenced, activities may be redirected to other areas.

The effectiveness of the work also depends very much on the sharing of information, experiences and expertise among the different players. This will need to be streamlined by a coordination body using modern IT tools.

## **3. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**

### **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

Coordinating different projects, with different implementers, procedures, reporting mechanisms, etc. is a tremendous challenge. This work can be greatly reduced if the management of these different projects is entrusted to one organisation, which can also assure that the contributions of each donor and player is duly acknowledged. Considering the work already carried out by the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF Ljubljana) and the SEE PCC, as funded by DCAF, under the First Line project and the Western Balkan Counter Terrorism initiative it seems evident that the DCAF Ljubljana should take of the overall management. It has the expertise and necessary links to the key players of the IPA II beneficiaries as well as implementing bodies such as the (OSCE, UNODC, United States Agency for International Development - USAID, etc.). As concerns the political steering the coalition proposes to build upon the work already done by the RCC. As a part of it, the RCC is in a process of establishment of its own web-based P/CVE platform. This P/CVE platform could eventually be transformed in a Secretariat supporting the Western Balkans RAN-modelled network (Western Balkans RAN secretariat)

### **IMPLEMENTATION METHOD(S) AND TYPE(S) OF FINANCING**

The action will be implemented on a direct management basis through a grant with the DCAF Ljubljana to be signed in Q1 2017 for an indicative EU contribution of EUR 3 million. The EU grant will be 95.2% of the total costs. The direct award is based on Article 190 (1)(f) of the Rules of Application, since a particular type of body on account of its technical competence and its high degree of specialisation is required.

DCAF Ljubljana will act in partnership with the SEE PCC and RCC.

## **4. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT**

### **METHODOLOGY FOR MONITORING (AND EVALUATION)**

The European Commission may carry out a mid-term, a final or an ex-post evaluation for this action or its components via independent consultants, through a joint mission or via an implementing partner. In case a mid-term or final evaluation is not foreseen, the European Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner. The evaluations will be carried out as prescribed by the DG NEAR Guidelines on linking planning/programming, monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the action might be subject to external monitoring in line with the European Commission rules.

## INDICATOR MEASUREMENT

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Baseline (value + year) (2)</b>	<b>Target 2020 (3)</b>	<b>Final Target (2020) (4)</b>	<b>Source of information</b>
Degree of RAN-readiness	Non existing in 2016	One RAN Satellite office in the WB with local focal points in each relevant IPA II beneficiary	One RAN Satellite office in the WB with local focal points in each relevant IPA II beneficiary	RAN report
Number of P/CVE Action programmes developed and adopted	Non existing in 2016	One per relevant IPA II beneficiary	One per relevant IPA II beneficiary	
Degree of readiness of CT and CVE web based platforms	Non existing in 2016	Fully operational	Fully operational	Web reports

(1) This is the related indicator as included in the Indicative Strategy Paper (for reference only)

(2) The agreed baseline year is 2010 (to be inserted in brackets in the top row). If for the chosen indicator, there are no available data for 2010, it is advisable to refer to the following years – 2011, 2012. The year of reference may not be the same either for all indicators selected due to a lack of data availability; in this case, the year should then be inserted in each cell in brackets. The baseline value may be "0" (i.e. no reference values are available as the Action represents a novelty for the beneficiary) but cannot be left empty or include references such as "N/A" or "will be determined later".

(3) The target year CANNOT be modified.

(4) This will be a useful reference to continue measuring the outcome of IPA II support beyond the 2014-2020 multi-annual financial period. If the Action is completed before 2020 (year for the performance reward), this value and that in the 2020 target column must be the same.

## **5. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

### **GENDER MAINSTREAMING**

Women from the Western Balkans and elsewhere are as attracted to the Islamic State as much as men. The roles of women in the Islamic State and the messaging that the group uses to lure women to Syria and Iraq are sufficiently different, however, to warrant a gender-based perspective in countering violent extremism. Around 10 to 15 per cent of all Islamic State recruits are women, more than 110 of whom are from the Balkans and have been in Syria and Iraq since the conflict started in 2011. Most come from Kosovo - 42. In second place are women from Bosnia and Herzegovina - 36, followed by Albania - 29.

Research notes no single profile of the typical female recruit. However two distinct groups are evident. First are women as young as 15 who travel to ISIS territory to marry a jihadist. Second are women who are already married and travel with their husbands.

### **EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES**

As can be concluded from above a balanced approach making sure that all persons, reasons, background, etc. are involved in the activities is essential.

### **MINORITIES AND VULNERABLE GROUPS**

The recruitment of FTFs now also takes place in areas with sizable Roma populations, such as the town of Smederevo in central Serbia and the Belgrade suburb of Zemun. These Roma communities “face very bad economic conditions and are not integrated enough within society”, experts warn that this kind of alienation can lead to a “jihadist ideology that has absolutely nothing to do with Islam.

Likewise unemployed youth, persons who have not found their place in the society, and in particular those often found among (religious) minorities will be an essential focus of attention.

### **ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY (AND IF RELEVANT OTHER NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS)**

Civil Society Organisation (including faith-based associations) are the key players in P/CVE, as evidenced also by the RAN approach. Therefore, they will be heavily involved in the research, policy design, development of action programmes, delivery of support/assistance as well as in the evaluation of the actions.

Small-scale initiatives supported by this action will help empower, strengthen and prepare the civil society to fully embrace the RAN model of working on CVE.

### **ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE (AND IF RELEVANT DISASTER RESILIENCE)**

Not applicable.

Climate action relevant budget allocation: EUR 0.
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## **6. SUSTAINABILITY**

RAN Centre of Excellence is funded by the Internal Security Fund – Police. RAN is a network of frontline or grassroots practitioners from around Europe who work daily with people who have already



been radicalised, or who are vulnerable to radicalisation. Practitioners include police and prison authorities, but also those who are not traditionally involved in counter-terrorism activities, such as teachers, youth workers, civil society representatives, local authorities' representatives and healthcare professionals. In RAN Working Groups, frontline practitioners may share their extensive knowledge and first-hand experience with one another and peer review each other's practices. RAN is also a platform for the world of practitioners, researchers and policy makers to pool expertise and experience to tackle radicalisation.

The EU Member States experts can help in demonstrating the benefits (financial and societal) to prevent and counter violent extremism. This should encourage the Western Balkans to make similar arrangements, as part of their P/CVE action programmes.

## **7. COMMUNICATION AND VISIBILITY**

Communication and visibility will be given high importance during the implementation of the action. The implementation of the communication activities shall be funded from the amounts allocated to the action.

All necessary measures will be taken to publicise the fact that the Action has received funding from the EU in line with the Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions. Additional Visibility Guidelines developed by the European Commission (DG NEAR) will have to be followed.

Visibility and communication actions shall demonstrate how the intervention contributes to the agreed programme objectives and the accession process. Actions shall be aimed at strengthening general public awareness and support of interventions financed and the objectives pursued. The actions shall aim at highlighting to the relevant target audiences the added value and impact of the EU's interventions and will promote transparency and accountability on the use of funds.

However, considering the delicate nature of the actions, it may be decided not to make public that a particular action or organisation receives EU support.