



European Commission

# Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy

## Final Report

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	Association Agreement
AAP	Annual Action Programme
ACAA	Agreement on Conformity Assessment & Acceptance of Industrial Products
Acquis	Acquis Communautaire <sup>1</sup> , Acquis of the European Union or EU Acquis
ADB	African Development Bank
ADO	Agence de Développement de l’Oriental (Maroc) – Oriental Development Agency (Morocco)
AFD	Agence Française de Développement – French Development Agency
AP	Action Plan
APDN	Agence pour la Promotion et de Développement du Nord (Maroc) – Agency for the Promotion and Development of the North (Morocco)
APII	Agence pour la Promotion de l’Industrie et de l’Innovation (Tunisie) – Industry and Innovation Promotion Agency
AREP	Agence Régionale d’Exécution de Projet (Maroc) – Regional project Contracting Agency
AS	Advanced Status
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BAS	Business Advisory Services Programme
BA	Beneficiary Administration
BC	Beneficiary Country
BC PL	Beneficiary Country Project Leader
CC	Candidate Country
CAMP	Customs Administration Modernisation Programme
CAPMAS	Central Agency for Public Mobilisation & Statistics (Egypt)
CAOA	Central Agency for Organisation and Administration (Egypt)
CERES	Centre de Ressources et de Services Euro-Méditerranéens (Maroc) – Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Resources and Services (Morocco)
CFCU	Central Finance & Contracts Unit (see Enlargement)
CfP	Call for Proposals
CIB	Comprehensive Institution Building Programme
CMU	Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
CPA	Cooperation & Partnership Agreement
CS	Commission Services
CSP	Country Strategy Papers
CTM	Common Twinning Manual (September 2009 Revision)
CV	Curriculum Vitae
C&V	Communication & Visibility
DAC	Development Assistance Criteria
DCFTA	Deep & Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DCP	Division de la Concurrence et des Prix (Maroc) – Division for Competition & Prices (Morocco)
DQSM	Division pour la Qualité et la Surveillance du Marché (Maroc) – Division for Quality & Market Surveillance (Morocco)

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<sup>1</sup> The “Acquis Communautaire” is the accumulated legislation, legal acts, court decisions which constitute the body of European Union law. The term is French: *acquis* meaning “that which has been acquired”, and *communautaire* meaning “of the community”. It is now known as “Acquis of the European Union”, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 9<sup>th</sup>, 2009.

EaP	Eastern Partnership
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENP	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESA	European System of Integrated Economic Accounts
ETA	Egyptian Tourist Authority
EU	European Union
EUD	Delegation of the European Union
EuropeAid	European Development Cooperation Office
FA	Financing Agreement
FEZ	Free-Exchange Zone
FIIAPP	International Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies
FLD	Forensic Laboratories Department
FLP	Focal Point
FM	Financing Memorandum
FP	Financing Proposal
FWC	Framework Contract
GAFI	General Authority for Investment & Free Economic Zones
GIS	Geographic Information System
GIZ (ex-GTZ)	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German International Cooperation Agency)
IB	Institution Building
INTOSAI	International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession
IRP	Institutional Reform Plan (CIB)
ITTO	Implementation of Twinning and TAIEX Operations (Azerbaijan)
ITTSO	Implementation of Twinning, TAIEX & SIGMA Operations (Azerbaijan)
JC	Judgement Criterion
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LF	Logical Framework
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MCSDU	Main Civil Service Department of Ukraine (since end-2011, National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service or NAUCS)
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MED	Ministry of Economic Development (Azerbaijan)
MEDA	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Programme (Barcelona 1995) <sup>2</sup>
MinFin	Ministry of Finance
MPCI	Ministère de la Planification & de la Coopération Internationale (Tunisie) – Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (Tunisia)
MR	Monitoring Report
MS	Member State
MSA	Member State Administration

<sup>2</sup> Acronym of “Mesures D’Ajustement” (in English: “adjustment measures”). MEDA was the EU financial instrument (1995-2006) for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the establishment of a free exchange zone. It was replaced by the ENPI in 2007.

MSAD	Ministry of State for Administrative Development
MS PL	Member State Project Leader
NAP	National Action Programme
NAUCS	National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service (known as the MCSDU before end-2011)
NCP	National Contact Point
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NPO	National Project Officer
NPR	National Programme Representative
OECD	Organisation for European Cooperation and Development
OO	Overall Objective
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PAO	Project Administration Office
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PCA	Partnership & Cooperation Agreement
PCAM	Programme d'Appui à la Compétitivité des Entreprises et à l'Amélioration de l'Accès aux Marchés (Tunisie) – Enterprise Competitiveness and Market Access Facilitation Support Programme (Tunisia)
PDS	Project Definition Sheet (SIGMA)
P3A	Programme d'appui à la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord d'Association – (Association Agreement Implementation Support Programme) – Support to the Association Agreement Programmes (SAAP)
PHARE	Eastern European Countries Programme for EU accession <sup>3</sup>
PM	Prime Minister
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PSD	Public Security Department (Jordan)
PSRP	Public Sector Reform programme
RSP	Recovery Support Programme (Tunisia) – Programme d'Appui à la Relance (Tunisie)
RTA	Resident Twinning Adviser
SAAP <sup>4</sup>	Support to the Association Agreement Programmes
SAPP	Support to the Action Plan Programme
SAI	Supreme Audit Institutions
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SAUID	State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Development
SAUII	State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Innovation
SC	Steering Committee
SCFWCA	State Committee for Family, Women and Children Affaires
SG	Steering Group
SIGMA	Support for Improvement in Governance & Management
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SPS	Sanitary & Phyto-Sanitary
SPSP	Sector Policy Support Programme

<sup>3</sup> PHARE is a French acronym that stands for “Poland-Hungary – Aid to Economic Reconstruction”

<sup>4</sup> Programmes for the Implementation of the Association Agreements. The French acronym for SAAP is P3A, which stands for “Programme d'Appui à la Mise en Œuvre de l'Accord d'Association”. Only ENP-South countries have signed an SAAP with the EU (See Common Twinning Manual – Table 1.2 – p.13). Within the ENP, they are now known as “Support to the ENP Action Plans”.

SSC	State Statistics Committee (Azerbaijan)
STE	Short-Term Expert
TA	Technical Assistance
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
TAIEX	Technical Assistance & Information Exchange
TAM	Turn Around Management Programme
TIR	Transports Internationaux Routiers – International Road Transport
TM	Task Manager
TORs	Terms of Reference
UAP	Unité d'Administration des Projets (Project Administration Unit or PAO)
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UGP	Unité de Gestion de Programme (French equivalent of PAO)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSJ	Ukraine's National School of Judges
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WBG	World Bank Group
WCO	World Customs Organisation
WP	Work Plan

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The purpose of this Evaluation is “to assess the past and current implementation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Region” and to estimate to what extent it contributes to the ENP’s overall objectives and to the beneficiary countries’ institutional modernisation effort and public administration reform conducted within the framework of their respective bilateral agreements with the European Union.

Together with this, the Evaluation focuses on key recommendations, lessons learnt and best practices for the design, management and implementation of the next Twinning programming cycle in the ENP Region. Moreover, special attention has also been drawn to the coherence/complementarity of Twinning with other institutional capacity building tools, more particularly the European-Commission (EC)-funded TAIEX and SIGMA, and to the added value of the Union intervention.

### **Background**

The ENP aims to forge closer ties with countries to the South and the East of the enlarged EU without necessarily offering them a membership perspective. In 2007, the Commission introduced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, also known as ENPI, as a comprehensive new fund to promote cooperation in the ENP Region and to replace the MEDA and TACIS external programmes. As a result, the acceding country (Croatia), the current candidate countries (Iceland, Turkey, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and the potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) have been included in the separate IPA instrument.

The ENP Region consists of 16 partner countries, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, the Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territory for ENP-South (ex-MEDA), and Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan for ENP-East (ex-TACIS). The historical, geographical, economic and political context, as well as the public governance systems effective in the ENP-East and ENP-South countries are not of the same nature and should therefore be differentiated. This evaluation covers a well-balanced sample of 18+2 both completed and ongoing twinning projects<sup>5</sup> in 6 ENP countries where the Twinning Instrument has been most advanced, namely Ukraine and Azerbaijan in the ENP-East and Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in the ENP-South.

Through these privileged relationships, the EU seeks to promote greater economic development, stronger stability and better governance in its new neighbourhood by fostering democracy and economic development, by facilitating free movement and trade and by bringing domestic legislation closer to EU practices, directives and standards.

The ENP builds upon existing bilateral agreements between the EU and each neighbour partner: Cooperation & Partnership Agreements (CPAs) for Eastern European Partners or Association Agreements (AAs) for Mediterranean Partners. These Agreements have been concluded with 13 of the 16 ENP partner countries (there are no such agreements in force with Belarus, Libya and Syria).

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<sup>5</sup> Projects were selected to cover all twinning areas to the largest possible extent. Another 2 projects were added to the 18 projects initially selected. The full project sample can be found in the Methodology.

The bilateral Action Plans between the EU and each ENP partner country are the core basis for implementing the AAs and CPAs within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). All the countries where twinning has been introduced have so far adopted an ENP Action Plan or an equivalent document (Association Agenda or Road Map).

### **Institutional Twinning Instrument**

Initiated within the EU enlargement context in 1998, the Twinning Instrument was extended progressively to the ENP Region from 2004 onwards in order to provide a workable model framework for closer cooperation between public administrations and semi-public organisations in the EU Member States and their counterparts in the beneficiary countries. In fact, twinning projects are now increasingly used as a tool for achieving the objectives of the AAs and CPAs in accordance with the Action Plans. Their fundamental function is related to EU Acquis approximation and capacity building rather than EU Acquis transfer. Indeed, the ENP remains distinct from the enlargement process, as the approximation process is carried out on a voluntary basis.

As a main feature, in addition to necessarily involving structural reform elements – Twinning is expected to solve systemic, not conjuncture-related, problems –, Twinning projects set out to deliver specific and guaranteed results, also referred to as “mandatory results”, rather than to foster general co-operation and deliver technical assistance. The parties jointly adopt a detailed work programme in order to fulfil an objective related to one or more priority areas set out in the Action Plans.

### **The Evaluation**

The Evaluation covers the Twinning Instrument from its inception in the Region in 2004 to May 31<sup>st</sup> 2011, the cut-off date for the Final Report. After **8 years’ implementation, 175 twinning projects were launched in 12 neighbouring countries<sup>6</sup> with an overall budget of roughly € 160 million**. Consequently, time is now up to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the Twinning Instrument in the Region.

This global evaluation of the ENP Twinning Instrument is fully consistent with the Joint Evaluation Unit’s Methodological Guidelines for EU External Assistance applied to “project and programme evaluation”. It is result-oriented and issues substantiated conclusions and horizontal and targeted recommendations to the line stakeholders, helps develop Lessons Learnt and Best Practices that will eventually contribute to improving current and further development of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability (5 DAC criteria), to which are added “coherence/complementarity” and “EC value added” (2 EC policy criteria).

Moreover, cross-cutting and other horizontal issues, such as Decentralised vs. Centralised Management and Communication and Visibility aspects of the Twinning Instrument, are taken into account as part of the EC intervention.

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<sup>6</sup> Namely Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco

## Methodology

For the purpose of this evaluation, 6 ENP countries and 20 (18 + 2) twinning projects (i.e. 3 projects per country plus another 2 projects) in three different sectors have been selected into as consistent and representative a sample as possible. It includes Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco as ENP countries with consolidated twinning experience. The Finance, Trade & Industry, and Justice & Home Affairs sectors have been selected as they account for just over 50% of the total twinning budget in the entire ENP Region. Another two projects (regional development and tourism) in non-priority sectors have been selected to raise the question of their relevance to the Twinning Instrument.

The evaluation methodology consists of 4 key stages, including: Inception, Desk Research, Field Missions and the (Draft) Final Report. The main instrument underpinning the evaluation consists of “**10 Evaluation Questions**” that are related to one or several evaluation criteria and focus on a limited number of key issues, as follows:

1. To what extent have the intervention logic, strategy and approach contributed adequately to the results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region?
2. To what extent have the twinning activities achieved the twinning mandatory results in the ENP Region?
3. To what extent have the twinning activities been delivered adequately to the ENP Region’s beneficiary institutions?
4. To what extent have twinning activities contributed to capacity building, legal approximation (EU Acquis) and institutional modernisation in the ENP Region?
5. To what extent are the results achieved by twinning activities likely to survive individual twinning project completion? Are those results still operative after project completion?
6. To what extent have the twinning activities implemented under the Institutional Twinning Instrument been complementary with TAIEX and SIGMA and coherent with other institutional building instruments funded by the EU and other multi- and bilateral donors?
7. To what extent has the EU twinning intervention contributed successfully to a beneficiary’s institutional building effort?
8. To what extent has institutional twinning contributed to improving cross-cutting issues in the ENP Region?
9. To what extent has *decentralised vs. centralised management* of twinning activities contributed to the quality of results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region?
10. To what extent have the communication & visibility activities promoted the Institutional Twinning Instrument across the ENP Region and thus contributed to the achievements of twinning activities in the Region?

For each evaluation question (EQ) supported by a specific rationale, several indicative judgement criteria have been proposed. Later on in the evaluation process, i.e. during the Desk Phase, proper indicators were designed and fine-tuned against the indicative judgement criteria, which in turn provided further ground for the definition of data collection methods and analysis.

The data collection and analysis progressed as follows:

1. In-depth review and analysis of the twinning project documents received from EuropeAid. Preliminary conclusions were drawn and verified.
2. Preparation of a reference questionnaire based upon the judgment criteria. Preparation of targeted evaluation questionnaires based upon the reference questionnaire to collect further information from the selected stakeholders either by phone or during the scheduled face-to-face interviews (field missions). Anticipated use of the triangulation method for reconciling and validating the preliminary results into solid findings.
3. Relevant information was collected through 151 twinning project documents and 61 questionnaires. The Desk Report, complemented by the Field Note at a later stage, presented the preliminary results, conclusions and findings.
4. Field missions were organised to the six countries for face-to-face interviews during which the data already collected was fine-tuned. Field missions took place from early April to end of June for an average duration of one week per country.
5. On the basis of the data collected during the Desk Report phase and field missions, the Evaluation Team submitted to EuropeAid their early findings, conclusions and recommendations, which were presented to the NCP Meeting in Brussels on 16-17 June 2011. Besides, a Field Note was prepared separately and submitted to EuropeAid and the Reference Group.

The present (draft) Final Report focuses more particularly on data analysis, findings and conclusions and formulates several key recommendations for improving the implementation and extension of the Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region over the next few years.

### **Data Analysis and Twinning Performance**

**The main conclusion of our evaluation is that overall the Twinning Instrument's extension to the ENP Region has been successful.** The results achieved against those initially sought have been significant and relevant within the framework of the Instrument's and the ENP Region's context. But there is room for improvement in the near future.

- The vast majority of results achieved through project implementation are very *relevant* against project objectives and the ENP. Only a few of them did not correspond to that format, given that the demand-driven approach was too systematically and too widely applied and sometimes all the expected results could not be achieved at all.
- Twinning has proved to be an extremely *effective* instrument, more effective than other types of project, more particularly with the required achievement of mandatory results and the way to achieve them. That is a very important point of this evaluation. This *effectiveness* is strengthened insofar as the BA's absorption capacity is high.
- However, one of our findings has been that the means/resources allocated have not always been used optimally by a large number of projects and therefore those projects do not always have the necessary *efficiency*. More particularly, we have often noted a distortion between the resources mobilised and results, which could have been achieved more economically. That has been verified in the case of expertise when it was reallocated to other activities and also, above all, in the case of funding where savings could have been made. We have also noted the high cost of the project preparation phase, i.e. all stages from project idea to contract signature, which can

take up to 2 years. Nevertheless, we have also noted the effort made to reduce this period.

- Most projects have had a relevant and irreversible *impact* in terms of results, effects on the institution-building process, modifications to the legal framework and approximation with EU values, norms, standards and practices. However, that *impact* may be considered as variable and even unsatisfactory in a few cases, when a BA's institutional capacity has been insufficient, when the necessary legal framework has not been put in place and also when the planned results are materially neither achievable, nor feasible.
- The same can be said about the *sustainability* of achieved results. Moreover, the more significant the impact is, the more that impact affects *sustainability*. The results sought on twinning projects are related to fundamental values pertaining to the rule of law in the ENP Countries by affecting the legal framework and the institutional reform process, which can only be relevant and also, in the long term, irreversible. Subject to the points stated under *impact*, the effects/results generated by twinning projects can most often be *sustainable*, as twinning projects aim to convey and/or strengthen standards, practices, laws and institutional capacity for long-term purposes and irreversible changes.
- In the majority of cases, *coherence* and *complementarity* between Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA, the three institutional capacity building tools, are adequately guaranteed, although Twinning and TAIEX may sometimes have been mixed up by beneficiaries, mostly at the preparation stage of the twinning cycle. *Coherence* and *complementarity* are weaker in relation to projects funded by other donors. Moreover, several line stakeholders, more particularly beneficiaries, still mix up Twinning with classical Technical Assistance.
- All direct beneficiaries have acknowledged their overall satisfaction with EU-Funded Institutional Building tools, especially the Twinning Instrument. This is also the opinion of the Evaluators. *European Union Added Value* provided by all twinning projects contributed effectively to the institutional capacity building, civil service modernisation and/or legal approximation effort in the ENP Region. The results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region must be considered as integral part, even a master piece, of the overall benefits generated by the EU Cooperation Programmes to the Region.

## Findings and Conclusions

*The main findings and conclusions based upon data analysis are the following:*

- Twinning is a unique and extremely valuable instrument
- The quality of EU MS expertise is highly appreciated across the ENP Region
- ENP Country nationals, civil servants and senior officials have not been informed sufficiently of the existence and objectives of the Twinning Instrument
- Twinning management and procedures must be simplified and be more flexible
- All stakeholders have high expectations about Study Tours

- No major overlap has been noticed between Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA. Real complementarity between the 3 instruments has been ensured. No major coordination issue between EU-funded instruments and other donors' programmes has been raised
- A majority of beneficiaries still mix up Twinning with classical Technical Assistance
- The demand-driven approach has been applied in all ENP countries. However, this approach better responded to instant needs identified by beneficiaries rather than to Acquis-related objectives. The demand-driven approach should ideally continue to prevail, but this time from a more strategic (or sectoral) perspective
- Twinning projects have been successful when they responded to needs identified by the Beneficiary Administrations (BAs); when they were feasible and focused just on a few specific issues; when BAs had sufficient absorption capacity and demonstrated a level of commitment to mandatory results; and also when the quality of EU MS expertise was high.
- The local, administrative and political context has had a tremendous influence on the outcome of twinning projects
- Twinning success or failure rests upon the central role played in each country by PAOs/UGPs and RTAs, even if the role played by PAOs/UGPs is different in ENP-South (decentralised management mode) and ENP-East (centralised management mode).

## 8 Priority Recommendations

Even though overall the Twinning Instrument's introduction into the ENP Region has been successful, there is still room for improvement, however, so as to consolidate the existing mechanism and continue its extension while ever better and greater performance is sought. There are 8 main recommendations that have been classified by priority, as follows:

- Keep the demand-driven approach and now, above all, combine it with a global and coherent **strategic approach** associated with a policy with clear objectives and priorities, founded on the AAs, CPAs or even the CIBs (ENP-East).
- Revise and **extend the reference to the EU Acquis**, which is an accession-oriented term poorly adapted to the ENP context.
- Reconsider and adapt the concept/**definition of Twinning** to the ENP context so that it can best fulfil its aims.
- Better **involve political decision-makers** in the twinning process. Without their active support, a number of twinning projects could not achieve the planned results and were not integrated into a public administrative reform process.
- Improve the **feasibility** of results sought in terms of impact and sustainability. In other words, never impose unrealistic or unlikely results upon twinning activities against too far-reaching assumptions and risks. Moreover, it is better to develop the BA's institutional capacity (absorption capacity) through a preparatory project first (classical TA, FWC, TAIEX, SIGMA), before they are asked to achieve, by means of a twinning project, more fundamental results related to the EU fundamental principles and approximation/harmonisation process.

- Strengthen the *governance* of twinning projects, more particularly that of PAOs/UGPs, which play a central role in the Twinning Instrument's implementation.
- Although already excellent, *strengthen EU MS expertise*, not technically, but rather in terms of project management and communication skills.
- Proceed to the *revision of twinning rules and procedures* towards greater simplification, better efficiency and stronger adaptation to the ENP context. The recommendation is also to revert to the Twinning Instrument's original values, to be differentiated from a "technical assistance contract".

The Evaluators are confident that the Twinning Instrument's capacity will continue to improve and its performance grow against the objectives and results expected within the ENP framework.

## MAP OF THE ENP REGION

“If you don’t know where you’re going, how will you ever know if you got there?”

**EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY**  
**16 ENP Partner Countries**

**ENP-East**

- Belarus
- Ukraine
- Moldova
- Georgia
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan

**ENP-South**

- Syria
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Israel
- Palestinian Territories
- Egypt
- Libya
- Tunisia
- Algeria
- Morocco

**TWINNING**

## **1. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

### **1.1 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

The purpose of this assignment is to evaluate the Institutional Twinning Instrument implemented in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Region. Institutional twinning projects have been introduced into the ENP region since 2004. At the very beginning they were financed under MEDA – now ENP-South – and under TACIS – now ENP-East. Overall, twinning projects are still on-going or have been completed in the following ENP countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine.

The main objective of the present Evaluation is to assess to what extent the Institutional Twinning Instrument contributes to the overall objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy and to the beneficiary countries' institutional modernisation effort and public administration reforms conducted within the framework of their respective Association Agreements (AA(s) for ENP-South countries) and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA(s) for ENP-East countries) with the European Union.

At the same time, this evaluation also identifies key recommendations, lessons learnt and best practices in terms of design, management and implementation for the Twinning Instrument's next programming cycle in the ENP Region. Moreover, special attention will also be drawn to the coherence/complementarity of Twinning with other EC-funded instruments, more particularly TAIEX and SIGMA, and to the added value of the Union intervention.

This evaluation covers the Instrument from its inception in the ENP Region in 2004 to May 31<sup>st</sup> 2011, the cut-off date for this Final Report. To date, 175 twinning projects have been implemented in the ENP countries for an overall amount of minimum € 160 million in 3 main sectors, namely Justice and Home Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Finance, which represent 54% of all twinning project budget. The projects have focused on institutional capacity building, institutional modernisation and legal approximation, more particularly with reference to the EU Acquis.

Twinning projects were introduced in the ENP Region in 2004 and time has come for a global and comprehensive evaluation of the Instrument.

### **1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT**

The Final Report follows on from the *Inception Report*, which covered this Evaluation's approach, data collection methods and analysis and the work programme, and also from the *Desk Report*, whose purpose was to present the Evaluation Team's preliminary results and findings based upon the review of the relevant ENP Twinning documentation and the evaluation questionnaires filled in by the stakeholders. And finally, the Final Report follows on from the *Field Note*, which offered comprehensive feedback on the Evaluation Team's field visits and provides further substantiated evidence on the main findings established at country and regional levels.

The Final Report not only recapitulates all those elements, but also focuses essentially on the Evaluation's analysis and results. Upon EuropeAid's request, it also includes an important section dedicated to the recommendations the Evaluators have put forward in order to

improve the Twinning Instrument's implementation and extension in the entire ENP Region in the near future (phase 2).

This Final Report consists of eight chapters presented fully in accordance with the Terms of Reference (TORs) of this evaluation, more particularly Annex 2 to the TORs:

- Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the evaluation objective and scope as well as the structure of the Final Report.
- Chapter 2 presents the cooperation context, the Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region, the intervention logic and also provides some figures on the financial resources channelled to the ENP Region for the twinning activities.
- Chapter 3 is dedicated to the methodology, data collection method, and representativeness and limitations of this evaluation.
- Chapter 4 presents the context specific to each ENP Country.
- Chapter 5 provides substantiated answers to the 10 evaluation questions.
- Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and findings of the Evaluation based upon 15 main points derived from the evaluation questions.
- Chapter 7 puts forward the recommendations of the evaluation based upon the conclusions and findings presented in Chapter 6.
- Chapter 8 presents the Overall Conclusion of the Final Report.

## **2. GENERAL CONTEXT**

### **2.1 THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY (ENP)**

Given the abundance of EU official documents and comprehensive background information on the subject, only a rather brief overview, highlighting the various elements necessary to fully understand the context and objectives of our Evaluation, will be presented in this section.

Initiated in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) aims to develop and maintain close ties at various levels with the new neighbours to the East and to the South of the enlarged EU. Its overall objective is to bring neighbour countries closer to the European Union through the establishment of a common area of prosperity, stability and security based upon European values, together with increased cooperation relations.

At present, the ENP includes 16 partner countries, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria for ENP-South (ex-MEDA), and Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan for ENP-East (ex-TACIS).

The EU proposes to neighbours a privileged relationship building upon a mutual commitment to common European values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP goes well beyond existing relationships and offers political association and cooperation in three major areas: economic development and trade facilitation, increased mobility within the framework of one of the EU fundamental principles that is “free movement of persons, capital, goods and services”, and support to democracy and public administration reforms in the neighbour countries.

However, the institutional and political context differs, to a large extent, from that, which prevails under EU enlargement, where EU accession is the ultimate goal for candidate countries. The ENP remains distinct from the enlargement process, although it does not presume how and to what extent relations between the EU and ENP countries will develop in accordance with Treaty provisions.

The ENP is by no means an enlargement policy. In the ENP context, each of the EU neighbours has the possibility to work out a bilateral Action Plan with the EU in order to enhance and strengthen its own democratic and human rights reform efforts, to increase its access to the EU single market, to improve the environment and/or step up co-operation with the EU on sectoral issues. They can also expect to receive substantial political, financial and technical assistance. To achieve these objectives calls for developing cooperation with ENP countries, focusing on “EU Acquis approximation”, which includes legal approximation, adoption of modern norms and standards, best practice exposure, democracy and rule of law enhancement, institutional capacity building support, etc.

In 2007, the Commission introduced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) as a comprehensive new fund to promote co-operation in the ENP Region and replace MEDA and TACIS external programmes. All partner countries covered by the ENP are eligible to ENPI funding. In the same year, the Commission put forward concrete

proposals<sup>7</sup> to strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy, focusing on further economic integration, free movement of persons, regional conflicts, political dialogue, sectoral reforms and overall modernisation, in various priority sectors, such as energy, climate change and environment, transport, innovation and research, information society, education and human capital, employment and social development, health, maritime policy, regional policy, financial cooperation and single market.

The ENP builds upon existing bilateral agreements between the EU and each neighbour partner: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) for European Eastern Partners or Association Agreements (AA) for Mediterranean Partners<sup>8</sup>. AAs and PCAs have been concluded with 13 of the 16 ENP partner countries (there are no such agreements in force with Belarus, Libya or Syria yet).

The PCAs should gradually be replaced with Association Agreements. In 2011-2012, negotiations on Association Agreements were well advanced with Ukraine and talks recently started with Moldova. The Council has also been considering draft negotiation directives for Association Agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

AAs were first concluded in the ENP-South. PCAs were signed with ENP-East countries later. These Agreements are bilateral cooperation treaties signed by the European Union and each of the non-EU countries. Areas that are most frequently covered by the agreements include provisions on bilateral political, economic, trade, social, cultural and security issues and also horizontal institutional capacity building. Even if Twinning was more often than not introduced into the ENP Region well after the AAs and PCAs had been adopted, the fact remains that Twinning objectives are very close, or are at least in line with the main items and political views expressed in those agreements (see also Action Plans in the next paragraph), all the more so as Twinning projects are increasingly used as a tool to achieve the objectives of the AAs and PCAs in accordance with the Action Plans.

The bilateral Action Plans between the EU and each ENP partner country are the core basis for implementing the AAs and PCAs within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). All the countries where twinning has been introduced have so far adopted an Action Plan or an equivalent document (Association Agenda or Road Map).

These documents are negotiated with the EU and tailored for each country on the basis of domestic needs, capacities and priorities as well as EU interests. They all put together an agenda for political and economic reform by means of short and medium-term (3-5 years) priorities. They mostly cover political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, sectors (such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) and also bear a human dimension (person-to-person contacts, civil society, education, public health, etc.).

In addition to the AAs and PCAs, two specific instruments must be mentioned, namely the Union for the Mediterranean for ENP-South and the Comprehensive Institution Building Programme (CIB) for ENP-East.

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<sup>7</sup> A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy Brussels, 05/12/2007, COM(2007) 774 final.

<sup>8</sup> All AAs and PCAs can be found at [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/index_en.htm) - see key documents and related links in the top right-hand corner of the page

In July 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched at the Paris Summit to give a new impetus to Euro–Mediterranean relations, thus replacing the Barcelona Process<sup>9</sup>. Priority areas include de-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, alternative energy, civil protection, higher education, business development. The UfM is funded mainly by the ENPI with additional resources. It has an institutional structure, including a co-Presidency, senior officials, Joint Permanent Committees, a Secretariat and a joint permanent assembly known as the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM). The ARLEM ensures the relations with Parliaments, local and regional authorities and their participation in the Euro-Mediterranean political debate.

More recently, within the framework of the new Eastern Partnership<sup>10</sup> (EaP) launched at the Prague Summit of May 2009, the European Union has been developing bilateral Comprehensive Institution-Building (CIB) Programmes individually with each of the five ENP-East partner countries<sup>11</sup>, in order to improve their administrative capacity, including through training, technical assistance and any appropriate innovative measures.

With an overall budget of € 173 million for 2011-2013, the CIB is the EaP framework jointly developed and implemented with each ENP-East partner country to ensure effective institution building of a limited number of core institutions which are central in preparing the ground for, and in implementing, future agreements (AAs, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements or DCFTAs). Priority areas, measures, inputs and funding sources are outlined in the Institutional Reform Plans (IRPs).

Bilateral CIB Memorandums of Understanding were signed with the 5 ENP-East countries, as follows:

- Moldova: 15 May 2010
- Georgia: 2 October 2010
- Ukraine: 14 October 2010
- Armenia: 29 October 2010
- Azerbaijan: 13 January 2011

Therefore, in most cases, given the very recent character of these bilateral documents, the CIBs are still in their very early stages or are still unheard of amongst the institutions of most ENP-East countries.

Bilateral cooperation under the EaP should also provide the foundation for Association Agreements (AAs) between the EU and those ENP-East partner countries willing and able to comply with resulting commitments. AAs should facilitate the establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade areas.

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<sup>9</sup> See [http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm)

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Because Belarus does not have a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and is not in the process of advancing towards an Association Agreement/DCFTA, no full-fledged CIB is planned at this stage. However, limited funding for CIB preparatory measures have been allocated to Belarus for institutional reform, including the preparation for and implementation of a possible future Joint Interim Plan.

Notwithstanding, the ENP remains the Eastern Partnership's core agreement and political framework. It offers a package that entails financial resources (ENPI), the CIBs being part of the respective National Indicative Programmes for 2011-2013, added as a top-up to the previously existing allocations.

## **2.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL TWINNING INSTRUMENT IN THE ENP REGION**

The Twinning Instrument was launched by the European Commission in May 1998 and was conceived as one of the main Institution Building tools within the EU accession process. Twinning aimed to help beneficiary countries develop modern and efficient administrations, including the structures, human resources and management skills needed for implementing the EU Acquis to the same standards as in EU Member States. It was conceived as an instrument for targeted administrative co-operation to assist Candidate Countries (CC) in strengthening their administrative and judicial capacity to implement EU legislation as future EU Member States (MS).

Today, Twinning remains a unique and essential institution building tool in the acceding country (Croatia), in the current candidate countries (Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Iceland) and also in the potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo)<sup>12</sup>.

The Twinning Instrument was introduced into the future ENP-South Region for ex-MEDA countries in 2004, and then was extended to the ENP-East Region for ex-TACIS countries in 2007. To date, over 160 twinning projects have been completed in 12 of the 16 ENP Countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

In the ENP Region, although based upon the same principles as in the Enlargement process, Institutional Twinning does not pursue EU accession as an objective. Its fundamental function is now more closely related to "Acquis approximation" and institutional capacity building than to "Acquis transfer", in accordance with AA and PCA commitments and further reinforcement of AAs.

Also at stake here is the very definition of what a twinning project is and should be, and not what it is not and should not be as described in Section 2.1 to the EU Common Twinning Manual. In fact, the Evaluators are of the opinion that no real, satisfactory definition of Twinning can be found in any EU relevant official document, the elements provided being either incomplete or too restrictive<sup>13</sup>. EU Regulation N° 1638/2006 establishing the ENPI<sup>14</sup> does not contain any explicit reference to the Twinning Instrument in any of its articles, although it mentions "administrative cooperation". Therefore, the Experts point out that the very essence of Twinning has so far not been defined clearly enough both in relevant EU legislation and official reference documents.

Nevertheless, at this stage, it can safely be said that basically Twinning provides a model framework for closer cooperation between MS public administrations and semi-public

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<sup>12</sup> The countries of the Western Balkans are not covered by the ENP. The framework for the EU's relations with these states is the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) implemented through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)

<sup>13</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/technical-assistance/twinning\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/technical-assistance/twinning_en.htm)

<sup>14</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:310:0001:0014:EN:PDF>

organisations and their counterparts in the beneficiary countries. In the ENP Region, Twinning is a privileged instrument for implementing Action Plans in line with the AAs and PCAs.

Also really worth mentioning for evaluation purposes is, in our view, the scope of the Commission's role and involvement in twinning activities at Headquarters or Delegation level. The specific role of the Commission or an EU Delegation in ENPI-funded projects, including twinning, depends on the level of decentralisation achieved within the relevant country.

To date, Twinning in the ENP-South (North Africa and Middle East), with the exception of Israel, is under decentralised management, whereas in the ENP-East Twinning is under centralised management. However, as a result of progressive devolution, the Contracting Authority is now the EU Delegation. After decentralised management is gradually introduced into the ENP-East, the Project Administration Offices (PAOs) will operate as the full-fledged Contracting Authorities<sup>15</sup>.

This variable level of involvement of the Commission Services actually has quite important formal and informal repercussions on the preparation, implementation and management of twinning activities in the ENP countries in terms of commitment, content, flexibility, etc., which will therefore be analysed and assessed under Evaluation Question N°9 hereinafter.

The Commission intends to also gradually introduce decentralised management into the ENP-East, as current talks on Association Agreements with several ENP-East countries indicate and as was already suggested in Section 1.1. Actually, this move is fully consistent with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda of 2005 on Aid Effectiveness, especially in respect of technical assistance and project ownership.

The Common Twinning Manual (Revision – 2009)<sup>16</sup> provides further detailed information on the management structures and organisation under a decentralised or centralised management mode (see Manual Sections 2.6 & 2.7, pp. 20-28).

As a main feature, in addition to necessarily entailing elements of **structural reform** – Twinning is expected to solve systemic, not conjuncture-related, problems –, Twinning projects set out to deliver specific and guaranteed results, which are also referred to as “**mandatory results**”, rather than to produce services (or goods) delivered by technical assistance. The parties, i.e. MSA and BA, jointly adopt a detailed work programme in order to fulfil an objective related to one or more priority areas set out in the Action Plans. Further detailed information on Twinning project components, requirements and design may be found in the Common Twinning Manual (Revision 2009).

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<sup>15</sup> See also the DEVCO Companion to the financial and contractual procedures applicable to external actions financed from the general budget of the European Union. Effective since January 2011, the Companion explains from A to Z the internal financial and contractual procedures to be applied by the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid and EU Delegations. The Companion supersedes the Financial Guide of the EU Budget and about 20 instruction notes on procedural and financial issues.

<sup>16</sup> The Common Twinning Manual can be downloaded from:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/documents/twinning\\_manual\\_2009\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/documents/twinning_manual_2009_en.pdf)

However, generally the contractual relationship between the Commission and the MS in the ENP-East and the PAO and the MS in the ENP-South, with the exception of Israel, has sometimes proved insufficient to achieve the mandatory results in terms of impact and sustainability. Much more is very often needed to help reinforce and secure the political commitment of the beneficiaries.

As a result, the Union for the Mediterranean for ENP-South, the Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) Programmes for ENP-East, new generation agreements, such as the DCFTA (e.g. Ukraine, Morocco) and the Advanced Status (ENP-South – Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) were set up recently (see Section 2.1).

Twinning projects are based upon a number of basic principles and procedures making the instrument unique<sup>17</sup>:

1. As a rule, the beneficiary country (BC) selects its Member State (MS) partner(s) (together with the EUD under centralised management mode)
2. The selected MS partner(s) agree(s) to transfer the requested hands-on public sector expertise available in its home administration to the applicant institution in a given BC. This first and foremost includes the secondment of a full time Resident Twinning Adviser (a public sector official) for at least 12 months
3. Twinning projects must always bring added value to the BC in the form of one or more concrete operational results (*mandatory results*) in connection with the EU Acquis, other EU policies and within the framework of the AP
4. The Twinning partners commit themselves to achieving the mandatory results that have been defined, and do not only confine themselves to the means to achieve those results. At the end of a twinning project, a new or adapted system, process or procedure must function under the sole responsibility and ownership of the BC
5. Twinning is a joint project of a grant nature. It is not a one-way delivery of technical assistance from a MS to a BC. It is a joint process, in which each partner takes on responsibilities. The BC commits itself to undertaking and funding reforms, the MS to accompanying the process for the duration of the project
6. To underpin the credibility of their commitment, the Twinning partners draft a detailed Twinning work plan, before starting work. It may be adapted in the course of its implementation, but it must fix clear benchmarks to allow for close monitoring of progress towards the final result
7. The achievements of a Twinning project (mandatory results) should be maintained as a permanent asset to the BC administration even after the end of the Twinning project implementation. This presupposes inter alia that effective mechanisms are put in place by the BC administration to disseminate and consolidate the results of the project

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<sup>17</sup> See Common Twinning Manual (Revised 2009), p. 12

8. In order to ensure transparency of proceedings and equality of all administrative bidders, the Twinning calls for proposals will only be circulated to the designated National Contact Points in the administrations of Member States

After a twinning project is completed, the BC is expected to have achieved the mandatory results as described in the project fiches. In some cases, however, one Twinning project may not be sufficient to achieve this goal and a series of additional actions (Twinning, Twinning Light or other Institution Building instruments, such as TAIEX or SIGMA) may be required to achieve full compliance with the relevant obligations. However, this by no means reduces the need for each individual project to have defined clear goals and a precise, scheduled and budgeted work plan for their achievement.

Since 1998, beneficiary countries (33 countries, PHARE, MEDA, CARDS, IPA, ENP) have benefited from over 2,000 twinning projects, representing a total funding exceeding € 1 billion. Twinning projects have been evaluated by independent external experts on a regular basis. Some of these evaluation reports can be found on DG Enlargement's webpage dedicated to Twinning:

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financialassistance/institution\\_building/twinning\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financialassistance/institution_building/twinning_en.htm)

The European Court of Auditors has also released a special audit report on Twinning and a subsequent review report. The reports together with the Commission's replies can be found on the website of the Court of Auditors: <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/547539.PDF>

Past and recent outstanding Evaluation Reports are presented below in reverse chronological order:

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TITLE</b>
01/2011	Evaluation of Twinning vs. Technical Assistance – ECORYS
01/2006	Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis. Thematic Evaluation Report of the European Union PHARE Programme – ECOTEC
03/2004	From Pre-Accession to Accession. Thematic Evaluation. Second Generation Twinning – Preliminary Findings. Interim Evaluation of PHARE Support Allocated in 1999 – 2002 and Implemented until November 2003 – EMS Consortium
01/2003	An Evaluation of Completed Twinning Projects. A Report Presented to the National Contact Points -Meeting. Brussels – January 30 <sup>th</sup> /31 <sup>st</sup> , 2003 – EMS Consortium
04/ 2003	PHARE Country Ex-Post Evaluation and Capacity Building. Country Report-Slovakia – EMS Consortium
07/2003	Special Report N° 6/2003 Concerning Twinning as the Main Instrument to Support Institution Building in Candidate Countries Together With the Commission Replies. Court of Auditors.
09/2001	Assessment of the European Union PHARE Programmes. Multi-Country. Thematic Report on Public Administration Reform (Author: OMAS Consortium).

As was substantiated in the above-mentioned EMS “Thematic Report on Second Generation<sup>18</sup> Twinning – Preliminary Findings of March 2004”<sup>19</sup>, the Twinning Instrument has been quite successful as a tool in accompanying the EU Accession process, facilitating the transfer of the *EU Acquis*, also working on legal approximation, providing support to the institutional capacity building and public administration reform effort in the CCs, bringing them to the overall level of EU standards and norms. In the ENP Region, however, Twinning aims to strengthen EU cooperation in roughly the same sectors without pursuing accession as a goal, but a strengthened relationship with the EU.

Therefore, although several evaluations of twinning activities have been conducted separately in ENP countries, this global evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument is the very first of its kind across the entire ENP Region.

### 2.3 TWINNING FIGURES IN THE ENP REGION

As already mentioned, twinning projects were introduced in the ENP Region in 2004, first to the ex-MEDA Countries (ENP-South) and then to the ex-TACIS countries (ENP-East) in 2007. Ever since (as of May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011, the cut-off date for this Report), 175 projects have been launched in 12 ENP countries<sup>20</sup> with an overall budget of roughly 160 million:

- 23% of the twinning budget is dedicated to the Finance sector, 17% to Trade and Industry, 15% to Justice and Home affairs (total 55%)
- In terms of proposals submitted to the ENP Region, the most active Twinning Member States have so far been France (77), Germany (68), Italy (47) and Spain (38).
- 56 projects have been launched in ENP-East and 46 awarded (as at December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2010)
- 89 projects have been launched in ENP-South and 80 awarded
- Morocco, Ukraine and Tunisia are the leading beneficiaries of twinning projects, followed by Jordan, Egypt and Azerbaijan

Consequently, time was up for a comprehensive evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region.

This Final Report aims to assess the Twinning Instrument’s “performance” in the ENP context and issue recommendations, draw lessons learnt and derive best practice for improving and extending the Instrument into the next programming and implementation exercise.


Chart 1 shows the total 175 twinning projects launched by status in the 12 ENP Countries from 2004 to May 2011 (cut-off date of the present evaluation report).

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<sup>18</sup> According to the EMS Thematic Report, First Generation Twinning projects were launched in 1998. Second Generation Twinning projects were launched from 1999 to 2002. More is available here: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial\\_assistance/institution\\_building/dg\\_enlargement\\_report\\_from\\_pre\\_accession\\_to\\_accession\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/institution_building/dg_enlargement_report_from_pre_accession_to_accession_en.pdf)


<sup>19</sup> See more specifically the Thematic Report’s “Executive Summary” and also Cross-Cutting Findings and “Conclusions & Recommendations” respectively in Chapters 3 & 4 to the Report.

<sup>20</sup> ENPI Twinning Pipeline, Data and Figures – December 9<sup>th</sup>, 2010, EuropeAid. **More recent twinning figures are available (updated in 2012).**




**Chart 1 (Source: EuropeAid - June 2011)**

Chart 2 shows the number of twinning projects launched per year in the 12 ENP Countries for 2004-2011.



**Chart 2 (Source: EuropeAid – June 2011)**

Chart 3 shows the sectoral breakdown of twinning projects for 2004-2011.



**Chart 3 (Source EuropeAid – June 2011)**

### 3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS

As suggested in the Joint Evaluation Unit’s Methodological Guidelines, the evaluation process consists of 4 key stages:


- Inception (Report)
- Desk Research (Report)
- Field Missions (Field Note)
- (Draft) Final Report

The main instrument underpinning the evaluation consists of 10 Evaluation Questions that focus on a limited number of key issues. The questions have been worked out according to the 5 OECD-DAC **evaluation criteria**, namely Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability.

Another two criteria used for evaluating EU policies, namely Coherence/Complementarity, and European Union Value Added, have also been considered.

The TORs recommend limiting the number of questions to 10 in order to focus only on key issues related to the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region. We have added three horizontal criteria also essential for the Twinning Instrument’s global evaluation: Cross-Cutting Issues, Centralised vs. Decentralised Management and Communication & Visibility. However, it must be noted that each Evaluation Question may address one or more criteria.

The following diagram shows how the evaluation has been conceived:



### 3.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

For data collection purposes, a **questionnaire**, reflecting the **10 questions** and their related indicative judgement criteria, as recommended in the Joint Evaluation Unit's evaluation guidelines, was prepared and validated by EuropeAid and the Reference Group.

Several judgement criteria have been proposed for each EQ. The judgement criteria were developed during the Inception Phase. The indicators referred to in the Inception Report were designed against those judgement criteria and then turned into sub-questions, which became an integral part of the 10 generic Evaluation Questions. However, in the Evaluation Questionnaire, the indicators were not formally separated from the judgement criteria.

Further detailed information on the Evaluation Questions, their judgement criteria and indicators may be found in Annex 2 to this Report.

For each project under review, the questionnaire has been forwarded to the following 4 key twinning stakeholders:

- Beneficiary Administration (BC Project Leader and/or RTA Counterpart)
- PAO/UGP Project Manager
- EUD Project Manager
- EU MS RTA and/or Project Leader

An introduction letter including all instructions necessary to fill in the questionnaire was also provided to the stakeholders. All these documents were prepared in English, French and Russian (attached in Annexes 4 and 5).

While testing this methodology, the Evaluators noticed that the Twinning concept varied according to the beneficiary stakeholder category under consideration.

For evaluation purposes, the Evaluators have made the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” stakeholders. The above-mentioned “key stakeholders” are those considered as “directly” involved in the twinning process and to whom the evaluation questionnaires were addressed, whereas “non-key” or “indirect” stakeholders are those who are potential beneficiaries, hierarchy-supervisory ministries/administrations, focal points, other ministries or civil servants.

The Evaluators intended to collect information on those non-key stakeholders, mainly in order to establish to what extent Twinning-related information had been received and also to have a better understanding of their perception of the Twinning Instrument.

The questionnaires helped the Evaluators collect the opinions of interviewees (direct stakeholders) on as to what extent Twinning-related information was delivered to non-key stakeholders and what their perception of Twinning was.

Moreover, a few non-key stakeholders were also interviewed at meetings held in beneficiary institutions and even during side meetings. That was the case of several focal points at line ministries (while they were discussing the identification of new projects with their respective PAOs) and also of a few senior beneficiary staff normally in charge of supervising their respective institution's activities, including Twinning.

### 3.3 PROJECT SAMPLING METHOD

The chief criterion considered for selecting this evaluation sample has been to make this sample as representative as possible of all Twinning activities in the ENP Region in terms of country, sector and project. The reason for opting for this approach is that the evaluation will eventually need to extrapolate validated findings to the whole set of countries, sectors and twinning projects across the entire ENP Region, and issue recommendations accordingly.

Therefore, the project sample selected for this evaluation in the ENP countries is based upon the following 5 sub-criteria:

- Geographical diversity
- Maturity level of the Twinning Instrument
- Sector / thematic items
- Twinning projects completed and on going
- Number of twinning projects, size-weight of the Twinning Instrument

For the above reasons, we have considered this sample – **6 countries, 3 sectors, 18+2 projects** – as the most representative possible of all twinning projects in the ENP Region.

The first selection sub-criterion led us to include in the sample those countries where the Twinning Instrument was most advanced, also taking into consideration a fair balance between ENP-East and ENP-South.

As a result, the 6 following countries were selected:

- ENP-East: **Ukraine, Azerbaijan**
- ENP-South: **Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt**

The second sub-criterion led us to select those sectors with the largest number of twinning projects, i.e. not necessarily in each individual country. Therefore, for the sake of homogeneity, we have selected the following sectors in all 6 countries, which account for 54% of the total twinning budget dedicated to the ENP Region (24% in Finance, 17 % Trade and Industry, 13 % in Justice and Home Affairs):

Sector selection:

- **Justice and Home Affairs**
- **Trade and Economy**
- **Finance**

However, it must be noted that Egypt does not have any twinning project in the field of Justice & Home Affairs. Therefore, the Evaluation Team selected a twinning project pertaining to the Environment sector. This project may also be relevant from a cross-cutting issue perspective.

The third sub-criterion led us to select twinning projects that were completed quite recently, or with at least one year into their implementation phase:

Project selection:

- **18 projects selected**
- **3 per country**

➤ **2 additional projects**

At EuropeAid's request, the Evaluators included in the sample another two projects on Regional Development (Morocco) and Tourism (Egypt), since EuropeAid expressed serious concerns over the relevance of these projects to the Twinning Instrument's scope, eligibility and selection approach.

The Evaluators were also requested to pay particular attention to the already selected Parliament project in Azerbaijan exactly for the same reasons. The full list of the 20 (18+2) selected projects is presented below. For further detailed information on project titles, duration, budgets, etc, see Annex 3 to this Report and also refer to the Twinning Thesaurus 2010.

**ENP-East - Selected Projects**

**UKRAINE**

- 1) Support to the School of Judges of Ukraine
- 2) Capacity Building to the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine (NAAU)
- 3) Enhancing the State Agency of Ukraine for Investment & Development (SAUID)

**AZERBAIJAN**

- 1) Support to the State Statistics Committee (SSC)
- 2) Support to the State Committee on Standardisation, Metrology & Patents
- 3) Support to the Parliament (legal approximation with the EU)

**ENP-South - Selected Projects**

**MOROCCO**

- 1) Standardisation and Promotion of Quality (DQSM)
- 2) Facilitation of Foreign Trade Procedures for Morocco's Customs Administration
- 3) Capacity Building for Morocco's Competition Authorities
- 4) Capacity Building for the Oriental Agency

**JORDAN**

- 1) Support to the Customs Department
- 2) Institutional Strengthening of the Audit Bureau
- 3) Strengthening the Public Security Directorate (PSD) in the Fight against Terrorism & Organised Crime

**EGYPT**

- 1) Institutional Capacity Building for CAPMAS (Statistics)
- 2) Institutional Strengthening of General Authority for Foreign Investment (GAFI)
- 3) Institutional Strengthening for the Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA)

- 4) Water Quality Management Capacity for the Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation (MWRI)

#### **TUNISIA**

- 1) Capacity Strengthening of the Administrative Court (Twinning Light)
- 2) Agreements on Conformity Assessment & Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA)
- 3) Modernisation of the State Tax Service (Ministry of Finance)

### **3.4 DATA COLLECTION METHOD**

Three main sources of information were available to gather relevant data on the Twinning Instrument:

- Twinning documents
- Filled-in evaluation questionnaires
- Interviews of direct stakeholders

Twinning documents: in addition to the Twinning Thesaurus, the Evaluators received from EuropeAid a considerable number of documents related to the twinning projects selected for this evaluation. These documents were forwarded mainly by e-mails during the first two months after the kickoff meeting.

Examination of these documents was critical to have a clear understanding of the current status and situation of the twinning projects selected for this evaluation. For each project, this documentation included the Twinning Fiche, the Twinning Contract, the Inception Report (if any), Quarterly Reports, Interim and Final Reports, as well as Monitoring Reports (when available).

During the Field Phase, in addition to the later questionnaires, the Evaluators also collected missing documents on twinning projects. Our library now consists of 151 files on twinning projects representing 158.78 Mo, which is more than sufficient to make our analysis consistent and reliable. The breakdown of received documents per ENP Country is the following:

<b>Documents</b>	<b>Space Mb</b>	<b>number of files</b>
Azerbaijan	17.72	33
Egypt	10.34	10
Jordan	22.27	14
Morocco	49.17	43
Tunisia	22.97	28
Ukraine	36.31	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>158.78</b>	<b>151</b>

Evaluation Questionnaires: the questionnaire was the main tool for collecting data on selected projects and for obtaining focused information relevant to this evaluation's objectives. These questionnaires were not so easy to fill in and the Evaluation Team indicated in the

introduction letter that several questions were addressed only to specific categories of stakeholders and therefore should not be answered by all respondents.

The overall quality of the answers was very high for this evaluation. Out of the 80 questionnaires sent out to the direct stakeholders (i.e. 20 projects x 4 questionnaires per project), 61 were filled in and returned to the Evaluators. 76% of the returned questionnaires can be considered satisfactory and thus representative of all the selected projects. This also clearly indicates the rather high level of commitment and interest demonstrated by the stakeholders to this evaluation.

<b>Questionnaires</b>		
	<b>Space Mb</b>	<b>Number of Files</b>
Azerbaijan	3.38	11
Egypt	1.16	9
Jordan	1.73	9
Morocco	2.13	13
Tunisia	1.43	8
Ukraine	2.49	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.32</b>	<b>61</b>

It was particularly difficult to obtain timely and relevant feedback from those RTAs who had been involved in projects already completed and also, in a few cases, from their Counterparts who had been appointed to other positions after project completion. A full list of the questionnaires both returned and left unanswered is attached in Annex 3 to this Report. The questionnaires have been sorted out by country, sector and category of stakeholder.

The last point “Interview of Stakeholders” was developed further in the Field Note. However, the field interviews focused essentially on the Twinning Instrument itself and far less on the project sample. In accordance with the ToRs, the interviews were meant mostly to validate the work already carried out during the Desk Phase rather than to gather any additional significant information. In this spirit, fieldwork was undertaken on the basis of the methodology described earlier in the Inception and Desk Reports and approved by EuropeAid.

The Field Phase consisted of a number of interviews that were conducted (from 3<sup>rd</sup> April to 28<sup>th</sup> May 2011) by the Evaluation Team with the main direct stakeholders in the 6 selected countries, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. This formal interview process was the main methodological tool used for confirming and/or fine-tuning the findings already established during the desk phase.

Whereas the evaluation questionnaires used for the desk phase consisted of a rather exhaustive list of closed and open questions as well as numerical questions on individual projects, the field interviews essentially addressed far more global issues relating to the EU Institutional Twinning Instrument’s implementation, achievements and perception in each of the 6 countries.

The field interviews were based upon 15 key thematic points that were derived directly from the Desk Phase's early findings to serve as face-to-face interview guide for the discussions planned with stakeholders, as follows:

- 1) Demand-driven approach
- 2) Extent of beneficiary institution involvement
- 3) Quality of the Twinning Instrument's management system
- 4) Twinning as a tool for implementing the Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans
- 5) The Twinning Instrument's objectives
- 6) Sectoral approach - EU Acquis approximation - Institutional capacity building
- 7) Results effectively achieved vs. mandatory results
- 8) Absorption capacity
- 9) Impact and sustainability of achieved results
- 10) Quality of EU Member States' interventions
- 11) Complementarity of twinning activities with other external institutional capacity building interventions, such as TAIEX & SIGMA
- 12) Twinning or Technical Assistance, which is most appropriate?
- 13) Appropriate use of funding and other resources allocated to twinning activities
- 14) Information, communication & visibility actions supporting twinning activities
- 15) Relationship and complementarity of cross-cutting issues with the Twinning Instrument's objectives

These points are comprehensively substantiated in this Final Report in light of all the findings obtained from the ENP Region's 20 twinning projects under review. This analysis has in turn led to the formulation of a number of *recommendations*, *lessons learnt* and *best practices* aiming to improve the Institutional Twinning Instrument's performance across the ENP Region. These recommendations, lessons learnt and best practices are presented in detail in the Final Report.

### **3.5 REPRESENTATIVENESS AND LIMITS OF THE ANALYSIS**

This evaluation aimed to provide as representative as possible a sample of the countries, sectors and projects as possible.

The limits of the analysis are closely related to the quantity and quality of the information and data collected through the evaluation questionnaires and ensuing field interviews with the direct stakeholders, including EUD Twinning Contact Points and Project/Sector Managers, PAO/UGP Directors and Project Managers, various BA staff, i.e. Senior Officials, RTA Counterparts and BC Project Leaders (BC PLs), and, whenever possible, MS RTAs and/or their Project Leaders.

However, in this respect, it must also be noted cooperation between the European Union and the ENP Region is part of a far broader relationship involving an active political and policy dialogue through diplomatic channels and also the structures established by the Association Agreements and Cooperation and Partnership Agreements.

#### **4. BRIEF SPECIFIC CONTEXT PER SELECTED ENP COUNTRY**

Immediately perceptible was the great influence of the local political and administrative context on the Twinning Instrument's positioning and project implementation with each direct beneficiary in the 6 countries of ENP-East and ENP-South.

That is also why it was appropriate to carry out a country-based analysis that, each time, raised new country-specific issues, which could find their origin and be identified only in the various individual local contexts.

Therefore this section provides a brief overview of the specific context in each of the 6 ENP Countries selected for this evaluation. This overview is presented according to the chronological order of the field visits, as follows:

- Ukraine: 3 – 8 April 2011
- Morocco: 14 – 19 April 2011
- Jordan: 21 – 30 April 2011
- Azerbaijan: 2 – 8 May 2011
- Egypt: 11 – 19 May 2011
- Tunisia: 23 – 28 May 2011

##### **4.1 UKRAINE**

###### **Country Overview**

The Ukrainian government has long been one of the largest in Europe and has often been criticised even by its own members for duplication of functions and a lack of responsibility. However, on December 9<sup>th</sup> 2010, Ukraine's President signed a decree<sup>21</sup> launching a large-scale comprehensive public administration reform process aiming to reorganise Ukraine's central and local executive bodies and cut the number of civil servants by 30%.

As a result, six types of central executive agencies have been defined, including ministries, services, inspections, agencies, independent regulators and agencies with special status. The reform also provides for significant changes to the structure of executive agencies and significantly reduces the number of central executive bodies from 112 to 63, i.e. 16 ministries (down from 20), 28 services, 12 agencies and 7 inspections. Ukraine's civil service reform started simultaneously.

Overall, this comprehensive administrative reform should reduce budget expenditures and help Ukraine cut budget deficit, one of the key conditions for future cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, as indicated by the EUD, it is also very important to underline that this reform disrupted the administration's functioning, as an ad-hoc evaluation revealed.

EU-Ukraine relations are still based upon the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force in 1998 for an initial period of ten years, and on the EU's Common Strategy of 1999, which originally covered four years, but was extended until December 2004.

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<sup>21</sup> Decree N°1085/2010 "On Optimising the system of central Executive Authorities"

A Protocol to the PCA was signed by the EU and Ukraine on March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2004, to extend the application of the agreement in full to the ten new EU Member States from May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004. The EU considers Ukraine as a priority partner within the ENP framework. However, although this may change over the next few years, Ukraine is not being regarded as a country in line for EU membership at the moment.

The CIB Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Ukraine was signed in October 2010 and € 43.5 million have been earmarked for 2011-2013 and will be dedicated to the following priority areas: steering and implementation process for the future EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA); trade: SPS and state aid monitoring; migration; and public administration reform.

As negotiations over the Association Agreement (AAs) started between Ukraine and the EU in 2007, the Association Agenda is now the real basis for cooperation. Ukraine has set up a committee of civil servants to review 200 priorities. 78 top priorities have been selected for 2011-2012 into approx. 10 clusters.

Together with this, the Deep & Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), which is also being negotiated between the EU and Ukraine at the moment, goes well beyond quotas and economic ties. It proposes a lot broader package of measures. However, again recently, Russia attempted to scuttle the free-trade talks between the EU and Ukraine by offering an US\$ 8 billion annual discount on natural gas if it opted instead to join a Russia-led customs union. It is no secret that Ukraine remains politically and socially divided between pro-Russian and pro-Western elements, and also remains an important tool of influence for both sides.

Ukraine has also been recognised not only as a neighbourhood country, but also as a European nation (See Art. 49 to the Treaty of Rome in relation to EC membership).

### **Ukraine and Twinning**

In spite of the reform effort, Ukraine's public institutions are still by and large functioning according to principles inherited from the old Soviet system. Therefore the Twinning Instrument is supposed to offer a great opportunity for Ukraine's civil servants and political elite to open up to the EU Acquis and also start networking with their counterparts across the European Union ("peer-to-peer cooperation approach").

However, it must be noted that twinning activities have so far not been integrated adequately into the public administration reform process initiated end-2010. Senior officials, ministers, legislators and other high-ranking political decision-makers are not fully aware of the Twinning Instrument. As a result, overall institutional commitment to Twinning has generally been inadequate amongst Ukraine's political elite, although it can be argued that direct beneficiaries have usually demonstrated a rather high level of commitment to their individual twinning projects.

Moreover, the reorganisation of the central administration had negative effects on twinning activities in Ukraine in 2011: several twinning projects have been postponed and several calls for proposals suspended.

Another example of a negative effect was that in reducing the number of institutions, ongoing reform led to the absorption of one twinning direct beneficiary by another agency, which caused massive layoffs and also the loss of a great deal of training results that had been achieved under the ongoing twinning project before the merger took place. Consequently, this merger reduced the impact and sustainability of this project considerably. The EUD pointed out that, after the administration reform was launched, civil servants became far less proactive, which then became a very important issue.

In addition, the impact and sustainability of a large number of twinning activities so far implemented in Ukraine may also be seriously compromised by high civil servant turnover.

Although it has well educated and highly committed staff, the PAO has not been in a position to fulfil its role properly for several reasons: lack of technical expertise, lack of senior status and lack of political visibility. As a result, the PAO has not been well integrated into Ukraine's institutional landscape or into the comprehensive public administration reform process.

As is the case with all ENP-East countries, decentralised management is not yet effective in Ukraine.

## **4.2 MOROCCO**

### **Country Overview**

Morocco benefited from decentralised management immediately after the ENP Action Plan was agreed upon in 2004 and adopted in 2005 further to the signature of the Association Agreement with the EU in 1996, which entered into force on March 1st, 2000, and replaces the 1976 Cooperation Agreement.

The DCFTA should be signed between the EU and Morocco in 2012. This is mainly due to the dynamics generated by the Advanced Status. In fact, this Advanced Status does not consist in a signed or ratified agreement. However, it allows Morocco to enter into a new, wider and comprehensive framework.

In one of his speeches on the subject, the King of Morocco stated the following: "The Advanced Status is more than Association and less than EU accession". Only Morocco currently benefits from the Advanced Status across the ENP Region. Tunisia and Jordan have requested the Advanced Status, whereas Israel enjoys a special status.

The Road Map on the Advanced Status establishes that the Twinning Instrument must be recommended as THE tool for institutional capacity building in Morocco. Moreover, recent political decisions made by the King should push Morocco further towards even deeper relations and agreements with the EU and its Member States.

### **Morocco and Twinning**

In selecting and preparing the twinning activities, the PAO refers systematically to the Association Agreement, the Action Plan and the EU Acquis. Morocco has been one of the

first ENP-South countries to get involved in twinning activities in 2004, i.e. two years ahead of ENP-East<sup>22</sup>.

What is remarkable with Twinning in Morocco and worth highlighting is that twinning activities have so far been integrated rather well into the public administration reform and institutional modernisation process. Twinning activities are an integral part of the institutional reform effort. Moreover, ministers and state secretaries are involved in the twinning process from the preparation phase to project completion.

In terms of sustainability, staff turnover has remained low thanks to an attractive promotion system put in place for twinning participants, including BC Project Leaders and RTA Counterparts (Morocco boasts a structural and systemic approach towards human resources in the civil service), and also because Twinning has been integrated adequately, albeit not systematically, into the reform process.

Overall, twinning activities are very well perceived and appreciated in Morocco. Since 2004, thanks to the PAO's great communication work and high degree of involvement and commitment, a real twinning community has progressively and surely emerged in Morocco. Several stakeholders also mentioned that Twinning was the "Ferrari" of all technical assistance and international cooperation programmes for its powerful and well-endowed character. As it enables twinning beneficiaries to acquire within just two or three years new skills and processes that would take much longer if they were to be introduced by the stakeholders with their own resources.

It must be noted that although it is true that Twinning is widely perceived by the respective BAs as an accelerator of reform in ENP countries in general and Morocco in particular, this perception, however, still remains, unanimously limited to internal processes within individual administrations and does not yet fully encompass global domestic/sectoral reform.

Besides, Morocco is also preparing for structural funding management. Cross-border activities are under way and shall be managed by regional (development) agencies, which implies that the Twinning Instrument's scope could be enlarged over time.

### **4.3 JORDAN**

#### **Country Overview**

Jordan was amongst the first Mediterranean partners to embark on new association ties with the EU: negotiations were initiated on 18 July 1995 and completed on 24 November 1997, the date of signature of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement.

This Agreement was subsequently ratified by the European Parliament in July 1998 and the Jordanian Parliament in September 1999. It entered into force on 1 May 2002, and replaces the Co-operation Agreement of 1977. The ENP Action Plan was agreed upon in May 2004 and adopted by the EU and Jordan in early 2005.

In order to facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement, the Support to the Implementation of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement Programme (SAAP-I) was

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<sup>22</sup> The first ENPI-East Twinning project was launched in Ukraine in 2006.

launched in 2002, with the overall objective to assist Jordan in implementing the Agreement requiring legislative and regulatory alignment of policies and regulations in different fields as well as to upgrade the Jordanian institutions to carry out necessary reforms. SAAP-I and II are now closed. SAAP-III is on-going, SAAP-IV is under preparation and SAAP-V and VI are already in the pipeline.

The process of redirecting and strengthening the Mediterranean policy of the European Union led to the concept of an all-embracing Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which in turn provided the framework for the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. However, negotiations over the DCFTA have not yet started between the EU and Jordan.

In 2005, Jordan initiated large-scale reform and sector-based modernisation of its public administration and economy based on the private sector development, including revision of legal framework and actions to support trade, large companies and SME development. The EU has already provided considerable support to this reform process together with other donors. In October 2010, the EU agreed to grant Jordan the Advanced Status. In this context, Twinning has been and continues to be a central component of this support to Jordan's institutional capacity building and modernisation effort.

### **Jordan and Twinning**

Less integrated into Jordan's domestic reform process, Twinning has, however, been taken into account rather adequately in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)'s programming strategy, just like other donors' programmes and instruments.

However, it must be highlighted that transferring the EU Acquis is not part of Jordan's objectives. Therefore mandatory results are very often simply considered ordinary results or classical technical assistance outputs. The PAO has argued that Twinning should be based more on the ENP policy document than on the Acquis because, while being regarded as an excellent benchmark, the Acquis is too remote from Jordan's priorities. The reference to the EU Acquis should not be systematically mandatory, as the Acquis is very useful only for international, global issues, such as certification, normalisation or standardisation. Therefore the PAO's view is now to extend the notion of EU Acquis to overall institutional capacity building, legal framework approximation and modernisation, trade facilitation (EU norms and standards), etc.

The difference between Twinning and classical technical assistance has remained an issue in Jordan as it is not always clear to the beneficiaries.

Although Twinning is high on the political agenda as a serious institutional building tool, politicians are neither really interested, nor involved in the details. Government support to twinning activities has been and remained variable, i.e. adequate for certain sectors, and insufficient for others. It can therefore be argued that there is sometimes a lack of political commitment. At project preparation level (from project idea to contract signature), political decision-makers prefer not to intervene even if, once again, they are very committed to the Twinning Instrument. However, once a twinning contract has been signed, the commitment will be respected. In this sense only, political commitment is high.

The PAO was extremely weak in the beginning and now is extremely strong in its interaction with the stakeholders. The PAO also represents the MOPIC to all sectoral subcommittee meetings.

#### **4.4 AZERBAIJAN**

##### **Country Overview**

As the EU's largest trading partner in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan holds a strategic location between the EU and Central Asia. Azerbaijan benefited from TACIS Technical Assistance from 1991. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Azerbaijan covers co-operation in all non-military areas. The PCA was signed on 22 April 1996, ratified by Azerbaijan on 8 October 1996 and entered into force on 1 July 1999. On 23 November 1999, a Decree of the President of Azerbaijan set up a State Commission on Partnership and Cooperation with EU.

After the PCA was brought into force, several committees, namely the Cooperation Council, the Cooperation Committee, the Sub-committee on trade/investment, the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, were set up to foster EU-Azerbaijan dialogue and exchange of information, supervise the implementation of the Agreement, and examine any major issues related to the PCA and any other bilateral and international issue of mutual interest. The Cooperation Committee consists of members of the Azerbaijani Government, of the Council of the European Union (governments of the EU Member States) and members of the European Commission. Additionally, in the context of the Eastern Partnership, a Summit of Heads of State will be organised on a 2 year basis, the first of which took place in May 2009. The Cooperation Council helps to present EU activities, including the Twinning Instruments and thus contributes to the awareness-raising effort.

In May 2004, the Commission recommended the inclusion of Azerbaijan, along with Armenia and Georgia, into the ENP. The Council approved the recommendation in June 2004. The Commission issued its Comprehensive Country Report on Azerbaijan in March 2005.

Reinforced cooperation through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was initiated with the ENP Action Plan of 2006. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) was set up in 2007 and the new Eastern Partnership in 2009.

Within the framework of the new Eastern Partnership, the CIB will dedicate approximately € 20 million over the next three years to the following priority areas: justice and home affairs, visa facilitation and readmission agreement; trade: WTO accession; and civil service reform. The CIB Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Azerbaijan was signed in January 2011.

However, the CIB is yet to start in Azerbaijan and negotiations over an Association Agreement and the DCFTA are only in their very early stages.

##### **Azerbaijan and Twinning**

Twinning operations in Azerbaijan started at the end of March 2006. Azerbaijan is now the South Caucasus country with the largest number of twinning projects.

Relevant Twinning projects were identified and the Programme Administration Office (PAO) was established at the Ministry of Economic Development (MOED).

The implementation of the Twinning Programme in Azerbaijan is also based upon the priority areas stipulated in the Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013:

- Priority Area 1: Support for Democratic Development and Good Governance:
  - (a) Public administration reform
  - (b) Rule of law and judicial reform
  - (c) Education and science
  
- Priority Area 2: Socio-economic reform (with emphasis on regulatory approximation with the EU Acquis):
  - (a) Sector-specific regulation, including public accounting
  
- Priority Area 3: Legislative and economic reforms in the following sectors:
  - (a) Energy
  - (b) Transport
  - (c) Environment

Overall, Twinning has so far been successful in Azerbaijan and is now preferred to classical Technical Assistance in the field of institutional capacity building. As a result, although not all of them are to be considered eligible, many more requests for twinning projects are submitted by the day. However, the EUD has only been involved in programming since 2010. Therefore the EUD has no records regarding previous data on the number of requests submitted since Twinning's inception.

However, several project objectives and results have at times been overambitious. For example, the twinning project "Strengthening of Standardisation, Metrology, Conformity Assessment and Accreditation in SASMP – Standards Agency of Azerbaijan". One of the project results was *“Completed process of legal approximation and transformation of SASMP activities to a transparent national technical regulations management institutions corresponding to EU horizontal directives covering accreditation, metrology, national standards body, conformity assessment, notifying body, etc.”* For a country that endeavors for the first time to build a modern quality infrastructure framework on the basis of the old Soviet system, the challenge can be considered overambitious indeed.

However, Twinning in Azerbaijan suffers from roughly the same Soviet heritage as in Ukraine: similar competition and distance between political decision-makers, senior officials and beneficiary stakeholders. The situation with the administration is also very similar to Ukraine's (see Ukraine's Country Overview in Section 4.1).

The EUD was officially opened in February 2008, taking over from the Europa House. The devolution process started in November 2009 and has really facilitated programming.

Twinning in Azerbaijan works under centralised mode. However, the PAO is involved in the twinning fiche preparation from the start. One problem, which should hopefully be solved in the near future, has been that the PAO wants to be the exclusive interface with the ITTSO support project, the line ministries and the direct beneficiaries. This has caused delays,

because the translation of twinning fiches and comments from FWC experts were not forwarded to the beneficiary in time or were not forwarded at all.

ITTSO-II (ITTSO-I if considered after ITTO for 2008-2009) was established for two years in September 2009 and will cease functioning in September 2011. It provides TA support to the Azerbaijani Government through the PAO in order to help them make the most of the EU-funded Institution Building (IB) instruments (Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA). ITTSO-III should start in September 2011 (see also footnote 36).

Mandatory Results are not always 100% achieved. In terms of *Mandatory Results*, there is also some contradiction between the fiche requirements and the real situation in the country. Some degree of conditionality<sup>23</sup> may be observed and preserved even as the country is getting wealthier. Careful attention must be paid to this aspect during the project fiche preparation phase.

According to feedback from discussions, long-term impacts seemed to be guaranteed in Azerbaijan. This was probably due to the very nature of the projects under review for this evaluation.

## **4.5 EGYPT**

### **Country Overview**

The EU-Egypt Association Agreement was signed in Luxembourg on June 25<sup>th</sup>, 2001. It was brought into force on June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004. A Protocol adapting the Agreement to the enlarged EU was initialled with the Egyptian authorities on May 11<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

The 6<sup>th</sup> EU-Egypt Association Council took place in Luxembourg in April 2010. During this bilateral conference, it was highlighted that the implementation of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, in force since June 2004, and the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan, in place since March 2007, had made progress, assisted by regular dialogue within the framework of eight sub-committees, a Working Group and an Association Committee that met on a regular basis throughout the year. The ENP Progress Report, which was published in May 2010 summarised progress and outstanding points.

In 2009, the EU endorsed Egypt's request to enhance bilateral relations. The EU and Egypt agreed to set up an informal Ad-Hoc Group to consider means of political dialogue enhancement, to present policy options for strengthening bilateral relations, and to explore opportunities to incorporate the results of those considerations into the ENP Action Plan.

The Ad-Hoc Group met for the first time in Cairo in July 2009 for preliminary discussions. In January 2010 Egypt submitted revised proposals for enhancing political dialogue. These

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<sup>23</sup> In this context, as per World Bank terminology, conditionality - to be differentiated from EU budget support conditionality - refers to the prerequisites and other requirements placed on the use or distribution of financial resources dedicated to another country. Conditionality is most often associated with aid funds. International organisations and/or individual countries may use conditionality when lending money to another country. The donor may require that the beneficiary country implement certain actions and/or adopt certain rules directing the use of funds, even beforehand. Conditionalities can range from the adoption of anti-corruption measures to the implementation of structural adjustment policies. The donor may also require that the funds be used towards a specific project instead of leaving them to the discretion of the beneficiary country.

included the holding of EU-Egypt summits, meetings between the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and his EU counterparts, and meetings between Egyptian Ministers and EU Commissioners on different themes. The Ad-Hoc group met for a second time in February 2010, and the EU responded favourably to almost all the Egyptian proposals.

In March 2010, the EU received further Egyptian updated proposals for the enhancement of relations in fields other than political dialogue. These took into account ideas discussed in different sectoral sub-committee meetings and related to trade and economic relations, agriculture, energy, science and technological cooperation, higher education, and culture. The Ad-Hoc group met for a third time on 21 April for an informal discussion of these proposals, as well as of proposals put forward by the EU.

The EU also reiterated that enhanced relations must be based upon the full implementation of the Action Plan. In this context, further progress in areas related to human rights and democracy is fundamental. The Association Agreement and ENP Action Plan remain the key framework documents guiding the intensification of bilateral relations for the foreseeable future.

However, since the Revolution of January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011, which followed a popular uprising, Egypt has gone through a transition period whose final direction is not yet quite clear.

### **Egypt and Twinning**

The recent Revolution may have been an opportunity to seize as it marks the end of the status quo (e.g. the former regime's patriarchal top-down system). In this transition context, the PAO's role has become difficult to assume in Egypt, even if the Revolution did not have an insuperable negative impact on still on-going twinning projects. Actually, although no new project fiches were launched from 2009 to 2011, on-going project fiche preparation and on-going twinning projects continued during that period. After the Revolution, two new project fiches were launched and awarded in July 2011.

Worth mentioning is the PAO's remarkable effort to operate within the framework of its own improved demand-driven strategy. Therefore, the PAO has worked out an Overall Work Plan for 2010-2016, which has just been finalised for submission to the EUD. It includes a Project ID Form, an Executive Summary, a Technical Plan, a Management Plan (programme staff, financing agreements, timeframes, link between workload and staffing) and a Financial Plan.

Due to the unstable political situation in the country, the PAO decided to be more pro-active in preparing this document, which must now still be discussed with EUD and other stakeholders. Overall, the document looks professional in terms of content and structure, has been prepared in accordance with the National Reform Strategy and has taken into consideration complementarity/coherence with TAIEX and SIGMA. Also noticeable was that the PAO showed a clear maturity and a tendency to work on its own without systematically seeking support and advice from the EUD.

The demand-driven approach was applied very literally, hence several deviations were noticeable e.g. in the field of tourism<sup>24</sup>, where twinning activities were combined with classical technical assistance. A few major components of several projects implemented under Twinning pertained more to classical technical assistance than to Twinning. For

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<sup>24</sup> In fact, this Twinning project in the field of tourism was the first twinning project in Egypt.

example, the project with the Egyptian Tourism Authority delivered activities aiming to promote tourism rather than to strengthen institutional capacity.

Egypt has a very developed administration employing approx. 5 million civil servants. This administration is already familiar with pouring external aid, twinning activities being simply considered as yet another inward technical assistance tool funded by yet another foreign organisation. As a result, Twinning is often mixed up with classical technical assistance.

However, generally speaking the impact of twinning activities has been very high in Egypt as staff turnover remains low. The reason for this is that most civil servants tend to retain their jobs instead of moving e.g. to the private sector, especially in this period of uncertainty.

Another serious challenge now also lying ahead for twinning activities is that about 1 million additional civil servants will be recruited soon to join the total 5 million civil servants already employed by the entire Egyptian administration. This recruitment is part of a strategy supposed to make the achievements of the recent national Revolution sustainable.

The main Lesson Learnt in Egypt has been that a twinning project should never be imposed upon a beneficiary administration with an EU MS partner that this beneficiary does not want, even if the MS partner has been awarded the project by the joint Selection Committee. It was the case with one of the four projects reviewed in Egypt, where the BA clearly preferred that the project be awarded to one specific MS on the basis of previous successful contacts established with that MS partner before the project was conceived. However, the Selection Committee eventually selected another MS partner on a strictly objective basis: this MS partner had submitted a better proposal.

## **4.6 TUNISIA**

### **Country Overview**

Tunisia and Europe have always had close historical and trade ties that date back to the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC when Carthage was a major power competing with the Roman Empire for supremacy in the Mediterranean. Tunisia was also occupied by the Ottoman Empire like other parts of North Africa.

More recently in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Tunisia became a French protectorate till its independence in 1956. However, French influence has not fully disappeared and is even today deeply felt in the organisation of public administration and the judiciary.

Tunisia was the first country in the region to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, in July 1995. The Agreement came into force on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1998, and its application is considered to be overall satisfactory. Under the terms of the agreement, the EU and Tunisia have committed themselves to creating a joint free trade area by 2010. The DCFTA between the EU and Tunisia was signed in 2010.

The ENP Action Plan was agreed upon in 2004 and adopted by the EU and Tunisia in early 2005. This Action Plan is an update of the Association Agreement.

Further to the latest EU enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, Tunisia was about to be granted the “advanced status” of a privileged EU partner in December 2008<sup>25</sup>. On the basis of this (informal) status, the EU and Tunisia may develop closer and deeper political and economic cooperation relations, whose community quasi-convergence has almost been reached.

Notwithstanding the fact that the full set of benefits normally associated with this status has not been granted to Tunisia, essentially because of the authoritarian nature of the regime in place till the Jasmine Revolution of December 2010-January 2011, the Free Trade Area Agreement entered into force in 2008 and applied only to Tunisian industrial goods exported to the EU.

It is true that the degree of integration through the Association Agreement, the ENP and the EuroMed partnership as well as the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement could give the impression that the close relations between both parties could have led to full economic integration into the European Economic Area (EEA).

Obtaining the advanced status was considered as the epitome of this cooperation. However, shortly before the uprising started end 2010, finalising Tunisia’s advanced status by 2012 was high on the agenda.

After the previous regime’s ousting, it was decided that elections to a Constituent Assembly would be held in mid-July 2011, which means that general elections could be postponed to a later date, possibly October 2011. The next election was originally scheduled for 2014.

Today, for fear that the new Tunisian regime could refocus its international relations on the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa, the main challenge facing the EU is that external aid should now be determined by Tunisia’s respect for democratic values without EU direct interference in the country’s internal affairs. Relations between the EU and Tunisia should from now on be governed by this conditionality.

### **Tunisia and Twinning**

Introduced in Tunisia quite early after 2004 and developing strongly ever since, Twinning Activities are defined by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation (MPCI) within the framework of the P3A/SAAP in accordance with the Government’s *Five-Year Development Plan for Tunisia*<sup>26</sup>, which is promulgated as a law and whose application is mandatory for state institutions and agencies and optional for the private sector.

Project management was decentralised, i.e. handed over, to the UGP/PAO, once the Financing Agreement on P3A-I was approved.

The UGP/PAO does not deal directly with the requests submitted by applicants for twinning projects. As part of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MPCI), the UGP/PAO acts in the capacity of executive agency on MPCI’s behalf. Cooperation represents a tool for achieving the *Five-Year Development Plan*, to which adjustments are made by the Economic Budget Department annually, if necessary.

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<sup>25</sup> Not ratified yet.

<sup>26</sup> Namely the Eleventh Development Plan (2007-2011) and the Twelfth Development Plan (2010-2014)

In terms of overall performance, even though already very experienced, Tunisia's PAO/UAP, especially management, should be strengthened through training. Internal quality control should be institutionalised at the PAO. Internal evaluation involving benchmarking methods, the use of implementation checklists, filing techniques and information-sharing are needed. No evaluation has yet addressed this issue after 7 years' implementation.

After intensive discussions with the PAO, the conclusion was drawn that to be successful a twinning project must fulfil the following conditions and qualities:

- BAs must be involved and committed seriously
- Absorption capacity must be real
- BA should be supervised closely by ministerial authority
- Management and follow-up capacities should be real
- Technical implementation capacity should be real (teams should be competent and sufficiently staffed). Some PAOs and EUDs mentioned that Twinning Light projects without RTA participation are usually far more complex, the evaluators do not completely agree with this comment.
- Timing and strategic context must be appropriate in that they lie within the framework of approved institutional reform.
- Twinning activities should be institutionalised in legal texts
- Twinning is a tool for implementing Association Agreements, ENP and domestic reform. However, ENP Action Plans must be revised into real plans for action.

Generally, mandatory results were fulfilled adequately, although several BAs still mix up Twinning with classical technical assistance. However, the Revolution has led to a caveat on the guarantee of mandatory results.

The main Lesson Learnt in Tunisia is that to be successful any twinning project should never consist of more than 3-4 main components. One of the three projects under review included no fewer than 12 components, which was far too ambitious and unrealistic.

Overall, the Twinning Instrument has fallen victim to its own success in Tunisia. Twinning is now expected to respond to each and every need expressed by potential beneficiary administrations and the Instrument tends to increasingly become a panacea for everything as a result.

A 14-page Intervention Strategy for P3A-II was designed by the PAO/UGP before the 2011 events. Its implementation has been extended until December 2014.

## 5. EVALUATION QUESTIONS, DATA ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS

### 5.1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS

This section analyses the data obtained through the evaluation questionnaires. This analysis is also based upon the various interviews that the Evaluators conducted in the 6 ENP Countries selected in the sample.

Each of the EQ relates to one or more evaluation criteria. Each EQ corresponds to a number of Judgement Criteria (JC) that have been defined so that the Evaluators may assess twinning performance against each of those criteria.

The 10 generic Evaluation Questions and their respective Judgement Criteria (JC) and Indicators are presented in tabular format in Annex 2, the questionnaire in Annex 5 together with the justification and coverage of each question.

The following table provides an overview of the 10 Evaluation Questions and related criteria:

EQ N°	CRITERIA
EQ 1	<b>Relevance - Intervention logic, strategy, approach and project preparation/design</b>
EQ 2	<b>Effectiveness, Impact, EU Intervention Added Value, Cross-Cutting Issues</b>
EQ 3	<b>Efficiency (best use of resources)</b>
EQ 4	<b>Impact, Cross-Cutting Issues, Communication &amp; Visibility</b>
EQ 5	<b>Sustainability</b>
EQ 6	<b>Complementarity/coherence with TAIEX, SIGMA and other donors' interventions</b>
EQ 7	<b>Value added of EU twinning interventions in the ENP Region, Impact</b>
EQ 8	<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>
EQ 9	<b>Decentralised vs. centralised management</b>
EQ 10	<b>Communication &amp; Visibility</b>

The next section to the Report covers each of the 10 EQs and corresponding JCs.

The three levels of presentation proposed by the Evaluation Team are as follows:

- A summary of the answer to each Evaluation Question (EQ)
- Detailed findings and analyses upon which each answer is based, with indications of the evaluation criteria and related Judgement Criteria upon which they are based
- The facts upon which the findings are based as fully provided per country in the Field Note's Country Reports.

All interesting aspects pertaining to twinning projects, the Twinning Instrument, its introduction into the ENP Region, its implementation and its performance under very

different conditions and contexts are extensively covered here. The assessment made by the Experts on each of those points is summarised in a separate box. Then a detailed analysis of thematic data is developed in each sub-section.

### 5.1.1 Relevance - Intervention logic, strategy, approach & project preparation /design

**EQ 1:** To what extent have the intervention logic, strategy and approach contributed adequately to the identified issues, global priorities, real needs and/or results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region?

In essence, *Relevance* is the extent to which institutional twinning activities are suited to the priorities and policies of a target group, recipient and donor. However, *Relevance* must be assessed throughout the lifecycle of twinning activities in case changes occur either in the nature of the issues originally identified or in the context – whether physical, political, economic, social, environmental, institutional or policy-related – in which the twinning activities have been planned and implemented, which may require a change to the activity focus.

The Evaluators consider twinning projects as relevant when the programme’s objectives are in full compliance with the short and medium term priorities stated in the ENP Action Plans. By contrast, twinning projects are not considered relevant in situations where their need is unclear or has been so poorly defined as to suggest it is unclear.

More particularly, EQ1 analyses the following points:

- Relevance of Twinning vs. classical Technical Assistance
- Validity of project fiches
- Project design
- Absorption capacity and involvement of the key stakeholders in the project preparation phase
- Demand-driven approach vs. the EU Acquis
- Coherence/complementarity of Twinning with TAIEX, SIGMA and other donors’ programmes (see also EQ6)
- Feasibility/compatibility of Twinning with the individual national contexts
- Deviations from the Twinning Instrument’s scope.

JC1 - The twinning intervention logic, strategy and approach have been well defined to contribute to the achievement of twinning objectives and mandatory results

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion (JC) is satisfactory. The difference between Twinning and classical Technical Assistance is not yet clear to all beneficiary stakeholders. However, the objectives set in the project fiches are explicitly linked to the reference documents, more particularly AAs, CPAs and ENP Action Plans, including the *EU Acquis*. Overall, the twinning intervention logic, strategy and approach have been defined adequately to ensure sufficient project *relevance* and thus to contribute to the achievement of immediate objectives and mandatory results.

## Relevance of Twinning vs. classical Technical Assistance

Most ENP countries have been the beneficiaries of three types of cooperation activities related to institutional building:

- Classical Technical Assistance
- Budget Support<sup>27</sup> - this instrument is not dealt with in this Report
- Twinning (with TAIEX and SIGMA)

Twining was introduced into the MEDA countries, now ENP-South, in 2004 and into TACIS countries, now ENP-East, in 2006<sup>28</sup>. The main issue at the time was that Twinning was bringing an entirely new cooperation approach and culture to ENP beneficiary institutions, which in most cases were more familiar with classical TA, whose introduction into the Region dates back to the early 90's.

Since then, it has widely and rightly been suggested that a clear understanding by the beneficiary stakeholders of what Twinning really entails in terms of commitment, workload, achievement of results and absorption capacity is key to achieving success.

In this respect, Twinning must not be confused with classical Technical Assistance. The main differences between Twinning and classical TA consist in the following:

<b>Twining</b>	<b>Technical Assistance</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peer-to-peer cooperation and direct EU MS public sector expertise</li> <li>• Twinning contracts with EU MS (originally called “covenants”)</li> <li>• “Mandatory results” jointly agreed upon</li> <li>• Approximation with the EU Acquis and best practices related to EU legislation and institutional capacity building</li> <li>• Political commitment highly desirable</li> <li>• EU MS selected upon quality of proposal with special focus on the RTA</li> <li>• Direct and active involvement of the beneficiaries required</li> <li>• High sustainability level due to prior capacity of beneficiary administration</li> <li>• Demand-driven approach</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Private expertise</li> <li>• Service contracts with external consultants</li> <li>• Provision of outputs and deliverables</li> <li>• Any cooperation-related subject</li> <li>• Political commitment desirable, but not always necessary</li> <li>• Bid selected on the basis of quality and budget</li> <li>• Direct involvement of the beneficiaries less required in project implementation</li> <li>• Justified by beneficiary institution’s insufficient level of development</li> </ul>

<sup>27</sup> Further detailed information on “budget support” is accessible here:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/budget-support/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/budget-support/index_en.htm)  
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/economic-support/documents/guidelines\\_budget\\_support\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/economic-support/documents/guidelines_budget_support_en.pdf)  
 and [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/LM\\_budget\\_support\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/LM_budget_support_en.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> The first twinning project in the ENP-East was launched in Ukraine in 2006.

It is immediately clear from this table that Twinning is more demanding than classical TA. In fact, Twinning is the most demanding of all development cooperation instruments for delivering and transferring expertise in the sense that twinning project requirements and expectations as to the achievement of mandatory results are of a very high level.

It must be noted that since its inception in the ENP Region, Twinning has too often been mixed up with classical TA by no less than 50% beneficiary stakeholders<sup>29</sup>, including at senior level, for several reasons:

- To start with, as beneficiary stakeholders do not appear to be sufficiently aware of the differences between Twinning and classical TA in spite of the awareness-raising effort demonstrated by the EUDs and PAOs, no clear line has been drawn between the two instruments. As a result, the confusion is not intentional and lots of beneficiary stakeholders are still struggling with both notions. It must be also noted that the choice of Twinning over TA may simply depend, amongst other criteria, upon a beneficiary's commitment or absorption capacity. However, it is important to determine whether the best option for clearing a gap should ideally be found in classical technical assistance or twinning activities. This clearly relates to the need for a better definition of what twinning project should be.
- Overall, with its rather complex rules and procedures, Twinning has also been perceived as a difficult and cumbersome instrument, especially in an environment where classical TA has been the norm. As a result, Twinning is still considered simply as a Technical Assistance instrument of a more complex nature, i.e. with cumbersome, more bureaucratic rules and procedures.
- The authorised involvement of mandated bodies in project implementation as an alternative to EU MS staff also adds to the confusion.
- The following occurred only in a few cases: in several ENP countries, in order to launch the process as soon as possible after the inception of the Twinning Instrument, EUDs sometimes pushed the BAs to opt for Twinning, although the selected projects clearly pertained to the classical TA category.
- The following occurred only in very few cases, when several of the twinning activities could have been run with TA. During the very first project generation (SAAP-I), a number of twinning projects selected for implementation consisted of a mixed bag of Twinning and classical Technical Assistance elements ("twinable" vs. "untwinable"). This can partly be explained by the fact that although several project components could have been implemented with classical TA, other elements were also very political and related to the peer-to-peer cooperation approach, which could have been put in place only through Twinning. In a few cases, success was achieved due to the twinning nature of the projects, because real specialists and political constraints were involved. Therefore classical TA would have been inappropriate to fully ensure the achievement of mandatory results. Moreover, it has also been observed that a twinning project, which should have normally pertained to TA rather

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<sup>29</sup> As was reflected in the filled-in questionnaires and in the ensuing field meetings and discussions with the stakeholders.

than Twinning but was implemented under twinning rules and procedures, could achieve far better results than it would presumably have under a classical TA format, essentially because Twinning imposes mandatory results upon the BAs and involves the BAs directly in project implementation.

**Lesson Learnt: Egypt-Tourism**

*As was the case for the project with the **Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA)**<sup>30</sup>, a project which, according to the BC PL himself, could have been a TA rather than a Twinning Project (e.g. also as suggested in the Indicators of Achievement in the logframe to the Twinning Fiche, Component 2 focused purely on tourism activity outputs rather than on the ETA's capacity strengthening), but which was implemented with twinning rules and procedures, could achieve far better results than it would presumably have under a classical TA format, essentially because Twinning imposes mandatory results upon the BAs and involves the BAs directly in project implementation.*

- Various beneficiary stakeholders, which applied for, and obtained, a twinning project, could not differentiate Twinning from classical TA because they had never been involved in either. They had no reference point.
- To date, there is no real checklist of “twinability criteria” to determine whether an intervention should consist of a twinning project or classical TA. However, this checklist must not be confused with the Twinning Project Concept Fiche or Synopsis<sup>31</sup>, which has been designed to provide a description of the twinning project proposed by a potential beneficiary.

Clear selection/eligibility criteria should be established to determine whether the best option for clearing an administrative gap should ideally be found in classical technical assistance or twinning activities. This clearly relates to the need for a better definition of what twinning project should be (see also Section 5.1.1.3 hereinafter). Nevertheless, the decision to opt for classical TA or Twinning must always depend upon the very nature of the activities and also a BA's maturity and absorption capacity.

<sup>30</sup> The Evaluators view this project not as a real Twinning, but rather as a TA project that was used to launch the Twinning Instrument in Egypt. As was acknowledged by the BC PL himself in a meeting with the Evaluators, several subcomponents pertained more to TA than Twinning *stricto sensu* (see logframe matrix in Annex 1 to the Project Fiche)

<sup>31</sup> The term “**Concept Fiche**” (also known as *Project Synopsis* in Azerbaijan) is used in several ENP countries for the project concept that is prepared jointly by the beneficiary institution and the PAO and submitted to the Commission Services for approval. Then, if necessary, an **FWC** may be mobilised by one or more external consultants who will draft the related Project Fiche. The Final Project Fiche, once revised and approved by the PAO and the Commission Services, will be launched by the contracting authority and circulated amongst EU MS. In turn, Member States institutions shall then submit their **proposals**. Once the winning MS consortium or mandated body has been awarded the project, the **Work Plan** for the given twinning project will be prepared and a **Twinning Contract** (previously called “Twinning Covenant” under the pre-accession PHARE Programme) will eventually be signed between the EC or the PAO and the MS partner. After this last operation is completed, the twinning project may start (notification letter).

### ***Tentative Best Practice example: Ukraine–PAO and Azerbaijan-ITTSO-PAO***

For example, to determine twinning eligibility, the PAO in **Ukraine** and ITTSO (technical assistance to the PAO) in **Azerbaijan** have worked out a Twinning Project Concept Fiche and Project Concept Evaluation Grid<sup>32</sup>, including:

- Brief description of the applicant institution/organisation
- Brief description of the proposed twinning project
- Information grid on the new twinning project concept

This document could be used tentatively as a Best Practice example. But is it sufficient to guarantee Relevance and make sure that the right cooperation tool is chosen?

### Project Fiches

The essential twinning documents are the Twinning Project Fiche and the Twinning Contract. In all the ENP countries, the objectives described in the Project Fiches were never modified till the end of their respective projects and always remained valid against, and consistent with, the Contract and instruments, namely AAs, CPAs, ENP Action Plans, including the *EU Acquis*, National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and Country Strategy Papers (CSPs).

The modifications that were introduced to the twinning contracts<sup>33</sup> during project implementation, by means of addenda and side letters<sup>34</sup>, essentially affected the number of activities, deadlines and staffing, albeit not necessarily significantly, and more rarely required an update of mandatory results. During the project fiche preparation phase, all PAOs and the beneficiary stakeholders involved in the project fiche drafting process linked their twinning objectives to the objectives stated in one or more of the bilateral reference documents, essentially the AAs, CPAs, and ENP Action Plans, including *EU Acquis*. The project preparation phase is dedicated to the finalisation of the Twinning contract by the MS PL, the BC PL and the RTA. Actually, it's been very easy to establish this link to the reference instruments, as they are tantamount to shopping lists of actions and suggestions rather than real plans for future action, although they were not initially conceived as such.

In addition, in several ENP countries, objectives set in the twinning fiches were also linked to national reference documents, such as the Government's Five-Year Development Plan in Tunisia, to the National Reform Strategy in Egypt, or to the public administration reform and institutional modernisation process in Morocco, where twinning activities are an integral part of the institutional reform effort.

The issues affecting mandatory results are related to absorption capacity and political and institutional commitment to twinning activities and will be dealt with hereinafter.

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<sup>32</sup> See Annexes 9 & 10 to this Final Report.

<sup>33</sup> Modifications to the Twinning projects can be made by means of side letters and addenda to the Twinning Contracts during project implementation, not to the Project Fiches, which may not be amended during project implementation.

<sup>34</sup> Remark: in principle mandatory results may not be modified, even with an addendum. Side letters consist of minor modifications, above all, to activities rescheduling and also to the budget. Addenda will often consist in modifications to the work plan, a deadline, an extension, a substantial activity change, but never affects the mandatory results.

JC2 - The involvement of line stakeholders, including PAOs, BAs and MS partner institutions, in the project preparation phase (contract & fiche) was adequate and contributed effectively to project relevance - assessment of absorption & delivery capacity, and political and institutional commitment

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is satisfactory but variable from one project to another. PAOs now take part actively in each stage of the twinning preparation phase. However, their training and input may still be considered insufficient against their intended level of commitment and contribution. Not involved in the twinning fiche preparation phase, EU MS RTAs are nonetheless still insufficiently trained in twinning-related issues. BAs are increasingly taking an active part in the project identification and drafting process (needs assessments, concept fiche, activities and mandatory results). RTAs and PLs have usually demonstrated an adequate level of commitment, competence and involvement in the twinning contract preparation process. However, overall the three parties lack adequate training in twinning rules, management, procedures and other twinning-related issues. Overall, political commitment has been insufficient.

### The PAO

In covering this criterion, which also includes the appropriateness of project design, it is crucial to analyse the level of involvement demonstrated by the BCs, more particularly the PAOs. Twinning experience has so far revealed that PAOs in the ENP Countries were playing a central role or would be set to play an increasingly central role in the twinning process.

PAOs can be categorised into three main groups (its main task is not project fiche drafting):

- 1) The PAO has a wide variety of in-country competent staff and experts. So the PAO can perform all its tasks without external support (EUD, external experts). Therefore FWC/TA is needed only occasionally, e.g. to help draft the Project Fiches, whose consistency is then checked by the EUD (ex ante). High level of ownership.
- 2) The PAO only has the staff strictly necessary to maintain some level of administrative activity. Therefore, FWCs for helping BAs draft the Project Fiches are more frequent. Variable level of ownership (never optimal, though).
- 3) Neither 1, nor 2. The management mode remains fully centralised and the EUD fulfils most of the tasks. FWCs are systematic called in. Low level of project ownership.

Further detailed information on the PAO's roles under decentralised management mode (ENP-South) and centralised management mode (ENP-East) can be found in the Common Twinning Manual on pp. 25-28.

During the project identification and project fiche preparation phase, the PAO's role normally consists in the following:

- To explain to the potential beneficiaries how the twinning process functions. For this purpose, PAOs organised preparatory seminars for beneficiary participants either

individually or jointly prior to starting the project implementation phase. This point has been dealt with further under EQ 10 on Communication & Visibility.

- To collect twinning requests, check their eligibility and the relevance of the project against the desirable mandatory results provided these results are also relevant to the Twinning Instrument's scope, to AA, PCA and/or ENP Action Plan priorities, and also check the coherence of the twinning concept fiche and, whenever possible, the overall absorption capacity of the applicants.
- With the help of FWC experts, to contribute to the needs assessments and twinning fiche drafting process, whenever necessary and if the PAO's internal resources (qualifications and competence) allow for this.
- To help the BAs work out their fiches, select their EU MS partner institutions, support the preparation of their work plans, and proceed to the signature of the Twinning Contract with the EU or PAO and MS.
- To provide adequate support in respect of all twinning-related issues and, also very often in respect of other institutional building tools, such as TAIEX and SIGMA and other donors' interventions. Therefore PAOs must cooperate closely with EUDs and other donors in order to ensure project complementarity/coherence and the best use of these institutional building tools. PAOs have been given the major role in twinning project fiche preparation and implementation support in all the ENP countries.

However, PAO's work has usually been affected by the following factors, which have not been necessarily common to all PAOs in the ENP Countries:

- Lack of political visibility
- Lack of seniority within their home administrations
- Lack of qualified staff to deal with the thematic and sectoral aspects of project fiches (technical expertise)
- High staff turnover in several PAOs
- PAO staff have not been systematically trained formally in the twinning rules and procedures, including adequate and timely guidance and training in twinning contractual procedures.
- They have learnt the various processes mostly "on the job".
- Internal quality control has not yet been institutionalised either at PAO or in the Commission Services (EUD, HQ). Internal evaluation involving benchmarking methods, the use of checklists (to know who did what), filing techniques and information-sharing are badly needed. No evaluation has yet addressed this issue over the past 7 and 4 years in the ENP Region-South and East.

Recommendations will be issued to improve PAO performance.

Generally, PAOs have always been involved, albeit to various degrees (see centralised vs. decentralised management), in the preparation of synopses and requests<sup>35</sup> for twinning projects and also in the formulation of needs assessments with and/or on behalf of the BAs. During the first project generation (SAAP-I), external experts were regularly called in on the basis of FWCs to draft twinning fiches. The main result was that twinning fiches were often overambitious in terms of activities and mandatory results, all the more so as PAOs and BAs did not master the twinning rules and procedures yet.

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<sup>35</sup>

Hereinafter called "twinning requests".

However, as of the second twinning generation (SAAP-II), absolutely all PAOs were directly involved in the project fiche drafting process, even if they still resorted and continue to resort to FWCs occasionally and upon their own initiative, mainly to fill a gap related to a lack of expertise. It must be noted that several PAOs are not keen to make use of FWCs, because, according to them, the mobilisation of experts takes too long. However, given FWC experts can be mobilised within 3 weeks, the Experts are rather of the opinion that the reluctance to FWCs stems from the fact that the PAOs may regard FWC procedures as too cumbersome and also FWC experts as sometimes too remote from field realities.

Several PAOs have been or are still being helped by short- and long-term Technical Assistance projects, as was the case in Ukraine in 2006-early 2010 and is still the case in Azerbaijan with ITTSO<sup>36</sup>, in Armenia with SATTO<sup>37</sup> and also in Morocco where the PAO received a four-month technical assistance in the first half of April 2011, in order to improve its overall performance, as recommended by the Mid-Term Evaluation Report of 2010.

The role of the PAO under decentralised vs. centralised management is developed under EQ9 hereinafter.

#### The EU Member State Resident Twinning Advisers (RTAs) and Project Leaders (PLs)

The EU MS RTAs and PLs are not involved in the project fiche drafting process. Once a project has been awarded by the ENP BC Evaluation Committee<sup>38</sup>, the EU MS twinning partner's RTA, who usually is a senior civil servant, must prepare for his future assignment. Seniority, expertise and experience have been key to RTA credibility. RTAs, whose role is regarded as pivotal and central to any project implementation outcome, need more intensive preparation in the following areas: project management, team management, EU basic issues, twinning rules and procedures, national environment awareness, financial report drafting, consistency and quality assurance. The field phase of this Evaluation has also revealed clearly that the two-day training workshops organised for RTAs in Brussels are not sufficient. As a

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<sup>36</sup> ITTSO is an acronym that stands for "Implementation of Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA Operations". ITTSO is also the name of the EU-funded project and project team that support the capacity of Azerbaijan to make the best use of EU assistance and in particular of the Institutional Twinning, TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) and SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) instruments. The project is the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of similar support activities aiming to make the Programme Administration Office (PAO) fully operational, with sufficient capacity to implement and coordinate Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA in Azerbaijan. The ITTSO-I project (2009-2011) is the successor to the TACIS project "Implementation of Twinning and TAIEX Operations in Azerbaijan" (ITTO - 2008-2009). ITTSO-II was expected to start in September 2011 for two years, but was delayed until November 2011.

<sup>37</sup> SATTO is an acronym that stands for "Support to Armenia's PAO for Twinning and TAIEX Operations". Started in March 2009, this Technical Assistance project aims to provide Armenia with adequate support to make best use of EU assistance through ENPI, particularly, of Twinning and TAIEX. The specific objectives are to support PAO in introduction of Twinning & TAIEX operations in Armenia, to strengthen the capacities of PAO and Beneficiary Administrations for Twinning & TAIEX operations and to increase awareness of Twinning projects and TAIEX events.

<sup>38</sup> Under decentralised management mode, each ENP BC Evaluation Committee consists of 2 representatives from the BA and 1 PAO Project Manager. EUD is represented to the Committee as an observer. Under the centralised system the Evaluation Committee consists of 2 representatives from the EUD, 1 from the BA and the PAO has an observer status. This Committee awards a twinning contract on the basis of a full review of the proposals, using a proposal evaluation grid common to all the ENP Region (see Annex C8 to the Common Twinning Manual – Revised 2009).

result, upon their arrival in their beneficiary countries, RTAs<sup>39</sup> usually struggle with positions, roles, procedures, job descriptions, task distribution, reporting, cultural differences, political and historical context, language issues, etc. Each ENP Country requires a specific attitude. Showing openness to the country and its individual characteristics during project implementation improves the relations with the beneficiary. All this relates to “delivery capacity”. However, the twinning approach for the new MS twinning teams put in place has been “gradual learning”, which has also contributed to the perception that Twinning is a cumbersome instrument.

Finally, although this is an MS responsibility, the Evaluators would like to highlight that the RTA remuneration, which is based upon his civil servant salary and which is normally determined in accordance with the Common Twinning Manual’s rules and procedures (actual salary received by the RTA in the MS + RTA allowances), must be agreed upon to all parties’ satisfaction. For example, in Azerbaijan, a serious remuneration-related misunderstanding occurred between one RTA and the MS consortium leader, which was financially detrimental to the RTA. Issues related to remuneration and per-diems must be sorted out from the outset. This could be a recommendation to EU MS administrations. They must refer to Annex B to the Common Twinning Manual, which clearly indicates the allowances and benefits that any RTA is entitled to. RTAs must be aware of that Annex.

Moreover, this misunderstanding may also have stemmed from nationality differences between the RTA and the Consortium Leader. Over the last few years there has been a tendency amongst MS administrations (Consortium Leaders) to hire RTAs of citizenships different to theirs. Even though this practice is not forbidden *stricto sensu*, it can be interpreted as a deviation from the very spirit of the twinning rules and procedures. This issue will be addressed in the Recommendations.

#### The Beneficiary Administrations (BAs) in the ENP countries

As regards the BAs, three main categories of absorption capacity have been identified as follows:

- 1) Level of staff competence and readiness
- 2) Staff availability and logistics
- 3) Institutional commitment

Potential participants in twinning activities are usually screened by their home administrations on the basis of their level of competence, readiness, availability, etc.

However, it has also been argued that on a few occasions better quality staff could have been selected/designated more carefully to participate in twinning activities.

There have been a few cases where staff and logistics have not always been made available adequately in several of the beneficiary countries. For example, the appropriate staff are not available, simply do not exist, have not been nominated and sometimes availability of qualified staff has not even been checked carefully by PAOs. Projects cannot really start without a reasonable level of staff availability, readiness and also logistics. For example,

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<sup>39</sup> It must be noted that an “RTA Welcome Pack” has been developed in the ENP-East to help remedy this situation.

access to project premises, telephone lines, internet connections, multimedia equipment and senior hierarchy in the BAs has not always been easy in the ENP countries.

RTA Counterparts and BC Project Leaders (BC PLs)<sup>40</sup> take an increasingly active part in the needs assessments, gap analyses, project concept and twinning fiche processes, as they are normally trained in Twinning rules and procedures prior to their respective projects. However, this has proved to be insufficient (too short sessions), as learning curves may be tough, especially when a beneficiary is involved in a twinning project for the first time. As a result, several EUDs have been trying to improve the situation by proposing further training in project rules, procedures and management. Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement in this respect.

Institutional commitment at senior level is very important for the credibility of a twinning intervention within the BAs. This also goes together with political commitment. Political power in the ENP Region has neither been directly involved in twinning preparation, nor implementation. Usually political commitment is limited to the participation of thematic Ministers and senior civil servants in Steering Committee and other meetings, such as launch events, high-profile seminars and closing conferences. Although Twinning has been high on the political agenda as a well-appreciated institutional building tool in most ENP countries visited (mostly in ENP-South), with the exception of Ukraine<sup>41</sup>, Azerbaijan<sup>42</sup> and to some extent Egypt, it is clear that political decision-makers and law-makers are not really interested in the details of day-to-day management and hardly do anything to remove implementation obstacles whenever they occur. In this respect, it can be concluded that there is a lack of political commitment. Conversely, it can be argued that political commitment is high in that if a contract is signed the engagement will be respected. At project level, even if they have expressed their commitment to the notion/concept of twinning and usually know what is going on, political decision-makers prefer not to interfere to support and facilitate activity implementation. When it exists, political commitment must in principle trickle down in most ENP Countries. So far it has been insufficient.

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<sup>40</sup> The Common Twinning Manual (Revised – 2009) stipulates in Section 2.2.1 that “a BC Project Leader is needed in each Twinning project. S/he acts as the counterpart of the MS Project Leader and ensures in close co-operation the overall steering and co-ordination of the project. S/he is likewise expected to be a high ranking official in the BC administration, who is in a position to operate at the appropriate political level. The role of the BC Project Leader and the RTA counterpart in the Beneficiary Administration are complementary”.

<sup>41</sup> Twinning is also high on the political agenda in Ukraine, however, only formally. The project ideas to be proposed for EU funding are approved by the Ukrainian party to the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Committee. However, the EUD regards this procedure as bearing a rather formal character. Hence the very good project selection mechanism established by the EUD through the *Twinning Programme Coordination Group (TPCG)*, which includes the PAO, the EU Programme National Coordination Unit (NCU) and representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economy and the Cabinet of Ministers (See the “Best Practice example” p. 60 hereinafer).

<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that since the Evaluation Team’s field mission of May 2011, the situation has been changing thanks to an increase in the number of twinning projects and visibility events. For example, during Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė’s visit, President Aliyev said that Azerbaijan was grateful to Lithuania for supporting Azerbaijan’s participation in the Eastern Partnership programme. The Lithuanian President was quoted as saying: “we can benefit from Azerbaijani talks with Europe, from the contribution through the *Twinning Programme* and an experience exchange in carrying out negotiations”. (02/05/2011 - news.az).

Overall, absorption capacity and political commitment are two factors that are closely intertwined and whose absence may affect project efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

JC3 - The demand-driven approach, when taken into account, contributed to, and was part of a well-defined strategy and, if yes, it contributed to project relevance and achievement of objectives

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion 3 has been mostly satisfactory, but could be improved. The demand-driven approach has facilitated the introduction of the Twinning Instrument into the ENP Region. However, it was not at all part of a well-defined strategy, especially in the first project generation, but is now increasingly moving in the right direction, i.e. towards a more *relevant* strategic, sectoral approach, as twinning requests are less high-profile and tend to be more focused on tangible objectives, results, impacts and sustainability.

While generally perceived as far too long, i.e. normally 12 months in theory against 2 years in practice, as has been noticed in quite a few cases, from project identification to contract signature, the programming phase is very important for strategic rather than strictly demand-driven aspects.

The demand-driven approach aims to guarantee the commitment of beneficiary institutions to the Twinning Instrument in ENP Countries as well as the *Relevance* to the needs expressed, even if, in a few cases, those needs were not “eligible” for Twinning! The demand-driven approach is the very corner stone of the twinning process as the intention is to prevent EU Member States from eventually dictating their will, e.g. by trying to impose their EU MS practices over the real needs of BAs. This process anyway results from negotiations between MS and BA representatives, with the MS side responding to BA needs, and the BA side complying with EU Twinning criteria, rules, procedures and requirements.

Overall, although imperfect, the demand-driven approach has greatly facilitated the introduction of the Twinning Instrument into the ENP Region and its relevance to needs.

To initiate and ensure the demand-driven approach, promotion workshops and information days were conducted by the PAOs and EUDs for the potential beneficiaries in each of the ENP countries.

Therefore the demand-driven approach effective in the ENP Region was simply based upon the “First Come – First Served” principle during the first project generation. However, the situation with the demand-driven approach is different in countries operating under centralised and decentralised management mode. The major differences between centralised and decentralised management are dealt with under EQ 9.

During the first twinning project generation, ENP countries adopted 5 different approaches:

- Even if an applicant was not amongst the top priorities predefined in the AAs, CPAs, ENP Action Plans and/or NIPs, but was able to put together a sensible project concept in line with EU or Twinning requirements, the twinning request was considered eligible and was eventually selected into the project pipeline.

- Even if an applicant's needs were clearly identified and assessed into a weak concept fiche, the project was selected for implementation, but not necessarily on the basis of sectoral priorities solidly established or mandatory results clearly defined.
- In a hurry to launch the twinning process in their respective BCs, several EUDs approached some of the BAs and pushed for, or accepted, any twinning request in spite of the real needs and project nature.
- EUD and PAO still proceed to the joint short-listing of eligible projects upstream, leaving aside potentially interested institutions and overall coherence between all twinning projects selected.

Besides, it must also be noted that the feasibility criteria are very often left aside and are not considered as *evaluation* criteria, but rather as being strongly related to absorption capacity!

In several ENP countries, both the PAOs and beneficiary stakeholders have now engaged in a ***reflection*** on the validation of twinning projects and also on the need to enlarge the scope of the Instrument, which will also bring us to the very definition of Twinning and the demand-driven approach. Some of them have already taken measures to ensure better selection and focus on priorities.

***Best Practice example - Example of this reflection on the need for internal political dialogue on Twinning in Ukraine:***

According to Resolution N° 157 of the Cabinet of Ministers of **Ukraine** (CMU) of February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2007 “On Approving the Procedure for Organising the Work on Preparing and Implementing Twinning Projects in Ukraine” (with Amendment N°868 of October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008) regulates all twinning activities in Ukraine.

Project proposal selection process in Ukraine:

- Step 1: In accordance with Resolution N°157, all Ukrainian public authorities are annually informed by the Main Department of Civil Service of Ukraine (MDCSU) / PAO of the Twinning Instrument's existence and cooperation opportunities. In Ukraine, twinning project proposals prepared by the beneficiaries with the PAO's assistance are normally submitted for consideration at high political level.
- Step2: Whenever a public institution is interested, it must prepare and submit its twinning project proposal before March 1<sup>st</sup> of each calendar year. It must also nominate its project's Contact Point.
- Step 3: The PAO then selects the proposals that are relevant to the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda and national priorities and prepares a draft list of eligible proposals, which is submitted for consideration and approval to the Ukrainian part of Twinning Programme Coordination Group (TPCG).
- Step 4: The Ukrainian representative to the TPCG then informs MDCSU/PAO of the proposals approved.
- Step 5: The PAO submits the final list of proposals to the TPCG, which approves it, feed it into the pipeline and/or amends it.

However, political awareness has not been sufficient in defining priorities, as the persons involved usually have too little authority and there is hardly any further high-level

involvement in, and commitment to, the selection process. For example, last year, no Cooperation Committee meeting took place to review the list of twinning projects proposed.

The demand-driven mechanism should be taken into consideration in the government strategy, with action plans for the various target sectors. An *official letter* has been sent to inform all departments that the “First come, first served” approach for selecting twinning projects would be abandoned. In Ukraine, *official letters* tend to have more weight than any twinning agreement or contract. Nevertheless, the EUD has managed to establish a very good selection mechanism through the *Twinning Programme Coordination Group (TPCG)*, which includes the PAO, the EU Programme National Coordination Unit (NCU) and representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economy and the Cabinet of Ministers.

This strengthens credibility and prioritisation. The political flavour of Twinning has also too often been ignored. Twinning is a political tool and not just cooperation. The Association Agenda<sup>43</sup> must also help to promote the Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CPA).

Moreover, the Twinning Instrument no longer remains only a tool for transferring the *EU Acquis* to beneficiary institutions, as was the case under the pre-accession context. ENP countries are not accession countries. In this respect, the terms “*Acquis harmonisation*” or “*Acquis approximation*” are already used instead of “*Acquis transfer*”.

In this respect, enlarging the Twinning Instrument’s scope to priority activities<sup>44</sup> other than transferring the *EU Acquis* is already more or less explicitly suggested in the Common Twinning Manual<sup>45</sup>.

Moreover, in the field of legal approximation, the dilemma is that if a bill prepared by the twinning project is passed into law, does this mean that this project has been successful? And if this bill is not passed into law, does this mean that the related twinning project has necessarily failed?

This led the Evaluators to find out how and to what extent the stakeholders perceived the Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region. The answers to that question varied from one stakeholder to another. They also reflected the rather wide variety of BC conceptions of, and interest in, twinning activities.

All stakeholders in the ENP Region – Beneficiary Institutions, PAOs, EUDs, RTAs – confirmed that they were highly satisfied with the Twinning Instrument as a tool designed

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<sup>43</sup> As negotiations over associate membership (AAs) have just started between Ukraine and the EU, the Association Agenda is now the real basis for cooperation. Ukraine has set up a committee of civil servants to review 200 priorities. 78 top priorities have been selected into approx. 10 clusters.

<sup>44</sup> As defined in the AAs, CPAs, ENP Action Plans and/or NIPs.

<sup>45</sup> The EU Acquis is no longer the only compulsory reference as suggested in Article 2 to Annex 1 “Description of the Action” - “Work Plan” to the Common Twinning Manual - p. 13: [ARTICLE 2 - ACQUIS - PROJECT FICHE FIELD OF COOPERATION WITH THE EU π ENPI: Relevant Field of Cooperation with the EU: *Describe how the project field answers to one of the areas of cooperation with the EU. If relevant, list other projects already implemented/under implementation with the EU in this field*]. However, Article 2 remains unclear as to the priorities (Acquis vs. Field of Cooperation) and provides room for manoeuvre as a result. There are of course Acquis-related fields of cooperation. However, other priorities may be highlighted such as the opening of the national economy to the EU. As regards procurement, the question remains pending and for the time being the rationale will be “EU approximation and harmonisation in the national interest”.

especially for institutional capacity building and modernisation, legal approximation with the EU Acquis and alignment with EU values<sup>46</sup>. 100% positive answers were given to the Question “Would you be in a position to confirm that the Twinning Instrument is a valuable tool to develop administrative cooperation between EU Member States and ENP Beneficiary Countries for improving the institutional capacity of the beneficiary administration?”.

The vast majority of stakeholders also mentioned that Twinning was really a unique instrument, with no equivalent amongst other donors’ interventions. Twinning is also very well adapted to the local context, especially to the needs of public institutions in terms of institutional capacity building and modernisation.

Besides, Twinning is considered as a tool for developing closer cooperation between EU Member States and Beneficiary Country administrations. 80% of the BC respondents indicated that Twinning was an extremely efficient tool and that they were keen to have a second twinning project. Some of them reported that Twinning was a “luxurious” but very useful tool adapted to institutional needs in their countries.

The question “What is a Twinning?” was suggested in the Evaluation Questionnaire several times. Answers were complemented and further discussion took place on that issue during the field visits. The Evaluators point out that the questions were left open. The following comments are only a description of the facts and answers gathered.

- Most answers collected indicated that “Twinning is considered an instrument used for reaching the EU Acquis”. It goes without saying that the EU Acquis cannot have the same meaning, importance and/or relevance for the ENP Region as in the pre-accession context. In this respect, BAs also indicated that it was not necessary to link the twinning projects to one or more of the EU Acquis chapters. Of course, the adoption of the EU Acquis partly includes legal approximation. However, the questions were left open intentionally in order to hear the understanding and point of view of the beneficiaries and stakeholders. The reference to the Acquis was mostly the opinion of the EUD staff involved in the twinning process, RTAs, PLs and a few PAO personnel, whereas beneficiaries (RTA Counterparts and BC PLs) provided other answers.
- Most BAs (RTA Counterparts and BC PLs) and a few PAO staff said that Twinning was an instrument for “Adopting/approximating laws, norms” (not necessarily the EU’s, though), or “Bringing ENP countries closer to EU values, standards...”. In the eyes of BAs and even a few PAO staff, the confusion between the “EU Acquis” and “adoption of laws and norms” is real. This point does not reflect our opinion as Evaluators, or our conception of the EU Acquis, but instead reflects that of the stakeholders (essentially the BAs). In their view, the EU Acquis is not mandatory and the EU Acquis does not mean anything to a vast majority of them. For them, the adoption of laws and norms is not necessarily included in, or part of, the EU Acquis. The Acquis applies more to an EU Accession process rather than to the

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<sup>46</sup> The ENP is based on the concept of shared values and common interests. The shared values are those which ensure our prosperity, stability and security i.e. democratic reforms (fundamental rights, rule of law), market economy and sustainable development (including reforms in sectors such as trade, competition, energy and transport, environment, people-to-people contacts etc). These reforms will enable us to develop joint responses to the common challenges we face in the twenty-first century e.g. prosperity gaps, migration, crime, environmental issues, public health, extremism and terrorism.

Neighbourhood Policy. This point will be dealt with in a recommendation in the Final Report. The reference to the Acquis must not be mandatory and may be flexible enough to apply in the ENP context.

- In the context of opening up the Eastern countries (ENP-East) and deepening economic relations with the EU (ENP-South), a large number of BAs found in the Twinning Instrument an excellent tool for “facilitating trade” with the EU MS. Twinning projects are considered by the BAs as a means for strengthening economic and trade ties with Western Europe and also for initiating the process leading to the DCFTAs.
- Only a few stakeholders answered that Twinning was a tool for “Implementing the ENP Actions Plans, or even the CIB (ENP-East)”. Although of another nature, this answer shows clearly that Twinning is not yet sufficiently understood as a privileged instrument for implementing the EU-ENP Agreements. Among the majority of stakeholders, a direct and interactive link has yet to be made between Twinning and ENP Action Plans. This point will be dealt with in the Final Report’s recommendations.
- It must be pointed out that no BA answered that Twinning was an instrument designed for “accompanying national administrative reform”. This only demonstrates that Twinning has not yet been fully integrated into a global administrative reform process, especially ENP-East. However, this is not a criterion specified in the Twinning Manual. As a result, Twinning tends to be perceived mostly as a tool funded by an international organisation for providing some sort of specific, rather complex technical assistance support. The Evaluators have therefore concluded that Twinning projects are not yet sufficiently integrated into the national reform process and are not perceived as an “administrative cooperation tool” for promoting or facilitating domestic structural reforms. Unless Twinning is integrated into the reform process, absorption capacity and twinning results will likely be undermined.

The Evaluators point out that the answers provided were collected from key stakeholders closely involved in the twinning process. The other beneficiaries who have not been “directly” involved in the twinning process and have not been responsible for any twinning activity have shown a poor understanding of Twinning. They either don’t know what a twinning project normally consists in, or only have a vague idea, their best interpretation being that Twinning is a cooperation tool for the public sector. This clearly reflects a cruel lack of adequate information and communication activities for promoting the Twinning Instrument.

Moreover, the Twinning Manual does not provide for an accurate and useful definition of the Twinning Instrument, as it explains only what a twinning project is not, failing to define clearly what it should consist in. The Evaluation Team has now put forward a tentative definition, which may be found in Recommendation 3 issued in this Final Report.

Also in the absence of a Concept Fiche/Project Synopsis Evaluation Grid<sup>47</sup> for justifying the selection of a given project and its twinning eligibility (“component twinnability”), several

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<sup>47</sup> Ukraine’s PAO has developed a structure concept fiche template (See Annex 9) and Azerbaijan’s ITTSO-PAO has worked out a project synopsis evaluation grid template (See Annex 10).

PAOs have used various criteria to determine whether a request is eligible to Twinning or not:

- National priorities against the Neighbourhood Policy and the EU Acquis
- Trade facilitation considerations
- Readiness of the beneficiary institutions (skills, staffing, availability of accommodation, equipment, premises, commitment, appropriate internal budgets, etc.)
- Approximation with EU laws.

However, the demand-driven approach is also acquiring a different meaning with today's new generation of twinning projects, as the twinning fiches are increasingly in line with the Financing Agreements and, above all, with the AAs, CPAs and/or ENP Action Plans. The requests are being fine-tuned far more seriously, which is a tendency that the Evaluators have fully encouraged. Several ENP countries have moved or are moving from the strictly demand-driven approach, which nevertheless remains very important for project ownership, to a more targeted and focused approach/strategy within the framework of the thematic aspects related to their own priorities. Today, twinning requests are no longer necessarily high-profile and often need to be reformulated to be considered.

Moreover, it has been difficult for several countries to switch from a project to a programme approach, as was the case in Ukraine for example.

Overall, the demand-driven approach has been and remains a key issue. A comprehensive strategy is now needed together with a prioritisation and sequencing mechanism to be put in place by the PAOs within the framework of global, or at least sectoral, structural reform. This will be our first recommendation for the next twinning implementation phase.

For example, an "Overall Work Plan for 2010-2016" and a "Stratégie d'Intervention du P3A-II pour 2009-2012"<sup>48</sup> have been developed respectively by the Egyptian and Tunisian PAOs as tentative strategy papers. Other ENP countries, which have not been selected in our sample, are developing such an approach.

The 25-page Overall Work Plan for 2010-2016 prepared by the Egyptian PAO has been worked out on the basis of the ENP Action Plan and in accordance with Egypt's National Reform Strategy. However, it now consists of 50 ideas/priorities for 50 new potential projects, which is far too many. Overall, the document looks professional in terms of content and structure, as it includes a Project ID Form, an Executive Summary, a Technical Plan, a Management Plan (programme staff, financing agreements, timeframes, link between workload and staffing), a Financial Plan has taken into consideration complementarity/coherence with TAIEX, SIGMA and TA. Due to the unstable political situation in the country and upon several EC requests, the PAO has prepared this document, which should now be discussed with EUD and other stakeholders.

Worked out before the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, the Tunisian PAO's 14-page P3A-II Intervention Strategy for 2009-2012 was discussed for 1.5 years without any tangible results. As a result, twinning activities were delayed. Egypt's PAO is facing a similar situation. The document proposed three major strategic orientations and intervention priorities as follows:

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<sup>48</sup> SAAP-II Intervention Strategy for Tunisia for 2009-2012

- Strengthening economic integration and competitiveness
- Support to sectoral integration policies
- Consolidation of social achievements and sustainable development.

However, given the present post-Revolution political instability, both strategies have been worked out without (enough) consultation with, and feedback from, the various key political decision-makers and senior officials.

Remark on the Agreement-driven approach:

ENP-East and ENP-South are very different in terms of implementation. In order to ensure that the demand-driven approach is fully consistent with the AAs, CPAs and ENP Action Plans and avoid potential deviations, it has also been proposed to prefer the Agreement-driven approach in the ENP-East. For example, most ENP-South countries have far better knowledge of the EU functioning and vice-versa than their ENP-East counterparts, where the administrative organisation and old centralised management systems are quite different. In this respect, as regards the demand-driven approach with a connection to the CPAs, a certain level of flexibility must still be preserved in the ENP-East. The Commission Services must remain vigilant as to the popularity of the Twinning Instrument across the ENP-East Region. Therefore the Agreement-driven approach is not and cannot be regarded the only alternative and ultimate solution. In other words, the Twinning Instrument's scope must not be limited to the CPAs, but could be extended to be more flexible in terms of project eligibility.

JC4 - The project preparation/design phase was adequate to ensure the consistency of activities and outputs with the twinning project objectives and impacts and effects

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is partly satisfactory. Procurement (i.e. equipment supply) may never be a pretext for the beneficiaries to engage in twinning activities. There are sectors more prone to twinning activities and as a result have had a positive outcome. Twinning in the ENP Region is now also at a turning point and real “incentives” need to be more explicitly defined for twinning activities as part of the more strategic priority approach. The incentive also relates to the demand-driven approach and planned results.

This section covers three important aspects to be considered during the preparation phase, including procurement opportunities, twinning-prone sectors and incentives. When carefully considered during the implementation phase, these elements normally facilitate project implementation.

Although Twinning must never be linked to supply/procurement requests, which are normally funded through other instruments, a few beneficiary stakeholders argued that procurement opportunities for new or additional equipment (e.g. computers, laboratories) should be considered under twinning. We also suspect that several BAs applied for Twinning in order to acquire new laboratory equipment via another funding source (e.g. Water Quality Management project in Egypt and ACAA project in Tunisia). Beneficiaries suggested that the equipment component be included more systematically in the twinning activities. The reason was that whenever equipment was ordered under another contract to complement twinning activities, delivery was often delayed.

As a result, if the equipment was needed for training purposes, it would be impossible for the projects concerned to meet their objectives and results as per schedule, if at all, during the implementation phase. To avoid this situation and as twinning should never serve as a pretext for systematically supplying equipment, the beneficiaries concerned suggested that the twinning fiche should at least specify the complementary need for equipment supply.

Another critical issue lies with the preparation phase of a twinning project fiche (from the “idea” to the “contract”), which should normally take one year, but has in practice taken up to two years in a number of cases, to the signature of a twinning contract, whereas Financing Agreements comply with the Commission’s N+3 rule. Therefore the question may be whether it is wise to sign the Financing Agreements before the project formulation phase is completed. However, it is imperative to have a Financing Agreement in place before any Twinning contract is signed (e.g. on average, in the ENP-South, each Financing Agreement provides funding for 5 to 8 twinning projects).

Moreover, there are a few sectors that have proved to be more directly “twinable” in essence, such as twinning projects dealing with legislation (in various sectors), police, customs, justice, accreditation, normalisation, certification, standardisation, accounting and auditing (and also SPS), because they were more focused and specific. It is interesting to note that in the evaluation questionnaires and during the face-to-face interviews, the BAs involved in those sectors and subjects indicated that twinning activities should be linked to the EU Acquis as a prerequisite to the AAs, CPAs and ENP Action Plans.

In connection with this, the BAs also indicated that specific project activities required a long-term relationship with a reference counterpart in the EU and only Twinning, not classical Technical Assistance, could provide this long-term relationship under “peer-to-peer” cooperation and networking. In fact, given the very nature of their core activities and mandates, several stakeholders are reluctant to disclose and share normally classified information with private consultants and therefore prefer working with their sectoral counterparts.

Moreover, results were better achieved and success ensured when the RTA Counterparts and BC PLs knew exactly what they wanted and also took a number of proactive measures related to absorption capacity issues (e.g. identification and availability of relevant staff, adequate legal framework, logistics, etc.), thus demonstrating the readiness of their home organisations, before their respective projects started. This implies that twinning activities usually mobilise the necessary human resources and institutional commitment far better when the project components are more focused and specific in terms of EU Acquis approximation and/or capacity building.

Now, after 8 years’ implementation in the ENP Region, it can also be safely suggested that the Twinning Instrument has arrived at a turning point. The main reason lies with the increased need of the beneficiaries for at least one long-term clear incentive to extend their commitment and continue implementing EU-funded twinning activities successfully.

This incentive may go either in the direction of the objectives stated in the Association Agreements, Cooperation and Partnership Agreements and ENP Action Plans, or of the institutional building and modernisation process implemented within the framework of the global PAR in the ENP countries or both. Hence the Twinning Instrument’s sometimes

uneasy positioning across the ENP Region and full or relative lack of integration into global institutional reform in the ENP countries.

Interviews have revealed several country-specific incentives among others, as follows:

- To secure best quality standards (EU legal and normative approximation) for international trade facilitation, including export and FDI promotion, and EU market access purposes – all 6 ENP countries;
- Regional development policy and access to regional structural funding, e.g. through future cross border cooperation – in Morocco;
- EU visa facilitation – in Azerbaijan;
- New equipment and study tours – in all the countries
- Modernisation of public governance institutions through PAR. This holds true for all the countries but was more explicitly stated in Azerbaijan and Ukraine.
- Modernisation of transport infrastructure

However, the incentive now remains a big question mark in Egypt, most probably because of the difficult transition period after the Revolution of January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

JC5 - The feasibility and compatibility of twinning activities have been taken into account adequately during the project preparation/design phase

**Summary:** This judgement criterion is partly satisfactory. As there has not yet been any global strategy in place for twinning activities in most ENP countries, the feasibility and compatibility of twinning activities with country specifics and realities have been partly taken into account. Deviations have sometimes been inevitable. However, the situation is improving, as the effort is being put on the elaboration of a more global (or sectoral) strategy aiming to integrate twinning activities into overall public administration process in the ENP countries.

The Project Formulation phase is key to success as it affects all the other implementation stages and also impact and sustainability. Moreover, conditionalities<sup>49</sup> have not always been set upfront in terms of absorption capacity requirements, need for realistic objectives and results to be achieved and demand-driven aspects to be considered. This is especially true when the situation in a beneficiary country is changing rapidly like in Azerbaijan, which has become wealthier. However, it must also be noted that due to the time gap between the twinning preparation and implementation phases, one project objective or another (e.g. contribution to the setting-up of an institutional body) may already have been achieved by the time the project starts.

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<sup>49</sup> In this context, as per World Bank terminology, conditionality - to be differentiated from EU budget support conditionality – refers to the prerequisites and other requirements placed on the use or distribution of financial resources dedicated to another country. Conditionality is most often associated with aid funds. International organisations and/or individual countries may use conditionality when lending money to another country. The donor may require that the beneficiary country implement certain actions and/or adopt certain rules directing the use of funds, even beforehand. Conditionalities can range from the adoption of anti-corruption measures to the implementation of structural adjustment policies. The donor may also require that the funds be used towards a specific project instead of leaving them to the discretion of the beneficiary country.

Our understanding is that project feasibility and compatibility with the local context have not always been analysed thoroughly. However, the Evaluators readily concede that this analysis will never be in a position to entirely eliminate project failure risks.

For example, one of the typical constraints usually linked to EU Acquis harmonisation is that a project, whose immediate objective and main mandatory result consist in drafting a law and having it passed, cannot not guarantee that this bill will effectively be passed into law during project implementation. So the obvious question is whether the activities at stake make any sense at all.

### ***Lessons Learnt: Ukraine-FDI Promotion and Tunisia-Modernisation of the State Tax Service***

Prior to the reorganisation of the central executive bodies conducted in **Ukraine** (see also the analysis of *Impact* in Section 5.1.4 hereinafter) since last December 2010, one beneficiary institution disappeared purely and simply after being merged with another public organisation, which also indicates that this twinning project was not integrated into the reform (this observation also goes beyond the strictly internal project management framework). Consequently, a large number of staff was laid off and the training results achieved during the first implementation year were partly lost as a result. However, the EUD managed to limit the damage<sup>50</sup> and to keep the project on track, as the new “beneficiary”, according to the PL and the RTA, did not apply directly for the project. Political contexts may make it difficult to predict certain situations, whatever the outcome of a feasibility study may have been and however accurate the assumptions and risk assessments may have been. However, it must be noted that Interim Quarterly Report N° 8 of November 2011 and the RTA’s closing remarks to the Final Conference of December 2011 suggested that the project

<sup>50</sup> According to the EUD, the decision was made to continue the project after two months’ intensive discussions with the PAO, the NCU and the 2 new beneficiaries, namely SAUII and NatsProekt, which in turn were merged into SAUID as result of the December 2010 reorganisation of Ukraine’s central public executive bodies. An assessment of the institutional capacity of the new beneficiaries and their commitment to the project was also carried out. The EUD slightly modified the Work Plan to transfer most of the results already achieved into a new Work Plan. In addition, the EUD agreed to approve the new beneficiaries only because the project was into its initial implementation stages (less than 3 months). The kickoff meeting took place in February 2010 and the project was suspended in June 2010 as the incumbent was absorbed by the new beneficiaries. SAUII and NatsProekt, then SAUID, simply took over the project from the previous incumbent.

Notwithstanding, during the field meeting with the Evaluators in early April 2011, both the PL and the RTA declared the following:

- 1) The project started in November 2009 and was implemented normally until November 2010. Then the original incumbent (Invest-Ukraine) was disbanded in July 2010. Management changed. Then a rather difficult period started.
- 2) SAUID took over the project, but SAUID was not directly involved in FDI attraction/promotion
- 3) Staff left and study visits were lost as a result (Note: only one study visit was lost according to the EUD and no other training activity took place during the first implementation phase of the project).
- 4) For further detailed information, the relevant references are the project’s Quarterly Reports November 2010-January 2011 and August 2010- November 2010.

had eventually been kept on track and achieved all its mandatory results as planned, in spite of the 3 beneficiaries encountered during implementation<sup>51</sup>.

In **Tunisia**, one twinning project aiming to modernise the state tax service included at least 12 components. This was far too many for a single project. The project fiche was overambitious in terms of objectives, activities and mandatory results, and absorption capacity became an issue very quickly. Most striking was that the Twinning Fiche managed to get through all the screening stage without the whistle being blown at any stage. Moreover, the EU MS acceptance logic underpinning the project was questionable.

However, feasibility studies, which are part of an ex ante evaluation process, are increasingly carried out now, as the first generation projects were sometimes too ambitious and the PAO didn't have any experience with EU rules and procedures yet. As regards the new generation of twinning projects, the formulation "capacity building for this or that" is no longer used. It was too vague and experience has also shown that it was difficult to identify the right experts as a result. However, two weeks for the feasibilities is too short to fully grasp the situation

In the same spirit, the condition ensuring that the mechanism governing any regulatory transposition is more effective is that a twinning project must be put in place whenever feasible, and not classical TA, which should be avoided as often as possible in such cases.

Another point that affects project has been that, as required by the Commission Services in Brussels<sup>52</sup>, Project Fiches are very detailed in terms of activities and mandatory results. This does not leave MS much leeway and scope for manoeuvre in preparing their proposals. Moreover, there can also be a reality gap between the fiche requirements and the situation in the beneficiary country at the start of the project implementation phase.

In the same spirit, although the Twinning Fiches may not be modified during the implementation phase, the Evaluators suggest that the OVIs should be systematically revised and/or fine-tuned in the contracts in a separate "monitoring logframe" during the implementation phase (e.g. mid-term reviews) in order to produce better focused, targeted, base-lined, time-lined and generally approved OVIs. This would be useful not only from a direct project management perspective, but also for monitoring and evaluation purposes (e.g. to more precisely measure the achievement of mandatory results and the fulfilment of project objectives). This goes beyond the current practice of updating the logframes in the twinning contracts.

Although the twinning fiches were often overambitious in terms of activities and mandatory results during the first project generation (they were usually drafted by external consultants under FWCs), most of them were appropriate in terms of budgeting, staffing, targeted training audiences, assumptions and risk assessments (although unpredictable events may always occur during the implementation phase and cause irreversible disruptions as a result).

Moreover, the high number of stakeholders (EUD, PAOs, BAs, Commission Services, External Experts, Steering Committee Members) involved in the preparation of twinning

<sup>51</sup> Invest-Ukraine (November 2009-July 2010), SAUID (October 2010-July 2011, resulting from the merger of SAUII with NatsProekt after Invest-Ukraine was absorbed by SAUII) and SAINPU (August 2011-December 2011 – State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and National Projects)

<sup>52</sup> As indicated by the PAOs.

activities may also have a negative effect on the twinning fiche preparation phase. In this respect, the review and comment procedure prior to signing the twinning contract must not exceed 6 months. In addition, there is a real need to commit senior BA hierarchy to this process much earlier because revisions by top hierarchy take place much too late, i.e. just before deadlines expire, in the vast majority of cases. Twinning Fiche preparation: in fact, when 90 % of a project fiche has already been finalised and approved by the BC Project Leader, the PAO and EUD, it is forwarded to Brussels HQ and a final draft is then submitted to the BA's hierarchy for formal approval. Notwithstanding, last-minute comments are sent by the BA's hierarchy to the EUD, which is detrimental and delays the process.

Several PAOs and BAs observed that funding for domestic travels is hardly ever earmarked for the beneficiaries in Project Fiches (lack of budget for local travels). Although currently not eligible for funding, domestic travels could be fully or partly funded for beneficiary stakeholders, especially whenever necessary for the achievement of results.

Budgets for individual project communication and visibility activities are rather limited in the twinning contracts and could be appropriate for outreach purposes when necessary.

Recommendations have been formulated hereinafter (Chapter 7) in respect of twinning implementation rules and procedures, the Common Twinning Manual and also with a view to simplifying the project preparation phase.

#### Coherence/Complementarity with TAIEX and SIGMA

Coherence/Complementarity with TAIEX and SIGMA and also other donors' instruments and programmes is generally taken into consideration during the project preparation phase. For this purpose, Project Fiches always include a section dedicated to "Linked Activities (other international and national initiatives)". However, this section also covers synergies with TAIEX and SIGMA projects and also with other instruments, including those funded by other bilateral and multilateral donors. This coordination exists, but is rather informal or does not really bring any desirable positive, concrete impact, as it should be more strategically envisaged (see also the analysis of Coherence/Complementarity in EQ6 hereinafter). Based upon their assessment, the Evaluators are of the opinion that no major overlap or lack of coherence between Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA has been detected. Complementarity is effective between the 3 instruments.

This section also aims to identify potential and real deviations from the Twinning Instrument's scope within the project preparation phase.

#### Deviations from the Twinning Instrument's scope

The most noticeable deviations identified were as follows:

- Twinning Projects are increasingly implemented by mandated bodies. The beneficiaries have already complained about experts not being staff of MS institutions. Twinning tends to be perceived as classical Technical Assistance also for this reason. Moreover, free-lance experts are also sometimes hired by MS institutions to do the job in the MS themselves. For example, the project with the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine had to operate with private standardisation experts,

not accreditation civil servants, nor EU MS agents. This occurs when the appropriate level of expertise is simply not available in the EU MS public sector.

- Mandated bodies, such as GIZ (Germany), FIIAPP (Spain), ADETEF (France) and DFID (UK), often tend to play the role normally assigned to MS<sup>53</sup>. Most PAOs are of the opinion that mandated bodies act like “contract hunters”, so that the inherent nature of twinning and the peer-to-peer approach literally disappear. This appears as a *real deviation* from the Twinning Instrument’s scope. But it is not the exact view of the evaluators. Flexibility must prevail only in exceptional cases. Civil servants must be given priority whenever possible. Twinning is by definition an attractive non-commercial institution building instrument. Notwithstanding, it must also be noted that mandated bodies have been instrumental in developing twinning activities so extensively this far.
- Twinning projects are increasingly implemented by mandated bodies and as a result are far more expensive than should normally be: one traditional civil servant expert costs € 250 + 150% project management cost per working day, whereas one mandated body expert costs € 250 to € 450 + 150% project management cost in the capacity of a public agent contracted by a mandated body. Twinning projects may use the project management costs for any cost arising in the MS in relation to the project. Moreover, mandated bodies add to the confusion between Twinning and classical Technical Assistance. The beneficiaries have already complained about experts not being staff of MS institutions. Therefore Twinning tends to be perceived as classical Technical Assistance with more cumbersome, bureaucratic procedures. This habit of resorting to mandated body experts instead of MS civil servants eventually tends to raise the expertise cost, bringing it nearer or over that incurred for technical assistance, i.e. over € 1,000 per working day.

*Point 5.8.1 to the Common Twinning Manual also stipulates the following:*

*"The breakdown of costs detailed in Annex A3 (Budget) to the Twinning Contract may not include expert fees or other any fees for work performed outside the BC, no matter what its nature (e.g. preparation or follow-up of mission, accompaniment of study visit, delivery of seminar in MS, co-ordination, logistical management [accounts] overheads and other incidental costs). In its place, and as a global contribution to the costs arising from the responsibility of preparing and implementing a Twinning project, the fee for short and medium-term expertise of any kind (including the Project Leader) delivered in the BC is increased by a compensation of **150% for twinning management costs**. This amount is added to expert fees for each activity in the BC. The MS organisation in charge of the Twinning project may dispose of it for any costs arising in the MS in connection with the project and overhead costs.)"*

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However, it must be noted that to be recognised as a “Mandated Body”, the applicant organisation must fill in a comprehensive application form and demonstrate its status as a public organisation funded by the State and mandated to act on behalf of its supervising administration. The list of mandated bodies is updated annually. Staff employed by Mandated Bodies are either permanent or contracted civil servants. The List of Mandated Bodies approved annually is accessible here: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial\\_assistance/institution\\_building/20110830\\_twinning\\_mandated\\_bodies\\_list\\_160811.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/institution_building/20110830_twinning_mandated_bodies_list_160811.pdf)

- Deviations also occurred when the demand-driven approach was applied very literally, i.e. to respond to needs expressed by a given BA on “grounds of expediency”, hence several deviations were noticed e.g. in the field of tourism in Egypt, where twinning activities were mixed up with classical technical assistance. Notwithstanding, it must be noted that this project with the Egyptian Tourist Authority is considered as a success story in Egypt.
- One monitoring report on Morocco’s Oriental Agency indicated that there had been a very high number of experts and activities, with experts not necessarily being civil servants of a central, regional or municipal administration, but rather private experts. In a large number of MS, not all employees are necessarily civil servants. Lots of them are hired through direct private contracts or even through private companies. This must be considered as a deviation from the twinning scope, as the very nature of activities, experts and BA participants must be well defined and limited from the project conception phase. This twinning project’s activities were more of regional development promotion nature and therefore were not dealing with Acquis-related issues, nor were they strictly focusing on capacity building.
- The decentralised management mode, which has been effective in ENP-South countries (with the exception of Israel) since the twinning activities were introduced there, could generate variable risks of deviation from the Twinning Instrument’s original scope and could also lead to the progressive emergence of different twinning practices in each of the ENP countries. This point is worth mentioning, even if it is not yet a cause for concern and even if it goes in the direction of the Paris Declaration<sup>54</sup> of 2005 and the Backbone Strategy<sup>55</sup> of 2008 on aid effectiveness, project ownership, transparency and accountability.

However, attention should be paid to the twinning project between the Lithuanian Seimas and Azerbaijan’s Milli Mejlis (Parliaments), which is regarded as 2010’s twinning success story in that country and cannot be considered as a deviation. Although several components could have been implemented with classical Technical Assistance, other more political elements could only have been put in place through Twinning. In fact, twinning projects between Parliaments are not very common (the other one is in Moldova). Parliaments across the ENP Region should have access to the Twinning Instrument and should even be encouraged to take part in twinning activities. It can be argued, however, that Parliamentary activity does not look, or is not perceived, as clear as other activities. But if strictly political issues can be left aside, there are lots of other issues related to the legislative process, which require a systematic and structured approach that can only be provided through Twinning. This project focused essentially on establishing clear rules and could be replicated with the other ENP Region parliaments. The project consisted of 4 main components and 4 main goals to be achieved:

- Supporting the EU approximation process
- Setting effective cooperation links with executive bodies
- Developing methods for impact assessment
- Building knowledge on EU institutions, law-making processes and EU laws

<sup>54</sup> [http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_3236398\\_35401554\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html)

<sup>55</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/backbone\\_strategy\\_on\\_tecpius\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/backbone_strategy_on_tecpius_final_en.pdf)

The peer-to-peer relationship is also very important for networking<sup>56</sup>, impact and sustainability. For example, Azerbaijan's long-term objective is to be located in Europe and get closer to the European / EU family, however not necessarily as a full-fledged Member State, but definitely as a partner. The idea is to bring EU standards to Azerbaijan ("legal compatibility"). Azerbaijan is generally interested to get closer to the EU. Therefore the Twinning Instrument may also progressively create a community of commonly shared values, in which Parliaments may well play a key role.

### 5.1.2 Effectiveness, delivery of mandatory results

**EQ 2:** To what extent have the twinning activities delivered the twinning mandatory results in the ENP Region? *Have the right things been done?*

*Effectiveness* measures the extent to which the twinning activities implemented have achieved the stated objectives, more particularly the project purpose (immediate objective). In other words, *Effectiveness* may also be interpreted as "Have the right things been done?"

More particularly, EQ2 covers the following points:

- Benefits from the twinning products and services for the beneficiaries
- Examples of major constraints on project implementation
- Adequacy of the Twinning Instrument to BA needs
- Adequacy of project management indicators towards the achievement of immediate objectives
- Adequacy of assumptions and risk assessments at result level (e.g. unanticipated external factors played a role in the achievement/non-achievement of results, flexibility demonstrated by project management to adapt and achieve the objectives, adequate support from key stakeholders, including Commission HQ, EUDs, local government, etc).
- Positive/negative effects generated by Unplanned Results

JC1 - The right twinning project activities have been conducted to achieve the immediate objective (project purpose)

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is very satisfactory. For most twinning projects selected in the sample, notwithstanding the indicated constraints, the great majority of mandatory results have been achieved adequately against immediate objectives

In general, project activities have been conducted in accordance with the respective Work Plans and against the benchmarks and key indicators of achievement identified in the Project Fiches (and Contracts). This observation is valid both for projects already completed and still under implementation.

<sup>56</sup> Cooperation with the EU Parliament has also been very useful. Moreover, on May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011, the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, which is the parliamentary component of the proposed **Eastern Partnership**, was launched officially. Euronest consists of MEPs and MPs of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus (now suspended), Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Euronest consists of 60 MPs, of which 10 MEPs and 10 MPs from the 5 partner countries.

Occasionally, the real needs of beneficiaries initially defined under certain project components were reassessed during the preparation of the work plan or during the inception phase and thus the focus could be properly adjusted to the immediate objectives. Thanks to consultation between the beneficiaries, the EU MS implementer, EUD Finance & Contract Section, corrective actions could be carried out immediately and smoothly.

Generally, the other adjustments made to the project contract during the implementation phase very often affected the overall duration, activities, staffing, budget breakdowns (changes limited to max. 15%), but never the total budget amount, nor the mandatory results. Whenever they did, the modifications were rather minor or contributed to a better use of resources without ever changing the results, or only towards better results.

***Best Practice example: Azerbaijan-Statistics and Jordan-Fight against Terrorism***

However, several projects even fulfilled their immediate objectives beyond the planned indicators. For example, part of the activities under the Statistics project in **Azerbaijan** was related to test calculations with real figures provided by the State Statistical Committee (supply and use tables, illegal activities) and to the implementation of new approaches (Business Register), which could not be evaluated by the planned indicators of achievement described in the fiche. These unplanned activities positively affected the achievement of the immediate objectives. In **Jordan**, the Fight against Terrorism project was very successful in that all the benchmarks were reached and in many cases surpassed. According to the beneficiaries, benchmarks are necessary to keep standards high.

Examples of major constraints:

However, the Evaluators noticed a number of major constraints that have negatively affected project implementation, as follows:

- Resistance to change / acceptance of change. This is very classical human factor, which is also very difficult to avoid, unless very good preliminary communication actions are carried out. It usually generates implementation delays to various degrees.
- Real and/or perceived heaviness of twinning rules and procedures
- Limited absorption capacity demonstrated by the BAs (e.g. availability of BA staff, availability of the right staff, lack of preparation)
- High staff turnover
- Limited delivery capacity demonstrated by the EU MS RTAs
- Effective legislation in the beneficiary country. See also “Relevance analysis” above in respect of project compatibility/feasibility
- Poor assessment of a BA’s absorption capacity
- Limited scope of Twinning
- Languages and cultural differences

Time and funding constraints as well MS expertise are covered in the analysis of *Efficiency* hereinafter.

Twinning rules and procedures specified in the Common Twinning Manual’s Revised Version of 2009 are still perceived as bureaucratic and cumbersome, even if this is sometimes justified. This may sooner or later seriously affect the absorption capacity, staff availability and motivation of beneficiaries. For example, in the case of workshops, activity-related

budget entries are usually very detailed and could be limited to the essentials (e.g. 10 lines) on only one page, including fees, project management costs, per-diems, travels and other eligible expenses. This would avoid drafting side letters for rather small amounts too early in advance.

In several ENP countries, including Algeria, Armenia, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon and Moldova, all twinning contracts must still be “*approved*” by the Commission Services in Brussels. However, full devolution to the EUDs will soon be effective.

Moreover, EUDs under centralised management mode complained that the level of detail required for preparing an eligible budget including all expenses to be incurred for seminars, training, workshops (e.g. fees for translation/ interpretation services, photocopies, etc), and also other incidentals, was far too high as this budget must be allocated and broken down into detailed entries for each activity (e.g. number of units, unit costs).

This has created a rather huge administrative burden, which could be simplified. This issue will be addressed in the Recommendations.

Several BAs in the ENP countries have started to turn away from Technical Assistance & TA training and now prefer Twinning. However, this Instrument could also run the risk of getting the same fate as classical TA, because it contains too many limitations perceived as unfair: the additional workload is not compensated for; no procurement for equipment is foreseen; etc. In fact, a number of beneficiaries tend to increasingly think that the EU uses Twinning for taking back the money that it has just allocated to the ENP beneficiaries. The Instrument’s rules and procedures should be more flexible. Thus the PAO could also have more power to put pressure on those institutions which do not respect their commitment. At the moment, the PAO is not always in a position to fight for mandatory results, as a large number of BAs still mix up Twinning with Technical Assistance.

Beneficiaries have often expressed the need for preparatory workshops to explain to the direct participants how to implement a twinning project successfully in order to better absorb the project outcomes. Although those preparatory workshops were conducted by the PAOs and EUDs or in several countries only under EUD supervision, there were shortcomings as their number and focus appear to have been insufficient in that they failed to provide all the necessary information to the beneficiary stakeholders. However, it must also be pointed out that several PAOs also complained that the BAs were not always receptive enough to these preparatory workshops. Moreover, it was a first experience with Twinning for all BAs, including for those who had benefited from classical technical assistance earlier under TACIS or MEDA, and there were also twinning implementation aspects that can only be learnt with experience, such as self-organisation for combining usual activities with twinning requirements.

Also worth mentioning is that the beneficiary stakeholders are not relieved of their daily routine as twinning activities come in addition to the usual workload. Even in the case of the highly successful project with Morocco’s Customs Administration, training sessions, which normally take place during the implementation phase, could really become an obstacle to the usual work of the beneficiaries because they mobilised key operational staff. Senior representatives of the Customs Administration proposed that these sessions should focus on the qualitative rather than quantitative aspects of training-related project components. “The

objective, they said, is not to train “en masse”, but rather to ensure that quality material is delivered and useful skills are transferred in an appropriate, user-friendly and sustainable manner”.

***Lesson Learnt: Morocco-Regional Development***

An example of constraint that affected project implementation negatively was provided by the Regional Development project in **Morocco**. The volume of expertise allocated to the project was overestimated against the beneficiary’s absorption capacity. Moreover, since RTAs could not proceed to the analysis of their BA staff’s absorption capacity as they are not involved in the project fiche preparation phase, difficulties arose especially in the early implementation stages. Adequate corrective actions were undertaken as soon as the institution realised the implications of being a beneficiary stakeholder. Instead of further postponing the planned missions due to staff unavailability, the BA decided with the RTA to appoint replacements (i.e. other BA staff) in order to ensure continuity and avoid delays and disruptions to the activities. This decision allowed the BA to make up for the delays and to utilise at least 80 % of the EU expertise available by project completion.

Another constraint lies with the EU MS RTA’s limited “delivery capacity”. For example, Twinning must support reform implemented by the BAs themselves, adapting EU MS best practices to the BC context without imposing them upon the BAs. However, it is sometimes very tempting for RTAs to replicate, not to say “cut and paste”, formats, practices and procedures used in their home administration. One RTA even said that he could not be asked to do anything else but only what he was able to do, whereas more flexibility was expected. Although EU MS practices, especially in relation to the EU Acquis, are the core references for Twinning, their literal transfer to the BAs cannot be not the ultimate goal.

Moreover, effective legislation in most ENP countries does not allow institutions to conduct administrative human resources reform (staffing, job descriptions, etc.) on their own initiative. For example, in Tunisia, public service regulation reform may not be implemented without the First Ministry’s official approval.

Effective implementation of a project may, to some extent, also be impeded by the Twinning Instrument’s restriction to the central level of government. At some point, several regional agencies, departments and representatives of central beneficiaries also needed to be involved in twinning activities, as was the case with the Ukraine’s National School of Judges (UNSJ). Moreover, there have been problems with co-financing from the Ukrainian side for the participation of regional representatives in twinning activities, such as training workshops organised at central level only. Notwithstanding, this project managed to reach out to the regions with its workshops, which reflects the relative flexibility of the Twinning Instrument.

Language and cultural differences were also raised as another source of constraints in most ENP countries visited as they had a negative influence on activity implementation and also on internal communication between RTAs and beneficiaries. For example, most language difficulties and communication issues arose when the RTA’s native language was other than English or French in ENP countries where these are used as second national working languages. Interpreters and translators were used, but were not easy to find given the language combinations and also their lack of knowledge or experience in the subject. Overall, it is very difficult to conduct training sessions with simultaneous and/or consecutive interpretation. Cultural differences were also pointed out as RTAs with previous experience

acquired in the beneficiary country either through a previous twinning project or in another context could adapt better to their respective countries. The Evaluators take the point that the idea is of course not to professionalise the RTA job. However, RTAs with relevant country experience and previous exposure to the local culture will always be better appreciated by their BAs and will better adapt to the demands of their functions.

As also indicated in the Relevance analysis, the lack of adequate logistics may also affect activity implementation negatively (difficult access to project premises, multimedia tools, etc.).

#### JC2 - Twinning activities have transferred institutional capacity to the BAs adequately

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is very satisfactory. Overall, even if the conditionalities were not always fulfilled, institutional capacity has been transferred adequately through twinning activities to the BAs.

High Effectiveness resulted from the great quality of MS expertise, which has been recognised almost unanimously by the stakeholders and also when the BAs, especially their RTA Counterparts and BC PLs, were strongly committed, which was very often the case. The analysis of *Efficiency* in Section 5.1.3 provides a more nuanced judgement as regards the use of available resources (times, funding and MS expertise).

The vast majority of twinning activities were accurately directed at the achievement of mandatory results. However, the scope of projects was often rather wide against project duration and lacked focus. However, the knowledge at stake was transferred, which led to significant operational changes within the beneficiary institutions. This was particularly the case with the new approaches adopted on the basis of the twinning activities for internal procedures and processes.

For example, the Statistics project in Azerbaijan led to the application of a new approach to the business statistics data collection process, to a new methodology for assessing the non-observed economy, introducing double-deflation into the National Accounts System.

Another example is provided by Jordan's Audit Bureau. This project strengthened the beneficiary's capacity more specifically in the fields of communication and human resources by providing relevant draft job descriptions and in the field of audit methodologies by providing an audit manual and conducting pilot training in this manual in addition to approximating its legal framework by providing a new draft law in line with the Acquis.

EQ2 also covers the *Impact* criterion. However, further detailed information on concrete project outputs will be provided in the *Impact* analysis hereinafter in EQ 4).

#### Adequacy of twinning benefit indicators measuring the achievement of immediate objectives

All indicators remained unchanged practically in all cases during the entire implementation phase. However, the indicators could sometimes have been reassessed, fine-tuned and even complemented with additional indicators in the early implementation stages, e.g. during the inception phase, and also when the project is halfway through. This would have allowed for appropriate corrective actions in order to fully ensure the successful outcome of the project at

stake. This would also have boosted the accuracy of the final reports and facilitated evaluation work. However, several RTAs failed, or even refused, to find a way to measure the increased capacity of their respective BAs in the sectors covered by their projects (monitoring and quality assurance). The achievement of results was measured predominantly through the completion of the corresponding activities. Now, we know that several projects were overambitious in terms of number of components, activities and mandatory results against absorption capacity. Although most projects reviewed for this evaluation may be deemed successful and most of their indicators appropriate or at least acceptable, the question remains as to the objectivity of judgements and assessments regarding the achievement of results. Therefore the opportunity and even the obligation to reassess and fine-tune the indicators could be established either during the inception phase or as soon as the projects are halfway through (e.g. “mid-term review of indicators”).

Adequacy of assumptions and risk assessments at result level (e.g. unanticipated external factors played a role in the achievement/non-achievement of results; flexibility demonstrated by project management to adapt and achieve the objectives; adequate support received from key stakeholders, including Commission HQ, EUDs, local government, etc).

As indicated in the above analysis of *Relevance*, the Evaluators have found that a number of projects were still frequently implemented without the appropriate conditionalities in place. Moreover, it has also been observed that several project activities could be implemented only after others had been completed beforehand (sequencing), which was not always taken into account properly in PAO twinning programming documents. Finally, several activities having too low chances of being achieved were planned, which meant that the corresponding mandatory result(s) could be achieved only partly or not at all.

These conditionalities (or prerequisites) have sometimes had serious repercussions not only on project feasibility, but also on relevance-related issues. They are partly included in the “assumptions and “risks” as indicated in the logical framework. Although those repercussions did not make the implementation phase, or the achievement of results and objectives impossible as corrective actions were implemented, albeit sometimes late, the Evaluators shall therefore recommend taking them into consideration more rigorously prior to project implementation.

One of these conditionalities also includes the careful attention that must be paid first of all to the local political and institutional context. It is very important to ensure and secure strong support for Twinning at the highest level, real political commitment to project implementation and the need to integrate Twinning into the on-going global public administration reform/modernisation process.

No less important is to ensure that the legal framework necessary to the Twinning Instrument’s successful performance exists beforehand. We have found that several projects left aside this fundamental aspect indispensable for the successful implementation of twinning projects.

The legal framework has been either ignored, or included as part of a project’s activities to be implemented. Therefore there is an important risk of having the legal framework in place too late or not at all during the whole project implementation phase, which means that in turn the next activities cannot be implemented as planned. This is more particularly the case of a bill

drafted by twinning experts and submitted to the Parliament for approval. As a result, the experts are not in a position to tell exactly when the bill will be passed into law (assumption) and are even less in a position to commit themselves to the activities that could be implemented only after the bill has been passed into law.

### Unplanned results with positive and negative effects

More as an exception to the rule, several projects recorded unplanned results, which positively and negatively affected the benefits received. For example, the Accreditation Project in Ukraine was allowed a two-month extension, while keeping the same budget, in order to perform additional activities (e.g. accreditation of bodies for certification of Quality Management Systems, accreditation of education institutes, etc.). Although the indicated activities had a rather limited scope, they nevertheless helped the beneficiary institution respond to the Ministry of Economy's urgent request to start accreditation services in the field of educational and vocational institutes. For the record, it can be noted that the UNSJ project was affected negatively by the change of beneficiary, which generated a 3-month delay in the activities. However, this did not negatively affect the achievement of results eventually.

### **5.1.3 Efficiency, activities delivered adequately**

**EQ 3:** To what extent have the twinning activities been delivered adequately to the ENP Region's beneficiaries? *Have things been done right? Have the right activities been conducted correctly in terms of quantity, quality, timeliness and best value for money?*

In measuring the outputs – both qualitative and quantitative – against the inputs, *Efficiency* aims to find out to what extent things have been done right in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and thereby also addresses value-for-money aspects. In other words, it addresses the best use of resources, more specifically time and financial resources. This analysis generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs in order to find out whether the most efficient decision as to the choice of the institutional building instrument has been made.

This EQ covers the following points:

- Transformation of available resources into achieved mandatory results
- Adequacy of day-to-day management
- Best value for money
- Communication and relations between stakeholders
- Quality of contributions made by EU HQ, EUDs and PAOs to twinning activity preparation and implementation
- Quality of available MS expertise (RTAs)
- Monitoring and Quality Assurance

JC1 - Twinning activities have transformed the resources available (time, funding, MS expertise) into achieved mandatory results

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion has not been satisfactory in many cases. Overall, even if project activities were effectively delivered and mandatory results were achieved, a number of projects still had serious problems with time and budget resources, which affected their *Efficiency*.

The achievement of results is far more demanding for twinning projects than for classical Technical Assistance. The “mandatory” aspect, which is typical of Twinning, really means achieving the planned results fully (100%) and not attaining them “if possible and/or as far as possible” as is the case for Technical Assistance. This point is fundamental because all the resources and activities implemented to achieve a project’s objectives stem from it.

On the basis of the filled-in questionnaires returned and the field visits, we found too large a number of projects with too many, overambitious, unrealistic and unachievable mandatory results for the planned implementation period (most often max. 24 months), even if those results fulfilled the eligibility criteria. We also found a significant number of projects whose implementation period had to be extended after they failed to achieve the results planned within the deadlines established from the start.

As indicated above in the *Relevance* analysis, the FDI promotion project in Ukraine could not achieve the mandatory results fully as planned as at cut-off date for this Report<sup>57</sup> (May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011). In addition to the allegedly low quality of the project work plan, the main reason for this was mainly due to the fast-changing character of the implementation environment, which was caused by Ukraine’s comprehensive public administration reform and eventually led to the absorption of the beneficiary by another institution. As a result, most of the staff who were directly involved in the project from the start were laid off and most of the training achievements was lost.

Due diligence was conducted in order to:

- Confirm that the potential partners were what they appeared to be
- Identify potential "deal killer" defects in the new target beneficiary
- Avoid a bad transition
- Gain information that will be useful for further cooperation work; etc.

After this assessment was completed, the EUD managed to keep the project on track (see Lessons Learnt p. 67 above).

***Best Practice example: Jordan-Fight against Terrorism***

It must be noted that one of the most striking success stories was the twinning project with Forensic Laboratory Department of **Jordan’s** the Public Security Directorate, for the following reasons:

<sup>57</sup> According to the EUD, the project achieved the mandatory results as planned, which was made possible because the Work Plan had been very well prepared and allowed for the easy transfer of results and activities to the new incumbent. However, the Evaluators have followed the statements made by the PL and RTA met with during their field visit to Ukraine, i.e. the mandatory results were not achieved as planned as at cut-off date for this Report (May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011). Corrective actions were undertaken to keep the project on track and achieve the mandatory results as planned by completion date.

- The activities indicated in the Work Plan were realistic, systematised, strategic, and were based upon a gap analysis and had a clear objectives and mandatory results. They met the expectations and needs expressed by the beneficiary. A Training Needs Assessment (TNA) was carried out by Northern Ireland experts and was fine-tuned in order to have a balanced work plan within the timeframe set for the project
- The activities were completed within the deadlines, although there were a few delays that were mitigated by project completion.
- The achievement of results was good, as 100% of the targets were reached, and a few results even exceeded the initial targets (110%), while a few activities were only 70% completed. This was due to the quality of EU and BC partners, good cooperation, immediate mutual understanding and efficient planning (*Efficiency*). This helped save funding on unused budget, which was reallocated to additional, unplanned activities
- The available resources, with very few exceptions, were optimal to achieve the mandatory results and one of the only shortcomings was the funding of expensive consumables for training sessions
- Twinning partners were able to achieve the planned activities within the allocated time and funding. For example, the financial resources were fully absorbed and managed in such a way that extra man-days were allocated and study visits were conducted within the deadlines
- Last but not least, the beneficiary is a technical department (forensic police) that really found its EU counterpart.

JC2 - Day-to-day management (budget, staff, information, activities, logistics, flexibility, risks, absorption capacity, political commitment, etc.) has been adequate in fulfilling the twinning project objectives

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion must be improved. Overall, as regards day-to-day management, there is room for improvement: better fine-tuning, better communication and more pro-activeness could be demonstrated not only during the preparation phase, but also during the implementation phase. This could be achieved through better monitoring and quality assurance procedures.

In too many cases, activities were not delivered as initially planned in the twinning contract and/or in the work plan and results were not fully achieved, even if there was room for flexibility. That was the case of twinning projects where the involved BAs demonstrated insufficient absorption capacity, were politically unstable and/or were facing high staff turnover. This also had a serious effect on *Impact* (see EQ 4 hereinafter) and *Sustainability* (see EQ 5 hereinafter).

A vast majority (approx. 80%) of beneficiaries indicated in the evaluation questionnaires that all their mandatory results had been achieved 100%. After discussing this point with them during the face-to-face interviews, the Evaluators pointed out that in most cases max. 70% achievement was a more realistic figure, which is also closer to the perception of the EUDs, several PAOs and also the RTAs interviewed. It appeared that several results could not be achieved during the implementation phase for several reasons:

- In most cases, these were minor mandatory results and were not absolutely necessary for the successful outcome of the project

- These results were simply no longer needed (e.g. they were absorbed into other results and achieved through the activities related to the other results)
- The often minor results could not be achieved because the related activities were not conducted due to time or budget constraints
- The conditions were not fulfilled to achieve the mandatory results as planned: the local context was not appropriate; the national counterpart was unavailable and of low level and the legal framework was not in place (this is linked closely to the assumptions and risk assessment).

However, the Evaluators argued that achieving above 70% of the mandatory results indicated in project fiches was a far more realistic success indicator.

**Communication** and **relations** between the stakeholders has generally been rather good and even very good between MS RTAs and RTA Counterparts, which is one of the conditions for ensuring successful implementation and the achievement of results. It was noted that a small number of RTAs were replaced for private reasons and for irreconcilable differences with RTA Counterparts and/or the BA's hierarchy. However, the Evaluators also noticed some competition in the relations between EUDs and PAOs. For example, in several countries under decentralised management mode (ENP-South), EUDs are running the risk of being sidelined by PAOs, because PAOs tend to take for granted that, once funding has been received on their respective accounts, they no longer need to report to EUDs. Although this trend is compatible with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and even desirable, the Twinning Instrument also runs the risk of seeing different twinning practices emerge in the ENP Region. Moreover, it must never be forgotten that programming is an activity normally conducted by EUDs and PAOs together. This should therefore be carefully examined.

For example, in Azerbaijan, which normally operates under centralised mode, the PAO wants to play the exclusive interface role between its TA support project to the PAO (ITTSO), the EUD, the line ministries and the direct beneficiaries. This has caused delays and other difficulties in the past. To avoid this, the PAO should more systematically share information (project outputs, case studies, surveys, etc. produced by the twinning activities) with the EUD, ITTSO, the relevant beneficiaries and line ministries and also within its home organisation (Ministry of Economic Development - MED). The PAO should ideally keep the highest profile possible - it could be more appropriately supervised by a Minister or the Cabinet of Ministers. Moreover, the Evaluators are also of the opinion that the PAO Director should be more involved in Twinning, at least in the programming phase<sup>58</sup>.

Generally, project **preparation** and **implementation** has been supported adequately by Commission HQ, EUDs and PAOs whenever issues arose. The decisions related to project management, including corrective actions, were made early in order to prevent any implementation delay. However, those decisions and corrective actions were not always carried out by the addressees.

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<sup>58</sup> It must, however, be noted that the situation has greatly improved since the new ITTSO II project started (end-2011). This has been mostly due to the pro-active involvement of ITTSO-II in programming, which was not the case under ITTSO-I.

***Best Practice example: Twinning projects in Morocco must comply with a well-established procedure, which also applies to all PAOs/UGPs:***

- 1) Before funding is approved by the Steering Committee, the PAO ensures with the potential beneficiary that the proposed reform is valid for implementation through a twinning project and drafts a concept fiche
- 2) Once all checks have been carried out (compliance with the thematic Sub-Committee's decisions, the Association Agreement, the ENP Action Plan and regulatory convergence<sup>59</sup>), an expert mission is mobilised in order to complete the identification phase and the formulation of the project fiche.
- 3) Only after the various stakeholders (beneficiaries, thematic DGs, PAO and EUD) have been consulted, the finalised fiche is subject to a call for proposal and distributed to the 27 EU MS contact points.

This Best Practice example illustrates the clear and systematic approach adopted by Morocco's PAO and the EUD, in preparing and implementing the twinning activities. Although the other countries have their own approach, Morocco is the only ENP Country visited, where this clear and systematic approach has been adopted by the PAO, so far in good cooperation with the EUD, in preparing and implementing the twinning activities.

The other issues related to political commitment, absorption capacity, risks, procurement and staffing have been dealt with in the analysis of *Relevance*.

A number of constraints, other than those related to time and funding, affected project implementation negatively, but eventually had a low impact on efficiency and effectiveness, as most results were achieved and most objectives were fulfilled as planned. Those constraints have been described in the analysis of *Effectiveness* in Section 5.1.2 above.

JC3 - The twinning project costs were justified against, and the budgets available and proportionate to the benefits generated (best value for money)

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is not satisfactory for all projects. There are still several significant uncertainties left unanswered in terms of budget use, e.g. with a few activities over-budgeted and under-budgeted. In this respect, the central role of PAOs is not yet well fulfilled.

Funding was not always *efficiently* spent for three major reasons: (i) in many projects of our sample, several activities were cancelled (through side letters) and funds were spent on other purposes; (ii) other activities could not be implemented for various reasons; (iii) a few activities had been either over-budgeted or under-budgeted, which was inadequate to the

<sup>59</sup> Term which is used in Morocco instead of EU approximation, as Morocco has moved from the "demand-driven approach" (P3A-I and P3A-II), which is very important for project ownership, to a more targeted and focused approach (P3A-III) within the framework of the thematic aspects to deal with under the Advanced Status. Therefore speaking of a regulatory convergence strategy is plainly justified as there is a thematic priority vision. The Advanced Status does not consist in any signed or ratified agreement. However, it allows Morocco to enter into a new, wider and comprehensive framework.

project format and the real needs; and (iv) effective procedures for project preparation purposes are too manifold, too complex, redundant; the process is too long process and involves too many actors and experts, which makes it far too costly. Hence the low level of *Efficiency*.

For example, the average project preparation phase takes two years. Moreover, the GAFI project in Egypt was delayed for a year. The Work Plan (Objectives and Mandatory Results) was revised with the RTA. There was no Inception Report. The main issues were that the Work Plan and Project Fiche were too detailed (not the objectives, which were adequate). There were problems with the activities and difficulties to reallocate budgets, even if, as the Evaluators pointed out, the reason for having so detailed Project Fiches and Work Plans was to establish the budget as precisely as possible.

Total budgets are in principle calculated on the basis of needs formulated and activities identified and validated by all stakeholders against the mandatory results to be achieved. However, it must be noted that the EU MS increasingly propose RTAs from mandated bodies with very high costs (now ranging from € 9,000 to 11,000 with the RTA's net salary accounting for 50%) and Cat.II STEs costing € 350 to € 450 only per day, which of course has repercussions on budgets and also tends to irritate the beneficiaries. Conversely, the budgetary provision for fees paid to an RTA for a project implemented in Azerbaijan was adjusted through an addendum to the twinning contract, in accordance with the Common Twinning Manual's rules and procedures (see Section 5.3.1 to the Manual - pp. 70-71). The mistake was due to a misunderstanding by the MS consortium leader of the rules applying to officials from other MS administrations. This was an exceptional situation. Otherwise the budget was appropriate.

In addition, the project preparation phase is a complex and lengthy process, involves a lot of stakeholders and, overall, is also very costly. Taking the project preparation phase into account, we can safely state that *Efficiency* has been undermined by the cumbersome mobilisation of resources and also by extra costs, which a TA project does not have to bear in achieving quasi-identical results.

However, as was indicated in the *Relevance* section, as long as there is no clear, comprehensive strategy, there is no adequate way to objectively determine the right budget that should be allocated to a project. Therefore external experience may be utilised for defining the budget of the various twinning projects (enlargement, IPA, etc).

Therefore EUDs and PAOs must keep a close eye on *Efficiency*-related issues. Recommendations have been formulated in Chapter 7 hereinafter to improve project *Efficiency*, more particularly rules, procedures and cost-related issues.

However, the situation is not as bleak as it could seem, because the situation is improving. Although Twinning is a rather costly instrument<sup>60</sup>, it must be noted that all expenses include preparation costs as well as BA and MS costs, EUD/EC costs. However, the comparative advantage of Twinning e.g. over TA in respect of institutional capacity building and legal approximation remains unmatched by TA. For example, in Azerbaijan, where formal procedures, hierarchy and civil service are of utmost importance, the active involvement of a

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<sup>60</sup> Here the Evaluators refer to the "Twinning Instrument's management and project preparation costs" and do not attempt to compare costs incurred for civil servants with those for TA.

civil service official and benchmarking with an EU institution are essential. This explains why Twinning has been rather successful in the country and the response of line ministries increasingly enthusiastic. Therefore the activity costs are justified against the twinning benefits that they have generated. This observation is also valid for the other ENP countries.

Moreover, in Jordan, the PAO indicated that the average budget of a first generation twinning project was € 1.5 million against € 1 million for the upcoming projects, which reflects better rationalisation of the use of funding against the activities.

***Best Practice examples: Morocco-Competition and Tunisia-Administrative Court***

In **Morocco** for example, the Competition-related project had a total budget of € 1,500,000, of which approx. 83% was spent (i.e. € 1,240,500). In addition to the PAO's policy to save resources by pooling several activities together, such as the study tours, by getting cheaper air fares, or by making adequate STE category changes, the unspent balance stems from modifications to several activities, which were considered outdated or irrelevant after the implementation phase started, more precisely Component 2, and also from strategic adjustments of activities (Component 1).

In **Tunisia**, thanks to a 50% discount off air flights negotiated between Tunis Air and the PAO, two additional activities could be conducted by the Administrative Court.

All this also underlines the crucial role played by the PAO as the beneficiary country's guarantor for the application of twinning rules and procedures, taking into account external factors, in order to get best value for money in achieving project objectives.

JC4 - The quality of available MS expertise (incl. study tours, monitoring, quality assurance) was sufficient

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is highly appreciated and very satisfactory. Although RTAs could be better prepared, given their crucial role in achieving implementation success, mandatory results and project objectives, EU MS expertise is widely recognised and greatly appreciated in the ENP Region. Although Study Tours could also be better prepared, more particularly by the MS partner institutions, they are very much appreciated by the BAs as they bring significant credibility to the know-how transfer process. Not all ENP Countries have an effective monitoring and quality assurance system in place.

The very nature of the twinning activities to be conducted has required the intervention of EU MS institutions as well as mandated bodies.

In principle, a twinning project is awarded to an EU MS partner not only on the basis of the quality of the proposals submitted, but also and above all on the basis of the CVs of MS PLs, RTAs and other key experts, whose quality in terms of skills and experience plays the decisive role in the proposal selection process. Therefore, a first evaluation of the CVs of MS PLs, RTAs and other experts, which have been submitted under each proposal, is carefully carried out by the respective Evaluation Committees in each ENP Country (see footnote 31 to this Report). A second evaluation of the MS PLs, RTAs and other experts also takes place in the country on the basis of a face-to-face interview with the RTAs and a slide presentation of the respective proposals by each of the project teams to the Evaluation Committee.

Moreover, in Morocco, for example, a third evaluation of the experts is also carried out during project implementation. The PAO carefully checks all the modifications related to the replacements of experts, which are based upon side letters. The PAO checks the content of those side letters and, if necessary, notifies the stakeholders of its reserves regarding an expert's performance and requests an ad hoc evaluation of that performance.

Although delivery capacity issues were raised by several beneficiaries (see "Constraints" in Section 5.1.2.1), overall MS expertise has been widely recognised and greatly appreciated in all the ENP countries visited (90 % of the direct BA beneficiaries), notwithstanding the RTA's citizenship. In this respect, all answers were unanimously positive and no stakeholder ventured to give ratings to individual EU MS expertise.

Whenever the quality of expertise did not fulfil the expectations of the beneficiary, the issue was immediately discussed with the MS partner and the PAO. However, only in very few cases (only one occurrence in our sample) was an RTA replaced because of inadequate skills and/or profile. However, the replacements were eventually considered as very satisfactory by the beneficiaries.

Compared to traditional cooperation work that generally focuses on expert deliverables, the Twinning Instrument provides the BA with great learning resources and opportunities, as it directly accompanies the implementation of tasks by the BA with a peer-to-peer approach, which translates into legal transposition/approximation, technical support to the elaboration of specifications and also significant know-how capitalisation.

The quality of the expertise delivered by EU MS RTAs has been very important, as some expertise was available only in the EU MS civil service. The vast majority of the RTAs selected were excellent in that their commitment was serious and their competence indisputable.

The role played by EU MS RTAs is critical to achieving success during the implementation phase. Direct BA stakeholders also indicated that RTAs should ideally combine 3 types of skills: i) technical expertise, which should be related directly to their twinning assignment; ii) sufficient project management experience; iii) and good communication skills in order to deal with various categories and levels of partners/stakeholders.

In addition to having those qualities, the best RTAs were also those who had a very good personal network of short-term experts, previous experience in Twinning and/or previous experience in the beneficiary country (previous direct exposure to the BC's cultural differences). The observation on previous Twinning experience would tend to somehow contradict the principle according to which an EU MS civil servant is not allowed to apply for an RTA post more than three times. However, this third assignment as RTA will be possible only under specific and restrictive conditions described in the Common Twinning Manual (Revised 2009) – Section 2.2.2.d "RTA – Duration of Secondments"<sup>61</sup>. These conditions have been created mainly to avoid the "professionalisation" of RTAs.

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<sup>61</sup> See Common Twinning Manual (Revised 2009) – Section 2.2.2.d "RTA – Duration of Secondment".

RTAs represent sectoral competence. According to Tunisia's PAO, RTAs should be managers first, which is not really accurate. However, the Evaluators and the EUD Twinning Coordinator indicated that the RTA Evaluation Grid specified that RTAs were first of all Sectoral Experts and then Managers. Nevertheless, although BAs are keener to get competent technical experts, good project managers and communicators are often better appreciated by their respective BAs, because they are perceived as "can-do" persons.

Practice has also shown that with EU MS advice the equipment supplied is of higher quality, given the MS experts are already familiar with the latest state-of-the-art and best value-for-money options against real needs.

The beneficiaries also want to keep the mix of RTAs from new and old EU MS. This request was voiced more particularly in the ENP-East (Ukraine and Azerbaijan). Given their common Soviet past, RTAs from new EU MS, more particularly Bulgaria and the Baltics for example, experience no language-related communication problems in the ENP-East, as a substantial number of public officials are fluent in Russian and, in the case of Slavic countries, because of language proximity.

However, several beneficiaries mentioned the following weaknesses in respect of EU MS expertise:

- The RTAs were not involved in the preparation of project activities
- During the twinning preparation phase, the mobilisation of FWC STEs often takes too long or is too cumbersome
- RTAs were not trained sufficiently in their respective beneficiary's national/regional contexts
- Several monitoring reports indicated that the number of experts and activities was sometimes too high, which is a deviation from the Twinning scope.
- RTAs were sometimes former private sector employees, which did not fulfil Twinning's "peer-to-peer" objective. For example, laws must also be drafted by lawyers, attorneys-at-law, law professors, judges, etc. who have hands-on experience and expertise, and not private consultants.
- Morocco's PAO pointed out that any twinning consortium may include a mandated body. However, it is imperative to give the priority to the corresponding public thematic / sectoral organisations in the EU Member States.
- Ukraine's Accreditation Agency and several other beneficiaries complained that their experts, including RTAs, were neither civil servants, nor permanent employees of mandated bodies. Although the quality of expertise was well perceived, several beneficiary organisations, e.g. the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine, have repeatedly voiced requests to involve more employees of the relevant EU MS institutions. In the case of accreditation, MS partners responded that EU MS accreditation agencies had very limited permanent staff and relied on external / freelance assessors and experts. Therefore EU MS staff were not available.
- When an RTA resigns or must be replaced, the recruitment procedure is launched once again, which is a time-consuming process.
- Usually, after an RTA's departure upon project completion, hardly any follow-up action is conducted, which may undermine a project's sustainability. The ACAA project in Tunisia and the EUD in Azerbaijan raised this issue. The Evaluators are of the opinion that RTAs could stay in place longer for objective follow-up reasons. Nevertheless, follow-up actions can also be undertaken through TAIEX and classical

TA, but not with a 2<sup>nd</sup> twinning project, which may never be the achievement of the 1<sup>st</sup> project.

- The Evaluators indicated that the right level of expertise was not always available in MS institutions, as has been the case with accreditation in Ukraine.
- Citizenships of RTAs and EU MS are not diversified sufficiently, especially in those ENP-South Countries where French has been the second language for a long time. For example, in Tunisia, 13 out the 18 projects under P3A-I, i.e. roughly 75%, were awarded to France. The other EU MS partner countries were Finland, Spain, Italy and Germany. Greece and the United Kingdom were not selected.
- In Jordan, the Forensic Laboratory Department's BC PL indicated that RTAs and STEs must be top people. Otherwise, they lose their credibility and tarnish the reputation of their institutions.
- Several beneficiaries, e.g. in Tunisia, complained that the RTA's mission and contribution were not defined sufficiently clearly/precisely within the framework of the assignment.
- EU MS experts tend to only put forward their own institutional models. As a result, given the wide range of EU MS models and experience, there is a risk of increasingly obvious inconsistency between the various sectors and experiences available. Therefore a strategy is also necessary from this point of view: what experience and what model for what beneficiary country?
- Training sessions were sometimes not sufficiently well coordinated and MS experts were not managed sufficiently closely by RTAs. The role of RTAs is to coordinate the experts and their timetables with a specific agenda and concrete messages.
- It would be a good idea to involve all PLs in Steering Committee meetings. Actually, not involving PLs and BC PLs in the Steering Committees (SC) is a serious deviation from the twinning rules and procedures, as they must conduct the SC meetings.
- For example, in one ENP country, one RTA took more time than initially planned to settle in the country (three months instead of one) and then was entitled to a 6-week leave for personal reasons. The human factor must be taken into account better during the project design phase, because it may seriously undermine the whole machinery. A Plan B must always be at hand for appropriate and timely arrangements for replacing RTAs. Finally, as a result, the project in question got a three-month extension.
- Preparation of RTAs leaves to be desired as regards report drafting, environment awareness, financial report drafting, consistency and resistance to improvement. Moreover, several RTAs interviewed argued that the two-day training workshops organised for them in Brussels was insufficient. Upon arriving in their respective countries, most RTAs struggle with positions, roles, procedures, job descriptions, task distribution, etc. EUDs often pointed out that the current twinning approach was based upon gradual learning.
- It was also reported that several RTAs felt discouraged by sometimes high staff turnover occurring within a few BAs. They are reluctant to train civil servants who will leave to another department or unit with their home administration, or will join the private sector after a while. As a result, the skills acquired through training are lost and the project achievements cannot have any impact or sustainability.

Recommendations have been formulated in Chapter 7 hereinafter to improve RTA performance in delivering EU MS expertise.

Several beneficiaries, PAOs, EUDs and the Evaluators agreed that Twinning could be a good career springboard for RTAs. Several RTAs have managed to set up an efficient contact system through networking, which has enabled them to be promoted within their home administrations upon their return. However, the Evaluators raised the issue that most RTAs were too often sidelined, once they returned to their home organisations, and it was very difficult for them to adapt to circumstances that had changed in their absence. In the same spirit, EU MS institutions also have difficulty reintegrating their RTAs.

### **Study Tours**

All stakeholders (100%) unanimously recognised the importance of study tours and the benefits that could be yielded. They are very keen on this activity, in respect of which there have been high expectations in exposing ENP nationals to EU best practices and also for inter-institutional and professional networking purposes.

EUDs and PAOs are fully aware that study tours are highly appreciated by the beneficiaries, sometimes for other purposes than those described in the project fiche. Nevertheless, they also acknowledge that this activity is crucial to expose ENP nationals to other environments and practices. However, study visits must not be the core activity of a twinning project, but rather one of the Work Plan's activities, with a specific objective, an agenda focusing on technical issues and participants carefully selected. The number of study visits must be limited and must never take place at the start of a project.

However, the stakeholders have made the following observations:

- A comprehensive gap and needs analysis should be carried out beforehand because of the “unbelievable character”, at least as perceived by Ukrainian trainees, of the EU MS institutions.
- Study tours offer the participants an excellent opportunity for other culture and real-life best practice exposure. They are very useful for networking and coaching purposes, and also to feel the “pulse”.
- However, the right persons must be picked up, as it was reported that on a few occasions, PAOs and beneficiaries had selected the wrong participants in terms of competence, motivation, status and even age. Participants in study tours must be selected jointly by EUDs, PAOs, RTAs and beneficiaries and the selection must be substantiated.
- For example, it offers Ukrainians an opportunity to feel more European.
- Almost all stakeholders were unanimously interested to participate in study tours.
- In Morocco, whenever a senior civil servant has an opportunity to go abroad for professional purposes, including training activities, they commit themselves to not leaving their department and to transferring their newly acquired skills and knowledge to their home institutions (e.g. comprehensive mission reports, debriefings, etc). “Anti-tourism” measures have been put in place. This is also related to the participant's commitment to the project.
- Jordan's Public Security Directorate indicated that a few study tours were very useful, while others were not that useful in that they did not bring anything new skills to the participants. Agenda and logistics could be improved. Timing must also be carefully considered.
- In several ENP countries, study tours are now assessed carefully. For example, participants from the State Statistics Committee were requested to present a very comprehensive report to the Statistics Committee Board and to propose additional

relevant activities to enhance the know-how transfer process. The study tours are sometimes much better, i.e. more useful, than the training activities themselves.

- As for the standardisation project in Azerbaijan, study tours were not so much needed at the beginning of the project. First, the workload was enormous. Second, the RTA and the laboratories were already on site. As a result, all study tours were postponed to the end of the project.
- Study tours strengthen project ownership and impact.
- The GAFI project in Egypt indicated that study tours should take longer than 3-5 days if the major concern is sustainability.
- Language problems may arise with study tours.
- The main weakness of Study Tours is obviously the relatively limited duration and number of participants. Therefore Study Tours shall never substitute for “Train the Trainers” approach.
- Tunisia’s Administrative Court pointed out that study tours were indispensable for awareness-raising purposes, as there has been difficulty getting out of theoretical training: *workshops are insufficient without real case studies*.

However, although the Evaluators are also convinced that study tours yield good results and benefits, they also argued that although study tours usually motivate BAs and more particularly BA staff, the objective of twinning projects is of course not to give the priority to study tours. The Evaluators concluded that study tours were an activity that must be continued, all the more so as inter-institutional, peer-to-peer interaction with real-life EU MS partners is far better than interaction with private sector consultants who disappear after a while.

### **Project Monitoring and Quality Assurance**

The idea of Twinning rests upon the full involvement of all stakeholders from project identification to completion (and even after completion), with the exception of the RTAs who are not involved in the identification and design phase. Project ownership (see also EQ 1 and EQ 5) normally depends on the active involvement of the beneficiaries in the preparation and implementation phases.

#### ***Best Practice examples: Morocco and Ukraine – Monitoring / Quality Assurance***

**In Morocco**, an ex post evaluation mission for the whole programme has been put in place in order to check the efficiency of the proposed methods and the degree of absorption of beneficiaries, the ultimate goal being the achievement and sustainability of mandatory results.

**In Ukraine**, three types of monitoring have been put in place: 1) monitoring for the Quarterly Steering Committee meetings. It must be noted that the internal project monitoring principles were developed with the assistance of the “Implementation of Twinning Operations” project, which was completed in 2009 and whose guide is available to interested parties; 2) external result-oriented monitoring of project implementation; and 3) follow-up actions carried out jointly by the stakeholders, including the PAO and EUD. Besides, the PAO also monitors the beneficiary institution’s preparation for the implementation phase before the project starts.

However, the internal monitoring system could be improved and streamlined in addition to the ROM function. For example, Morocco’s Customs Administration observed that it had

never received the ROM Reports. In Azerbaijan, on-the-job training in follow-up evaluation has been delivered by ITTSO and not the PAO itself. ITTSO has assisted the PAO in the follow-up (not to be mixed up with the ROM process) of the ongoing twinning projects by reviewing and discussing the regular project reports and by preparing the project feedback for the Steering Committee meetings.

In addition to the ROM process, the EUD also suggested that internal monitoring should be carried out by the RTAs for all activities together with an analysis grid annually.

#### ***Best Practice examples: Azerbaijan – Monitoring and Training Validation***

The RTA's team to the Statistics project in Azerbaijan has already developed an internal monitoring system. This has provided interesting feedback to the Steering Committee and the results are published in the project's newsletter. A section dedicated to the Steering Committee provides concise feedback on progress achieved by the project in terms of activities, which were carried to the cut-off date indicated. The activities are briefly presented in figures and by components. This approach offers a very useful picture of the project as it stands up to the cut-off date.

It must also be noted that, as the Evaluators have found, not all the ENP countries visited have sufficiently developed this type of systematic monitoring and quality assurance tools. For example, training workshop validation questions initially dealt only with logistics in Azerbaijan. For internal monitoring purposes, the EUD requested the RTAs to introduce open quality assessment questions to be filled in by the trainees and to be added to the standard EuropeAid Training Unit's reaction sheet (see Annex 7-A to this Report). Annex 7-B shows that the project with the State Statistics Committee in Azerbaijan has turned EuropeAid's standard reaction sheet into an improved document better adapted to its needs. This form is also attached to the Interim Quarterly Project Reports. A brief internal monitoring report is attached to all the Quarterly Reports with explanatory diagrams and charts, which has also proved to be useful for ROM missions.

As far as Egypt's PAO was aware, the experts used training validation questionnaires to assess the training sessions, but it was not clear whether the normally ensuing validation reports were compiled afterwards. The GAFI project in Egypt developed a Training Roadmap, but failed to put a real Quality Assurance system in place. There were questionnaire-based training validation surveys but only on a sporadic basis. There was no validation report. However, the project with Jordan's Public Security Directorate assessed the quality of training courses and validation reports were drafted.

#### ***Best Practice example: Morocco-Quality Assurance of Training Sessions***

In **Morocco**, training sessions are evaluated immediately after they are completed ("instant training evaluation feedback" – "évaluation à chaud") and also 6-7 months later ("delayed training evaluation feedback" – "évaluation à froid"). The second evaluation usually reveals that training sessions contained too much literature and not enough practical case studies adapted to Morocco's realities. Tunisia's Quality Assurance system is limited to some informal interviews with the experts and to the use of some satisfaction fiches in training workshops.

Therefore, given the various Quality Assurance practices in each ENP Country visited, an identical and systematic Quality Assurance system could be put in place for all ENP countries. An evaluation survey in the form of a questionnaire consisting of 5 to 7 questions could be carried out by RTAs after each training component has been completed. This questionnaire would be distributed to the trainees.

Although this Evaluation does not intend to put forward recommendations for improving Quality Assurance of training activities, we would like to propose this best practice example:

***Best Practice example addressed to all EUDs, PAOs/UGPs and BAs:***

The questions would cover the following aspects:

- Professionalism of the speaker
- Quality of the reader and other training material
- Quality of pedagogical methods
- Quality of logistics (time allowed for workshop, schedule of workshop, etc)
- Relevance of the workshop to the BA’s twinning activities
- Novelty of the workshop (content & approach)

Space would be left for comments after each item. A rating system from “Excellent” (5), “Good” (4), “Sufficient” (3), “Poor” (2) to “Very poor” (1) would be used (See “Validation Survey Grid” below) and an Overall Performance Rating expressed in % would be issued. On the basis of the results of this type of survey, RTAs would prepare a concise validation report. This Report would include conclusions and recommendations and would also propose corrective actions planned. This would facilitate monitoring and also help RTAs evaluate their performance, adapt to the audiences and improve the quality of their next interventions and training material.

The same type of validation grid can also be used to assess **Study Tours to the EU MS**.

***Validation Survey Grid***

<b>1. Professionalism of the speakers</b>	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Comments:</b>					
<b>2 Quality of the READER material</b>	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Comments:</b>					
<b>3. Quality of logistics (invitation, venue, refreshments, time allowed for workshop, scheduling of workshop, etc)</b>	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Comments:</b>					
<b>4. Relevance of workshop to your activity</b>	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Comments:</b>					
<b>5. Novelty of workshop (content &amp; approach)</b>	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Comments:</b>					

### ***Overall Performance Rating***

	Excellent, %	Good, %	Sufficient, %	Poor, %
Workshop N				

**Early Warning:** although the situation has been improving over time ever since Twinning was introduced into the ENP Region, supervisory stakeholders, namely EUDs and PAOs, must keep and continue keeping a close eye on all *Efficiency*-related project management aspects, more particularly the adequacy of resources mobilised and corrective actions.

#### **5.1.4 Impact on the Acquis, institutional capacity, legal approximation**

**EQ 4:** To what extent have twinning activities contributed to capacity building, legal approximation (EU Acquis) and institutional modernisation in the ENP Region?

This question is fundamental as it addresses the *Impact* criterion, which is also referred to as *Outcome*, and also to some extent, *Cross-Cutting Issues* (see EQ 8 hereinafter) and *Communication & Visibility* (see EQ 10 hereinafter) As such, it exposes the relationship between the overall and immediate objectives and mandatory results, i.e. the extent to which the capacity building benefits received by the target beneficiaries have had a wider overall effect on a larger number of persons, institutions, authorities and/or actors in a sector, region or even country as a whole. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The analysis of the *Impact* criterion will be qualitative and quantitative whenever is appropriate. However, it must be noted that any particular twinning project is just one contribution to the wider outcome.

In addition, the main assumption is that the Mandatory Results of twinning activities are hardly ever aimed at in principle. Twinning is not a mere disbursement process. The achievement, impact and sustainability of Mandatory Results must always be measurable and measured in due course so that a sensible, substantiated decision can be made as to the fate of a project: stop or continue? The impact could be measured by applying weighted grades to each of the various stages reached by a given project in terms of impact.

Together with *Sustainability*, *Impact* is often considered as the most important criterion from a donor perspective. Therefore, this criterion will be rather comprehensively covered.

More particularly, this EQ covers the following points:

- Achievement and contribution of Mandatory Results to the Overall Objectives
- Wider effect on the functioning of beneficiary institutions and/or on the larger public

JC1 - Mandatory Results have been achieved as planned and have contributed to the achievement of Overall Objectives (AAs, CPAs, ENP APs, NIPs, etc)

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is not fully satisfactory and varies from one project to another. Although most Mandatory Results achieved have contributed successfully to the achievement of the AA, CPA and ENP AP overall objectives and notwithstanding the three exceptions highlighted, *Impact* has been at risk in a number of cases, which reflects a lack of strategic approach as indicated in the analysis of “*Relevance*”. *Impact* may also be affected by high staff turnover (see analysis of *Sustainability*), as was observed in 50% of the BCs. The likely “*Impact*” of twinning projects is not well enough defined during the design phase.

In most cases encountered in the ENP Region, twinning projects clearly contributed to the quasi-full achievement (at least 70%) of their mandatory results (as mandatory results should ideally be 100% achieved to have a full impact). In this respect, twinning projects have had a high *Impact* as they introduced major changes within beneficiary institutions, such as EU Acquis-related approximation, legal framework creation or modernisation, institution capacity building, legal reform (draft directives, norms, standards), etc. Within each project, several activities, albeit sometimes minor, could not be fully implemented. In those cases, *Impact* was rather limited.

Moreover, *Impact* may also be assessed through the number of new activities/projects adopted (or rejected) by the beneficiaries after project completion and/or through long-term approximation with EU Acquis.

However, *Impact* can also be very limited when absorption capacity is insufficient; when there is hardly any political and/or BA commitment; when there are too many and too broad results planned; when the local context or legal framework is not ready to accept and absorb the changes required by twinning projects; and when staff turnover undermines a project’s effects considerably. Therefore *Relevance* and *Impact* are clearly intertwined (see also the analysis of *Relevance* under EQ 1) in that *Relevance* directly affects not only the other criteria, but also more specifically *Impact*, and also, to some extent, *Sustainability*.

With few exceptions, the Mandatory Results achieved have, to a large extent, contributed to the achievement of the Overall Objectives set in AAs, CPAs, ENP APs, NIPs, etc. Besides, several beneficiaries (Morocco, Tunisia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine) expressed their gratitude for being given the opportunity to take part in twinning activities and indicated that Twinning was an “***accelerator of reform***” as the Instrument helped them increase capacity a lot faster without “having to reinvent the wheel”.

Given the importance of this criterion, this section provides an analysis of projects for each ENP Country where the Mandatory Results achieved contributed to the achievement of Overall Objectives. This list is not exhaustive.

### ***Ukraine***

The purpose of the Accreditation project was achieved in that the relevant skills were transferred to the beneficiary. Awareness and capacity building related to conformity assessment requirements in priority areas, more particularly those covered by the New Approach Directives<sup>62</sup>, were strengthened amongst Ukraine’s industrialists, manufacturers and national authorities. The capacities of the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine (NAAU) increased in assessing the competence of laboratories and of certification and

<sup>62</sup> See <http://www.newapproach.org/Directives/>

inspection bodies to ensure the fulfilment by Ukrainian industry and national authorities of EU and international conformity assessment requirements. Thanks to the project, the NAAU has been recognised in the field of accreditation of certification bodies by a Decision of the Multilateral Agreement (MLA) Committee of the European Cooperation for Accreditation (EA) of November 4<sup>th</sup>, 2009. The NAAU has also initiated a new twinning project “Further Development of the NAAU’s capacities according to EU Practices”. When the field interview for this evaluation was conducted in Ukraine, the project was still in the Call-for-Proposals stage. Most Mandatory Results have been fully achieved. The project has also contributed to strengthening the NAAU’s international cooperation with various accreditation organisations worldwide (e.g. EA, ILAC<sup>63</sup>, IAF<sup>64</sup>). However, this project cannot dramatically affect the economic, trade and social spheres because its duration (24 months) was too short. Notwithstanding that no legislation component was planned under this project, the Law of Ukraine “On Accreditation of Conformity Assessment Bodies” was analysed and this analysis will be taken into account in the draft law amending several legislative acts related to the accreditation of conformity assessment bodies. This project already has an *Impact* on Ukraine’s accreditation procedures and on related legislation.

The project with the School of Judges of Ukraine consisted of three mandatory results: initial training, testing and selection criteria, and on-going training. Within the framework of the initial training and testing of candidates for judges, secondary legislation was drafted and on-going training of judges will be conducted, e-learning/distance learning will be implemented at selected pilot courts. The *Impact* on the School of Judges is already being felt and the quality of Ukraine’s judiciary will be enhanced progressively.

### ***Morocco***

The ACAA project complies with Article 40 to the Association Agreement (AA), which stipulates that both parties to the AA shall implement the resources necessary to promote the application by Morocco of EU technical rules, procedures, standards and norms related to the quality of industrial products and that both parties have concluded an agreement on the mutual recognition of their products on the basis of those principles. Those intentions have equally been expressed in Articles 51 (Cooperation in the field of normalisation and conformity assessment) and 52 (legal approximation). In the field of technical regulations and of conformity assessment norms and procedures, the Action Plan establishes short- and medium-term actions as follows: “Point (23): facilitate market access for industrial products. Pursue the harmonisation of Moroccan legislation on industrial products with EU and international regulations and practices”. The *Impact* of this project lies in the proper preparation of Morocco’s relevant authorities for the ACAA.

### ***Jordan***

The project with Jordan’s Customs Administration brought the following results:

- Drafting of the 2008-2010 Strategic Plan:
  - Guidelines for the preparation of an HR Plan – drafted and approved
  - Guidelines for the development of a Customs Training Strategy – drafted and approved
  - Guidelines for strategic planning – drafted and approved
- Appointment of Special Committees for drafting new Article 41 of Customs Law and for introducing a wider system of simplified clearance procedures

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<sup>63</sup> International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation  
<sup>64</sup> International Accreditation Forum

- Implementation of the TIR Convention<sup>65</sup>, including the organisation of a regional seminar on TIR with the participation of WCO<sup>66</sup> representatives from the MENA Region<sup>67</sup>.
- Approval of a Manual on Memoranda of Understanding for the benefit of the business community.
- Approval by the Ministry of Finance of a wider restructuring of Jordan Customs involving all Directorates with anti-fraud functions (risk management and enforcement) with the creation of an intelligence Directorate.

The RTA, also a customs officer, confirmed in the questionnaire that during project implementation the BA made significant capacity building progress in areas covered by the project, more particularly Transit and TIR procedures, origin-related issues, intelligence capabilities, Inward Processing Relief<sup>68</sup> (IPR), human resources and strategic planning.

Therefore Jordan's customs system has been and is still being considerably upgraded, which highlights the *Impact* of this twinning project's essential contribution to the Customs Administration's reform.

### ***Azerbaijan***

The main results of the Statistics project have been focused mainly on EU legal approximation, statistical methods and EU best practices. The *Impact* of this project has been that the Results have not yet led to direct and immediate organisational changes, but are expected to do so after project completion. It must be noted that the Beneficiary has paid careful attention to the achievement of results, which have regularly been reported to the Board of Statistics by the BC PL. After each study, a report was presented and discussed. Specific decisions have been made on the basis of the reports and in most cases the Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee has adopted them as internal practices.

The twinning project with the Azerbaijani Parliament has achieved the following results, which have already had or will have a considerable and sustainable impact on its functioning, as follows:

- Creation of the European Affairs Unit under the International Department to provide recommendations on improving IT tools for building better cooperation between Parliament and the executive power
- Preparation of guidelines on EU approximation (approval may lead to amendments to the Parliament's Internal Procedure)
- Preparation of comments and amendments to the Constitutional Law on "Normative Legal Acts" (debated and approved by Parliament);

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<sup>65</sup> The Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) was made at Geneva on 14 November 1975 to simplify and harmonise the administrative formalities of international road transport. The TIR Convention or International Road Transport Convention was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (TIR stands for French "Transports Internationaux Routiers" or "International Road Transports"). As at 1 January 2006, there were 66 parties to the Convention.

<sup>66</sup> World Customs Organisation

<sup>67</sup> Middle East and North Africa

<sup>68</sup> IPR is a method of obtaining relief from Customs duties and VAT charges. The relief applies to goods imported from outside the EU, processed and exported to countries outside the EU. IPR provides relief to promote exports from the EU and assist EU companies to compete on an equal footing in the world market.

- Preparation of guidelines on an “Early Warning Mechanism” (approval may lead to amendments to several laws);
- Development the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) methodology (approval may lead to the adoption of a new law to regulate the RIA mechanism); and
- Creation of the Virtual European Union Information Centre on the Parliament’s webpage (operational).

### *Egypt*

The Statistics project with CAPMAS consisted of 5 components:

- Statistical policy and legislation
- Organisational reform
- Increasing statistical awareness
- Improvement of IT functions
- Development of several statistical areas

CAPMAS has developed concrete policies for data collection, data confidentiality, statistical production and dissemination. Those policies now also serve as internal guidelines. The future step in implementing those policies is to develop a National Development Strategy on Statistics that outlines Egypt’s statistical system and the roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors and also sets up short and long-term objectives for CAPMAS.

CAPMAS has also developed a draft law based upon the UN official statistics principles and the EU’s European Statistics Code of Practice. The next step is to submit the draft law to the thematic minister and the Cabinet. The new law will provide CAPMAS with the necessary authority for developing into the national coordinator of official statistics.

The structure and purpose of the new Consultative Committee have been agreed upon. The Committee is headed by CAPMAS President and will consist of 12-15 representatives of Egypt’s main statistical authorities. Two sub-committees will be set up: a scientific committee and a user’s committee.

CAPMAS carried out several statistics user surveys during project implementation. The results have been used for developing the action plans for statistics dissemination and awareness-raising purposes.

The new website of CAPMAS was launched on World Statistics Day (20 October 2010). Improvements to the website have integrated recommendations made for Components 3 and 4. The website provides a good overview of CAPMAS activities and also user-friendly access to statistical data. This website has been developed by CAPMAS staff (approx. 20 people). Employees from the regional offices have been involved in the work to create a “second line” of competences to be available in the future.

However, in spite of the training sessions conducted and progress already made, the *Impact* has been limited as CAPMAS has not been in a position to conduct its restructuring as far as it wanted due to its size and age. The major changes made regard the operations in the institution’s departments in addition to enhanced cooperation with Egypt’s various institutional statistical sources.

## **Tunisia**

The Mandatory Results of the Twinning Light<sup>69</sup> project with the Administrative Court were as follows:

- The Administrative Court's organisational aspects related were diagnosed/audited and adjustments were proposed.
- The Administrative Court's working methods and procedures were assessed and adjustments were proposed (e.g. better access to documentary databases).
- Manuals of procedures were developed:
  - Manual of Procedures for registering and ensuring the follow-up on applications for legal remedy
  - Manual of Procedures for studying advisory files and for substantiating court decisions
- Professional skills of the Administrative Court's judges were developed in fields pertaining to public management.

The audit of the Administrative Court's organisational aspect helped identify the need to create new first instance chambers. To that effect, two chambers were created and others will follow suit.

The examination of the Administrative Court's methods and procedures revealed the need to introduce several new techniques in order to shorten proceedings and allow the annulment of appeals for abuse of power. As a result, the Law on the Administrative Court of June 1<sup>st</sup>, 1972, was modified (see Organic Law N°2011-2 of January 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2011).

The assessment of needs in the field of information recommended digitising the library of jurisprudential records. A specific unit was created to that effect and aims to digitise all court decisions made since 1974 (when the Court became operational). The unit consists of 5 employees, 1 computer specialist and is supervised by 2 judges.

The Administrative Court's judges have been trained in the changes introduced essentially through workshops and study tours. In fact, out of a total 90 judges, 11 took part in study tours and over 70 in workshops. Most of them still hold the jobs for which they were trained.

### ***Lessons Learnt: Egypt-Water Quality Management; Ukraine-FDI Promotion; and Tunisia-Modernisation of the State Tax Service***

The following 3 cases are examples of what should never be done. Out of the 20 twinning projects selected in the evaluation sample, 3 projects must be isolated as exceptions to the rule, as their [wider] *Impact* has been clearly at risk for various reasons, as follows:

- ***Objectives were poorly defined or were overambitious***
- ***Various interests in the projects were contradictory (e.g. Twinning was used as a pretext for acquiring new equipment or the EU MS partner was imposed upon the BA)***
- ***Mandatory Results were not achieved as planned***
- ***Resources were lost, if not wasted***
- ***Absence of the impact really sought***
- ***Absence of available and adequate staff***
- ***Absence of a link to the AAs/CPAs/ENP Action Plans***
- ***Non-integration of the projects into the national public administration reform***

<sup>69</sup> Twinning Light projects do not have RTA Counterparts, nor a Work Plan, have a 6-month implementation phase, etc.

*process*

- *The more targeted a twinning project is (3-4 components max.), the more chances it has to be successful*
- *The more focused and technical a twinning project is, the more successful it is likely to be*

### **1) Water Quality Management in Egypt**

The Evaluation Committee awarded the project to an EU MS partner that the BA did not want. The project did not go awry entirely though, but relations between the BA, the PAO, the RTA and other experts were strained.

For example, after the Evaluation Committee awarded the project to the EU MS partner institution that the BA did not want, the BA was no longer very committed, nor very supportive. However, the EU MS partner and the PAO were very keen on the project. The direct beneficiary at MWRI was the Water Quality Unit. The project was then moved to the MWRI's Planning Unit. Therefore only during the 6<sup>th</sup> quarter did the project really start gaining momentum. It even managed to make up for part of the delays, which had been generated by a long period of inactivity, as very little activity had been conducted during the first 5 quarters.

As a result, there was no real joint cooperation. It was a one-sided project. There was no partnership, no incentive and no commitment. The MWRI is a large, overstaffed ministry, but there were no staff available for the project. The PAO indicated that it would have been better to halt the project for good.

Moreover, achievements may also mean "ticking the box" without ever reaching quality results. An addendum was prepared to have less ambitious results and to cut and fine-tune activities. But quality was completely left aside. Notwithstanding, the project's objectives remained relevant throughout implementation.

Finally, the project was quite big as it consisted of 3 large components, which were also too spread. Although overall 40 MRWI staff were trained by the project, the achievements were not really clear.

During the field interviews, the BC PL complained that very often, the level of expertise was not suitable. The distribution of tasks was inconsistent and linguistic abilities were insufficient. The experts who were replaced did not have the appropriate qualifications for the components either.

Notwithstanding the issues at stake, the Evaluators found at least three gross deviations from the Twinning's scope, as follows:

- The BA was more interested in the new equipment available through the project than in the twinning activities themselves
- The EU MS partner was imposed upon the BA
- This project pertained to classical TA rather than Twinning. There was also some confusion between Twinning activities and grants.

### **2) Ukraine's Foreign Investment Promotion**

As was suggested in the analysis of *Relevance*, this project's direct beneficiary "Invest Ukraine" under the Ministry of Economy and Development was absorbed by the State

Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Development (SAUID). In fact, the new SAUID was created after “NatsProekt” (National Project) was merged with SAUID, which itself results from the merger of SAUII, the former State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Innovation, with Invest Ukraine. Therefore SAUID is now the only new beneficiary of this project, not SAUID AND “NatsProekt” (see Decree of November 2010).

In other words, all the work carried out till June 2010 has partly been lost (e.g. hardly any impact, waste of resources – see also p. 67 above). 10-15 staff left the Agency after the decision to set up a new agency [SAUID and NatsProekt] was made in November 2010. The idea to merge NatsProekt with SAUID was politically motivated and the merging process has been difficult due to different mentalities, ideas, non-integration of the project into Ukraine’s Public Administration Reform process, etc. As of the cut-off date for this Report (May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011), the new agency had 3 staff, including 1 head and 2 deputies who formed SAUID’s FDI promotion department created to that effect. However, it should have approx. 100 staff consisting of a mix of “Invest Ukraine” with SAUII, the former State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Innovation. The competitive edge of the newly trained staff against the job descriptions is being reviewed at the moment. During the field phase, the BC PL explained to the Evaluators that a recruitment competition would be organised within the next two months.

The EUD managed to keep the project on track with the new beneficiary. However, although appropriate skills and knowledge will eventually be transferred to the new Ukrainian partner institution under the project, the likely *Impact* and also *Sustainability* of this project will remain uncertain, as “Ukraine Invest” has been under restructuring and any changes to the institution’s operational functioning may be introduced only in accordance with the presidential decree. Moreover, as institutional commitment has been weak, the project results risk being diluted after project completion so that there will be insignificant *Impact* against the investment of resources.

### **3) *Modernisation of the Ministry of Finance’s Tax Administration in Tunisia***

The project was inspired essentially by an analysis of worldwide best practices in the field of modern tax collection management and by conclusions formulated by IMF experts within the framework of a study ordered by the Tunisian authorities for the enhancement of Tunisia’s tax administration. The project was prepared in close cooperation with the various relevant services and beneficiaries, including:

- Directorate General for Taxes
- Directorate General for Tax Studies and Legislation
- Directorate General for Public Accounting, Collection and Recovery
- Computer Centre to the Ministry of Finance
- National School of Finance

The project was overall rather poorly prepared (see also the analysis of *Relevance*). Moreover, the project was also overambitious as there were a high number of project components (and as many mandatory results...) (12 according to EUD - 17 according to the BC PL) against the limited duration of the implementation phase.

The Evaluators raised the question as to how the project fiche could go through all the various review and clearance stages without ever being stopped or without the issue ever being raised. Besides, the results achieved under several components did not reach the

quality level expected by the Ministry of Finance. However, those results remain important in that they offer a platform for pursuing the intended objectives. The Evaluators argue that the high number of activities indicates a lack of focus and adequate strategy: one single project cannot possibly respond to all the needs expressed by a beneficiary. According to the BC PL, the implementation rate of twinning activities was “89%” – against 50% according to the PAO with 74% of the budget used – which is quite high given the high number of components and activities and the limited duration of the implementation phase. Moreover, although generally the EU experts (all of them were civil servants) invested their best competences in the project activities, several expectations of the Tunisian BA were sometimes poorly understood by the RTA, which led to implementation difficulties.

JC2 - Results achieved by twinning activities have had, are having or shall have a wider effect on the beneficiary institution and/or on the larger population in the target sector, region or ENP Country

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is partly satisfactory. However impressive the wider *Impact* may be or may have been, specific information related to the present and/or expected wider *Impact* has not been available easily, which reflects a certain lack of strategic consideration. Projects do not “end” with activity completion.

In several cases, it has not been possible to evaluate the wider *Impact* reliably on the beneficiary institution and/or the larger population. However, the following examples show to what extent the wider *Impact* was achieved.

### ***Ukraine***

The beneficiary confirmed that the level of competence within the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine (NAAU) increased significantly in the field of accreditation as a result of the project. For example, several methods and practices, which normally go with the accreditation process for conformity assessment bodies, were modified. The NAAU employees are not public civil servants in the official sense of term in Ukraine and therefore have a special status. Nevertheless, thanks to the project they have improved their activity and have so far integrated their new skills and knowledge into their work. The only downside lies in the staff turnover, which has been an issue for Ukraine’s public institutions. This situation has been caused for various reasons, including political. For example, although the project may be considered successful, the NAAU’s senior management was replaced, which also raises the issue of institutional commitment.

Project implementation with the School of Judges has directly *impacted* on the achievement one of the indicators defined for the Overall Objectives “Improved training and education of judges resulting in the improvement of the quality of verdicts/court decisions and judicial services”, as it contributes effectively to the progressive restoration of trust in the judicial system amongst the Ukrainian population.

### ***Morocco***

In addition to the Mandatory Results achieved, the twinning project with the Oriental Agency for Regional Development helped the creation of the “Centre de Ressources et de Services Euro-Méditerranéen (CERES)”<sup>70</sup> as a regional unit of the Agency. The Centre reflects the

<sup>70</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Resource and Service Centre

proximity policy implemented by the Oriental Agency for the benefit of regional operators. Its activities will be directed at civil society organisations, regional public institutions (e.g. public decentralised services, Wilaya, regional councils, provinces, municipalities and communes), enterprises, and also Academia and research centres. However, it must be noted that this project could have been implemented as a classical Technical Assistance project.

The project with Morocco's competition authorities achieved very good results. The executives of the two beneficiaries, namely the Division for Competition & Prices and the Competition Council, received solid training in competition law and economics. Moreover, senior judges and junior magistrates were trained in competition law and a Manual of Procedures was produced (800 copies) to provide them with further guidance and references. Further to study tours and international conferences organised in Morocco, competition authorities have developed a solid network of contacts with their EU partners, which helps them to take part actively in national and international debates over competition issues and also to conduct joint investigations with other competition authorities. Morocco's competition authorities have increased their visibility at national and international levels and regularly take part in the work of international organisations in charge of competition. Therefore it must be noted that the [wider] *Impact* goes beyond the project's objective.

### ***Jordan***

On the basis of a legal assessment as planned in the Twinning Fiche, the Audit Bureau's twinning team proposed a draft Law on upgrading Audit Bureau Law N°1/1995 and the Amending Law for the Audit Bureau N°28/2002 in order to carry out the Audit Bureau's legal upgrading to the maximum extent possible and thus comply with INTOSAI<sup>71</sup> Standards. In turn, this draft Law was submitted to the Legislation and Opinion Bureau (LOB) for review. The draft Law was then adapted according to Jordan's legal terminology. The LOB took the main provisions into consideration and incorporated them into the proposed amendments. However, this process has been going on for a while, as Parliament has been under pressure to finalise the new Election Law, which is the national priority at the moment. Moreover, the Audit Bureau expressed the need to continue with twinning activities under a second project. A request was submitted to SIGMA (see also Section on Complementarity/Coherence with other institution building instruments, including TAIEX and SIGMA) to help the Audit Bureau prepare for future long-term projects, more specifically as regards working procedures and work plan implementation.

The Public Security Directorate indicated that its twinning project developed the Forensic Laboratories Department (FLD) to EU standards for general forensic techniques, bomb disposal and bomb scene management. Jordan's police have now developed enough capacity to deal with forensic aspects of any future terrorist attacks. Moreover, the integration of ISO17025/2005 Quality System into the FLD has increased professional confidence in the validity of forensic analyses and therefore has also strengthened public trust in the objectivity of Jordan's criminal justice system. The new explosive and controlled chemicals analysis laboratory was established and its capacity strengthened in dealing with bomb attack scene investigation. EU-funded equipment supplied within the framework of twinning activities helped the FLD to save time and budget. The FLD hopes to obtain further funding to prepare for accreditation. As a result, this project has been successful as it has helped to upgrade the FLD considerably. *Impact* goes far beyond the project's objectives, as the image of the police

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<sup>71</sup> International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions

is being strengthened among the population and relations with counterparts in other countries are also improving.

### ***Azerbaijan***

The project has helped the State Statistics Committee to enhance its visibility and credibility through strengthened contacts with the Central Bank, the Tax Administration, the Insurance Fund, etc. in order to collect data for improving National Accounts estimates. Moreover, a training workshop has been organised for the staff of State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan in order to prepare for the implementation of the new approach to data collection in business statistics.

The PAO, ITTSO, the RTA and the beneficiary indicated that the project with the Azerbaijani Parliament, which was still on-going during this evaluation's desk and field phases, was expected to have a wider *Impact* in the long term not only on the Parliament's activities and staff (capacity building, EU Acquis approximation, structural reforms and political affairs), but also in the economic, trade, justice and social sectors, as follows:

- Amendments to the draft Law on Building Code and Building in the Cities Codes (finalised - pilot cases)
- Amendments to the draft Law on Reproductive Health and Family Planning (finalised - pilot case)
- Amendments to the draft Law on the Competition Code (under preparation – pilot case)

### ***Egypt***

The CAPMAS PL was of the opinion that the economic and social effects generated by the project will materialise only in the longer term when the effects of better statistical dissemination and data quality can be felt by private and public sector users. However, project results have had a good impact on CAPMAS, especially under Components 3, 4 and 5 (see Section 5.1.4.1 on Egypt above), which were already achieved by project completion. Results from Components 1 and 2 still needed to be approved by other Ministers and governmental organisations after project completion. This was delayed due to domestic events, namely the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. However, the restructuring of CAPMAS was limited due to its size and age. The major changes, which were carried out, regarded the institution's operations, in addition to the cooperation with Egypt's various statistics sources. The activities achieved significant results, including capacity building through various training workshops in cooperation with other institutions. It is also worth noting the various updates and developments introduced to the website, including metadata development and the business registration system.

### ***Tunisia***

The results achieved under the ACAA project with the Industry Promotion Agency (APII) have led to the following changes within the BA:

- Regulatory texts transposing EU directives have been initiated
- The notion of “management of EU directives” has materialised through a manual of procedures establishing “Who does What”, although this manual is not yet fully operational due to delayed equipment delivery.
- The website related to CE marking in Tunisia was updated after project completion and has helped establish contacts with industrialists
- Other impacts may emerge after the ACAA agreement is signed with the EU.

Given the specific objectives could not yet be reached fully (e.g. given equipment delivery delays), it is impossible to assess the expected effects precisely at this stage. However, several effects likely to impact on trade have been noted. For example, several industrialists contacted the project team through the website for further information on CE marking procedures and were provided with adequate assistance. This is important to help industrialists better understand European conformity assessment regulations and procedures and to comply with them. Therefore *Impact* has gone beyond the project's objectives and is sustainable and even irreversible.

The BA's civil servants have been trained in the changes introduced into the functioning of their organisation. However, given the specific nature of several thematic aspects (e.g. market surveillance), training needs have remained high and will be dealt with through other programmes and projects. Nevertheless, staff turnover may sometimes be an issue in terms of continuity within the new responsibilities generated by the changes/mutations linked essentially to the "Who does what" manual, which was developed within the framework of the management of transposed EU directives.

### **5.1.5 Sustainability, continuation of the activities after twinning completion**

**EQ 5:** To what extent are the results achieved by twinning activities likely to survive individual twinning project completion? *Are those results still operative after project completion?*

This question addresses the *Sustainability* criterion, which is usually considered as most important not only from a donor perspective, but also for all stakeholders. To some extent, this question also addresses *the EC-funded Institutional Twinning Instrument's Added Value to the institution capacity building effort* (see EQ7) in the ENP Region. Like *Impact*, this criterion is therefore extensively dealt with in this Report. *Sustainability* of the effects and results is primarily concerned with measuring to what extent the benefits of twinning activities are likely to continue after EU funding has stopped. This criterion also analyses whether the longer-term impact of twinning activities on the wider on-going institutional capacity modernisation and approximation processes in the ENP Region are sustainable at all in a target sector, region and/or country.

More particularly, this EQ covers the following points:

- Ownership of twinning objectives and achievements by the beneficiaries
- Effective and/or likely continuity of results, outcomes and impacts
- Continued political commitment and absorption capacity
- Degree of continued political commitment and absorption capacity
- Financial and economic perspectives

JC1 - Ownership of twinning objectives and achievements is ensured by the beneficiaries in a sustainable manner

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion varies from one project to another, from satisfactory to highly satisfactory. The situation in ENP-South and ENP-East as well as in each ENP Country is rather contrasted for various reasons: (lack of) continued political commitment and absorption capacity, low vs. high staff turnover, existence of Train-the-Trainers manuals, existence of continued funding for project results after completion, etc. (see next sections under EQ5 hereinafter).

This criterion addresses the issues of **project ownership** and also **accountability**. *Sustainability* depends very much on the core subjects of the twinning projects at stake. Moreover, there is so much more to the Twinning Instrument than a mere disbursement process. Serious accountability for each eurocent disbursed is also integral part of the twinning philosophy.

Since topics like global public administration reform, legal framework modernisation, profound organisational changes to the public service and other institutional capacity building aspects are usually dealt with through twinning projects, the results must necessarily be significant and also sustainable in the longer term in that they must ideally continue after EU funding has stopped (i.e. after project completion).

*Sustainability* has usually been high, more particularly whenever mandatory results were achieved and they fulfilled the identified needs (as mentioned earlier), and also whenever the beneficiaries were committed and absorption capacity was high. However, *Sustainability* has been undermined by staff turnover and may also have been seriously affected in several critical cases where this turnover was very high, political commitment was low during and after project implementation and appropriate funding was not earmarked to continue the results after project completion. In a few cases, *Sustainability* was also seriously at risk whenever the project was not well integrated into a country's administrative reform process or was not part of any comprehensive sectoral approach/strategy.

With *Impact*, *Sustainability* is usually considered as most important not only from a donor's perspective, but also for all stakeholders. To some extent, *Sustainability* also addresses the EC-funded Institutional Twinning Instrument's Added Value (see EQ7) to the institution capacity building effort in the ENP Region.

For example, in addition to technical know-how transfer, institutional twinning provides a great opportunity to establish real and sustainable ties between beneficiary administrations and their EU MS partners beyond the project implementation phase. It helps to strengthen partnerships and cooperation, which can only be confirmed through the increasing number of twinning projects launched and of new requests received by PAOs. Therefore Twinning is an excellent institutional capacity building instrument that has already proved itself in the access process with East European Countries and can only continue contributing to the ever-increasing convergence between the ENP Region and the EU.

A general comment made in all the ENP countries visited has been that as beneficiaries and EU MS partners are jointly responsible for the achievement of mandatory results, the direct involvement of ENP beneficiaries in activity implementation increases project ownership, capacities of beneficiaries and generates more *Sustainability*.

Given the importance of this criterion, but without being exhaustive, the project review per country below provides examples of likely and/or already *Sustainability* in terms of project ownership in each of the 6 ENP Countries visited.

### *Ukraine*

#### ***Lesson Learnt: Ukraine-FDI Promotion***

The RTA Counterpart to the FDI promotion project with SAUID, which absorbed the beneficiary “Invest **Ukraine**”, indicated that the new skills acquired through the twinning project are expected to be utilised after project completion. A process of knowledge and result accumulation is currently on-going and its integration is being planned. However, although the RTA Counterpart said that the number of employees working on the project from the start has not changed, the Evaluators are of the opinion that *Sustainability* is at risk, as most staff of Invest Ukraine were laid off after one year into project implementation.

The outcomes of the Accreditation project with the NAAU have been integrated into the BA’s functioning. The project has brought the NAAU closer to EU standards in the field of accreditation. This overall achievement as well as relations developed with other accreditation organisations worldwide, which were developed during the first project, will be strengthened through the second project, which was still in the Call-for-Proposals stage when the field phase of this evaluation was conducted.

### *Morocco*

The PAO insisted that the beneficiaries should commit themselves more ambitiously to *Sustainability* aspects. Here the changes brought about by the reform process through twinning activities must absolutely go together with know-how transfer. This requirement is normally specified in Twinning Contracts.

The Foreign Trade project with the Customs Administration ended on June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2008, and since then activities implemented as part of the twinning project have continued. For example, the number of economic operators approved by the Customs Administration has been growing steadily.

The progressive strengthening of EU-Morocco ties has been taking place simultaneously with the endogenous dynamics modifying public governance and institutional reform modes. (decentralisation, devolution<sup>72</sup>, civil society support, etc.), which, right from the start, were conceived to be compatible with EU and international good practices related to decentralisation issues. The Regional Development project with the Oriental Agency has provided valuable technical support to the Agency’s regional development structures and positioning within the framework of a rather complex social and economic system, where the challenges to the economy, peace and stability issued by international competition require a logical proximity approach focusing on results and efficiency. Although wider *Impact* and *Sustainability* are still difficult to measure, the Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Resources and

<sup>72</sup> ***Devolution*** refers to the transfer of competences for the management of European funds from the European Commission to the Delegations of the European Commission, whereas ***decentralisation*** refers to the process whereby management of European Union funds is delegated to the administrations of the beneficiary countries. It implies the setting-up of competent infrastructures by the beneficiary countries and effective control of fund management by the European institutions.

Services (CERES) has been set up in Oujda, Oriental Region, and will be operational as of 2011.

The results achieved by the project with the Competition authorities, more particularly the reform of Competition Law, are currently the Competition Council's main target to reform its own status. The approach and methods learnt from the twinning activities continue to be used in the BA's everyday tasks. Besides, EU MS partner organisations have maintained permanent contacts with the BA and are examining new cooperation avenues in the field of competition. Moreover, it must be noted that, when new competition law is brought into force, its effects will be irreversible, i.e. permanent with very long-term sustainability, which cannot even be measured

### ***Jordan***

According to the BC PL, the project on forensic laboratories with the Police Security Department (PSD) has significantly consolidated the knowledge and skills of the Forensic Laboratory Department in ISO17025/2005 (accreditation issues) and also its technical capacity to fight against terrorism and organised crime in Jordan, e.g. bomb scene investigations. The Evaluators agree with this assessment as the PSD BC PL had a clear strategy from the start and had very proactively identified the key areas of intervention. During the project implementation phase, the beneficiaries have demonstrated ownership of project outcomes that should be integrated smoothly into their functioning. Therefore results are expected to still be operational after project completion. However, although staff turnover has always been an issue for Jordan's public administration, as the level of salaries paid to civil servants is very low and incomparable to those offered in the private sector, it is very low in the PSD (given the specific nature of its activities), which also contributes to strong staff commitment and project ownership.

Intensive training was delivered under the three twinning projects and guidelines and manuals were prepared. Therefore even with its high staff turnover (except for the PSD), the BAs still retain capacity to implement the reforms started and/or use the new skills acquired during project implementation.

The results of the project with the Customs Administration are still operational, including the Guidelines mentioned in Section 5.1.4.1, which serves as references for the work of the Customs Administration's Directorate. In addition, the Custom Administration manages activities related to the TIR Convention adequately and a draft amendment to Article 41 to the Law on Customs is being prepared to improve the Customs Administration's capacity in the fight against counterfeiting.

The Audit Bureau's EU MS PL indicated that often the real benefits from Twinning showed a few years after project completion and that it is important that BAs take ownership of twinning from the outset. At project conclusion, the RTA indicated the likely risks to sustainability and proposed steps the Beneficiary could take, e.g.:

- engage more openly with all key external stakeholders
- roll out and develop the Strategic Plan with concrete actions
- consolidate and extend the audit learning gained
- apply the revised organisational structure; and

- encourage coordination of the legislative framework across the public sector e.g. only “Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC)” equivalent with the Public External Audit Law

**Best Practice example: Jordan-Audit Bureau**

The EU MS partner institution’s PL to the project with the Audit Bureau assessed the risks to sustainability with this project, as follows:

***Risks to Sustainability as at Project Close***

<p><b>REVISED AUDITING GUIDELINES &amp; PRACTICES</b> Meeting international standards within the PSRP (Public Sector Reform Programme)</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>	<p><b>STRENGTHENED MANDATE</b></p> <p>Through proposed legislative &amp; associated frameworks</p> <p><i>AMBER/GREEN</i></p>	<p><b>RESTRUCTURE PLANS</b></p> <p>Consistent with revised mandate, auditing &amp; human resource policies &amp; practices</p> <p><i>AMBER/GREEN</i></p>	<p><b>STRATEGIC CONSENSUS</b></p> <p>Initially via Task Force of key External Stakeholders, subsequently Beneficiary one-to-one</p> <p><i>AMBER</i></p>
<p>Audit Bureau auditing guidelines &amp; practices capable of meeting international standards &amp; practices – within PSRP</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>	<p>Audit Bureau Mandate &amp; associated Policies appropriately strengthened</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>	<p>AB Restructure supports &amp; is consistent with revised mandate, auditing &amp; human resource policies &amp; practices</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>	<p>External Stakeholders reach consensus</p> <p><i>AMBER</i></p>
<p>Revised Manuals &amp; Guidelines prepared &amp; tested via pilot audits &amp; conceptual workshops</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>	<p>Revised legislation is drafted, consensus sought, &amp; wider stakeholder awareness gained.</p> <p><i>AMBER/GREEN</i></p>	<p>Internal Control, Internal Audit &amp; External Audit roles &amp; responsibilities are delineated and action plans prepared</p> <p><i>AMBER</i></p>	<p>High visibility &amp; effective communication between all parties</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>
<p>Audit Bureau staff education policy devised. A Training Programme devised based on a Needs Assessment</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>	<p>Audit Bureau Charters drafted, implementation plans prepared, implementation commenced</p>		<p>Opening &amp; Closing Position Statements, incorporating staff views</p> <p><i>GREEN/AMBER</i></p>

	<i>GREEN/AMBER</i>		
			Audit Bureau staff kept up to date  <i>GREEN/AMBER</i>

RED = concern

AMBER = potential concern

GREEN = satisfactory

What is important to note here is not only the PL’s conclusions, but also the approach to sustainability, as the Evaluators are of the opinion that the above table very well reflects the Twinning Provider’s strategic approach to *Sustainability* and could be used as a *Best Practice example* by stakeholders, especially project designers.

Moreover, the PL is of the view that the Public Service Reform programme (PSRP) requires a measure of openness and transparency between participating institutions. To some extent, this fell outside the experience of Jordanian participants. The PL is also of the view that the Beneficiary had sufficient absorption capacity in relation to the technical aspects of the project.

***Azerbaijan***

According to the EUD, the outcomes of the twinning project with the Parliament have been integrated into the BA’s daily work, hence fully transferring ownership of the results to the BA. Most trained staff have so far retained their jobs. A few of them were moved to other internal departments, which does not necessarily undermine *Sustainability* insofar as their new duties are to some extent related to the project activities. Taking into consideration the BA’s strong sense of ownership and commitment, the PAO expects that Sustainability of this project’s results will be very high, which was confirmed by the Parliament’s Secretary General as Azerbaijan demonstrates political commitment to European integration (without membership), including to the successful implementation of ENP AP provisions and objectives. The Evaluators are of the opinion that this twinning project with the Azerbaijani Parliament could be encouraged and replicated across the ENP Region, since Parliaments as the third estate (legislative power) are national institutions that play the key role in law-making processes, which is also central and consistent for EU Acquis approximation.

***Egypt***

Outcomes of the FDI promotion project with GAFI are being integrated progressively into GAFI’s functioning, such as the Investment Promotion Strategy, the Client Relationship Management systems (CRM) and the Working Instruction Manual, which were designed and implemented during the implementation phase.

The Statistics project with CAPMAS has, to a large extent, achieved its mandatory results. However, further work lies ahead to implement the various recommendations made by the project. The President of CAPMAS and the BC PL will retire according to Egypt’s civil service rules within the next 2 years. Both persons have demonstrated great support to, and interest in, the project and also commitment to reform in order to improve CAPMAS and Egypt’s statistical system. Overall, the beneficiary institution has demonstrated great ownership of project achievements and most recommendations are very likely to be integrated further into the institution’s functioning. However, no follow-up system has been put in place so far.

## ***Tunisia***

The ACAA project with the APII continues the reform effort made by the Tunisian administration and aims to fulfil the objectives of the Association Agreement of 1995 in facilitating the free movement of industrial goods. The project helped the BAs to prepare the conditions necessary to sign the ACAA. The recommendations made by the stakeholders in the Final Report to fulfil all the conditions for signing the ACAA are still implemented either through the resources of the institutions concerned, or through other cooperation programmes funded by the EU (P3A-II and PCAM). Only the thematic Ministry and its institutions in charge of industry, as leading beneficiaries, have demonstrated real project ownership. The Direction for Quality and Consumer Protection within the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Directorate General of the Customs Administration and the Consumer Protection Agency have not demonstrated sufficient project ownership, as they could not make adequate resources available to the project and they were not really aware that they were the direct beneficiaries of the project. The results achieved by the ACAA project with the APII continued after project completion. The project's objectives were clear, specific, achievable and wanted by the BAs. A list of indicators dedicated to the follow-up on the achievement of specific objectives has been worked out and a follow-up committee created. However, there has been some staff turnover in several beneficiary institutions. Moreover, a Manual of Procedures was produced during the implementation phase in order to ensure *Sustainability* of the know-how transferred. The training of trainers is also very important not only to ensure *Sustainability* of the know-how transferred, but also to systematically raise the awareness of all project beneficiaries on that commitment, especially by means of C&V actions for the management team, because the *Sustainability* issue is real and its consequences must not be ignored.

The recommendations made by the twinning team to the Administrative Court will be compiled into a reference table that will serve as implementation guidelines. In order to ensure *Sustainability* of the achieved results, as soon as the first project was completed, the same Tunisian team engaged in the preparation of a second twinning light project as a second stage in modernising the structures and working methods of Tunisia's Administrative Court. After the project, the Court's senior executives submitted requests to consolidate the achieved results through TAIEX and SIGMA actions.

JC2 - Twinning achievements and positive results/outcomes/impacts have continued/ are likely to continue after external funding ends

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is partly satisfactory. It is not recommended to try to have new laws passed during project implementation as part of mandatory results because this type of commitment is simply impossible to fulfil. Moreover, there can never be any guarantee that new legislation prepared during project implementation can be passed after project completion. It is also very important to build upon previous experience. The achievements of previous activities and interventions should always be considered out of *Impact* and *Sustainability* concerns. Stakeholders and twinning project designers should systematically try to capitalise on that. To achieve this, it is desirable to link successive projects with one another as part of a strategy to create a common understanding of the concrete sphere of intervention and of the main issues to be solved. This also helps avoid any potential overlap.

### ***Ukraine***

The FDI promotion project with SAUID did not have any legislation-related component, which is not compulsory. The project was not yet finished when the field visits took place. The new beneficiary (SAUID) expects FDI to grow in Ukraine as a result of this project. The PAO is of the view that it's too early to make any serious conclusion on *Impact* and *Sustainability*. However, given the various flaws resulting from unexpected circumstances, the Evaluators are of the opinion that this project's results will not have sufficient sustainability as initially intended.

The project with the School of Judges achieved one mandatory result "Legal Advisory Services for Initial Judicial Training" as part of the Initial Training Component, under which two draft regulations were developed: "On organising the Court Personnel at the National School of Judges" and "On Competitive Selection Procedures for Instructors (Assistant teachers) at the National School of Judges". Moreover, the results of this project will feed into the future training programmes to be conducted by the School. Therefore, effective *Sustainability* is guaranteed under this project.

### ***Morocco***

Morocco is not engaged in an Acquis transfer/approximation process, but rather in a legal convergence/harmonisation process (See "Advanced Status"). On this basis, the main result of the project with the Competition authorities, namely the Competition Council and the Division for Competition and Prices to the Ministry of the Economic and General Affairs (MAEG) is a draft law to reform Competition Law which was submitted to the MAEG. The Ministry has relentlessly repeated the Moroccan government's firm intention of pursuing the roadmap established by the twinning team, whose very first purpose is to reform the effective Competition Law and create an independent competition authority that will have the necessary executive powers. Therefore as reform is usually conducted over a long period of time (5-10-15 years), which is far more than the project (2 years), what was initiated during the project will continue during reform implementation.

### ***Jordan***

The Public Security Directorate staff who were trained by the project are still in place one year after project completion and have been conducting further training courses to transfer the knowledge and skills acquired through the twinning project to other staff (trained staff have become trainers), hence facilitating sustainability. The Evaluators appreciate this pro-activeness and continuity, but also argue that it is easier for a police corps to retain its staff, given the nature of its activities.

### ***Azerbaijan***

The State Programme for improving Official Statistics 2008-2012 will be updated for the next five years after the Statistics project is completed. One of the outcomes of the project was to establish several priorities for the near future: building a meta-data management system, improving the quality of statistical data and implementing the Geographic Information System (GIS) in statistics. For this purpose, the State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan plans to apply for a new twinning project as follow-up to the current project. The Evaluators indicated that this was feasible as the objectives of twinning projects should always deal with different issues. Moreover, this project deals more with institutional building than legal approximation. The project purpose is to support the SSC through twinning activities with an EU MS partner institution to upgrade Azerbaijan's National

Accounts and accelerate the implementation of ESA95<sup>73</sup>. This will involve the assessment of the current situation with National Accounts, the preparation of a short and medium-term strategy for implementing ESA95 and support implementation of that strategy. Therefore this project's results are *sustainable*.

Parliament staff trained by the twinning project with the Parliament are still in place. Training was still under way at the time of the field visit. 22 out of the 26 staff who were trained by the project are still in place. The others were moved to other departments. They have not so much changed their working methods as improved them thanks to new skills and knowledge acquired through the project.

### ***Egypt***

Several results of the FDI promotion project with GAFI continued or are likely to continue after funding ended, e.g.:

- The development of a promotion strategy document: as the existing strategy was implemented by GAFI staff and twinning experts, GAFI will most likely be able to update and develop future strategic documents on its own
- The results achieved by various training programmes and coaching activities are likely to continue in the future, as they provide value added to GAFI's professionalism
- High standard policy papers and sectoral studies are being developed by GAFI's research and policy advocacy staff through coaching and on-the-job training
- The strategic document on creating a network of overseas offices is more likely to be used as a reference when overseas offices are opening
- GAFI's Working Instruction Manual developed by the project will strengthen GAFI's capacity over time.

The Statistics project with CAPMAS developed a draft legislation based upon the principles of official statistics of the UN and the EU's European Statistics Code of Practice. The next step in the process is to submit this draft legislation to the thematic Minister and the Cabinet. The new legislation will give CAPMAS the necessary foundation for developing into Egypt's national coordinator of official statistics.

### ***Tunisia***

Only one draft legal text was produced during the ACAA project with the APII, namely the Law on Normalisation, whose very first draft had been prepared before the project started. Law N°2009-38 has now been effective since June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2009, i.e. two years after project conclusion. Another draft Law on industrial goods safety was also 95% produced during the

<sup>73</sup>

European System of Integrated Economic Accounts - The excessive deficit procedure, defined by the Maastricht Treaty (Article 104) and in force in the European Union since 1994, has been an important challenge for the European Commission, particularly its statistical aspects. Eurostat has endeavoured to guarantee a proper application of the conceptual reference framework, the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA, second edition), in order to obtain reliable and comparable statistics for evaluating convergence. The criteria for statistical evaluation have been made transparent, and consensus has emerged as to their pertinence. From February 2000 onwards, the ESA95 is the conceptual reference framework, which is legally binding in the European Union. The aim of the present manual is to aid its application for calculating the government deficit and debt. It provides the appropriate answers to most of the statistical and accounting problems posed in the European Union during the last years.

[http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_SDDS/Annexes/naga\\_a\\_esms\\_an1.pdf](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/naga_a_esms_an1.pdf)

project implementation phase, but took 1.5 years to be finalised (the bill was supposed to be passed into Law end of 2010 or start of 2011). The changes brought by this text were so significant that they could not be easily absorbed by the direct beneficiaries and other validation instances and ministries affected by the text. Other draft decrees cannot be passed, till the laboratories are fully installed (delivery delays). What is also remarkable is that the drafting of regulatory texts may take longer than the project lifecycle, especially because those new elements often consist in a regulatory approach that requires full integration into the BC's legislation. Therefore, the electrical and building material sectors will feel the changes brought by the twinning projects only after the ACAA has been concluded.

The twinning light project with the Administrative Court was not aimed to engage in any EU Acquis approximation to modify effective legislation, but rather to improve the Administrative Court's working procedures. Moreover, it was impossible to cover aspects related to the judiciary's independence, which contradicted the previous regime's policies in that field. However, after the old regime's demise, the Administrative Court became a sort of a pioneer as the only court having benefited from a twinning project to improve its internal procedures and operations. Now that the old regime is gone, the project results are likely to have far more *Impact* and *Sustainability*, especially in terms of judicial independence and potential for further reform within the judiciary, in accordance with the recommendations formulated in the project's Final Report.

JC3 - Policy support and responsibility of the twinning beneficiaries are sustainable in terms of continued political commitment and absorption capacity

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion varies from unsatisfactory to very satisfactory. Given the various issues indicated above and the relative confusion shown by the stakeholders between political and institutional commitment, it will be important to focus on the Communication and Visibility activities (see EQ10) and also to find the right incentive(s) right from the start (identification and design phases) in order to stimulate and secure political commitment and absorption capacity so as to ensure *Sustainability*.

### *Ukraine*

The PAO indicated that on average approx. 6,000 civil servants have so far been trained through twinning activities each year since the inception of the Twinning Instrument in Ukraine in 2007 (this observation also relates to *Impact*).

Further to this evaluation's Desk and Field phases, the Evaluators have concluded that overall the *Impact* and *Sustainability* of a large number of twinning activities so far implemented in Ukraine may be seriously compromised by high civil servant turnover. However, twinning activities are carried out by mid-career managers usually very committed to their work, which underlies that *Sustainability* aspects can be safe. Moreover, there has been an obvious decrease observed in EU funding since 2008 against a dramatic increase in the number of requests and proposals.

Although the direct stakeholders were very keen on the FDI promotion project, expressed their strong interest and demonstrated a very positive attitude, Ukraine's current institutional reform process and changes have affected the project rather negatively in terms of political commitment and absorption capacity (staff availability).

The PAO indicated that Ukraine's Ministry of Economy has been very supportive of the ACAA project with NAAU. However, it never took part in the twinning activities. Other government and business organisations were invited to project events and took part in several project activities (mainly training workshops and awareness-raising seminars). The Evaluators have therefore concluded that the overall political commitment to this project was very low against the importance of the project for EU-Ukraine trade relations. The project was extended by two months. Therefore it can be argued that the activities were carried out not 100%, but rather 110%. This was a deliberate choice as the budget allowed for this and there was enough good will on both sides to do so. Approximately 600 staff more directly related to accreditation were trained by the project. Approximately 1,000 staff were trained eventually if we include trainees from other institutions involved in the whole accreditation system in Ukraine. However, political commitment cannot be credited for the effective *Sustainability* of results.

Political commitment to the project with the School of Judges has been weak during the implementation phase. The project did not conduct any awareness-raising activities. Public officials were involved only in the kick-off meeting and in the closing event. However, the RTA (a judge) argued to the contrary, which adds to the apparent confusion between political and institutional commitment. This Report therefore provides an analysis of the Communication & Visibility activities under EQ10 hereinafter. Moreover, during the implementation phase, a number of trainers were trained in the results achieved and will in turn train other magistrates in due course, which will contribute to *Sustainability*.

Overall, Ukraine's political commitment to twinning activities has been insufficient. The political sphere does not really contribute to *Sustainability* and might even well be an impediment.

### ***Morocco***

Overall, staff turnover has remained low thanks to an attractive promotion system put in place for twinning participants, including national BC PLs and RTA Counterparts (Morocco boasts a structural and systemic approach towards human resources in the civil service), and also because Twinning has been integrated adequately, albeit not systematically, into the national reform process.

The project with the Competition Authorities was closely followed by the BA's senior management. The thematic minister conducted several meetings with the project team and suggested including the Competition Council in the second draft law. The Competition Council's Chairman was eager to be involved in the twinning project and to get the necessary support for the new Council. This demonstrates the close relationship with political decision-makers.

The Oriental Agency is a rather small and stable structure. The staff trained by the project are still in place. Although political commitment was remarkable, most probably because of some vested interests, absorption capacity demonstrated by the Agency, given its limited size and experience in international relations, was and will likely remain limited: only 20 staff who have too much on their plate. The Agency said it would recruit massively, which never happened for various reasons (e.g. funding). However, as the project with the Oriental Agency ended in December 2010, *Sustainability* should be analysed at a later stage. Last but

not least, the project with the Oriental Agency has also contributed to the creation of institutional, human and political links that softened, at project level, the impact of contextual diplomatic difficulties between Morocco and Spain, which has been good to strengthen the wider *Impact* and *Sustainability* of project achievements.

As indicated by the PAO during the field meetings in Morocco, the ACAA project with the APII has established a legal watch system to monitor any change to the EU Acquis and take the appropriate measures for integrating all modifications to the EU Acquis into Morocco's Acquis-based legislation. This is of course important also from a political perspective.

#### ***Best Practice example: Success Story in Morocco-Customs/Foreign Trade***

The project with **Morocco's** Customs Administration is well integrated into the public administration reform, the level of political and BA commitment has been satisfactory, the BA demonstrated strong quality-oriented and proactive absorption capacity, very useful expertise was transferred. For example, this project set up an on-line customs clearance system, through which a customs clearance may now be obtained in less than 5 minutes. This is a very good example of a *sustainable* result with regard to absorption capacity. Together with this, the project provided an excellent opportunity for Morocco's Customs Administration to get closer to its EU MS partner institution's Foreign Trade Ministry and Customs Administration. Moreover, the project also included a strong Train-the-Trainers component, for which senior executives were selected very carefully. Everything will depend on the beneficiary institution's organisational capacities. It must also be noted that, according to the PAO, Morocco boasts the best organised Customs Administration across ALL the Mediterranean Basin (north and south included). Twinning has contributed very effectively to the reform process going on at the Customs Administration. The system has fared remarkably well. They have even set up a user-friendly registration system for economic operations (mainly SMEs). However, the Customs Administration also observed that training sessions could really become an obstacle to the usual work of the beneficiaries because they mobilise operational staff. Therefore they should focus on the qualitative rather than quantitative aspects of training-related project components. As already indicated in Section 5.1.2.1, the objective is not to train "en masse", but to ensure that quality material is delivered and useful skills are transferred in an appropriate, user-friendly and sustainable manner. For example, the Customs Administration's Three-Year National Customs Training Plan and the Twinning Training Plan prevented operational staff from fulfilling their usual tasks. There were several major disruptions (e.g. staff availability) as a result, which were eventually overcome. Moreover, a few staff also retired, which did not help at all. However, it must be noted that this was due to an internal organisation problem. The Evaluators argued that the training activities should desirably be inserted into the National Plan, whose adaptation is rather flexible. The Training of Trainers component is fine, but a bit heavy still. Training sessions are one thing for sure, but practical coaching is also needed and must be included in the project activity programme.

#### ***Jordan***

The Audit Bureau's BC PL and RTA Counterpart indicated that its project was widely acknowledged at both the opening and closing ceremonies, which were conducted under the auspices of the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and the Audit Bureau's President. The Evaluators do not agree with this approach to political commitment, because there is more to it than just attending the official events organised by the project

teams. This issue could be solved with more proactive Communication and Visibility actions (see Recommendations in Chapter 7 hereinafter). Moreover, the Audit Bureau employs 450 auditors throughout the whole country and has a unit in charge of financial control in all Ministries. As regards, absorption capacity, only qualified auditors were selected for the project, i.e. approx. 50 staff from all units took part directly and are now still AB employees (*Impact*). 300 staff attended the training sessions. 6 staff took part in the Train-the-Trainers sessions. It took 15-17 months to prepare the project because initially it was prepared only for one year before it was decided to have a 2-year project.

### ***Azerbaijan***

The EU MS twinning team works almost as part of the State Statistics Committee (SSC) and the transfer of capacities has been very satisfactory. The BA's absorption capacity has been adequate, as the relevant staff selected have been committed to the project since its inception. The level of motivation, involvement of the SSC management and staff, hands-on training and the setting-up of working groups are all positive indicators of likely sustainability. Therefore *Sustainability* (and *Impact*) of the achieved results is expected to be the major positive outcome of the project. On average, 5-6 staff per training workshop. 30-35 staff were trained in the 4 twinning components.

The Standardisation, Metrology & Patents Committee is a newly created public entity. Its staff is always on the move from one of its departments to another. Staff turnover is high within the Committee as a result. Absorption capacity was variable: good in the metrology component and fairly good in the accreditation component. The standards department suffered and still suffers from a lack of human resources: capable staff are overloaded, which considerably undermines absorption capacity at the moment.

Political commitment and absorption capacity demonstrated by the BA and the various BC stakeholders to the project with the Azerbaijani Parliament have been high throughout the implementation period. The BC stakeholders included the Presidential Administration, Cabinet of Ministers, Office of the General Prosecutor, Supreme Court, various ministries and also public and civil society organisations. Training sessions are delivered to the Azerbaijani Parliament staff. The Project Unit employs 5 staff. The EU Affairs Unit/Working Group has 13 staff from various departments. They have been also involved in study tours. 30-35 staff from the Parliament and guests from executive bodies as well as university students have taken part in the training sessions. This project has enjoyed a high profile and strong visibility as it targets senior civil servants and ministerial levels, hence the facilitated political commitment.

### ***Egypt***

Generally speaking, staff turnover remains low. The reason for this is that most civil servants tend to retain their jobs instead of moving e.g. to the private sector, especially in this period of uncertainty.

Most GAFI staff trained by the project are still in place and their duties are related to the twinning activities. As a result, the knowledge and skills acquired during project implementation are used in their everyday tasks. Twinning experts advised GAFI on the development of a staff-incentive programme based on performance and personal contribution to increased investment flows. However, GAFI as a public institution has limited flexibility in the field of financial incentives. Therefore other non-financial mechanisms to influence

behaviour within GAFI have been put in place. 40-45 staff took part in the FDI promotion component, as follows:

- 15 staff - in the policy advocacy component
- 10-15 staff – in the legal dispute settlement (including lawyers)
- 10 staff – in the management reform process (Monitoring & Evaluation and project management for the other 3 components)
- The total number of staff (i.e. directly and indirectly) trained amounts to approx. 100.

Overall, GAFI employs 2,700 staff. However, a very high percentage of those staff are clerks. Today, GAFI also engages in outward investment in other countries. Therefore absorption capacity has been very satisfactory and newly acquired skills are very likely to be sustainable (low turnover rate, internal training opportunities envisaged, etc.).

There is no turnover at Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA), which can be considered as Twinning's success story in Egypt: 99.9 % staff remain in place. Therefore the overall *Impact* and *Sustainability* of the project have been very good. Moreover, the Evaluators and EUD agree that the project could have been implemented as a classical TA intervention. A Product Brand Unit has been created and operates from product conception to implementation. This has been a very positive result. It's still working now. The organisation employs 820 staff (not 1,000-2,000 as was suggested by the PAO), i.e. 350 at central office. Approx. 300 staff have been trained by the project (e.g. only attended one conference). About 150 staff have been closely assessed to attend the training workshops. Moreover, this project also provided a good basis for additional bilateral cooperation between Egypt and the EU MS partner institution: a training centre for tourist bus drivers was set up (too many accidents involve tourist buses in Egypt and the number of casualties is high).

Political commitment to the Statistics project with CAPMAS was high until January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011 (i.e. till the Revolution). Since then political commitment has been unclear, as government priorities have drastically changed. CAPMAS expects that priorities will be reassessed towards the further development of Egypt's domestic economy. Moreover, a new draft Law stipulates that CAPMAS is to be the only statistical entity in Egypt. The draft Law was to be submitted to the next parliamentary round before the events of January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Therefore it is still too early to make any further commitment at this stage, all the more so as CAPMAS wants to see the project results mature before going to the Parliament with the new draft law. CAPMAS employees who were trained by the project still occupy the same posts as during the implementation phase. The CAPMAS President is strongly committed to utilising all the results and experience gained from the project. The Twinning Management Committee headed by the Chief of the IT Department, who also was the BC PL, meets on a weekly basis to follow up on the integration of project results into the functioning of CAPMAS. Overall, the conclusion is that political commitment has been quite significant. However, CAPMAS needs continued political support in order to be in a position to play its role as the sole statistics agency and to have the new Law on CAPMAS new status passed.

### ***Tunisia***

The ACAA project with the APII revealed that the turnover rate of technical staff, more particularly engineers, in Tunisian institutions is rather high. Moreover, the commitment demonstrated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry was strong through the close involvement of the BC PL in the implementation follow-up almost on a daily basis. However, the other 3 BAs did not really fulfil the project implementation requirements.

The full-time availability of the Administrative Court's personnel for the project to consolidate the achieved results and prepare a second twinning light intervention testifies to a good level of project ownership. Moreover, staff turnover has remained very low at the Court. With a promotion and secondment system in place (albeit for a limited number of staff) and a young and dynamic generation, overall *Sustainability* is rated as positive. The Court's senior executives demonstrated full commitment throughout project implementation. The attitude of the Court's judges has been critical to successful project implementation, especially thanks to their availability and commitment to the specific objectives. The Administrative Court's First President also expressed his wish several times to see the results consolidated within the framework of other cooperation programmes.

The modernisation project with the Ministry of Finance was prepared entirely in accordance with the previous government's policy conducted in the field of public administration reform and rested upon a high level of political commitment. However, the level of absorption capacity demonstrated by the public institutions involved varied according to the project components and modules. The Ministry of Finance's real involvement in the project was felt with the appointment of a new BC PL in September 2009. However, the project was already into its last semester. However, the leaders of several components and their teams demonstrated a real interest and very strong involvement in the project activities, more particularly those pertaining to service quality, tax control, audit and human resource management. As regards the computerisation-related activities, the involvement of the component leaders was noticeable only into the 2<sup>nd</sup> implementation year. The BA's absorption capacity was limited, given the implementation of project activities required the intervention of senior staff that could not always be available.

Recommendations on political commitment have been issued in Section 7.4 hereinafter.

#### JC4 - Institutional capacity newly acquired through twinning activities is sustainable

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is partly satisfactory. Again the situation is contrasted. It is clear that several projects have fared better than others for various reasons: intervention sectors (some are more obvious, i.e. more "twinable" than others, e.g. certification, normalisation, standardisation, accreditation, sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations, forensic police, justice procedures, accounting, audit<sup>74</sup>, statistics, customs, etc.), lack of strategic considerations for *Sustainability* demonstrated during the project design phase, overambitious objectives and mandatory results against project duration and absorption capacity, lack of good preparation, etc.

#### *Ukraine*

At the time of the desk and field phases of this evaluation, the foreign direct investment (FDI) promotion project was still under implementation. It must be noted that regional FDI centres have also been involved in the project. The PAO believes that several twinning rules could be revised to target the development of regional authorities more effectively.

<sup>74</sup> Section 5.2.6 on Complementarity indicates, however, that the project designers must be careful in choosing the EU model that better corresponds to their functioning mode and format. Therefore, immediate "twinability" is not the only obvious criterion.

The National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine (NAAU) is a self-funding organisation in Ukraine. However, several issues in the Accreditation Law and the NAAU's charter have affected its financial situation and its ability to utilise available funding efficiently. Legal amendments are currently underway. Moreover, a call for proposals was recently published for a new twinning project with the NAAU. It is also expected that the NAAU will benefit from the technical assistance component of the Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) for removing technical barriers to trade between the EU and Ukraine. The project highly contributed to this priority. Accreditation is just one aspect though, because it did not exist at all in Ukraine before. The Law establishing the NAAU was passed in 2002. By contrast, Russia started this process only in January 2011. Ukraine started from scratch in November 2009 thanks to the twinning project, the ultimate objective being to get recognised by the European Accreditation Cooperation Association. It is important to note that one of the leading incentives for Ukraine to take part in twinning projects with sustainable results essentially focuses on the facilitation of trade relations. Together with this, the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) are currently being negotiated. The NAAU project and those still in the pipeline are very relevant to the "trade in goods" part of the DCFTA.

The Ukrainian School of Judges and EUD perceive as a real positive achievement the fact that the BA is now within the Judiciary partly thanks to the project. In addition, the "Train the Trainers" component and the development of the testing system and of curricula are very good.

### ***Morocco***

The Competition project's BAs were asked to examine files on competition-related issues in which the twinning benefits were undeniable. Therefore the new approach and procedures developed during the project implementation phase helped the BA teams succeed in their missions and make adequate decisions with the close assistance of the project's STEs. However, the "Train the Trainers" component involved 6 staff. Moreover, there have been serious limitations and the pedagogical part was not delivered properly.

Today, the Report on "advanced regionalisation" disclosed by the King in his speech of March 9<sup>th</sup>, 2011, plans a series of developments that should have influence on the Oriental Agency's medium and long-term future and on the institutional landscape regarding Morocco's territorial development. More particularly, and subject to legislative confirmation, the Report specifies that a Regional Project Contracting Agency (AREP – Agence Régionale d'Exécution des Projets) will be set up and operate under the supervision and control of each regional council. This project will also define the duties of the future AREPs. Therefore the future of existing territorial development agencies, such as the Agency for the Promotion and Development of the North (APDN), is still somewhat shrouded in mystery. At stake is the risk of overlapping competences between AREPs and the existing territorial development agencies. However, the Report clearly proposes that both types of agency co-exist at the risk of increasing institutional uncertainty. The Report concludes that "the coexistence of both types of agency does not appear conflicting and cooperation is even desirable within the framework of their respective duties". However, in this context, the advanced regionalisation /decentralisation process opens up new avenues for development agencies in Morocco, to which the twinning project obviously contributed as an institutional capacity building tool for state agencies other than central institutions. Moreover, it was also envisaged to use the success stories in regional development for designing new twinning projects in a triangular

format - North-South-South, e.g. one EU MS + Morocco + one less advanced country in the ENP Region. This would help make the Instrument more fluid. The Evaluators welcomed this idea, saying that this could be one of new long-term objectives for the activities. The Evaluators also concluded that the BC shows political commitment to regionalisation and that this project integrates well into the public administration reform process, although it should have been implemented under classical TA rather than Twinning.

### ***Jordan***

The Audit Bureau indicated to the Evaluators that their first twinning experience really contributed to improving the knowledge and skills of its staff, more particularly in the fields of audit methodologies and international audit standards, including INTOSAI standards. The Audit Bureau had the opportunity to see how public audit was implemented in SAIs (Supreme Audit Institutions). The Audit Bureau has also managed to keep close contacts with the EU MS partner's RTA and PL at the UK National Audit Office after project completion.

The Public Security Directorate continued operating 20 laboratories and implementing 80 Standard Operating Procedures<sup>75</sup> (SOP) after the project was completed. This clearly demonstrates the strong *sustainability* of this project.

### ***Azerbaijan***

CD-ROMs on project achievements are being developed by the State Statistics Committee's participants in the twinning activities. Moreover, no significant turnover has been identified on the project with the State Statistics Committee (SSC), which is a well-managed institution with a strong institutional position. By the time the project comes to an end, staff will also have developed their capacity to such a degree that they will be in a position to continue transferring the newly acquired skills and knowledge after project completion. Moreover, a follow-up twinning project has been requested. It will go ahead if the Cabinet of Ministers supports the idea and if funding is available. The SSC also more and more often resorts to the TAIEX instrument (See EQ6). Therefore this project's results have very strong sustainability-oriented potential.

The results of the project with the Parliament are expected to have long-term institutional, legal and policy effects, more particularly as follows:

- EU scanning mechanism and EU approximation process - set up and operational
- Better cooperation between Parliament and the Executive - ensured
- Early warning mechanism – operational
- Application of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)
- EU-Azerbaijan cooperation in various areas – strengthened

The above outputs are entirely new and bear a very sustainable character. It is important to highlight that *Impact* and *Sustainability* were initially planned in the project's objectives. For example, one of the objectives was to use the trained staff to extend training to other Parliament staff in EU approximation mechanisms towards guaranteed *Impact* and

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<sup>75</sup> In military terminology, SOPs describe a procedure or a set of procedures to perform a given operation in reaction to a given event. It has been misused repeatedly for so long that the accepted meaning of SOP is Standard Operating Procedure. However, the original and correct meaning to this abbreviation is Standing Operating Procedure. A Standard Procedure does not need explanation or publication because it is standard. However, a procedure that needs clarification for a limited time or limited use is a procedure that is valid only for the time or use stated.

*Sustainability.* Moreover, the RTA was very confident that changes are here to stay. The EU Affairs Unit/Working Group set up by the project will definitely remain operational after project completion. The virtual EU Info-Centre will also continue operating after project completion. The rather complex Regulatory Impact Assessment methodology remains the big question though. It must be highlighted that the Project Fiche may have been too ambitious. However, this was normal because it was a first experience with twinning activities for the Parliament. There will also be a new twinning project. Avenues are being explored in this direction at the moment. For example, Azerbaijan has no system to translate and transpose EU legislation into the national language. There is no terminology database on EU legislation. A new twinning project could also deal with consistency/complementarity of EU legislation with Azerbaijan's.

### ***Egypt***

CAPMAS, the BA of the Statistics project is now actively working on the implementation of newly acquired capacities, building upon achieved results, thus ensuring sustainability. Overall, CAPMAS has been very happy with the project results and now intends to use TAIEX for follow-up purposes. CAPMAS would be very keen to have a new twinning project in 3 years' time to feed into the achieved results, as new needs will be identified for preparing a new twinning project with another purpose and the results of the first twinning will have been "digested" and integrated into the institution's work. 5 areas have survived the project, as follows:

- IT functions
- Statistical forms
- New draft law, which has not yet been submitted to Parliament for review
- Statistical awareness-raising activities (with Action Plan). CAPMAS is working on this and has even kept and secured a budget for this.

However, time is still needed as the situation is particularly difficult without a Government and a Parliament ("force majeure"). Moreover, CAPMAS has not only drafted a new Law, but also a new contract (MoU) with other ministries, as it must become Egypt's only statistical entity.

CAPMAS employs approximately 5,000 staff, of whom 1,200 work in regional offices. 3,600 are directly employed at HQ in Cairo. Overall, CAPMAS has 1,000 technical professionals (IT and statistics). 45-50 staff were directly involved in the project. 9 working groups were set up with 15 staff each, which amounts to 135 staff. Approximately 100 participants attended the workshops, but were not necessarily involved directly in the project. Amongst them were consultants, Tax Ministry experts and other public sector officials). There were no training activities, but only workshops (85) and 13 study tours each with 3 experts (39). However, there was a "Train the Trainers" approach. 83 out of 85 workshops were excellent in terms of expertise delivered. Sometimes, the EU MS approaches to statistics differed substantially (Czech Republic and Sweden). But eventually, it was very interesting and useful to share several EU MS experiences – from Latvia to Denmark and from Sweden to the Czech Republic. International and EU standards were applied anyway. Egypt is now part of Eurostat together with other North African countries. At stake is the reliability of raw data provided by other ministries.

As revealed by the Water Quality Management project with the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources, *Sustainability* depends mainly on the BA's commitment in spite of real needs and project relevance (see Section 5.1.4.2 on the analysis of *Impact* above).

However, the main longer-term concern is that the Revolution has led the authorities to recruit new staff. The Egyptian Ministry of State for Administrative Development (MSAD) is now quite worried as 1 million additional civil servants will be recruited soon to join the total 5 million civil servants already employed by the entire Egyptian administration. This fast recruitment process is part of a strategy intended to make the achievements of the recent national Revolution sustainable. As a result, this will in turn lead to less capacity in the near future. Public sector salaries are not really attractive in Egypt. Civil Servants are paid by their respective organisation AND the UNDP's Operational Unit for Development Assistance (OUDA)<sup>76</sup>.

### ***Tunisia***

***See Tunisia-related Sub-Sections under Section 5.1.5.5.*** Moreover, the Ministry of Finance expressed the need to be accompanied for implementing the actions requested by the project in order to achieve the objectives related to the Tax Service's modernisation. The EUD considers that an ex post evaluation of the project is necessary.

JC5 - Sustainability of twinning activities is ensured from a financial and economic perspective

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is not satisfactory. Specific budgets to ensure *Sustainability* of results after project completion have not always been earmarked by the BAs or the information has not been readily available. A consistent financial strategy is necessary to ensure that project results are sustainable after project completion. Their budgetary (and also staffing) capacity could be firmly ascertained during the project design phase. This would be very useful as twinning projects also lead BAs to operate budget modifications. In the Twinning Requests and/or Twinning Fiches, the BAs could be asked to demonstrate in a specific section how they intend to ensure impact and sustainability.

### ***Ukraine***

An EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is currently being negotiated. 18 negotiation rounds have already taken place since 2007 (till May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011, the cut-off date for this Report). All twinning projects are in line with the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda, which was adopted in 2009. The CIB Programme is also under preparation and is considered an agreement-driven tool aiming to facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement. For CIB implementation, it was planned to allocate € 43.37 million for 2011-2013. The main instruments for CIB implementation are Twinning, TAIEX<sup>77</sup>, classical technical assistance and joint agreements with international organisations. The CIB will start end 2013. However, the Institutional Reform Plans (IRPs), which determine the intervention priorities, do not cover the judiciary, accreditation and other spheres. The CIB in Ukraine will only cover 4 priority sectors: migration, state aid, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and the steering and implementation process for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The financing of twinning projects is allocated within the framework of the ENPI. Within ENPI 2007, 11

<sup>76</sup> See <http://www.ouda.org.eg/intro.htm>

<sup>77</sup> TAIEX is not funded out of the CIB.

twinning projects were budgeted for a total amount of € 15 million; 15 projects for € 16.8 million within ENPI 2008. However, within ENPI 2009, the overall budget decreased to € 9.8 million, given the forthcoming inception of the CIB according to the PAO.

As a result and as was also pointed out to the Evaluators by the PAO during the field meetings, the amount of funding so far allocated to twinning activities does not cover the needs of Ukraine's public institutions. Conversely, the EUD indicated that the needs of Ukraine's public institutions were fully covered by the budget dedicated to Twinning activities, now taking into account the allocations made available within the forthcoming CIB. Besides, the EUD has also noted the lack of solid, "twinable" project proposals and their lack of coherence with Ukraine's current reform policies.

Moreover, now the NAAU will secure budget for at least three years in order to make the results achieved under the first project sustainable. The project has also developed a "Train the Trainers" Manual and has got budget for future activities. A new twinning project will follow suit very soon. Assistance with further development of accreditation legislation has also been envisaged.

Neither Ukraine's National School of Judges, nor SAUID has secured any specific budget to ensure project continuity.

### ***Morocco***

No financial strategy was put in place by the Oriental Agency to ensure the continuity of project results and achievements. No follow-up tool has been developed either. The RTA Counterpart explained that it was up to the RTA to see to it. The Evaluators disagree with that statement – this tool should be envisaged as part of a strategic perspective from the very start.

The PAO indicated to the Evaluators that after mid-2014 (end of the implementation period of the Financing Agreement), it may have to cease its activity, as funding has yet to be earmarked to ensure its extension.

### ***Jordan***

Given that the Audit Bureau is not independent financially as its budget is approved by the General Budget Department, the Audit Bureau hardly has any scope for manoeuvre in that respect. Therefore no budget was foreseen for after project completion.

A short-term technical assistance project has been foreseen to continue the recommendations and achievements made by the twinning project with the Public Security Directorate.

The Customs Administration has not secured any additional budget for after project completion.

### ***Azerbaijan***

Negotiations between the EU and Azerbaijan on the future Association Agreement is on-going. The CIB was considered in the National Indicative Programme for 2011-2013 to strengthen capacity of relevant institutions according to the Institutional Reform Plans. Twinning could be used as the main tool for implementing the CIB. Statistics could be related to the CIB's first component focusing on WTO-related issues. A new twinning proposal was submitted by the State Statistics Committee under the Twinning Programme 2010. It is worth

mentioning that this new twinning project now under preparation covers a totally different area: disability. Therefore it made sense to use the remaining funds for these activities.

### ***Egypt***

With the exception of CAPMAS, no funding strategy has been put in place by the other two BAs to ensure the continuity of the achieved results after project completion.

### ***Tunisia***

No funding strategy has been developed by the APII for after completion of the ACAA project for two reasons:

- In accordance with the recommendations of the project's Final Report, new twinning projects related to metrology and market surveillance are expected to continue the twinning project's activities within the framework of P3A-II, till the ACAA is concluded. New necessary equipment will also be acquired through the PCAM project.
- Results achieved by the twinning project will feed into the next projects launched to reach the ACAA.

The PAO launched a call for proposals for a new twinning light project with the Administrative Court in March 2011. The new project will aim to computerise case management, support the Court's regionalisation process in order to facilitate access to justice for citizens, to enlarge the court's legal competence to fields essential to the citizens (tax litigations or retirement allowances), which are still outside the Administrative Court's first instance jurisdiction. Therefore, there was no need to really work out a funding strategy to ensure the continuity of project achievements after project completion.

It was difficult for the Ministry of Finance to provide any further comment in relation to this judgement criterion due to the recent political events that have changed Tunisia's political spectrum and may affect Tunisia's present and future commitment to Twinning and other institutional capacity building instruments as a result.

### **5.1.6 Complementarity/Coherence with TAIEX, SIGMA and other donors' interventions**

**EQ 6:** To what extent have the twinning activities been complementary with TAIEX and SIGMA and coherent with other institutional building instruments funded by the EU and other multi- and bilateral donors?

This question addresses the *Coherence/Complementarity* criterion used for EU policy evaluation. This criterion may have several dimensions. We have decided to focus on the next two points:

- Coherence/Complementarity within the Commission's cooperation programme
- Coherence/Complementarity with the partner country's policies and with other donors' interventions.

Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA are the three EU-funded institutional capacity building tools.

Twinning is the most important of the three as the "heavy", i.e. long-term and fundamental, institutional capacity instrument, for which significant resources are mobilised. Its impact on

public administration and EU approximation is critical, as it helps the BC institutions implement the AAs, CPAs and ENP Action Plans.

TAIEX has been conceived as a flexible tool that can be mobilised rapidly for short-term targeted upstream interventions, even in the project preparation phase. TAIEX provides assistance and advisory services on the approximation of BC national legislation with the EU Acquis and also on the administration, implementation and enforcement of that legislation in accordance with the overall policy objectives of the European Commission.

SIGMA has been designed as a medium-term tool for public governance and administrative modernisation. It is used for preparing a reform process and also for complementing Twinning. It targets public governance institutions responsible for horizontal management systems of government – civil service, administrative law, expenditure management, financial control, external audit, public procurement, policy and regulatory capacities and property rights management.

Necessary in essence and even sought by stakeholders, complementarity between Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA is a very specific subject and a very important issue. Actually, complementarity is a crucial approach. There are lots of dimensions attached to complementarity: methodology, geographic spread, subject matter and/or timing. It all depends upon the scope of the activities and also upon the compatibility of the institutional building and/or technical assistance instruments. For example, in terms of subject matter, mixing EU models has one of Twinning's fundamental problems in the accession context. Continuity in time and consistency is seriously at risk, when various models are switched, e.g. UK, France and/or Germany. This is particularly the case in the fields of legal / court systems (e.g. common law vs. civil law countries), auditing and accounting.

In addition, project implementers are dealing with specific, organic activities and can't wait until all ideal conditions are in place to start their projects. Otherwise, they risk ending up never achieving anything at all. We are dealing with very complex social systems. Engineering determinism cannot be used for people (human factor). The marginal cost vs. benefit must always remain positive.

The following is a brief overview of the TAIEX and SIGMA instruments.

### **TAIEX<sup>78</sup>**

Support for reform processes in the partner countries is at the core of the ENP and represents a major share of programmes at all levels. The ENP Action Plans contain commitments for providing European expertise through institutional building programmes that, in addition to the Institutional Twinning Instrument, have proved themselves in the accession process in the new Member States, more particularly TAIEX and SIGMA.

Set up in 1996 to support the faster implementation of the EU Acquis in the Candidate Countries on the basis of a compulsory transposition, TAIEX – DG Enlargement's Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument – was progressively extended to the ENP Countries in 2006 (Directive 2006/62/EC of January 23rd, 2006) to foster the EU Acquis approximation on the basis of voluntary shared norms.

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<sup>78</sup> TAIEX: <http://taix.ec.europa.eu>

This extension is supported in close cooperation with the European Commission by a TAIEX National Contact Point (NCP) within the Programme Administration Office (PAO - wherever it exists) which acts also as NCP for Twinning. TAIEX assists Neighbouring Countries with the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is mainly demand-driven and contributes to the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise to address problems at short notice.

TAIEX provides 4 types of assistance:

- Expert missions to Beneficiary Countries: max. 5 days to provide guidance on legislative projects and on the functioning of the administrative process, to advise on legislative acts and on their implementation, to explain the EU Acquis and to present Best Practice examples.
- Workshops or seminars in beneficiary countries: max. 2 days to present and explain the EU Acquis-related and EU best practice issues to a large audience (selected by the Beneficiary Country) from the same country or from several countries, regarding issues of common interest. Regional workshops can also be organised (for several countries).
- Study Visits to EU MS: max. 5 days to train max. 3 BC officials how MS deal with practical issues related to the implementation and enforcement of the EU Acquis.
- Assessment missions involving several EU MS experts to provide feedback on legislative, institutional and administrative gaps in areas identified to produce analytical peer reports and recommendations.

TAIEX Beneficiaries include institutions and organisations, which have a role to play in the Beneficiary Countries in the approximation, implementation and enforcement of EU legislation, such as public administrations, public agencies, private sector associations with a public service mission, social partners.

TAIEX objectives are to strengthen public administration; approximate the EU Acquis; achieve the priorities of the Neighbouring Countries & Russia, as stated in the Action Plans and National Indicative Programmes (NIP); identify issues for **future Twinning projects**; reinforce networks between Neighbouring Countries & Russia and EU MS; ensure Twinning/SIGMA complementarity (avoiding dual financing due to overlaps in terms of contents and timing); and finally carry out “assessment missions”.

The role of TAIEX is that of a facilitator, channelling requests for assistance and cooperation submitted by the relevant BC public administrations to EU MS for the delivery of appropriate expertise to address well-defined issues within short notice. TAIEX operations are based upon free-of-charge interventions and simplified procedures. PAOs, EUDs and the TAIEX Unit in Brussels provide EU MS experts and permanent advice and assistance on contents all along the TAIEX cycle. The setting-up of TAIEX operations is led by the applicant while the logistical implementation is performed under the TAIEX Unit’s responsibility. Its overall TAIEX budget was € 5 million in 2009, € 5 million in 2010 and is now € 7 million per annum for 2011-2013.

In most countries<sup>79</sup>, requests for TAIEX interventions are forwarded by the relevant PAOs to Brussels with prior EUD approval. TAIEX requests must be linked directly to fields of cooperation as provided for in the bilateral agreements (AAs in ENP-South and CPAs in ENP-East) and to EU Acquis approximation. TAIEX interventions for the ENP Region are jointly managed by EuropeAid, which makes the appropriate resources available, and the TAIEX Unit (Elarg/D2), which ensures their disbursement. Thematic DGs are also involved.

The TAIEX request templates are accessible here (then click on the icon “Application Forms and follow the instructions): [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taix/beneficiaries/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taix/beneficiaries/index_en.htm).

However, requests for TAIEX interventions may be rejected for the following reasons:

- There is an overlap with twinning projects (e.g. subject, activities, calendar, etc) or regional projects
- The link to the EU Acquis is too weak
- The request pertains more to classical Technical Assistance
- There is overlap between requests for TAIEX interventions (e.g. identical subjects)
- The BA’s request for funding covers actions already underway (TAIEX has no value added)
- Requests are submitted for study visits to EU institutions

TAIEX records have been quite impressive: from January 2006 to 31 March 2011, there have been around 1,750 TAIEX requests from the 17 ENP Beneficiary countries. A total of 616 applications were received in 2010, which represents a 36% increase against the previous year and over 110% increase against 2008. A total of 917 single events (locally or regionally organised) took place from 2006-2011 (1<sup>st</sup> quarter). A total of 374 single country events were organised in 2010, which represents an 80% increase against 2009. The top 5 Beneficiary Countries correspond to the most active applicants: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Israel and Morocco.

## **SIGMA<sup>80</sup>**

SIGMA – Support for Improvement in Governance and Management – is a joint initiative of the OECD and the EU, which is funded mainly by the EU (98%). Launched in 1992, SIGMA has, since June 2008, been working under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) with countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In agreement with the European Commission, priority has been given to the launch of activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine. SIGMA's main EC counterpart is EuropeAid Cooperation and Development.

SIGMA is used for providing short to medium-term missions (from 1 day to 12 months) to improve public governance and management and also prepare reform strategies and horizontal management systems on the basis of requests submitted by beneficiary countries, in the following areas:

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
<sup>79</sup> For example, prior approval is not required in Ukraine, whereas this is not necessarily the case in all ENP countries. However, the TAIEX website is accessible to any interested party and the EUD in Ukraine encourages potential applicants, before they send their applications to Brussels, to consult with the relevant EUD Sector Manager and also with the PAO in order to check the accuracy and consistency of their applications.

<sup>80</sup> SIGMA: [http://www.sigmaweb.org/pages/0,2987,en\\_33638100\\_33638151\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.sigmaweb.org/pages/0,2987,en_33638100_33638151_1_1_1_1_1,00.html)

- Civil service
- Administrative law
- Public integrity
- Public expenditure management
- Public internal financial control
- External audit
- Public procurement
- Policy-making and coordination
- Regulatory management
- Administrative environment of business

There is no real request template to apply for a SIGMA intervention. However, a request in the form of an official letter for a SIGMA intervention is submitted by the applicant beneficiary institution to the local EUD. After the request has been registered, SIGMA representatives propose to deliver a general presentation of SIGMA to the applicant, which is often followed by a presentation of SIGMA's sectoral intervention capacity. Then a SIGMA Project Definition Sheet (PDS), including an indicative calendar, budget and work programme, is worked out. The PDS must be approved by the Commission Services before the intervention may start.

### SIGMA in the ENP Region (as at June 2011)



## JC1 - TAIEX and SIGMA have facilitated the achievement of twinning objectives

This Judgement Criterion is satisfactory. *Coherence/Complementarity* exists between the 3 institution building tools in all visited countries, but may be improved together with a more strategic and programming approach for Twinning, while keeping enough flexibility with TAIEX. With only one exception, no real overlap between these institutional capacity building tools, interventions and activities, were noticed.

References to the *Coherence/Complementarity* with other projects and programmes are usually indicated under Section 3.2 “Linked Activities” to the twinning project fiche.

90% of stakeholders reported that they had no major concern over *Complementarity* and possible overlap/redundancy between TAIEX, SIGMA and Twinning activities. TAIEX is considered as a very flexible tool, which can be mobilised within short notice, as it consists in very brief short-term expert missions. TAIEX is often used primarily to facilitate identification of twinning itself. SIGMA is also mobilised in a complementary manner and fulfills objectives related to governance and public administration reform.

During their field visits, the Evaluators could appreciate that most beneficiary stakeholders in the ENP Region, including PAOs, were aware of how to best utilise those instruments for *Complementarity* purposes. Overall, the need for upstream *Complementarity* of TAIEX and SIGMA with Twinning has been acknowledged and well understood by the BAs, provided information on the institutional building tools has been conveyed properly.

Most BAs are aware that TAIEX and SIGMA may not deal with thematic twinning activities under implementation and/or about to be launched and prefer resorting to TAIEX and SIGMA upstream of twinning activities (preparation phase) or downstream, i.e. once the project has been completed. The Evaluators suggested that opportunities with TAIEX, SIGMA and other instruments should be more systematically considered for better coordination (e.g. readiness for mobilisation should be higher) also during the project design phase (See also the analysis of *Relevance*). Recommendations have been formulated on that issue in Chapter 7.

Generally, the mechanism ensuring *Coherence/Complementarity* of TAIEX and SIGMA with Twinning is coordinated by PAOs with EUD cooperation and approval. For example, in Ukraine and Jordan, PAOs have clearly appointed 2 project managers each to TAIEX and SIGMA. Otherwise there is at least one TAIEX NCP in the PAOs. Besides, the PAO in Morocco indicated that proactive TAIEX strategies are not necessary, because “Twinning is flexible enough to integrate additional, albeit minor, activities identified during project implementation”. Resorting to TAIEX must remain exceptional during project implementation. It’s during the preparation phase that the project must integrate a mechanism that allows for enough flexibility in order to look for alternative solutions elsewhere, e.g. in a Manual of Procedures. Once the project has opted for one of the institutional instruments, it should stick to it. It’s no good leaving one instrument for another one during project implementation<sup>81</sup>”. However, the Evaluators argued that TAIEX could be used whenever there is a need to solve a more sophisticated, focused, astute issue that cannot be dealt with otherwise, i.e. in theory, when the adequate knowledge resources are not available under the twinning project.

<sup>81</sup> This is not allowed anyway.

A few requests were rejected for not fulfilling the TAIEX criteria, as was the case for the Accreditation project with the NAAU. TAIEX was not applied for by the Water Quality Management project with Egypt's Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources, because the PAO discouraged applying for TAIEX, and with Morocco's ACAA project. There have also been cases where neither instrument was considered as needed, e.g. Ukraine's FDI promotion project with SAUID (Invest Ukraine) and Egypt's FDI promotion project with GAFI. The FDI promotion project with Ukraine's SAUID (Invest Ukraine) did not get any TAIEX intervention because the EC does not support combined Twinning-TAIEX implementation with certain types of public authorities to avoid any overlap. However, it must be noted, as the EUD in Ukraine pointed out, that in a large number of cases, TAIEX requests were supported even when the twinning projects are on-going, provided that the activities requested under TAIEX does not overlap with the on-going twinning projects, but rather is complementary to the twinning activities. However, it is clear that no TAIEX request could be supported when related to the twinning fiche finalisation phase or during the Call for Proposals period.

SIGMA has become increasingly active in the ENP Region since its inception in mid-2008. However, one will never come across SIGMA in several sectors, such as trade facilitation, tax legislation and collection (with the exception of customer relations, transparency, governance, fight against corruption, etc.). SIGMA has been designed for horizontal systems and is to be encountered in public procurement, Ministry of Finance (except tax legislation and collection), Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economy, 1<sup>st</sup> Ministry and/or Secretariat General to the Government, public & administrative law reform, etc.

The major references provided by the stakeholders on *Coherence/Complementarity* of TAIEX and SIGMA with Twinning were as follows:

- The EUD in Ukraine indicated that TAIEX would be used increasingly for preparing twinning requests (e.g. road-mapping through TAIEX, but not for drafting twinning fiches). The PAO also indicated that in accordance with a CMU order, SIGMA recommendations were now compulsory for Ukraine's beneficiary administrations, although, in principle, SIGMA recommendations are not compulsory. Ukraine's administration is organised vertically and very rigidly and remains rather dysfunctional. For example, as a result of the on-going public administration reorganisation process launched by presidential decree end-2010 (see Section 4.1 above), the number of staff has been drastically reduced (30%) by the new government, but not the number of tasks. All cooperation work is affected as a result even if SIGMA<sup>82</sup>, which was launched in 2008, is there to support the government's public administration reform in the field of Civil Service Reform and Public Administration, Financial Control & External Audit, Public Procurement and Public Service and Human Resources Management.
- In Morocco, both instruments seem to be well utilised to avoid overlaps, more particularly before twinning activities start and after they are completed. For example, the Certification project with the Division for Quality & Market Surveillance (DQSM) applied for TAIEX during the implementation phase. Requests were submitted to DG Enlargement, but were left unanswered, although they were clear

<sup>82</sup>

Further information on SIGMA in Ukraine is accessible here:

[http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en\\_33638100\\_33638200\\_44396619\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_33638100_33638200_44396619_1_1_1_1,00.html)

and specific enough. However, it must be noted that in Morocco SIGMA is used for coaching purposes (reflection on preparing reform implementation), whereas TAIEX is used as a direct complement to twinning activities. Why “coaching”? Simply because in the absence of coaching, there is neither any specific timeframe nor any concrete objective for reform projects within a reform-oriented agenda.

- Morocco’s Customs Administration’s experience has been that it was not possible to mobilise TAIEX during project implementation. TAIEX comes in either before or after a project and must be complementary if the TAIEX intervention takes place only in relation to specific, focused, more sophisticated points during implementation. The Evaluators also indicated that this was not necessarily the case, as TAIEX may be mobilised during project implementation for topics other than those set in the twinning fiche.
- However, there may have been an overlap between two twinning projects “Capacity Building for the Oriental Development Agency (ADO)” (Ref. MA07/AA-OT-12, 2007) with ADO, which has been selected in our sample, and “Territorial Capacity building of the Wiley of the Oriental in integrated and sustainable economic development in the Region” (Ref. MA07/AA-OT-13, 2007): both twinning fiches and budget were very similar.
- Jordan’s Customs Administration sent officers to Germany and the UK within the framework of TAIEX in coordination with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. This activity was considered very useful as it facilitated implementation of the twinning activities.
- The specific objectives of the project with Jordan’s Public Security Directorate were directly linked to the ENP Action Plan. The EUD is not really strict about the link of twinning activities to the EU Acquis in Jordan, whereas TAIEX must be linked systematically to the EU Acquis.
- SIGMA is now being used by Jordan’s Audit Bureau for audit control in ministries. For this purpose, 6 workshops were organised at the Audit Bureau. To date, the Government of Jordan has requested SIGMA’s assistance for the following purposes (Source: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation – MOPIC<sup>83</sup>):
  - Establish the High Commission for Public Procurement.
  - Assess the Public Sector Development efforts.
  - Improve the legislative drafting procedures of the Legislative and Opinion Bureau.
  - Assess the draft Strategic Plan of the Audit Bureau for 2011-2014.
  - Public debt management and internal control of the Ministry of Finance.
  - Decentralisation project.
- A few twinning projects have used TAIEX in Azerbaijan (e.g. SSC – Statistics) for additional training that was not available across the board (more advanced

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[http://www.mop.gov.jo/pages.php?menu\\_id=296&local\\_type=0&local\\_id=0&local\\_details=0&local\\_details1=0](http://www.mop.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=296&local_type=0&local_id=0&local_details=0&local_details1=0)

knowledge), taking into account that TAIEX may not overlap with twinning activities. Moreover, SIGMA was used for explaining to Azerbaijan's Ministry of Finance that they should apply for a twinning project.

**Best Practice example: Azerbaijan-PAO/RTAs**

In Azerbaijan, RTAs are requested by EUD/PAO to assist in identifying additional needs against the most suitable institution building tools for the country's BA in order to ensure the adequacy of the IB tool chosen and also to maximise *Complementarity/Coherence* between EU institution tools. The RTA to the Parliament project suggested that a new twinning project could also deal with *Consistency/Complementarity* of EU legislation with Azerbaijan's.

- In May/June 2011, Egypt's Central Agency for Organisation and Administration (CAOA - Ministry of Civil Service) got a TA project on upgrading Egypt's civil service training system. The TORs have been prepared jointly by the PAO and SIGMA.
- The Statistics project with CAPMAS in Egypt Overall, CAPMAS has been very satisfied with the project results and now intends to use TAIEX for follow-up purposes.
- TAIEX was not applied for by Egypt's Water Management project because the PAO was not sufficiently supportive.
- The Tunisian PAO is of the opinion that TAIEX is worth promoting much more. SIGMA activities in Tunisia have only just started. The project with Tunisia's Administrative Court used TAIEX for workshops, whereas SIGMA was used for e-Procedures and e-Actions / e-Appeals, involving the creation of an e-mail correspondence system between attorneys, public administrations and liable physical persons and legal entities. In addition, SIGMA was resorted to for establishing a training system for those magistrates in charge of administrative litigations (See also Venice Commission<sup>84</sup>) and also two other commissions, one on the status of magistrates and the other on the "administrative court hierarchy" ("ordre juridictionnel administratif").

Overall, according to SIGMA, it would be a positive move to involve SIGMA in all sectors (agriculture, transport, environment, etc.). Further reflection and strategic thinking are needed on this aspect. Therefore, given the relative confusion remaining amongst the beneficiaries in respect of TAIEX and SIGMA rules, procedures and opportunities, the Evaluators are of the opinion that awareness-raising activities could better promote *Complementarity* of TAIEX and SIGMA with Twinning. This aspect is developed further under Communication and Visibility in EQ10.

JC2 - There is effective *Coherence/Complementarity* of Twinning activities with the partner country's policies and other donors' interventions

<sup>84</sup> <http://www.venice.coe.int>

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is partly satisfactory. *Coherence/Complementarity* between the 3 institution building tools and other EU-funded projects (classical TA Tenders, grants, FWCs, Calls for Proposals, Budget Support<sup>85</sup>, etc...) and other bilateral or multilateral donors already exists (see also Section “Related Projects” in Project Fiches). However, although the situation has been developing positively, there is still room for further improvement with a more strategic approach to *Proactive Complementarity* during the design phase and even earlier, as well as during implementation, as each and every identification mission should carefully examine *Complementarity* opportunities.

*Coherence/Complementarity* between programmes can be either active – i.e. real coordination and sequencing between programmes is sought to avoid overlaps and achieve results in a cost-effective manner (efficiency) – or passive – i.e. coordination is not sought and is only casual.

Coordination with other institutional building instruments, which are funded either by the EU, or any other multi- and bilateral donor, exists and has also been improving though. Great attention is increasingly paid to past, ongoing and forthcoming related activities when the Twinning Fiche is being drafted. EU and other Donors’ representatives take part in joint meetings on a regular, albeit insufficiently frequent, basis, often at sectoral level, in order to ensure appropriate follow-up on project coordination and also to ensure complementarity and coherence between all projects.

Here follow a few examples of *Complementarity* between Twinning and other cooperation interventions:

Ukraine’s National School of Judges worked in close cooperation with the following EU-funded projects:

- “Accountability and Effectiveness of Ukrainian Judiciary Functioning (civil service component) – Ref.: europeaid/125611/C/SER/UA;
- The Joint Programme of the European Commission and the Council of Europe “Transparency and Efficiency of Ukraine’s Judiciary;
- USAID/Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Ukraine “Rule of Law” project

In Morocco, twinning activities have been integrated by the EUD into the sectoral approach, seeking *Complementarity* between the twinning projects themselves. From the start EUD sought a horizontal approach in and with the NIP, Advanced Status, etc.

USAID is the main foreign donor in Jordan and the EUD tries to avoid overlaps with the American Agency. Donor Coordination Meetings take place on a regular basis (twice a month) and are chaired by UNDP and now by MOPIC under a USAID Team Leader.

The Project with Jordan’s Customs Administration exchanges information and coordination activities (e.g. risk management) with USAID’s CAMP (Customs Administration Modernisation Programme). The RTA, as a customs facilitator to the “WTO Trade Facilitation National Self Assessment of Jordan Needs and Priorities”, has proposed to assist Jordan in negotiating more effectively on WTO trade facilities. Moreover, GIZ (former GTZ)

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<sup>85</sup> See footnote 27

had already implemented one project with the Customs Department and also the Millennium Challenge Corporation (USAID). So the twinning project didn't start entirely from scratch.

The Forensic Laboratories Department of Jordan's Public Security Directorate (PSD) is having a training course on cybercrime with USAID. It also has contacts with the US Cooperative Test Service, which is part of the US Educational Testing Service (ETS), which is important for accreditation purposes.

The PAO in Azerbaijan argued that the beneficiary authorities have got enough skills to determine what the components of a project should be and know well enough what will work out and what won't and also where *Complementarity* with other donor programmes lies and why it should be sought. The Evaluators only partly subscribe to that point of view, as it all depends upon the right information being conveyed to the beneficiaries about opportunities.

USAID and the World Bank Group (WBG) are engaged in EU legal approximation with EU twinning experts for Azerbaijan. For example, the twinning project "Support to the State Labour Inspectorate (SLI) in Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) enhancement in the Republic of Azerbaijan" closely cooperates with the WBG project "Social Protection Development".

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***Best Practice example: Azerbaijan-EUD***

During the Evaluation Team's field visit to Baku, **Azerbaijan**, the EUD's twinning coordinator provided the Experts with a Note to the File dated 13/01/2011 (See Annex 8 to this Report) showing the list of all donors coordination activities in 2010 with follow-up actions for 2011. We consider this document as Best Practice example as it shows very well that the complementarity effort really exists and what it consists in.

In Egypt, the European Development Counsellors meet regularly and there is an International Donor Partnership Group chaired by UNDP. The EC cooperation with Egypt has had three historical phases: MEDA I, MEDA II and the ENP. The first two being classical development cooperation examples; the ENP is about partnership. The EC provides aid to Egypt through grants that were on average € 150 million per annum in the 2005–2007 period. The distribution of the current EC cooperation with Egypt is 10% for political cooperation, 50% for social cooperation and 40% for economic cooperation. Germany co-chairs the Donors Partner Group (DPG) held on monthly basis in Cairo. Germany regards Egypt as a very

important development partner in the Middle East. Therefore, its bilateral support to Egypt has been constant over the past decade. Germany provides support to Egypt in various forms.

It has developed a number of instruments to support several areas such as culture, education and civil society. For development projects, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ, now GIZ) designs and implements projects in the fields of climate and environmental protection, water resources and water management. There has been a clear commitment by the Egyptian counterpart towards these priorities. GIZ also cooperates with local NGOs. In addition, the Embassy of Germany has a small grant fund (€ 60 000 per year) to support NGOs. The USA regards Egypt as a strategic partner in the Middle East due to its strong political influence.

However, USAID has considerably changed its assistance approach to Egypt. Over the last ten years, USAID has axed half of its annual direct aid to \$ 400 million (per annum since 2007). USAID supports Egypt through development projects and NGO funding. Its projects focus on trade and investment, utilities, education, healthier family planning, natural resources and democracy. Other forms of cooperation between the USA and Egypt are managed by the American Embassy in Cairo in the fields of higher education and culture.

Twinning projects do not aim to substitute for traditional bilateral cooperation and could even encourage it. For example, as indicated above in Section 5.1.5.3, the project with Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA) provided a good basis for additional bilateral cooperation between Egypt and the EU MS (Austria): a training centre for tourist bus drivers was set up.

In Egypt, Twinning was a totally new concept for GAFI's FDI promotion activity, especially in terms of quality management requirements. The RTA Counterpart had relevant experience with most TA instruments and other multilateral donors, such as the IFC, which was on the policy advisory side, and MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Company).

In Tunisia, donor coordination meetings are regularly organised on a thematic and ad hoc basis. They usually cover thematic issues related to civil society, public debt management and budget support and also the Tunisia Recovery Support Programme (RSP)'s approximately € 500-million envelope co-funded by the African Development Bank (ADB), the French Development Agency (AFD), the World Bank and the EU. The Financing Agreements signed with the first three donors provide funding within the framework of loans, whereas the EU grants this funding as a gift. However, coordination meetings between Tunisia's MOPIC and donor community have so far not been organised this year.

The Evaluators also point out that *Complementarity* of twinning activities with classical Technical Assistance interventions should also be taken into account. Each instrument should never be considered separately. The achievements of previous activities and interventions should always be considered out of impact and sustainability concerns. Stakeholders and twinning project designers should systematically try to capitalise on that. How to better complement EU MS bilateral programmes with Twinning has also been an issue that will be dealt with more carefully in the future. In fact, bilateral relations under EU auspices should also be encouraged, as they have sometimes weakened because of EU interference. Moreover, the line between Twinning and classical Technical Assistance is still not clear for too many stakeholders. The difference between Twinning and classical TA could be better defined.

Overall, the Evaluators are of the opinion that more synergies should be sought with other institution building instruments (World Bank Group, USAID, UNDP, etc) and their potential in terms of *Impact* and *Sustainability* should be identified. The Donor Cooperation Meeting takes place twice a year. *Complementarity* must be sought with other donors as well. Briefings on the need for *Complementarity* should be made more comprehensive. Project fiches must normally include one paragraph with references to *Complementarity* with other donors. However, this exercise has revealed quite perfunctory in a number of cases.

Finally, several beneficiaries pointed out the need for complementary procurement projects. The Evaluators argue that Twinning must never become a pretext for the beneficiaries to be supplied with new equipment (laboratories, hardware, software, etc.). However, in our view, it also appears indispensable to ensure better complementarity between Twinning and twinning-related procurement, as equipment has too often been delivered too late, i.e. after project completion.

### 5.1.7 Added value of EU Twinning Intervention in the ENP Region

**EQ 7:** To what extent has the EU twinning intervention contributed successfully to a beneficiary's institutional building effort?

This question relates to any *Added Value* contributed or likely to be contributed by the Twinning Instrument to the institutional capacity building, civil service modernisation and/or legal approximation effort in the ENP Region. It is therefore very important for the Commission to be well informed of the benefits that its external cooperation programmes, in this occurrence the Institutional Twinning Instrument, have generated or are generating in a particular region of the world, i.e. the ENP Region in this occurrence. It is important for the Commission to fully understand to what extent its own expertise has been utilised to good effect and has played a good role model in capacity building. Obviously, this question also relates to *Impact*.

JC1 - EC twinning activities have contributed successfully to a beneficiary's institutional building effort in the ENP Region

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is highly satisfactory. All direct beneficiaries have unanimously acknowledged their overall satisfaction with EU-Funded Institutional Building instruments, especially the Twinning Instrument, with regard to their "valuable" contribution to the institutional capacity building effort.

*EU Added Value* provided by all twinning projects contributed effectively to the institutional capacity building, civil service modernisation and/or legal approximation effort in the ENP Region. The results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region must be considered as integral part of the overall benefits generated by the EU Cooperation Programmes to the Region.

It has also been widely acknowledged that Twinning is a well-calibrated instrument that helps the ENP BCs to develop modern and efficient public administrations and organisations with the structures, HR capacity and management skills needed to implement the EU Acquis to the same standards as in EU MS.

Moreover what is concretely most appreciated by the ENP beneficiaries has been the unique opportunity provided to them by Twinning to have access to public expertise within an institutional framework and to cooperate directly with senior EU MS civil servants and upgrade/modernise their skills, expertise and knowledge in their respective sectors (“*Sustainability*” of peer-to-peer cooperation). The greatest quality of Twinning is the direct and active involvement of beneficiaries in project implementation, as beneficiaries and EU MS partners are jointly responsible for the achievement of mandatory results. Moreover, Twinning is also more appreciated than classical TA, as in most cases it offers more practical, hands-on, real-life experience than TA’s dry theory.

Overall, notwithstanding the various constraints and issues encountered, the Twinning Instrument has been rather successful in the ENP Region.

With the exception of the EU, no other multi- or bilateral donor has been able to provide any equivalent programme for the following reasons:

- Twinning is, above all, the only comprehensive institutional capacity building instrument that has been intended for public administrations and civil servants.
- Competition between the 27 MS administrations, which inevitably enhances the quality and diversity of proposals
- Over ten years’ experience gained with Twinning in the field both in the capacity of beneficiaries (accession candidate countries) and providers (“old” Member States).
- Several providers are ex-Soviet Bloc countries that have the same background as several BCs (ENP-East), but have gone through legal approximation and have integrated EU best practices successfully;
- Not only EU law, but also and above all EU standards are a reference in most ENP countries.
- Achieving the Mandatory Results as specified in the project fiches is a unique feature of Twinning.

In fact, the EU role has been gaining momentum through Twinning and TAIEX in the ENP Region and has increasingly become a reference for other donors who acknowledge the EU’s comparative advantage in providing legal approximation support. It must also be noted that ENP countries do not intend to join the EU as full-fledged member states, rather to use the world’s best quality standards, which have been and are being developed by the EU.

Several beneficiaries, although acknowledging the invaluable contribution made by the Twinning Instrument to the institution capacity building effort, have indicated to the Evaluators that Twinning was overall insufficient. According to them, the mobilisation process should be revised towards a more dynamic and open approach upstream and downstream though the establishment of more flexible mechanisms. Although the twinning rules and procedures could indeed be more flexible, the Evaluators tend to disagree with that statement, as other institutional building instruments, such TAIEX and SIGMA, may be mobilised upstream and downstream of project implementation.

#### JC2 - EC twinning activities are well perceived in the ENP Region

This Judgement Criterion is satisfactory. EC twinning activities (as well as TAIEX and SIGMA) have achieved very positive results in the ENP Region. However, the difference between Twinning and classical TA must be clarified further to beneficiaries.

Overall, Twinning is very well perceived and appreciated as a valuable tool by all beneficiaries in the ENP Region. It must be noted that although it is true that Twinning is unanimously perceived by the respective BAs as an accelerator of reform in ENP countries, this perception, however, still remains limited to internal processes within individual administrations and does not yet fully encompass global domestic/sectoral reform.

However, as indicated in the various Sections above, more particularly in the analysis of *Relevance*, Twinning also tends to be perceived as classical Technical Assistance with more cumbersome, bureaucratic procedures, whereas it should be perceived as a positive institutional building tool, not a bureaucratic burden (see also the analysis of *Communication & Visibility* in EQ10 hereinafter). Moreover, it must never be forgotten that several sectors and activities are more “twinable” than others: legal procedures, police, justice, certification, audit, accounting, statistics, customs and any other areas where expertise can only be found in the public sector.

Overall, beyond its technical value, the Twinning Instrument is also a clear political message addressed to BCs in order to strengthen their cooperation with the EU.

### JC3 - EC HQ and EUDs have managed to bring together EU MS and BAs in the ENP Region

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is highly satisfactory. However, there is room for improvement, essentially with Communication and Visibility activities, which are dealt in EQ10 hereafter.

EC HQ and EUDs have really demonstrated a capacity to bring EU MS and beneficiaries together. Evidence of this lies with the Twinning Instrument’s popularity in the ENP Region, as in a large number of cases the beneficiary administrations have requested a second twinning project, are on the verge of doing so or are contemplating doing so.

The Twinning Instrument’s management mode is still centralised in Azerbaijan and Ukraine (and ENP-East), whereas it is decentralised in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan (and the ENP-South, with the exception of Israel). In countries operating under decentralised management mode, EUDs have also entrusted project follow-up management to their sector managers, which offers great value added (although more limited than under centralised management mode), and PAOs play the central role between EU MS and beneficiaries. The centralised vs. decentralised management issue is developed further in EQ9.

EC HQ and EUDs provide all necessary support for establishing and implementing the twinning projects in all ENP BCs, more particularly in ENP-East countries, which are still under centralised management mode. Even if relations have sometimes been strained with PAOs (see case with Azerbaijan and Egypt in Section 5.3.2), EUDs take an active part in the implementation process and provide good advice for solving cooperation-related and project management issues.

Most appreciated by beneficiaries and EU MS is also the opportunity offered by Twinning to develop long-term privileged inter-institutional, peer-to-peer relationships and networks. Twinning has also facilitated further bilateral relationships between EU MS and BCs at various levels. All this is definitely due to the successful achievement of mandatory results.

For example, backup from embassies can be very useful, e.g. the French embassy to Azerbaijan offered French courses when France was awarded one of the twinning projects. Another example was that after the Statistics project was awarded, a joint visit by representatives of Bulgarian and German statistics agencies took place end of April 2010 to sign a Joint Declaration of Intent between the State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan and Germany and also an Agreement on statistics cooperation with Bulgaria. It was acknowledged during a Steering Committee meeting that all stakeholders had learnt from one another.

Finally, various ENP stakeholders (EUDs, PAOs, beneficiaries and RTAs/PLs) in the 6 countries visited have indicated that Twinning should be extended to regional and local levels for institutional capacity building purposes.

### 5.1.8 Cross-cutting issues

**EQ 8:** To what extent has institutional twinning contributed to improving *Cross-Cutting Issues* in the ENP Region?

The European Development Consensus<sup>86</sup> identifies four “*Cross-Cutting Issues*” of major importance to development cooperation:

- democracy and human rights
- environmental sustainability
- gender equality/equity
- HIV/AIDS

*Cross-Cutting Issues* require action in multiple, often interconnected fields and should thus be integrated into all areas of donor programmes and be addressed in all political dialogue on development. *Cross-Cutting Issues* are laid down in a number of international conventions, declarations and treaties on development that are binding on EU countries and most beneficiary countries. The broad policy goals must be taken into account at all stages of the funding cycle and the EU cannot support action that may result in a beneficiary country infringing its obligations under the multi- and bilateral agreements.

Therefore, by including the most relevant *Cross-Cutting Issues* in its development cooperation strategies, the EU intends to work out better development strategies and **respond more effectively to particular circumstances** in each target country/region.

Taking *Cross-Cutting Issues* systematically into account helps the European Commission and other donors:

- To identify the key constraints affecting growth, poverty reduction, equity, opportunity, security and empowerment in a given sector, region or country
- To cooperate with national stakeholders on measures to address these issues
- To incorporate such measures into the domestic development strategy
- To monitor the outcomes of a policy of integrating *Cross-Cutting Issues*.

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<sup>86</sup> See the Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: “The European Consensus” (2006/C 46/01) and also [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/cross-cutting-issues/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/cross-cutting-issues/index_en.htm)

90% of the stakeholders mentioned that *Cross-Cutting Issues* were taken into account for project design purposes, “whenever they were relevant”.

Of course, *Cross-Cutting Issues*, such as anti-discriminatory measures for AIDS patients, cannot be dealt with systematically on each occasion, whereas democracy and human rights may be at the core of several Twinning Projects. To the best extent possible, several stakeholders ensured that gender equality/equity and environmental considerations were carefully integrated into their respective projects. There have even been twinning activities dedicated to *Cross-Cutting Issues*, such as the ongoing project “Support to the State Committee for Family, Women and Children Affairs (SCFWCA)”, which deals with gender issues.

JC1 - A *Cross-Cutting Issue* strategy/approach has been envisaged and/or put in place in each project

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is partly satisfactory. The Evaluators are of the opinion that *Cross-Cutting Issues* are not systematically taken in account adequately enough during the project preparation phase.

This point was systematically raised by the Evaluators with the Stakeholders both in the questionnaires and during the field interviews in the 6 ENP countries. All of them indicated that *Cross-Cutting Issues* were taken into account whenever was appropriate. However in a number of cases, they were irrelevant to project objectives and activities. According to several EUDs, *Cross-Cutting Issues* are more publicised than ever, but hardly anything is done to better integrate them into the project preparation process. They’re hardly ever considered properly in project design, or only in a perfunctory manner.

JC2 - Twinning activities have contributed to improving *Cross-Cutting Issues* in the ENP Region

This Judgement Criterion is not satisfactory. In line with Section 5.8.1, the Evaluators are of the opinion that *Cross-Cutting Issues* have not been integrated into the topics and objectives of twinning activities also for feasibility and compatibility reasons. *Cross-Cutting Issues* can be very sensitive issues indeed and cannot be imposed upon the BCs by the EU across the board without contradicting the demand-driven approach and triggering fears of external interference in domestic affairs.

Several organisations and twinning projects have taken into account *Cross-Cutting Issues* in their activities (e.g. Project Fiches). However, one PAO (Ukraine) argued rightfully that one twinning intervention could hardly improve the status of *Cross-Cutting Issues* in any country’s domestic and sectoral policy as a whole.

Below, we present a few examples of how *Cross-Cutting Issues* have been integrated into twinning activities:

***Best Practice example: Ukraine-National School of Judges***

Because the project with the National School of Judges in **Ukraine** lends itself easily to *Cross-Cutting Issues*, it has integrated topics related to *Cross-Cutting Issues*, such as gender equality/equity, human rights and antidiscrimination measures into its training programmes for judges. According to the beneficiary, newly trained judges are now more aware of *Cross-Cutting Issues* and will integrate them into their day-to-day work. Moreover, Section 9 to the twinning fiche states that “the training needs analysis within Component C will also focus on training needs for gender issues or environmental aspects. If indicated by the analysis training on these subjects might also be delivered within this Project. During the implementation of the project equal opportunities for participation of men and women will be guaranteed. Whenever applicable, the following issues should be mainstreamed into the project activities: management issues; human rights and fundamental freedoms; quality performance delivery of justice rendered from a citizen’s perspective, including anti-corruption measures”. The Evaluators greet and encourage this effort. However, the formulation remains vague. Along the same lines, it is not enough to assert that *Cross-Cutting Issues* were taken into consideration by a particular project “just like in all EU projects”.

Moreover, SAUID indicated that its FDI promotion project strongly affected employment through the typology of jobs created, regional employment distribution, wage levels, income distribution and skills transfer. Equal opportunity and gender equality/equity principles and practices are expected to be adopted to ensure fair gender participation in the project according to EU standards. The Evaluators are not really convinced as no follow-up mechanism has been reported on by the PAO/EUD. As regards the Accreditation project with the NAAU, environmental policy was one of the specific sectors selected for the intervention. Indirectly, the project supported the rights of consumers.

According to the PAO, Morocco’s administration implements gender equality/equity requirements in its recruitment procedures. In the same spirit, the PAO ensures that gender equality/equity is respected when local staff are recruited within the framework of a particular project. The RTA’s assistant was recruited along those lines. However, the implementation of a technical regulation has no real positive or negative impact in terms of gender equality/equity, as this type of regulation does not necessarily affect gender equity. Moreover, the twinning fiche for the project with the Customs Administration has not planned to deal with any *Cross-Cutting Issue*, as the BA already integrates those approaches into its functioning. The fiche was prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Common Twinning Manual’s version of 2005. Moreover, the Oriental Development Agency’s Director General has pledged himself to gender equality/equity, to fight against any form of gender discrimination and to develop instruments and strategies on the basis of an integrated gender equality/equity approach. Project staff (BA participants) were selected accordingly. The Oriental development project’s current strategies include heavy equipment supplies. The project has taken the necessary measures towards sustainable development, especially for saving water resources for future generations. Again, the Evaluators believe that such statements are perfunctory or need to be substantiated further.

According to ITTSO in Azerbaijan, the project with the Parliament could contribute to improving *Cross-Cutting Issues* in Azerbaijan after successful project completion as a result of approximation of national legislation with EU laws. Moreover, *Cross-Cutting Issues* are normally specified in twinning fiches under Section 9 “In project implementation activities,

each twinning partner is required to comply with the “equal opportunities” requirement set by the EU. This will be the case more particularly in selecting EU experts and local staff for the project”. However, the Evaluators are not of the view that this consideration for *Cross-Cutting Issues* may be regarded as valid to fulfil the above Judgement Criterion. The PAO indicated that the reference to *Cross-Cutting Issues* could also be formulated in very general terms in the twinning fiche and the work plan: “Contributing to the development of democratic values, the promotion of human rights and rule of law in Azerbaijan and to legal approximation with EU MS legislation is a cornerstone of the project (with Parliament)”. In addition, *Cross-Cutting Issues* under this project were also taken into account in the Twinning Contract’s Annex 1 “Description of the Action – Component B – Testing”.

Tunisia’s PAO indicated to the Evaluators that all project fiches developed since 2009 included a section dedicated to *Cross-Cutting Issues* regarding gender equality/equity and environment. Notwithstanding, like Egypt’s Statistics project with CAPMAS, the ACAA project in Tunisia was so technical that *Cross-Cutting Issues* were not considered. Tunisia’s Administrative Court took *Cross-Cutting Issues* into account as the project endeavoured to maintain gender equality/equity all along, as 50% magistrates are women.

Finally, the Evaluators also noticed that the notion of *Cross-Cutting Issues* was rather poorly understood or they were dealt with by several beneficiaries in a perfunctory manner. It was also observed that relevant Cross-Cutting Issues are referred to in the twinning fiches, but are then ignored during project implementation.

### 5.1.9 Decentralised vs. Centralised Project Management

#### EQ 9

To what extent has decentralised vs. centralised management of twinning activities contributed to the quality of results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region?

This is a very important point as it addresses the asymmetrical character of twinning project management across the ENP Region. As ENPI-South and ENPI-East are asymmetrical in their respective institutional and management structure in respect of twinning, this question aims to analyse the repercussions and impacts that *decentralised vs. centralised management* and institutional structure have or may have on twinning project preparation, implementation and results (for more feedback information on those aspects, see Chapter 2 to this Report).

Our understanding is that *Decentralised vs. Centralised Management* has not had any major significant effect on the quality of twinning project management. Moreover, EUD and PAO roles and mandates should be redefined/redistributed clearly.

The success of the *Decentralised Management Mode* rests upon the central role played by PAOs, especially their ability to stimulate, promote, prepare, implement and follow up the twinning process.

For more information on the modalities related to *Centralised vs. Decentralised Management*, see the Common Twinning Manual pp. 20-28.

JC1 - Decentralised project management has effectively contributed to the quality of mandatory results achieved in the ENP Region

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion is partly satisfactory. Decentralisation has had a positive impact in terms of project ownership. However, PAOs must still be strengthened towards better project management and twinning rules and procedures.

With the exception of Israel, project management has been *decentralised* in ENP-South since the Twinning Instrument's inception, whereas it is still *centralised* in ENP-East. As a result, EUDs in countries are no longer directly involved in twinning activities but still monitor the various phases (each EUD has its Twinning Coordinator).

For example, in Tunisia, project management was *decentralised*, i.e. handed over, to the PAO, once the Financing Agreement on P3A-I was approved.

Besides, over time the European Commission intends to also introduce *decentralised management* into ENP-East, as current talks on having Association Agreements in place with several ENP-East countries indicate and as was already suggested in Section 1.1. Actually, this move is fully consistent with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda of 2005 on Aid Effectiveness, especially in respect of technical assistance and project ownership (See the analysis of *Relevance* under EQ1 above). Decentralisation increases a BC's project ownership.

Evidence of this is to be found merely in the impact that a "minor" administrative change to a regulation (e.g. administration's deadline for responding to a query is shortened) may have on the administration itself and also on company law, to say nothing about the impact a change to the twinning procedures could have on overall project design and on the efficiency of EUD/PAO technicians.

However, the Evaluators are of the opinion that effective *decentralised project management* has had no real impact on the quality and achievement of mandatory results, even if several PAOs (e.g. Egypt, Jordan) have argued to the contrary, i.e. that *decentralisation* has been key to implementation success.

Moreover, EUDs still apply *ex ante control* over disbursements and contracts in countries under decentralised management mode. EUDs also register twinning contracts within the Commission's CRIS database, pay the EU MS directly and carry out *ex ante control*. Otherwise, too much control would be lost across the ENP Region.

Therefore, this decentralisation must be considered as partial<sup>87</sup>. At the moment, Egypt is the only ENP country under complete decentralised management mode (the Commission services only retain *ex post control*). However, Brussels HQ's Neighbourhood Policy Directorate would like to return to partial decentralisation, as it has been the classic management mode across the ENP-South.

<sup>87</sup> See DEVCO Companion's Section 2.13.1 on Decentralised Management: "**Partial decentralisation** is the normal level of decentralisation practised by the European Commission, where the procedures used by beneficiary countries are those of the European Commission and all payments to third parties are made by the European Commission, apart from payments made under programme estimates (see Section 2.12.3.3 on degrees of decentralisation)" (see also footnote 15).

The EUD staff in charge of Twinning in Azerbaijan, which is under centralised management mode, is not keen on decentralisation because disbursement procedures are complex and cumbersome and their assessment is that it's still too early to decentralise project management now.

Besides, it was also observed that the decentralised management mode could, to various degrees, generate risks of deviations from the Twinning Instrument's original scope and procedures and could also lead to the progressive, even if limited, emergence of different twinning practices in each of the ENP countries, e.g. in Egypt, Jordan and even Azerbaijan, which is still under centralised management.

JC2 - The role played by the PAOs under *decentralised vs. centralised management* has contributed to the quality of mandatory results achieved in the ENP Region

**Summary:** This Judgement Criterion varies from barely satisfactory to satisfactory. PAO performance should be strengthened in all ENP Countries, as it plays the key role in the project preparation phase. PAO sectoral and technical capacity should be strengthened, whether in a centralised or decentralised management mode.

Overall, implementation success, i.e. achievement of objectives through the successful achievement of mandatory results, depends above all on EU MS RTAs of course and also on EUD and PAO staff. This is a rather complex issue. For example, the PAO very often knows the Common Twinning Manual better than the EUD staff because the PAO applies the Manual and abides by the book. Both EUD and PAO need to understand where their jurisdiction, prerogatives and boundaries lie. Otherwise, it becomes a political game likely to be detrimental to the beneficiaries and to the Twinning Instrument's credibility.

Recommendations for improving the PAO/UGP's central role have been issued in Chapter 7.

All the PAOs in ENP Countries under centralised project management indicated to the Evaluators that decentralised management should be adopted.

In Ukraine, an ENP Country under centralised management, the main role is played by EUD. However, whereas the EUD remains the Contracting Authority and is indeed responsible for overall funding allocations, the final decision to allocate funding to a given twinning project does not depend on the EUD only. In fact, these decisions are made at the meetings of the Twinning Programme Coordination Group (TPCG)<sup>88</sup>. As the Group consists of representatives from various institutions, decisions are made jointly. In the event of differences of opinion, additional information is sought and decisions are made - always on a collective basis – only after a consensus has been reached. Even though the PAO takes an active part in project preparation and implementation and conducts monitoring before and during project implementation, its role remains rather limited, especially in terms of budget management. Ukraine's PAO is of the opinion that decentralised management should be adopted in Ukraine. The main obstacle is the need to improve public finance management and public procurement processes. However, sometimes the PAO, with the best intentions, issues instructions to Ukrainian public organisations on issues that are normally under

<sup>88</sup> Further information on the TPCG is provided in the Best Practice example on pp. 61-62 to this Report.

EU/EUD responsibility, e.g. preparation of TORs for FWC assignments for twinning fiche drafting. This has led to the emergence of conflicting responsibilities and has added to the unnecessary formalism related to communication with the BAs on purely working issues. Moreover, it must be noted that the PAO Director's profile is more political than technical. The PAO Director has a high political profile as the Deputy Head of the Main Civil Service Department of Ukraine (MCSDU)<sup>89</sup>. However, the Evaluators point out that the MCSDU's positioning within Ukraine's administration is not stable due to the government's on-going public administration reform launched in December 2010.

**Best Practice example: Morocco-PAO**

In Morocco, the PAO has been playing an essential role in putting twinning projects in place over the past few years. The PAO Director's high political profile has greatly contributed to this in the sense that, mandated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his actions have a lot of political weight. Moreover, PAO staff have also managed to develop relevant project implementation expertise. The PAO is of the opinion that given the various on-going major institutional projects in Morocco time could be up for the PAO to be transformed into a government Technical Assistance agency or bureau through twinning and technical assistance projects. Therefore decentralised management helps better identify needs and prepare mandatory results of better quality.

The PAO in Jordan also operates as part of, and under the umbrella of, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), to which EU programmes have been decentralised. Very active, the PAO fulfils the following tasks: prepares the twinning fiches with line ministries, launches the related calls for proposals, is responsible for the MS contact point network for Jordan, chairs and manages the Evaluation Committees, whose meetings are attended by the EUD Task Manager in the capacity of an observer, seeks EuropeAid's approval of project selection through the EUD in accordance of rules and procedures, distributes twinning fiches to the MS contact points, is responsible from the Work Plan up to the Contract, is responsible for financial management aspects. With the old generation projects, namely SAAP-I & SAAP-II, the PAO was both the payment and contracting authority. With the new generation projects, the EUD is the payment authority and the PAO is the contracting authority. Rules have changed so that the EUD *retains ex ante control* over financial aspects. However, that is not recentralisation *per se* as Twinning in Jordan still operates under decentralised management mode, but no longer through a programme estimate.

In Azerbaijan, as EUD and PAO have had no meetings over the past six months (see cut-off date for this Report), their relations should be improved towards a more constructive approach, which would facilitate dialogue and cooperation. Regular EUD/PAO coordination meetings took place at the beginning of 2011 and had positive outcomes. This practice should continue in the future. PAO's involvement in Steering Committee meetings could also be improved. Its participation in Quarterly Twinning Focal Point meetings has so far been very effective. The number of study tours should not exceed PAO's capacity<sup>90</sup>. In early 2011, Azerbaijan's Minister of Economic Development declared his support for a joint approach to programming. However, there was no real involvement of PAO management under ITSSO-I.

<sup>89</sup> End-2011, within the framework of the reorganisation of Ukraine's public executive bodies, the MCSDU was transformed into the National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service (NAUCS). The PAO Director is now the head of this new Service.

<sup>90</sup> A limited number of PAO staff takes part in study tours.

Joint Twinning programming exercises should be carried out at the appropriate management/government level (i.e. PAO Director). The PAO should play a more active role in the preparation of project synopses. The Evaluators pointed out that the PAO's functioning and active involvement should be improved before any further step is made towards the decentralised management mode. In April 2011, EUD was informed that a decree issued by the Minister of Economic Development restructured the Department and renamed it into Cooperation with International Organisations instead of Department for Foreign Investment and Aid Coordination. The PAO has already benefited from two TA support projects, namely ITTO (2008-2009) and ITTSO (2009-2011). A third TA project (ITTSO-II) was expected to start in September 2011, but was eventually delayed until November 2011. It is widely assumed that Azerbaijan will continue receiving EU funding and the annual budget for Twinning is expected to increase over the coming years. However, the PAO still has progress to make in order to acquire sufficient capacity to manage Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA on its own.

Tunisia's PAO does not directly receive the requests submitted by applicants for twinning projects. As part of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MPCI), the UGP acts in the capacity of executive agency on MPCI's behalf. Cooperation represents a tool for achieving the *Five-Year Development Plan*<sup>91</sup>, to which adjustments are made by the Economic Budget Department annually, if necessary. Therefore the PAO is involved essentially in the project design phase, the selection of the EU MS twinning partner and the preparation of the twinning contracts. Once a contract has been signed, its implementation rests essentially upon twinning partners and the PAO only acts as a facilitator and coordinator providing advice on the application of the Common Twinning Manuals Rules and Procedures. The PAO ensures the financial follow-up on twinning activities and monitors cost compliance and modifications to the Common Twinning Manual. The PAO also follows up on twinning activities within the framework of its participation in Steering Committee and follow-up committee meetings. No conflict was encountered between Tunisian and EU procurement procedures. However, as regards purchasing equipment, the requirement to comply with national and EU procedures extends approval and tendering deadlines, which delays equipment delivery and project implementation.

The PAO Director is a high civil servant who has been appointed by the MPCI. Moreover, given the increasing number of requests for institutional capacity building support, the PAO will have to strengthen its structure. Responsibilities stemming from the centralised management mode will become more important with Tunisia's new political situation. The issues the previous regime was very reluctant to deal with will become "privileged" subjects (priorities) for twinning activities. In respect of this new climate, the PAO will have to play a central role with BAs in identifying needs and priorities, hence the need for the PAO to enhance its functioning and working methods and procedures.

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<sup>91</sup> The Twinning Activities are defined by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation (MPCI) within the framework of the P3A/SAAP in accordance with the Government's Five-Year Development Plan for Tunisia, which is promulgated as a law and whose application is mandatory for state institutions and agencies and optional for the private sector.

### 5.1.10 Communication & Visibility

**EQ10:** To what extent have the communication & visibility activities promoted the Institutional Twinning Instrument across the ENP Region and thus contributed to the achievements of twinning activities/results in the Region?

This question addresses all communication and visibility aspects of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region. Its objective is to find out to what extent C&V actions have been conducted efficiently and effectively to promote the twinning instrument across the line beneficiary institutions in the ENP countries. For this purpose, it is also important to find out what specific C&V activities have been carried out, whether the C&V actions undertaken have had the desired impact and who the beneficiaries and target audiences of C&V actions have been.

All EU-funded communication and visibility activities and actions for third countries must be conducted in accordance with the “Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions<sup>92</sup>” of October 2010. This manual has been designed to ensure that actions that are wholly or partially funded by the European Union (EU) incorporate information and communication activities designed to raise awareness on specific/target or general audiences of the reasons for the action and the EU support for the action in the country or region concerned, as well as the results and the impact of this support. The Manual mainly covers the written and visual identity of the EU. It sets out requirements and guidelines for briefings, written material, press conferences, presentations, invitations, signs, commemorative plaques and all other tools used for highlighting EU participation, involvement and/or commitment. In addition, it proposes communication and visibility tools facilitating the development of a dynamic communication strategy that highlights the achievements of EU support.

Within the framework of the evaluation, our intention is not to find out whether the EU Communication and Visibility Manual’s guidelines have been applied adequately in the ENP Region, which we assume, is the case. On the basis of various practices developed in each ENP Country, our concern is rather to find out whether communication and visibility activities have been conducted, by whom, how and to what extent, for what purpose and what the results have been. In other words, have communication and visibility activities been conducted and to do what?

This analysis has been carried out in two directions: have the resources been efficient and used to good effect? Have they contributed to the implementation of activities and achievement of project results as planned? The analysis of communication and visibility will be conducted on the basis of the two following judgement criteria:

- 1) C&V activities have contributed to promoting the Twinning Instrument effectively and efficiently in the ENP Region
- 2) C&V activities have contributed to the implementation of twinning activities and achievement of results in the ENP Region

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<sup>92</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/index_en.htm) (English) and [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/index\\_fr.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/index_fr.htm) (French)

After the information obtained through the evaluation questionnaires, more particularly EQ 10, and further to the field visits was analysed, the following judgement indicators were considered, whenever appropriate:

- C&V activities and actions have been conducted in the ENP Region by line stakeholders and/or through long-term technical assistance
- Extent to which the level of coordination and communication between the line stakeholders has been appropriate
- Degree of twinning information dissemination amongst line stakeholders, potential line stakeholders and MS twinning partner institutions
- Degree of Member State awareness about the twinning activities in the ENP Region (briefings, correspondence, etc)
- Degree of awareness of the opportunities offered and requirements imposed by the EC-funded Twinning Instrument across the ENP Region's civil service spectrum
- External/internal popularisation and dissemination of twinning results have been carried out or are being envisaged
- Increased number of requests for participation in twinning activities submitted by institutions in a beneficiary ENP country
- Increased effective participation in twinning activities by institutions in a beneficiary ENP Country
- Increased coordination and cooperation between line stakeholders
- "Enlarged" participation in the Steering Committee as an opportunity to better disseminate information on the project, to ensure its promotion and to get the active support of stakeholders
- Extent to which C&V actions have contributed to increasing Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Sustainability, Added Value and Cross-Cutting Issues

The Evaluators have made a distinction between communication and visibility activities conducted to promote the Twinning Instrument, hereinafter referred to as "*Promotion Activities for the Twinning Instrument*" and communication and visibility activities conducted within each project, hereinafter referred to as "*Project Communication*".

*Promotion activities regarding the Twinning Instrument* consist of awareness-raising activities, i.e. workshops, information days, seminars, that are conducted by PAOs (and EUDs) in order to mobilise political and BA commitment and facilitate the ENP Region's absorption capacity and demand-driven approach.

*Project Communication* activities are conducted at project level by RTAs and BAs and include individual project kick-off meetings, launch events, closing conferences and other public information and visibility actions covered by mainstream and/or specialised mass media, i.e. written press, radio, television, specialised internet websites, project newsletters, and also other external C&V material developed by RTAs/BAs (leaflets, stickers, plaques, pins, folders, gifts, etc.) in accordance with the Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions of October 2010.

## JC1 - C&V activities have contributed to promoting the Twinning Instrument effectively and efficiently in the ENP Region

**Summary:** This judgement criterion is not satisfactory. With the exception of Communication & Visibility actions carried out under a number of projects, relatively little attention and funding are actually dedicated to ensure the Twinning Instrument's communication, visibility and promotion in each ENP Country. Few EUDs and PAOs/UGPs deliver those activities satisfactorily due to a lack of appropriate budget and adequate staff.

This analysis only covers communication and visibility activities conducted to promote the Twinning Instrument. Project-related activities have been developed under the next judgement criterion.

### Promotion of the Twinning Instrument & Communication Planning

Overall, although the situation has been variable in each ENP Country, the C&V activities have a positive impact on project promotion when they are considered seriously. However, the impact on the Twinning Instrument's promotion as such has been clearly insufficient in each ENP Country.

During the Field Phase's interviews with BAs in the 6 countries, we immediately noted a clear lack of information dissemination and communication activities, more particularly upstream from the project programming phase. Too many beneficiaries declared that they had not received any information on twinning rules and procedures either from EUDs or from PAOs/UGPs.

Moreover, in most ENP Countries, communication plans have not been considered sufficiently. For example, in Ukraine, the PAO has no Communication Plan and no separate newsletter is dedicated only to Twinning due to lack of resources. As a result, although it has its own website, the PAO uses the MCSDU's facilities to publish information. Notwithstanding, the PAO manages to keep abreast of the overall picture, receives the twinning requests and monitors all cooperation activities, including twinning projects. The PAO updates the twinning project pipeline and database. Twinning-related information is posted on the PAO's website accessible via [www.twinning.com.ua](http://www.twinning.com.ua). The PAO conducts meetings with stakeholders about progress on the projects in the pipeline, delivers presentations on the twinning rules and procedures. The extent of this effort has been acknowledged by all MS, more particularly during the Annual Institution Building days that took place in Brussels on 16-17 June 2011. It was indicated that Twinning-related information was easily accessible and transparent in Ukraine, whose public institutions also benefit from regular PAO-organised workshops for potential beneficiaries. However, the Evaluators point out that the PAO needs to adopt a more strategic approach that would be reflected in a consistent Communication Plan and also to at least develop its own communication tools as a *de facto* distinct department within the MCSDU. As was indicated earlier, the PAO needs to be a strong and visible player across Ukraine's institutional spectrum.

In Azerbaijan, RTAs were requested by EUD project managers to submit a communication strategy paper, but the quality of the document could be improved. In Tunisia, a Communication Plan has been developed by the PAO and several actions have been

conducted under the PAO's responsibility. However, a number of BAs still don't know anything about the Twinning Instrument, the PAO's website is not accessible and the number of Twinning brochures disseminated has been insufficient. Since end of 2009, hardly any communication and visibility activity has been launched, whereas a € 150,000 budget is available under the PA3A-2 (SAAP-II).

Regular dissemination of information on the Twinning Instrument and general activities, achieved progress and latest news to national and international stakeholders (meetings, briefings, project pipeline, etc.)

In each ENP Country, Twinning-related communication and information activities are essentially and systematically conducted during donor coordination meetings, where each donor representative informs their peers of the various updates to their respective programmes and projects, including for EU-funded twinning activities. Few other activities are conducted in that direction to reach other stakeholders, especially BAs.

However, at EuropeAid, during NCP meetings and the twinning fiche circulation phase, in addition to the Commission's website dedicated to twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA, communication, visibility and promotion activities are conducted for a relatively large number of persons in each EU Member State and each third IPA and ENP Country.

In Azerbaijan, stakeholders are regularly informed of the latest news on the Twinning Instrument through newsletters issued by ITTSO in English and Azerbaijani. Communication & visibility aspects are usually discussed between ITTSO's Team Leader and the RTAs or PLs under the supervision of the EUD Twinning Coordinator. We have noted that the PAO is relatively absent in the process. Moreover, the dissemination of newsletters makes sense only if they are accessible to line stakeholders and if the line stakeholders read them.

***Best Practice example: Azerbaijan-ITTSO***

ITTSO has issued in English and Azerbaijani "Twinning Guidelines for Azerbaijani Beneficiary Administrations"<sup>93</sup> (18 pages in each language), including an interesting tentative definition of Twinning. The Guidelines are based upon the Common Twinning Manual revised in 2009. ITTSO has also issued in English and Azerbaijani "TAIEX – Guidelines for Azerbaijani Beneficiary Administrations"<sup>94</sup> (11 pages in each language) in April 2010. All the documents were reviewed and endorsed by the EUD.

Jordan's PAO declared that no C&V activity was conducted simply because there was no budget. Today, the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation urges the PAO and Jordan's 10 sub-committees to identify twinning projects. The PAO's role is to explain how the system works and also to investigate eligibility, coherence and absorption capacity. In doing so, the PAO also explains how to differentiate Twinning from classical Technical Assistance.

JC2 - C&V activities have contributed to the achievements of twinning activities/results in the ENP Region

<sup>93</sup> ITTSO's Twinning Guide is accessible via [http://www.twinning.az/uploads/tt/twinning\\_final\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.twinning.az/uploads/tt/twinning_final_Eng.pdf)

<sup>94</sup> ITTSO's TAIEX Guidelines are accessible via [http://twinning.az/uploads/guidelines\\_taiex\\_final\\_14.04.pdf](http://twinning.az/uploads/guidelines_taiex_final_14.04.pdf)

**Summary:** This judgement criterion is not satisfactory. Our overall assessment is that Communication and Visibility (C&V) actions have not been developed sufficiently to support the Twinning Instrument's status in the Region. C&V actions have too often been very limited and/or conducted too late in the project design phase. The Evaluators have very often noticed that a number of RTA Counterparts and BC PLs, who were directly involved in the twinning process from preparation to completion, had not been properly informed and had insufficient understanding of the twinning principles and procedures. In a majority of cases, with the exception of two of the six countries, senior officials and civil servants (e.g. at ministerial level), key policy-makers and civil society have never received any information on the Twinning Instrument. At least 50% of beneficiaries indicated that they had not received any information from their respective PAO on twinning rules and procedures during the project preparation phase.

The next section is dedicated to C&V activities conducted within twinning projects.

Sufficient C&V activities, including awareness-raising actions, have been planned in the twinning project fiche

Communication and visibility activities have too often been restricted to disseminating project information and promotion material only during launch events and closing conferences. On those occasions, when a budget line has been planned to that effect, relevant communication and visibility material is produced (brochures, leaflets, pins, pens or even USB keys, etc...). The mass media have sometimes been invited, but have not always attended the project events, except when senior personalities were present to deliver a speech or to make an official announcement. Moreover, several projects have developed their own internet website, as each project normally receives a "small" envelope for communication and visibility activities (See Project Fiches and Programme Estimates).

Whereas, in the case of Azerbaijan, communication and visibility activities were not included in the 3 project fiches of our sample, since this aspect is covered in the Twinning Manual, the EUD project managers have taken the initiative in enhancing communication and visibility activities, as follows:

- C&V actions have been planned for kick-offs and closing events.
- Newsletters have been prepared by the RTAs and issued usually after each project's Steering Committee meetings. Those newsletters are posted on the project's website in both English and Azerbaijani, as is the case of the twinning project with the State Statistics Committee. The project with Parliament regularly informs stakeholders and encourages their participation in the events conducted by the project, which increases the project's visibility and ensures its promotion.
- For the three projects, templates of reports, PowerPoint presentations, letters and business cards of each project were discussed and approved by the respective EUD project managers.
- Further to the EUD project manager's request, EU and Azerbaijani flags are now visible at the Steering Committee meeting in each beneficiary's premises
- The EUD has requested that at least one visibility event should be organised per project per annum. Since then, an important number of high-profile events on thematic issues have been organised. RTAs are often reminded of the importance of EU visibility, including in EUD correspondence.

In Morocco, each project fiche includes at least all the so-called “classic” project activities, from the project launch event to the closing conference. Besides, a few project seminars were organised and were technically supported by their respective experts. However, those actions have generally been considered insufficient, with the exception of the project with the Customs Administration, where that component was considered to be an important activity essential to the project and its sustainability.

***Tentative Best Practice example: Morocco-Customs/Foreign Trade***

***C&V activities:*** an **intranet website** on the twinning project was created to help follow up on twinning activities both for the hierarchy and the rank and file. The objective was to facilitate internal communication within the Customs Administration’s departments. A full description of the project was posted on the intranet, including information on the deliverables, legal documents, the twinning contract, the activities and mandatory results, follow-up actions, C&V activities, etc. This was a pilot experiment and the Customs Administration was keen on it. The Oriental Agency followed suit. From now on, the intranet websites will be managed and operated directly by the RTAs and their BC Counterparts. However, *Sustainability* should be ensured by RTA Counterparts after project completion.

In Egypt, communication and visibility activities are considered as having little importance. In the work plans, communication and visibility activities are limited to launch and closing events with a few printed materials and a website link with rather limited access. Generally, project communication and visibility activities do not promote the Twinning Instrument in Egypt. Moreover, no communication plan has been prepared as a clear strategy to promote the Twinning Instrument.

In Jordan and Tunisia, only a few project communication and visibility activities have been planned in project fiches. In Jordan, the three twinning projects selected in our sample organised an official launch ceremony and a closing conference with the participation of the line stakeholders. Only the project with Jordan’s Audit Bureau included specific awareness-raising activities (workshops) intended for external stakeholders. Budgets allocated to communication and visibility activities have been insufficient and the PAO or the BA had to complement them with their own funding. For example, communication and visibility activities were conducted at the start and the end of the project with Tunisia’s Administrative Court. Tunisian journalists were invited jointly by the Administrative Court, the PAO and EUD to visit the Court in October 2010. The objective was to disseminate the project results to the general public. However, that has often been considered as “going well beyond the minimum”.

In Morocco, communication plans have never been prepared by the PAO or the projects, at least according to our information. However, the EUD considers that communication plans need to be developed and updated and their impact maximised in terms of visibility. However, very little has so far been achieved in that respect. Finally, in Ukraine the general feeling has been that project communication and visibility activities should be more developed in order to better promote the twinning projects, their visibility and also their impact. However, those operations have been conducted best by Ukraine’s National School of Judges (UNSJ). For example, in autumn 2010, the UNSJ took part in a seminar on all international projects related to judicial reform in Ukraine, including Twinning. The RTA was invited as a speaker and delivered a presentation for promotion purposes. Moreover, a

press conference was also held when the project started and a website created, describing all the project activities. However, although the PAO attended a few of those activities, it should have been and should be far more involved in the C&V process.

An “enlarged” participation in the Steering Committee could be an opportunity to better disseminate information on the project, to ensure its promotion and to get the active support of stakeholders

Steering Committees (SCs) do not have project communication as a major vocation, but play a monitoring role in order to ensure project success. In fact, Steering Committee meetings are rarely open to persons other than their permanent members. Those meetings also offer them an opportunity for project ownership and more active involvement. Project managers who chair Steering Committee meetings may invite, as observer, any person whose contribution can help the projects. However, the risk is that SCs may become too large and inefficient as a result.

In Azerbaijan, some representatives of EU MS embassies attend SC meetings. For example, it’s been the case with the Bulgarian and German embassies, which are always represented in SC meetings on the State Statistics Committee. In parallel, it is worth mentioning that several twinning fiches indicated that participation in the SC meetings was open to all relevant stakeholders. For example, the twinning fiche for the State Statistics Committee stipulated that the SC was open to<sup>95</sup>: “Other representatives from the European Commission may be invited to participate in a technical capacity, as and when necessary. Representatives from international statistics organisations, international donor community, organisations representing the providers and users of statistics and SSC experts could be invited as observers as and when necessary”.

Nevertheless, C&V actions could certainly be improved. In general, with the exception of those directly involved in twinning activities, very few stakeholders, especially from beneficiary countries, have so far attended SC meetings.

SC meetings are therefore not always the best vehicle for C&V activities and thematic visibility events. The media, stakeholders and the international community have far more impact.

The number of twinning requests increased in your country as a result of C&V activities or not.

Overall, the increase in the number of twinning requests has not resulted from communication and visibility activities as much as was intended.

In Jordan, the Twinning Instrument is advertised by the PAO or by the EUD in bilateral meetings with line ministries. The same EU Member States sponsor twinning projects with line ministries and institutions. However, it is not obvious to say that those actions have a direct impact on the Twinning Instrument’s promotion and visibility.

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<sup>95</sup> It is worth mentioning that several recent SC meetings were attended by other donors, such as the IFC for the twinning project on Occupational Health and Safety (OHS), and by other stakeholders, such as trade union representatives for a twinning project on taxation.

Again in Jordan, like in other countries, the PAO receives a large number of requests from potential BAs that would like to participate in twinning activities. Line ministries and public institutions appreciate the idea of being twinned with an EU peer institution. However, those requests do not always fulfil the Twinning Instrument’s rules, procedures and eligibility criteria, not the absorption capacity level normally required from any applicant. Moreover, those requests stem more from the demand-driven approach because line ministries are provided with only very limited information by the PAO upstream from the project programming phase.

We have also noted that in Morocco the Twinning Instrument is increasingly becoming visible thanks to the high rate of successful projects and their concrete support to public administration reform and not only because of C&V actions. Institutional Twinning provides active support to in-depth reform conducted in the country. It is slowly but surely becoming a conspicuous success label in a record time. And all that justifies the need for more intensive and consistent Twinning communication, visibility and promotion activities in all ENP Countries.

## 5.2 SYNTHESIS ON EVALUATION CRITERIA

As already mentioned, the evaluation methodology is based upon the 5 standard DAC evaluation criteria, namely *Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability*, and the 2 EU policy evaluation criteria i.e. *Coherence/Complementarity* with other institutional building instruments and *Added Value of the EC Intervention*. In order to better adapt the evaluation methodology to the specific nature of the Twinning Instrument, we have added another 3 others criteria, including *Cross-Cutting Issues, Centralised vs. Decentralised Management, and Communication & Visibility*.

Each evaluation question (EQ) reflected in the stakeholder questionnaire is directly related to one or more of the 10 evaluation criteria. The evaluation is based upon these criteria in order to fully assess the overall performance of the Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region.

The following table presents a synthesis of the evaluation of the Twinning Instrument’s performance according to the 5+2+3 selected evaluation criteria:

<b>Relevance</b>	☺
<b>Effectiveness</b>	☺☺
<b>Efficiency</b>	☹
<b>Impact</b>	☺☹
<b>Sustainability</b>	☺☹
<b>Coherence/Complementarity</b>	☹
<b>EC Intervention Added Value</b>	☺
<b>Cross-Cutting Issues</b>	☺☹
<b>Centralised vs. Decentralised Man.</b>	☹
<b>Communication &amp; Visibility</b>	☹

The following chapters summarise the Evaluation Team’s comments and value judgements on the Twinning Instrument’s performance in the ENP Region. These judgements stem from Sub-chapter 5.1, have been substantiated further in this Report’s Findings and Conclusions

and have also helped us to formulate recommendations and suggestions for improving the overall twinning process in the ENP Region.

### **5.2.1 Relevance**

*Relevance* has been “*Satisfactory*” for the majority of projects under review, especially when the beneficiary administration demonstrated its capacity to identify its specific needs and convert them into (realistic) objectives, mandatory results and activities.

In this case, *Relevance* addresses to what extent institutional twinning activities are suitable for the established priorities and planned results. It also demonstrates to what extent the objectives of twinning activities are consistent with the beneficiaries’ specific expectations, requirements, needs and priorities. Even if results are not fully in line with the EU Acquis, most twinning projects have been designed and implemented in accordance with the major issues and objectives previously defined.

### **5.2.2 Effectiveness**

*Effectiveness* has been “*Highly Satisfactory*” for most twinning projects selected into the sample, as a great majority of mandatory results has been delivered adequately. The “Mandatory Results” requirement is certainly one of the strongest qualities of the Twinning Instrument, even if the same results could have been achieved through classical Technical Assistance.

*Effectiveness* measures to what extent the twinning activities implemented have achieved the stated objectives, more particularly the project purpose (immediate objective). In other words, *Effectiveness* may also be interpreted as “Have the right things been done?”

In the ENP Region, *High Effectiveness* also results from the great quality of MS expertise that has been recognised almost unanimously by the stakeholders, and also when the BAs were strongly committed, which was very often the case.

### **5.2.3 Efficiency**

*Efficiency* has been *variable*, from a *very low level*, i.e. *few results achieved against the resources allocated*, to a *satisfactory level*, but *not higher*. The overall efficiency of the 20 projects in the evaluation sample could be improved significantly.

In a few cases, *Efficiency* has been very low, especially when activities were not delivered as planned in the twinning contract and/or in the work plan and when the results were not fully achieved, even if there was room for flexibility. This was the case of twinning projects where the BAs involved demonstrated insufficient absorption capacity, were politically unstable and/or were facing high staff turnover. This had a serious effect on *Impact* and *Sustainability*

Funding was not always *efficiently* spent for three major reasons: (i) in a large number of projects selected into our sample, several activities were cancelled (through side letters) and funds were spent on other purposes, but not necessarily more efficiently; (ii) other activities could not be implemented for various reasons (low absorption capacity, staff shortages, activity inadequacy/irrelevance against mandatory results, which also undermined efficiency); and (iii) a few activities had been either over-budgeted or under-budgeted, which was inadequate to the project format and the real needs. The savings made on specific activities were reallocated to existing or new activities.

In addition, the project preparation phase is a complex and lengthy process, involves a lot of stakeholders and, overall, is also very costly. Taking the project preparation phase into account, we can safely state that *Efficiency* has been undermined by the cumbersome mobilisation of resources and also by extra costs, which a TA project does not have to bear in achieving quasi-identical results.

#### **5.2.4 Impact**

*Impact* rating varies from “*Barely Satisfactory*” to “*Highly Satisfactory*”. Together with *Sustainability*, *Impact* is often considered as the most important criterion from a donor’s perspective.

In most cases encountered in the ENP Region, twinning projects clearly contributed to the full achievement (100%) of mandatory results. In this respect, twinning projects have had a high *Impact* as they introduced major changes within beneficiary institutions, such as EU Acquis-related approximation, legal framework creation or modernisation, institution capacity building, legal reform (draft directives, norms, standards), etc. Within each project, several activities, albeit sometimes minor, could not be fully implemented. In these cases, *Impact* was rather limited.

Generally, *Impact* has so far been “*Highly Satisfactory*” in the ENP Region, especially when there hardly was any staff turnover, when BA staff who were directly involved in the twinning activities continued working on identical issues within their home administration after project completion. Moreover, *Impact* may also be assessed through the number of new activities/projects adopted (or rejected) by the beneficiaries after project completion.

However, *Impact* can also be very limited when absorption capacity is insufficient; when there is hardly any political and/or BA commitment; when there are too many and too broad results planned; when the local context or legal framework is not ready to accept and absorb the changes required by twinning projects; and when staff turnover undermines a project’s effects considerably.

#### **5.2.5 Sustainability**

Overall, *Sustainability* has varied from “*Satisfactory*” to “*Highly Satisfactory*” for a majority of projects. This criterion also addresses the issues of project ownership and accountability. *Sustainability* depends very much on the core subjects of the twinning projects at stake.

Since topics like global public administration reform, legal framework modernisation, profound organisational changes to the public service and other institutional capacity building aspects are usually dealt with through twinning projects, the results must necessarily be significant and also sustainable in the longer term in that they must ideally continue after EU funding has stopped (i.e. after project completion).

*Sustainability* has usually been high, more particularly whenever mandatory results were achieved and they fulfilled the identified needs, and also whenever the beneficiaries were committed and absorption capacity was high. However, *Sustainability* has been undermined by staff turnover and may also have been seriously affected in several critical cases where this turnover was very high. In a few cases, *Sustainability* was seriously at risk when the

project was not well integrated into a country's administrative reform process or was not part of any comprehensive sectoral approach/strategy.

*Sustainability* is usually considered as most important not only from a donor's perspective, but also for all stakeholders. To some extent, *Sustainability* also addresses the EC-funded Institutional Twinning Instrument's Added Value to the institution capacity building effort in the ENP Region.

### **5.2.6 Coherence/Complementarity**

Coherence/Complementarity between the 3 EU-funded institution building tools, i.e. Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA has been rated "Satisfactory". As already mentioned in Finding 7 above, stakeholders, including PAOs, are aware of how to best utilise these instruments. Overall, the need for upstream complementarity of TAIEX and SIGMA with Twinning is well understood by the BAs, when information on the institutional building tools has been conveyed properly.

However, *Coherence* between the 3 institution building tools may be improved together with a more strategic and programming approach for Twinning, while keeping enough flexibility with TAIEX.

*Coherence/Complementarity* between these 3 tools and other EU-funded instruments (Tenders, FWCs, Calls for Proposals, Budget Support, etc...) and other bilateral or multilateral donors already exists (see section "Related Projects" in Project Fiches), but there is still room for improvement.

### **5.2.7 Union Added Value**

All direct beneficiaries have acknowledged their overall satisfaction with EU-Funded Institutional Building instruments, especially the Twinning Instrument.

*Union Added Value* provided by all twinning projects contributed effectively to the institutional capacity building, civil service modernisation and/or legal approximation effort in the ENP Region. The results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region must be considered as integral part of the overall benefits generated by the EU Cooperation Programmes to the Region.

### **5.2.8 Cross-Cutting Issues**

90% of the stakeholders mentioned that Cross-Cutting Issues were taken into account for project design purposes, "whenever they were relevant". These Cross-Cutting Issues are democracy and human rights, environmental sustainability, gender equality and HIV/AIDS.

Of course, Cross-Cutting Issues, such as anti-discriminatory measures for AIDS patients, cannot be dealt with systematically on each occasion, whereas democracy and human rights may be at the core of several Twinning Projects. To the best extent possible, several stakeholders ensured that gender equality and environmental considerations had so far been "carefully integrated" into their projects. However, the Evaluators express some serious concern in that respect (See also Section 7.9.3 hereinafter).

### **5.2.9 Centralised vs. Decentralised Management**

Our understanding is that Decentralised vs. Centralised Management has not had any significant effect on the quality of twinning project management. Moreover, EUD and PAO/UGP roles and mandates should be redefined/redistributed clearly.

The success of *Decentralised Management* rests upon the central role played by PAOs/UGPs, especially their ability to stimulate, promote, prepare, implement and follow up the twinning process.

### **5.2.10 Communication & Visibility**

Our assessment is that Communication and Visibility (C&V) actions have not been developed sufficiently to support the Twinning Instrument's status in the Region. C&V actions have too often been very limited and/or conducted too late in the project design phase. The Evaluators have very often noticed that a number of RTA Counterparts and BC PLs, who were directly involved in the twinning process from preparation to completion, had not been properly informed and had insufficient understanding of the twinning principles and procedures.

In a majority of cases, with the exception of two of the six countries, senior officials and civil servants (e.g. at ministerial level), key policy-makers and civil society have never received any information on the Twinning Instrument. Many beneficiaries (50%) indicated that they had not received any information from their PAO/UGP on Twinning during the project preparation phase.

Twinning visibility should be intensified and C&V actions repeated by PAOs/UGPs on a regular basis, ideally upstream of the programming phase up to the start of project implementation.

During the implementation phase, C&V actions could be carried out more systematically at kick-off and closing meetings, seminars, conferences, in leaflets, on websites, through advertising material, in the mainstream and specialised media, etc.

## **6. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

Chapter 5 to this Report was dedicated to the answers provided to the evaluation questions of a comprehensive evaluation questionnaire (Annex 5). Overall, we have noted the high level of involvement demonstrated by the various line stakeholders to the twinning activities, whether they were Commission HQ/EUD staff, PAOs/UGPs, beneficiaries, or EU MS experts/civil servants.

The analysis carried out was based on the answers to the evaluation questionnaires, but have also recapitulated all the important issues that were discussed with the line stakeholders during our field visits to the 6 countries. Overall, approximately 160 stakeholders were interviewed. Moreover, the analysis is fully consistent with the evaluation methodological guidelines and the information collected has been classified by evaluation criterion and each of the evaluation criteria was analysed on the basis of its respective judgement criteria.

This analysis is therefore very detailed as it covers a great deal of issues and all significant and relevant aspects pertaining to the Twinning Instrument's performance and perception in the ENP Region. It must also be noted that the various issues identified very often intertwine, which may sometimes lead the reader to see a number of redundancies in the text. However, this is inevitable whenever a project activity or result is analysed from different angles to reflect an important feature of the evaluation.

As has already been pointed out, the information and data collected by the Evaluators are overly abundant. On the basis of the analysis and, in the present case, using a different approach, i.e. briefly rather than comprehensively, the Evaluators have derived a number of findings and conclusions that not only reflect the opinions and positions expressed by the line stakeholders in respect of the Twinning Instrument, but also the main conclusions drawn by the Evaluators.

A number of findings and conclusions have already been mentioned in the Desk Report of the evaluation. They were also disclosed in a PowerPoint slide presentation to the participants in the Institution Building Days of 16-17 June 2011. They were submitted to EuropeAid for further discussion and comments were added to the final version of the Desk Report. They have again been described and completed here and are also partly indicated in the last and most important section to this Report (Chapter 7), where recommendations have been formulated to improve the Twinning Instrument's future performance in the ENP Region.

### **6.1 FINDINGS**

The Findings have been classified under 8 thematic headings:

1. Quality of Twinning performance ,
2. Twinning's perception in the ENP Region,
3. Quality of EU MS expertise,
4. Communication and information issues,
5. Procedural issues,
6. Assessment of Study Tours,
7. Coherence/complementarity of twinning projects with TAIEX, SIGMA and other donors' interventions,
8. Twinning and Technical Assistance

### 6.1.1 Twinning is a unique and extremely valuable instrument

All stakeholders in the ENP Region – Beneficiary Institutions, PAOs, EUDs, RTAs – confirmed that they were highly satisfied with the Twinning Instrument as a tool designed especially for institutional capacity building and modernisation, legal approximation with the EU Acquis and alignment with EU values<sup>96</sup>. 100% positive answers were given to EQ7 (1) in the questionnaire. All the line stakeholders interviewed had the same views, which were also shared by the Evaluators.

The vast majority of stakeholders also mentioned that Twinning was really a unique instrument, with no equivalent amongst other donors' interventions. Twinning is also very well adapted to the local context, especially to the needs of public institutions in terms of institutional capacity building and modernisation.

Besides, Twinning is considered as a tool for developing closer cooperation between EU Member States and Beneficiary Country administrations. 80% of the BC respondents indicated that Twinning was an extremely efficient tool and that they were keen to have a second twinning project. Some of them reported that Twinning was a “luxurious” but very useful tool adapted to institutional needs in their countries.

All line stakeholders in the 6 countries have unanimously declared that the Instrument is flexible and can adapt to various subjects, however always in more or less close relationship with the EU Acquis or institutional capacity building. Imposing the achievement of mandatory results upon the beneficiaries helps participants in the twinning activities implement the project activities towards a clear objective. The contribution offered by the Twinning Instrument must also be integrated into the national reform process and institutional capacity building/modernisation effort as well as the legal framework.



<sup>96</sup> The ENP is based on the concept of shared values and common interests. The shared values are those which ensure our prosperity, stability and security i.e. democratic reforms (fundamental rights, rule of law), market economy and sustainable development (including reforms in sectors such as trade, competition, energy and transport, environment, people-to-people contacts etc). These reforms will enable us to develop joint responses to the common challenges we face in the twenty-first century e.g. prosperity gaps, migration, crime, environmental issues, public health, extremism and terrorism.

Finally, it is clear for the vast majority of our interlocutors in the 6 ENP Countries that the Twinning Instrument must develop and extend to other subjects and sectors and also be set up in the ENP countries where it has not been firmly established yet. A more strategic approach is very often referred to without being more precisely defined.

### **6.1.2 Perception of Twinning: what is a Twinning?**


The Evaluators were interested to find out how and to what extent the stakeholders perceived the Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region. The answers to that question varied from one stakeholder to another. They also reflected the rather wide variety of BC conception of, and interest in, twinning activities.

The question “What is a Twinning?” was suggested in the Questionnaire’s EQ1.5, EQ4.2 and EQ7.1. Answers were complemented and further discussion took place during the field visits. The Evaluators point out that the questions were left open. The following comments are only a description of the facts and answers gathered.

- Most answers collected were for “twinning as an instrument for reaching the Acquis” It goes without saying that the EU Acquis cannot have the same meaning, importance and/or relevance for the ENP Region as in the pre-accession context. In this respect, BAs also indicated that it was not necessary to link the twinning projects to one or more of the EU Acquis chapters. Of course, the adoption of the EU Acquis partly includes legal approximation. However, the questions were left open intentionally in order to hear the understanding and point of view of the beneficiaries and stakeholders. The reference to the Acquis was mostly the opinion of the EUD staff who were involved in the Twinning process, RTAs, PLs and a few PAO personnel, whereas beneficiaries (RTA Counterparts and BC PLs) provided different answers...
- Most BAs (RTA Counterparts and BC PLs) and a few PAO staff said that Twinning was an instrument for “Adopting/approximating laws, norms” (not necessarily the EU’s, though), or “Bringing ENP countries closer to EU values, standards...”. In the eyes of BAs and even some PAO staff, the confusion between the “EU Acquis” and “adoption of laws and norms” is real. This point does not reflect our opinion as Evaluators, or our conception of the EU Acquis, but instead reflects that of the stakeholders (essentially the BAs). In their view, the EU Acquis is not mandatory, and the EU Acquis does not mean anything to a vast majority of them. For them, the adoption of laws and norms is not necessarily included in, or part of, the EU Acquis. The Acquis applies more to an EU Accession process rather than to the Neighbourhood Policy. This point will be dealt with in a recommendation in the Final Report. The reference to the terminology “Acquis” must not be mandatory and may be flexible enough to apply in the ENP context.
- In the context of opening up the Eastern countries (ENP-East) and deepening economic relations with the EU (ENP-South), a large number of BAs found in the Twinning Instrument an excellent tool for “facilitating trade” with the EU MS. Twinning projects are considered by the BAs as a means for strengthening economic and trade ties with Western Europe and also for initiating the process leading to the DCFTAs.

- Only a few stakeholders answered that Twinning was a tool for “Implementing the ENP Actions Plans, or even the CIB (ENP-East)”. Although of another nature, this answer shows clearly that Twinning is not yet sufficiently understood as a privileged instrument for implementing the EU-ENP Agreements. Among the majority of stakeholders, a direct and interactive link has yet to be made between Twinning and ENP Action Plans. This point will be dealt with in the Final Report’s recommendations.
- It must be pointed out that no BA answered that Twinning was an instrument designed for “accompanying national administrative reform” or for “institutional capacity building”. This demonstrates that Twinning has not yet been integrated into a global administrative reform process in the ENP Region, especially ENP-East. Twinning tends to be perceived mostly as a tool funded by an international organisation for providing some sort of specific, rather complex technical assistance support. This lack of clear understanding of the Twinning Instrument, results from an insufficient knowledge of the Twinning Instrument amongst ENP beneficiaries, which is also due to a lack of appropriate information dissemination.

Moreover, the Evaluators point out that the answers provided were collected from key stakeholders closely involved in the twinning process (see Section 3.2 Methodology). The other beneficiaries who have not been “directly” involved in the twinning process and have not been responsible for any twinning activity have shown a poor understanding of Twinning. They either don’t know what a twinning project normally consists in, or only have a vague idea, their best interpretation being that Twinning is a cooperation tool for the public sector. This clearly reflects a cruel lack of adequate information and communication activities for promoting the Twinning Instrument.




The slide features the European Union flag in the top left corner and the ENP Twinning logo in the top right corner. The main title is "ENP Twinning Evaluation" in white, with "FACTS & FIGURES" in red below it. The central question is "To the question, what is a Twinning ?" in yellow. Below this, it asks "An instrument/tool to...." and lists three categories of answers:
 

- from EUDs/PLs/RTAs/some PAOs:* "...Reach the Acquis"
- from RTACs/PLCs/some PAOs/other stakeholders:* "...adopt/approximate laws, norms, standards, practices..."
- Other answers:*
  - "...Facilitate trade" (20%)
  - "...Implement the AA or PCA actions plans" (15%)
  - "...Bring ENP countries closer to EU values" (10%)

### 6.1.3 High quality of EU MS Expertise

All direct BA stakeholders mentioned the high quality of EU MS expertise (question EQ3.9), notwithstanding its national origin. In this respect, all answers were unanimously positive and no stakeholder ventured to give ratings to individual EU MS expertise. In just 1 occurrence in

our sample was an RTA replaced because of inadequate skills and/or profile. However, the replacement was eventually considered as very satisfactory by the beneficiaries.



Besides, it was also indicated that RTAs having gained previous twinning experience were of course better prepared than newcomers. This observation would tend to somehow contradict the principle according to which an EU MS civil servant is not allowed to apply for an RTA post more than three times.

The Evaluators are of the opinion that the RTAs should ideally combine 3 types of skills: i) technical expertise, which should be related directly to their twinning assignment; ii) sufficient project management experience; iii) and good communication skills in order to deal with various categories and levels of partners/stakeholders. Overall, the Evaluators have found that the vast majority of RTAs fulfilled the first quality. However, quite a few of them failed to fulfil the second and third qualities satisfactorily. This is aggravated by another two elements: approximately 50% of the RTAs were hardly knowledgeable about EU affairs and approximation and a few RTAs had very little previous “exposure” to the local context, which they did not actually grasp very well.

That point has been developed further in the Recommendations. Although the quality of EU MS expertise has been widely acknowledged and even praised in the ENP Countries, room for improvement nevertheless remains to improve its performance and that of the Twinning Instrument without, however, creating an administrative corps of professional RTAs.

#### **6.1.4 Insufficient information provided on the Twinning Instrument**

70% of the beneficiaries declared to be insufficiently well informed of the functioning of the Twinning Instrument (answer to EQ10.1 and 3). That is a very important issue. We have considered RTA Counterparts and BC PLs as “direct beneficiaries”. They are the national counterparts that are directly involved in the twinning activities. Indirect beneficiaries include all other national stakeholders, such as a BA’s civil servants, other civil servants involved in the twinning activities and also beneficiaries that are likely to receive another twinning project (see Section 3.2).

Therefore, only direct beneficiaries received full information on the Twinning Instrument before starting to work on a project. A lot of the “indirect” stakeholders that the Evaluators met during their field visits and who were involved in the twinning process, declared that they had not been informed properly. That was also the case with several Beneficiary Country Project Leaders (BC PLs) that we met. Moreover, a small number of RTA Counterparts declared that they had not received any information on the twinning process. This occurred mainly when an RTA Counterpart was replaced.

Before their respective involvement in twinning projects, most interviewees had no prior twinning experience and as a result, had no idea of what a twinning project really consists in and entails. However, even after receiving relevant information on Twinning, they were still very often mixing up the concept of Twinning with classical Technical Assistance.

In fact, only the direct beneficiaries with previous twinning exposure to twinning, i.e. the RTA Counterpart and National Project Leader, are fully aware of the whole mechanism underpinning the twinning process. The Evaluators noticed in a few cases that even these two actors had hardly ever been even informed, if briefed at all, about twinning rules and procedures by the PAO/UGP. This situation occurred more frequently in countries where staff turnover was high and also when the RTA Counterpart and/or the National Project Leader had been replaced during project implementation.

The Evaluators also noticed the rather poor understanding and/or knowledge of the twinning principles, aims and procedures. The quality of the information on twinning rules and procedures was insufficient, only partly delivered, or not fully understood by the beneficiaries. In short, the information provided upstream from twinning projects is very insufficient. The large public as well as the direct and indirect beneficiaries are not sufficiently informed about what twinning activities really entail.

This critical issue has been fully developed under EQ10 Communication & Visibility in Chapter 5 to this Report and will be dealt further with in a specific recommendation in Chapter 7.

### **6.1.5 Various requests to simplify and improve the twinning procedures**

A vast majority of stakeholders, i.e. no less than 90 % of the answers to EQ9.1, with the exception of several EUD Finance and Contracts Units, declared that twinning rules and procedures were too cumbersome, too complex, too manifold, too rigid and quite difficult to apply. This may sooner or later seriously affect absorption capacity, i.e. the BA staff's capacity to absorb all the Twinning rules and procedures, as well as their motivation.

Several examples have confirmed that assertion:

- In the case of workshops, stakeholders mentioned that budget entries usually were too detailed and could be limited to the essentials. In their opinion, most items could be funded under a lump sum in order to avoid the frequent use of side letters for very small amounts.
- In several ENP countries, including Algeria, Armenia, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon and Moldova, all twinning contracts must still be “*approved*” by the Commission Services in Brussels. However, full devolution to the EUDs will soon be effective.

- Moreover, EUDs under centralised management mode complained that the level of detail required for preparing an eligible budget including all expenses to be incurred for seminars, training, workshops (e.g. fees for translation/ interpretation services, photocopies, etc), and also other incidentals, was far too high as it must be allocated and broken down into detailed entries for each activity (e.g. number of units, unit costs). This has created a rather huge administrative burden, which could be simplified. This issue will be addressed in the Recommendations.
- They also mentioned that the Twinning Fiche was too detailed, that the preparation phase took far too long (no less than 2 years frequently needed from the “concept fiche” prepared by the beneficiary and contract signature prior to project implementation).The delays in preparing the twinning contracts vary from one project to another. In several countries (mainly in the ENP-East), obtaining an official signature can take up to 6 months. We received a clear answer only from one PAO who said that they were able to have the contracts signed within less than 6 months, which is in fact impossible as the work plan preparation itself requires 6 months. No other clear answer was provided as to the exact number of months required, except that the process “took too long”!
- A number of PAOs and even EUDs pointed out that the twinning process was far too complex and involved a considerable number of players, which also extended and delayed the preparation phase. No less than 15 to 20 officials from the BC, EC, MS sometimes intervene in the process several times from the drafting of the Concept Fiche up to the signature of the contract.
- As regards budget-related issues, namely rules governing expenses and budget reallocations to other activities, lots of remarks have been formulated, above all, as to the detailed reports required to justify those expenses. For example, whenever costs must be assessed one year ahead for each single project activity, such as the number of copies, number of translations, number of interpretation days, number of days training rooms must be rented, number of days each expert will stay at a hotel, etc. Several BAs have also highlighted the very high costs related to RTA activities, which could reach 1/3 of a project’s budget, as well as those incurred by short-term experts with the application of the flat rate, which also leads to even higher costs when those experts are employed by mandated bodies.

Rules and procedures have been perceived as very rigid (request, proposal/concept fiche, twinning fiche, work plan, call for proposals, evaluation, contract, implementation), which makes it impossible to modify requests, procedures, work plans, objectives and/or mandatory results. This opinion was expressed by the majority of stakeholders involved in the twinning process.

A large number of stakeholders, more particularly beneficiaries, also pointed out that needs assessments could be more proactive and could be anticipated well ahead of time. The project implementation phase normally takes 24 months (2 years) in a context where the N+3 financial rule is also effective. Moreover, this rule has very often been perceived as an obstacle, even if all stakeholders are aware that it is enshrined in the Financial Regulation of the Commission and may neither be changed, nor repealed.

The opinion expressed by the Evaluators on the Common Twinning Manual and the application of its rules and procedures is contrasted as it varies from one element to another. It is true that the application of twinning rules and procedures leads to very strong project implementation rigidity. Conversely, it offers the advantage of great discipline, which facilitates the achievement of results as planned.

We consider it useful to formulate the following comments, which are consistent with those made by the line stakeholders:

- Several rules still remain vague in their application;
- The direct stakeholders (MS RTAs, MS PLs, RTA Counterparts, BC PLs, etc.) are still insufficiently trained in the twinning rules and procedures;
- Twinning project preparation costs are very high, which limits project efficiency;
- The project preparation phase is too long;
- Greater flexibility must be encouraged for budget execution and at least overheads should be considered within a “lump sum”;
- Adjustments still need to be made in order to adapt the Manual’s rules and procedures better to the ENP context, of course without deviating from fundamental principles;
- Procurement procedures supporting twinning activities must be revised, as this issue still remains a stumbling stone and leads to uncertainty as to the timely availability of project equipment.

It is not within the remit of the Evaluators to initiate a revision of the Common Twinning Manual’s rules and procedures. However, recommendations will be put forward on this issue in Chapter 7 to this Report.

#### **6.1.6 High expectations from study tours**

To EQ6’s sub-question “What is your opinion about activities such as Study Tours...?”, 100% of stakeholders replied that they were keen on this activity, in respect of which there have been high expectations in exposing ENP nationals to EU best practices and also for inter-institutional and professional networking purposes.

EUDs and PAOs are fully aware that study tours are highly appreciated by the beneficiaries, even sometimes for purposes other than those described in the project fiche. Nevertheless, they also acknowledge that this activity is crucial to expose ENP nationals to other environments and practices. However, study visits must not be the core activity of a twinning project, but rather one of the Work Plan’s activities, with a specific objective, an agenda focusing on technical issues and participants carefully selected. The number of study visits must be limited and must never take place at the start of a project.

This point has been developed further in Chapter 5 to this Report. The Evaluators are of the opinion that the Study Tours are really critical to help the BAs to better understand EU practices within the Europe context. And that is the very first objective of twinning projects. Therefore this activity must be continued and encouraged and its purposes must never be dropped in favour of other objectives.

#### **6.1.7 Coherence/Complementarity of twinning activity with TAIEX, SIGMA and other donors’ interventions**

From the answers to EQ6’s sub-questions 1 – 4, 90% of stakeholders reported that they had no major concern over complementarity and possible overlap between TAIEX and Twinning

activities. The Evaluators also share this view. TAIEX is considered as a very flexible tool, which can be mobilised within short notice, as it consists in very brief short-term expert missions. TAIEX is often used primarily to facilitate selection of twinning itself. SIGMA is also mobilised in a complementary manner and fulfills objectives related to governance and public administration reform.

Coordination with other institutional building instruments, which are funded either by the EU, or any other multi- and bilateral donor, has also been improving, as great attention is paid to past, ongoing and forthcoming related activities when the Twinning Fiche is being drafted. EU and other Donors' representatives take part in joint meetings on a regular basis, often at sectoral level, in order to ensure appropriate follow-up on project coordination.

This point has been extensively covered in Chapter 5 to this Report and does not require any further development, except to say that the BAs have not yet been sufficiently informed of the existence of the other two institution building tools, namely TAIEX and SIGMA, and that confusion between Twinning and Technical Assistance is still pervasive amongst BAs.

### **6.1.8 Twinning vs. Technical Assistance**

50% of the beneficiaries still mix up Twinning with classical Technical Assistance [EQ1.2 and 1.5(d)]. It is also the feeling of the Evaluators. One beneficiary even referred explicitly to Technical Assistance whereas the project was implemented as a twinning intervention. Answers to these questions showed that BAs cannot easily make the difference between the two concepts. This confusion is very serious in that it may lead the stakeholders to more confusion in selecting and implementing a classical Technical Assistance project with twinning rules and procedures.

The major reason confirming this assessment is that BAs have hardly received any appropriate and sufficient information on Twinning rules and procedures, or how to differentiate classical Technical Assistance from Twinning in terms of administrative cooperation, commitment, absorption capacity, workload, delivery of results, procedures, EU approximation, etc.

The Evaluators are of the opinion that part of the beneficiaries still appear not to have fully appreciated that Twinning is a tool for inter-institutional cooperation, with EU MS public administrations providing (advanced) capacity-building support to their BC counterparts in the ENP Region, on specific issues and/or topics related to the EU Acquis (e.g. transfer, approximation), whereas classical Technical Assistance only delivers expertise in the form of outputs and deliverables, as opposed to Twinning, which aims to jointly achieve mandatory results jointly agreed upon.

Beneficiaries are still not really clear about the eligibility criteria that should normally guide and justify their choice between Twinning and classical Technical Assistance, when a choice must be made. To some extent, this issue could also be clarified further by EUD and PAO/UGP staff.

This point has been covered extensively in Chapter 5 to this Report and does not require any further development or specific recommendation.

## 6.2 CONCLUSIONS

The following early conclusions have been formulated by the Evaluators from the data analysis of three main information sources:

1. Documents on the 20 projects, including Project Fiches, Twinning Contracts, Quarterly Reports, Final Reports, Monitoring Reports (when available);
2. Questionnaires filled in by the direct stakeholders, i.e. Beneficiary Institutions / PAOs / EUDs / RTAs.
3. Interviews with all line stakeholders in the 6 ENP Countries.

In addition to the findings and on the basis of the analysis conducted in Chapter 5, the Evaluators have also derived 15 major points from the Evaluation Questions. Lessons learnt and best practices for improving the Twinning Instrument's performance in the ENP Region have been presented in Chapter 5. Some of these conclusions will be highlighted and developed further into key recommendations (Chapter 7).

Our Conclusions (Chapter 6) and Recommendations (Chapter 7) cover the following 12 thematic aspects selected by the Evaluators:

### Items

- 1) Demand-driven approach
- 2) Extent of the involvement of beneficiary institutions
- 3) Quality of the Twinning Instrument's management system
- 4) Twinning as a tool for implementing the ENP Action Plans, strategic approach
- 5) Absorption capacity
- 6) Impact and sustainability of achieved results
- 7) Quality of EU Member States' interventions
- 8) Complementarity of twinning activities with other external interventions
- 9) Twinning vs. Technical Assistance
- 10) Appropriate use of funding and other resources allocated to twinning activities
- 11) Information, communication & visibility actions supporting twinning activities
- 12) Relationship and complementarity of cross-cutting issues with the Twinning Instrument

The main conclusions related to these items were presented to the Annual Meeting of the National Contact Points during the Institutional Building Days, which took place in Brussels on the 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> June 2011. The PowerPoint presentation is attached in Annex 11 to the Final Report.

The following in addition to the 8 findings, are the 4 major conclusions drawn by the Evaluators.

### 6.2.1 Demand-Driven Approach

The demand-driven approach has been adopted ever since the Twinning Instrument's inception in the ENP Region, i.e. in 2004 for ENP-South and in 2007 for ENP-East. This approach had and still has the advantage of designing/preparing only twinning projects that correspond to needs clearly identified and/or expressed by the potential beneficiary institutions themselves. This requirement together with the reference to the EU Acquis and

the mandatory results were the key criteria underpinning the project identification and eligibility process.

The demand-driven approach also greatly facilitated the Twinning Instrument's launching process in the ENP Region. Therefore, whenever this requirement, i.e. meeting BA needs, was fulfilled, the corresponding twinning projects were approved without sufficiently considering the other eligibility conditions, i.e. the "reference to the EU Acquis or related cooperation issues" (see footnote 45) to this Report and also Annex 1, p.13 to the Common Twinning Manual of 2009); the BA must be a public institution; the principle of inter-institutional cooperation between MS and BC public administrations; the commitment to mandatory results jointly agreed upon.

Moreover, to our knowledge, we have not found (in the Manual) any clear indication on twinning eligibility criteria. This lack of consideration for eligibility criteria was essentially the case for the first generation of twinning projects. However, the twinning validity of several more recent projects can still be questioned, as the demand-driven approach was applied to a number of those projects in various areas and for various purposes that were quite remote from twinning principles and eligibility criteria. The question is to assess whether those projects are eligible for Twinning, i.e. whether they were at least related to the EU Acquis or any similar purpose.

Nevertheless, all the stakeholders applied the demand-driven approach literally, i.e. as a basic project selection principle and this was done up to now rather successfully in both the ENP-South and the ENP-East.



The slide features a blue background with the European Union flag in the top left corner. The title "ENP Twinning Evaluation" is in white, with "Conclusion 1" in red below it. The text "During a first phase" is in white, followed by "The Demand-Driven Approach Has been applied...." in yellow. Two orange arrows point to the text: "To better respond to the needs of beneficiary institutions..." and "But also to launch the twinning process in the ENP region". On the right, there is a diagram with a blue box labeled "EUD" and a yellow circle labeled "PAO UGP". Arrows point from these boxes to a stack of four twinning logos, each showing two figures shaking hands.

Notwithstanding, the demand-driven approach means responding to specific needs expressed by the beneficiaries with the assumption that these needs are clearly identified and "eligible" for Twinning. This also suggests that those projects should be successful because they are requested by the beneficiaries and not induced or suggested from outside.

The demand-driven approach should be maintained and even strengthened, provided it is combined with a more **strategic focus** to better fulfil neighbourhood countries' priorities within the framework of the AAs, CPAs and CIBs. This crucial point will also be developed further in Chapter 7.

### **6.2.2 Conditions for success of twinning projects**

The Evaluators have asked themselves exactly the same question so as to find out what conditions made a twinning project successful in terms of preparation, implementation and achievement of mandatory results.

On the basis of the overall analysis, which covered the 61 questionnaires received, the Evaluators have identified 3 major categories of project:

- Successful, when all mandatory results have been 70-100% achieved.
- Partly successful, when a few mandatory results have been 70%-100% achieved, while the others have been 50-70% achieved.
- Unsuccessful, when most mandatory results haven't reached the 50% achievement rate.

Whatever the impact and sustainability of those projects may be, the Experts raised the question as to what facts, criteria and reasons could make those twinning projects successful.

After reviewing the questionnaires (see EQ2.1, EQ4.2, EQ5.2, etc), the Evaluators drew the conclusion that twinning projects were successful essentially when:

- They responded to a beneficiary institution's needs: this not only relates to the demand-driven approach (see Point 9 above), but also means that these needs were clearly identified.
- They were realistic, feasible and focused on specific issues: results are "mandatory", i.e. these results should be 100% achieved by the end of the project. Therefore, results should also be clearly identified and be realistic and feasible. This point also relates to the relevance criterion. Feasibility should be carefully considered in order to assess whether these conditions are met or not. We also noticed that successful projects are those with just a few focused objectives and results (1 to 3 objectives and related results). In this case, twinning resources are better allocated towards the achievement of these results.
- Beneficiary institutions are fully committed to project implementation: most twinning projects may have a huge impact and effect on the organisation and functioning of the beneficiary institutions. It goes without saying that the staff who will be directly involved in the twinning project must familiarise themselves with the new working procedures. The Evaluators also observed that the full commitment of a beneficiary institution's senior hierarchy to the mandatory results was a key success factor. This observation is linked to the next one:
- The sufficient absorption capacity demonstrated by the beneficiary institution. For example, how has it been possible to create an Accreditation Agency without any legal framework, without any budget, mandate or status, and with only 7 staff, who have not been appointed yet and who have no clear understanding of accreditation

objectives? Therefore, during the project fiche preparation phase, it is critical to ascertain, as far as possible, that a beneficiary institution's absorption capacity is real and can be mobilised for the project implementation phase. Only then should the appropriate resources be allocated to the project in terms of qualified staff, budget, equipment, premises, possibly including the legal framework, organisation and procedures. E.g. before real accreditation work starts, so that institutional capacity may be strengthened and the beneficiary may fulfil its tasks accordingly.

- The high quality of EU MS expertise. This is an obvious but also critical issue for project implementation success. This observation has already been mentioned in Point 6.1.3. above. In the present case, the quality of MS expertise depends, above all, on the RTA's technical capacity and also, to a large extent, on the RTA's management and communication skills.



Those points will also be covered in the Recommendations formulated in the next section.

### 6.2.3 High influence of the political context

The political context may have serious influence on project implementation, impact and sustainability. For example, the Evaluators observed that, in countries where the Government and political sphere were deeply involved in the twinning process, projects were very successful and met the mandatory results as planned. This assessment was also verified in answers to EQ5.5, EQ9.2 of the evaluation questionnaire.

Conversely, whenever twinning projects were implemented by a single decision-maker, at the level of an executive structure, without support from senior politicians, the Evaluators noticed that those projects encountered lots of difficulties, mainly because they were not integrated into the overall administrative and government landscape. Amongst the projects selected, the Evaluators even came across a situation where a beneficiary institution had disappeared purely and simply as a result of on-going administrative reform. Consequently, most activities, which had been carried out over the past year, were lost, because staff was assigned to another administration. This indicates first of all that the project was not part of the on-

going reform process, and second that senior political decision-makers either ignored, or hardly knew anything about, the project when they made their decision.

The Twinning Instrument has been conceived as a tool for accompanying domestic administrative reform and should therefore be fully integrated into the overall reform process. Twinning activities should not be an administrative “excrescence” of some sort imposed upon beneficiaries from outside. The more integrated at the highest political level a twinning project is, the more successful its outcome is likely to be and the more significant its impact will be.



This issue is developed further in the next section and will be subject of one major recommendation.

#### **6.2.4 The Twinning Instrument rests upon the central role played by PAOs/UGPs**


This final conclusion is key to the present and future success of twinning projects in the ENP Region. From the answers to the questionnaires (and the ensuing field visits), the Evaluators immediately got a clear picture of the major role played by PAOs/UGPs in selecting and implementing the Twinning Instrument in the 6 countries, irrespective of whether project management was centralised or decentralised in the ENP Region. Therefore the Twinning Instrument’s performance in each ENP Country also rests upon the quality of the services provided by each PAO/UGP to the beneficiary institutions. Of course, in addition to EUDs and TA projects such as ITTSO, SATTO providing support to PAOs and PAOs themselves, RTAs play a central role in the project implementation phase.

The PAO’s major role is to provide the beneficiary institutions with adequate support in respect of all twinning-related issues and, also very often in respect of other institutional building tools, such as TAIEX and SIGMA and other donors’ interventions. Therefore PAOs must cooperate closely with EUDs and other donors in order to ensure project complementarity/coherence and the best use of these institutional building tools. PAOs have

been given a major role in the project selection process and share this role with the RTAs in the implementation phase in all ENP countries.

We have noted that PAO interventions were crucial at the start of a project, i.e. from identification to the contracting phase. PAOs must inform beneficiary institutions of the existence of these tools and of the rules and procedures that govern them. They must assist the beneficiaries in identifying their eligible needs, in preparing the project concept fiche and the twinning fiche. PAOs may also help the BAs negotiate the fiche and proceed to the signature of the Twinning Contract with the EU and MS.

During the implementation phase, PAOs must track down and follow up on any progress made, and/or any failure experienced, by their respective twinning projects. If necessary, they must provide the beneficiaries with appropriate guidance, which may include the revision of project components and results, as required by circumstances.



Improving the institutional capacity of PAOs/UGPs and twinning project governance constitutes one of this evaluation's main recommendations (See Chapter 7 hereinafter).

## **7. RECOMMENDATIONS**

These recommendations have been formulated to enhance the Twinning Instrument's effectiveness, efficiency and performance in the ENP Region, 7 years after it was introduced into the majority of ENP Countries. They have been formulated and proposed by the Evaluators in order to contribute to the continuing process of improvement, consolidation and extension of the Twinning Instrument across the ENP region, although several of these recommendations may also be taken into consideration in other contexts (e.g. IPA-Enlargement).

We already know that in the ENP Region the Twinning Instrument has generally been successful and has achieved significant results. However, those results can be improved. These recommendations aim to consolidate the Instrument's performance and also improve the assessment that can be made of it. We have found (see Chapter 5 to this Report) that the judgements on the evaluation criteria's performance were not all satisfactory and could be improved.

The 8 recommendations hereinafter are proposed by the Evaluators to EuropeAid and are their sole responsibility. They follow on from our global evaluation of the Instrument in the whole ENP Region, which is based upon the in-depth analysis in Chapter 5 and the findings and conclusions derived by the Evaluators.

The top 8 priority recommendations very often intertwine as they are interdependent. Therefore the modification of one single element will affect the others. Their substance stems from several analyses presented in this Report. They have been classified by order of significance and priority, starting from those which are most important followed those with a more limited scope. Side recommendations have been pooled under a single heading "7.9 Other Recommendations".

### **7.1 A MORE STRATEGIC DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH**

This is our main recommendation.

The demand-driven approach was recommended right from the inception of the Twinning Instrument in the whole ENP Region. This approach is based on the principle of implementing twinning projects that respond to beneficiary institutional demand, provided that this demand is consistent with the minimum EU Acquis approximation requirement and in line with legal documents of EU cooperation.

As indicated in Chapter 5, this approach has been applied identically in all ENP-South and ENP-East countries where twinning projects were introduced. In fact, it was a way to facilitate the launching of the first generation of twinning projects and encourage the beneficiaries to endorse the Instrument and apply for twinning activities.

In practice, the Evaluators observed that the demand-driven approach was applied extensively and rather successfully, however, without the level of strictness required. It is clear that the principle of responding to the needs of beneficiaries has indeed facilitated the introduction and development of the Instrument across all the ENP countries, however, without always responding to the specificities of Twinning.



The strategic political framework in which the Twinning Instrument must be implemented is the neighbourhood policy and the adoption by each ENP Country of a Support to the Association Agreement Programme (SAAP/SAPP/P3A) or of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (CPA) Programme. Each of these programmes is being implemented through ENP Action Plans that list all activities to be implemented as planned in the Association Agreements. They generally include EU Acquis-related activities that are of interest only to the administrations of the ENP countries. The Twinning Instrument is also related to the implementation of the Comprehensive Institutional Building programmes (CIBs).

In that sense, the three Institutional Building Tools, namely Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA, are the main instruments indispensable to Action Plan and CIB implementation.

**Twining must become the preferred instrument for implementing the AA, CPA and ENP Plans.**

The Action Plans should be the basis of the strategic programming approach. However, after examining several of them, the Evaluators found that in fact they consisted merely in a long list of activities (above 150) to be carried out in various sectors, without any further information. Priorities are not mentioned, activities are far too manifold to be implemented under a single programme. Most of them remain far too vague even if they are linked to the EU Acquis. There is no programming approach. In reality, they are far from being real “action plans”. They are simply “long lists of actions” and it is therefore difficult to adopt a real strategic approach on that basis.

Two steps are now being proposed:

- (1) The first step is to revise the Action Plans into real “plans for actions”, including the programming of activities, objectives, clear priorities (whose number must by definition be limited to max. 3-4 activities to be carried out according to a definite sequencing plan), a global and sectoral approach and implementation deadlines based on a 3-to-5-year programming period, the Twinning Instrument being only a tool for implementing priority activities set in each of the Action Plans. Twinning activities must also be integrated better into the national reform strategies of public institutions.
- (2) The second step is to consider how the Comprehensive Institutional Building Programme (CIB), under implementation in ENP East, could correspond to this strategic approach and become the preferred instrument for implementing the AAs, CPAs and ENP Action Plans, at least its “Institutional Building” aspects. The CIB is fully consistent with the AAs and has been conceived as a “medium-term structural approach” with a view to strengthening the institutional capacities of those public administrations involved in AA/CPA implementation. This structural approach is required to help the beneficiary authorities prepare for a new agreement. Priority areas have been defined (e.g. modernisation of the legal framework, DCFTA, Justice, etc.), for which Institutional Reform Plans (IRPs) have been or are being prepared, which will be implemented by “clusters” of institutions. Therefore twinning activities must support those institutions in each priority area. Systematic implementation of the CIB has started in the ENP-East, but has not yet been introduced into the ENP-South. Several ENP-South countries have also felt the need to conduct this strategic reflection and to define priority orientations (see insert at the end of this presentation).

A strategic approach is therefore required one way or another, which would help to strengthen the demand-driven approach, to respond to the needs identified by beneficiary institutions, to conduct public administration reform only within the framework of clearly defined programming plan, objectives and priorities. Once this has been established, a programming plan for twinning activities may be operated over 3 to 5 years to support priority institutions. This programming plan will be within the competence of EUDs and PAOs/UGPs, in accordance with the attributed responsibilities within the decentralised or centralised management framework.

This programming plan will considerably strengthen the Twinning Instrument's performance, as it better fits a global and structural (comprehensive) approach. It will help determine priority actions and projects; it will avoid overlaps and could even allow for economies of scale. It will also be possible to improve coherence, complementarity and coordination between twinning projects themselves and with other IB tools (TAIEX/SIGMA), by focusing, as a priority (by field or sector), on the legal framework modernisation, institutional capacity building, public administration reform, and eventually to deal with more technical questions.

***For example, Best Practice/Egypt Demand-Driven Approach/PAO Strategy***

*The ENP Action Plans are the core basis for the demand-driven approach. Now there are 50 ideas for 50 new potential projects. In this respect, the PAO's Overall Work Plan (Strategy) for 2010-2016 is ready. The document has been finalised for submission to the EUD. It includes a Project ID Form, an Executive Summary, a Technical Plan, a Management Plan (programme staff, financing agreements, timeframes, link between workload and staffing) and a Financial Plan. Due to the unstable political situation in the country, however, the PAO has decided to be proactive in preparing this document, which must now still be discussed with the EUD and other stakeholders. Overall, the document looks professional in terms of content and structure, has been prepared in accordance with the National Reform Strategy and has taken into consideration complementarity/coherence with TAIEX and SIGMA (See also Section 5 for further detailed information)*

## **7.2 ENLARGE THE EU ACQUIS REFERENCE**

The reference to the EU Acquis is one of the fundamental principles governing the twinning rules and procedures. The first versions of Common Twinning Manual, which were used in the pre-accession context (PHARE Programme), stipulated in "Article 2 to the Work Plan: the *Acquis Communautaire* related to the project must be mentioned". In the pre-accession context, the *Acquis Communautaire* had a very strong significance as it linked accession to the adoption of the Acquis and Twinning was used for transferring the Acquis to the Candidate Countries. The adoption of the Acquis was considered as an "obligation". Back then it was the main motivation, the "incentive" used for moving forward towards accession, as was often repeated by the stakeholders. The same principle has remained valid for IPA countries.

The 2009 version of the Common Twinning Manual (CTM) stipulates the following:

- “Twinning projects must bring to the BC a **concrete operational result** (the so-called “mandatory result”) in connection with the EU Acquis or other EU policies open for cooperation” (CTM – p.12)
- “...The goal is relatively clear, i.e. the BC has a good understanding of the relevant part of the Acquis or the relevant area of co-operation, and has selected the type of system it intends to adopt” (CTM – p.13)
- “At the completion of a Twinning project, the BC should have a significantly improved organisation enabling it to properly fulfill its objectives in relation to the EU Acquis or in relation to the relevant area of co-operation with the EU” (CTM – p.15)
- “Twinning as a mechanism for assisting BCs to adopt, implement and enforce the acquis or other policy objectives...” (CTM – p.20)
- **“For IPA: the Acquis Communautaire related to the project / For ENPI: the relevant field of co-operation with the EU and the Acquis Communautaire related to the project. (to be mentioned in the Twinning Contract and in Article 2 of the Work Plan)”** (CTM – p.92).

As regards the ENP Region, the reference to EU Acquis has been put forward again and remains an important criterion mentioned explicitly in the Common Twinning Manual. The relevant fields of cooperation have been added for ENP countries, but the reference to the specific EU Acquis chapter(s) directly related to the project must be mentioned:

#### ***EU Definition of the EU Acquis:***

*"This is a French term meaning, essentially, "the EU as it is" - in other words, the rights and obligations that EU countries share. The "Acquis" includes all the EU's treaties and laws, declarations and resolutions, international agreements on EU affairs and the judgments given by the Court of Justice. It also includes action that EU governments take together in the area of "justice and home affairs" and on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. "Accepting the Acquis" therefore means taking the EU as you find it. Candidate countries have to accept the "Acquis" before they can join the EU, and make EU law part of their own national legislation*

[http://www.babylon.com/definition/Acquis\\_communautaire/English](http://www.babylon.com/definition/Acquis_communautaire/English)

The EU Acquis, which has a specific and wide meaning in the pre-accession context, is a generic and rather vague term that can hardly apply to the ENP context. In this respect, the Evaluators have found (see Chapter 5) that the stakeholders, more particularly the beneficiaries, did not have a clear understanding of this term: “what is the Acquis for?” “What does the EU Acquis consist in?” “To acquire what and what for?” Besides, nowhere in the Manual is it specified what “relevant field of cooperation” exactly means.

The definition of those terms and the reference to the EU Acquis are now quite insufficient such as provided for in the Common Twinning Manual. Partners working on twinning projects (EuropeAid, EUDs, PAOs/UGPs, Beneficiaries, NCPs, RTAs, officials, civil servants, experts, etc.) have expressed the need to have a common understanding of this terminology and also to clarify the terms used.

**Our recommendation is, on the one hand, to better define the terms “Acquis” and “Relevant field of cooperation” and, on the other hand, to enlarge the Acquis notion to a wider scope of intervention that would better fit the situation in the ENP Region.**

The Acquis must remain an important criterion for implementing twinning projects and must remain a fundamental reference for the IPA. However, in the ENP Region, the EU Acquis must not be officially associated with EU accession.

Of course, Twinning is no less than a cooperation tool for transferring the EU Acquis. However, it is also an instrument operating within a far wider framework. In the ENP Region, our recommendation is not only to keep the EU Acquis as a reference, but also to extend it to other areas, e.g. other fields of cooperation.


Within the framework of AAs and CPAs in the ENP Region, enlarging the **Twinning Instrument’s scope** can be fully justified in the following situations and at 5 conceptual levels:

1. **EU Values:** respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights (1)
  - **Bringing ENP countries closer to fundamental EU values**
2. **EU founding principles :** Primacy of EU legislation over MS legislation, free movement of persons, goods, services and capital across the EU without any discrimination (1)
  - **Bringing common fundamental principles effective in ENP countries into line with the EU’s**
  - **Implementation of ENPI AA/CPA/ENP Actions Plans, CIB or equivalent strategy**
3. **Legislation:** Legal harmonisation and approximation, legal framework modernisation, adoption/harmonisation with the EU Acquis (1)
  - **Support ENP countries in harmonising their legislation with the EU, the major focus of twinning projects so far and a prerequisite for further interventions**
4. **Institutional capacity building:** administrative reform, modernisation, revision of the status and mandates of public administrations, institutional restructuring, institutional capacity building and upgrading of staff competences
  - **Support to national structural and public administration reform, support to administration modernisation, staff capacity, also a major focus for twinning activities and often a pre-requisite for further interventions**

(1) A reminder of EU values and founding principles is provided on the next page

We propose that the “relevant fields of cooperation” be discussed and possibly complemented and that the Common Twinning Manual be updated with these elements. Thus the twinning

eligibility criteria will be more flexible, covering a wider scope, but also remaining strict in their application and respectful of the Twinning Instrument's original spirit, bringing ENP countries closer to the EU.



The slide features a blue background with a yellow starburst containing the word 'Acquis' on the left. At the top left is the European Union flag. The main title is 'ENP Twinning Evaluation Recommendation 2' in white and red text. Below it, the recommendation text is in yellow. A list of six bullet points with checkmarks is on the left, and a small logo is on the right.

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**Recommendation 2**  
*In the ENP Region, both East and South, the reference to the Acquis should be extended*

The Acquis was the "incentive" for Candidate Countries

**This reference in twinning project should now encompass:**

- ✓ Legal harmonisation/approximation
- ✓ Institutional capacity building
- ✓ Implementation of AA/CPA/ENPI Action Plans
- ✓ Accompaniment to domestic structural reform processes
- ✓ Public sector modernisation
- ✓ Bringing ENP Countries closer to EU values, practices, norms, standards...

***One comment by SIGMA:***

*“Twinning activities should focus less on text drafting and should instead capitalise on the results already achieved by the beneficiaries and focus more on whatever useful substance may be extracted from the EU Acquis. However, it is very clear that the EU Acquis may not / must not be the only reference for twinning activities and eligibility. Generally, the EU MS experts tend to only put forward their own institutional models. As a result, given the wide range of EU MS models and experience, there is increasingly obvious inconsistency between the various sectors and experiences/expertise available. Therefore a strategy is also necessary from this point of view: what experience and what model for what beneficiary country?”*

### **Reminder of EU values:**

*The Union is founded, according to the Convention's proposal, on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values, which are set out in Article I-2, are common to the Member States. Moreover, the societies of the Member States are characterised by pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination. These values play an important role, especially in two specific cases. Firstly, under the procedure for accession set out in Article I-57 any European State wishing to become a member of the Union must respect these values in order to be considered eligible for admission. Secondly, failure by a Member State to respect these values may lead to the suspension of that Member State's rights deriving from membership of the Union (Article I-58).*

*In comparison with the existing Treaties the Convention has included new values, notably human dignity and equality, as well as characterising the values upheld by the societies of the Member States.*

### **Reminder of EU principles:**

*As regards relations between the Union and the Member States, the Convention has brought together the pertinent provisions of the existing Treaties in Article I-5, in particular the obligation to respect the national identities and the fundamental political and constitutional structures of the Member States. The principle of loyal cooperation is also included in this Article.*

*Article I-6 confers on the European Union legal personality, something that was still unimaginable at the Nice Intergovernmental Conference in 2000. The merging together of the European Community and the European Union will therefore give the new Union the right to conclude international agreements, in the same way as the European Community can do today, yet without compromising the division of competences between the Union and the Member States.*

*Title III, spanning Articles I-9 to I-17, lays down the Union competences. It should be noted that the principle of the primacy of Union law over the law of the Member States, a principle established by the Court of Justice, has been formally integrated into Article I-10.*

*Article I-4 of the draft Constitution guarantees the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital within the Union and strictly prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality.*

[http://europa.eu/scadplus/european\\_convention/objectives\\_en.htm#PRINCIPL  
ES](http://europa.eu/scadplus/european_convention/objectives_en.htm#PRINCIPL<br/>ES)

## **7.3 REVIEW AND ADAPT THE TWINNING CONCEPT/DEFINITION**

Twinning is closely linked to the EU Acquis. It has been conceived as a tool for “implementing the EU Acquis” within the framework of the EU accession process. This concept was then extended to the MEDA area, now the ENP-South, in 2004 and to the ENP-

East in 2007. Nevertheless, the Common Twinning Manual (Revised 2009) still does not provide for any clear definition of Twinning. Instead, the Manual explains what Twinning is not (p. 14):

- *A Twinning project is NOT designed to provide only advice or other types of classical Technical Assistance. It is a project of administrative co-operation in a specific field that must yield MANDATORY RESULTS.*
- *Twining project is NOT one-way Technical Assistance from MS to BC. It is a close partnership in which the specific commitment of the beneficiary, who is also the driving force behind the changes targeted, is vital.*
- *A Twinning project does NOT aim at replicating a particular MS administrative system but rather strive to help introduce EU wide best practices in connection with Community legislation.*

During the evaluation and the visits to the ENP countries, we collected an impressive number of opinions and tentative definitions on Twinning (see Chapter 5). This demonstrates that opinions are not unanimous and that everyone has their own conception of the Instrument. Moreover, different twinning implementation “practices” have also emerged in countries (ENP-South). This has led to deviations from the initial scope of Twinning, especially as regards project design and the application of twinning rules and procedures. The Experts recommend conducting actions (training, awareness-raising, communication) with the various stakeholders in order to reconcile Twinning with how it’s perceived.

The Experts recommend that the next main elements be included in a sensible definition of Twinning that could be as follows:


**The EU Twinning Instrument is:**

- A cooperation tool between a public administration institution in a BC and the equivalent institution in an EU MS in a specific field related to the *Acquis or any other relevant field(s) of cooperation*
- A tool for a strategic implementation of the AAs and PCAs action plans and CIBs
- An instrument for targeted administrative cooperation to assist ENP countries in strengthening their administrative and judicial capacity
- A tool for transferring, adopting and/or adapting to EU legislation, standards and practices through a close and result-oriented relationship between similar institutions in the EU MS and BCs
- A project that must yield concrete result(s) (“mandatory results”)
- A joint project dealing with an institutional capacity building process, in which each partner takes on responsibilities, and not a one-way technical assistance project provided by an EU MS to a BC

On the basis of the discussions with stakeholders in the ENP countries (See further detailed analysis in Chapter 5), the benefits of Twinning are as follows:

- A Unique instrument for international administrative and inter-institutional cooperation
- An Accelerator of the public administration reform process across the ENP Region
- The cleverest instrument ever created for transferring EU values, tools, know-how, methods.
- Opportunities for closer inter-institutional **peer-to-peer** cooperation
- Opportunities for inter-institutional networking and information-sharing
- Opportunities for EU & international legal and normative approximation
- Opportunities to gain project management and technical skills in record time
- Opportunities for ENP institutions to cooperate with the EU member states institutions and continue this cooperation separately on a bilateral partnership basis in this and/or other areas
- Opportunities to achieve more than PCA/AA objectives
- Opportunities for long-term inter-institutional partnerships
- A tool to reach the Acquis
- An instrument to facilitate trade

The next picture shows how the ENP Region's BAs understand what Twinning consists in (slide copied from Section 6.1.2.)



The slide features the European Union flag in the top left corner. The title 'ENP Twinning Evaluation' is in white, with 'FACTS & FIGURES' in red below it. A central question 'To the question, what is a Twinning?' is in yellow. Below this, the text 'An instrument/tool to...' is in white. Three categories of responses are listed in orange: 'from EUDs/PIs/RTAs/some PAOs', 'from RTACs/PLCs/some PAG/other stakeholders', and 'Other answers:'. Each category has a corresponding quote in white. A 'TWINNING' logo with two stylized figures is in the top right.

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**FACTS & FIGURES**

**To the question, what is a Twinning ?**

**An instrument/tool to...**

*from EUDs/PIs/RTAs/some PAOs :*  
" ...Reach the Acquis"

*from RTACs/PLCs/some PAG/other stakeholders :*  
" ...adopt/approximate laws, norms, standards, practices..."

*Other answers:*

- " ...Facilitate trade" (20%)
- " ...Implement the AA or PCA actions plans" (15%)
- " ...Bring ENP countries closer to EU values" ( 10%)

The wide variety of responses clearly indicates that there is no common understanding of what the Twinning Instrument consists in. It is not for the Evaluators to provide a suitable definition of Twinning. However, they **recommend that this definition be reviewed, completed and inserted into the next version of the Common Twinning Manual.**

#### **7.4 TAKE BETTER INTO CONSIDERATION AND INVOLVE THE POLITICAL SPHERE IN THE TWINNING PROCESS**

Further to the field visits, the Evaluators noticed the great influence of the local political and institutional context on the Twinning Instrument's positioning and project implementation with each direct beneficiary in the 6 ENP-East and ENP-South countries visited. The Twinning Instrument's positioning is different in ENP-East and in ENP-South.

- In the ENP-East Region, remnants of the old Soviet administration are still very much present today. Public institutions have not yet fundamentally opened up to the Western world's functioning mode, such as that prevailing in EU countries. The political sphere enjoys great influence within the administration. The decision-making process takes place at a very high level and the system is very hierarchical. Under such conditions, the Twinning Instrument is not well integrated into the administrative system. Instead, Twinning is understood rather as a programme or a project like the others funded by foreign institutions as part of "international cooperation". Twinning is by no means considered as an instrument for accompanying (global) institutional reform. Moreover, PAOs in the ENP-East Region are in charge of the Twinning Instrument as well as of other types of international cooperation, whether bilateral or multilateral.
- In the ENP-South Region, public institutions have already gained long-standing practical experience in cooperation work with Europe, or at least with several European countries. Several of those administrations even stem from those in Europe and their civil servants even have an academic background very close to that of their European MS partners. The language barrier does not play as significant a role as in ENP-East countries. Institutional functioning modes are similar and therefore in this context the Twinning Instrument is far better integrated into the reform process. Political circles are a lot closer and more accessible, and the government as well as decision makers are also a lot more involved in twinning activities than in the ENP-East Region. In this respect, our interlocutors declared: "We are not your new neighbours. We are your very old neighbours".

In this respect, the detailed analysis, including best practices and lessons learnt, can be found in Chapter 5.

However, the situation is rather paradoxical as we attempt to integrate one single model into two radically different political and institutional contexts. Of course a fine-tuned country-based analysis will have to be carried out in order to better measure those differences.

Whenever twinning projects were implemented by a single decision-maker, at the level of an executive structure, without support from senior politicians, the Evaluators noticed that those projects encountered lots of difficulties, mainly because they were not "promoted" nor integrated into the overall administrative and government picture. Amongst the projects selected, the Evaluators even came across a situation where a beneficiary institution had disappeared purely and simply as a result of the on-going administrative reform. Consequently, most activities, which had been carried out over the past year, were lost, because staff were laid off or transferred to another institution. This indicates first of all that the project was not part of the on-going reform process and second that senior political decision-makers either ignored, or hardly knew anything about, the project when they made their decision to abolish the beneficiary.

The political and institutional context of each ENP Country is decisive for the implementation of twinning activities. On the basis of this analysis, we propose two major recommendations, as follows:

- **Involve political and institutional decision makers at the highest level** in the twinning process. Ministers, secretary-generals, policy- and decision-makers must be

involved in the process. Twinning activities deal with issues related to the State's administrative structures, to the legal framework, to the State itself and to the functioning of its institutions. Therefore, the more integrated at the highest political level a twinning project is, the more successful its outcome is likely to be. Therefore high-level decision makers must be involved systematically right from the start of the project preparation phase, whether in the MS twinning partner selection process or in the twinning "*contract*" drafting process, which also offers the advantage of informing them of, and committing them to, the mandatory results and putting forward the respective rights and obligations of the parties. During the project implementation phase, these individuals must be kept informed of the progress made on a regular basis and must also provide the necessary guidance. They must promote the project, participate in the project's communication effort, in the various meetings and conferences. Twinning must be "visible" amongst decision makers and stakeholders in a more comprehensive manner and of course amongst as many public administration circles as possible.

The Evaluators are of the opinion that a national administration's and government's political commitment can be guaranteed in the majority of ENP countries and elsewhere only if the twinning contracts are signed at the highest level (Ministers, DGs, SGs, PM Offices.). Twinning contracting rules and procedures governing the Twinning Instrument must naturally be in line with the effective EU Financial Regulation just like the mobilisation of assistance through grants must be in line with relevant EU rules. However, during the enlargement process, as was mentioned in various Common Twinning Manuals' previous versions, a "*covenant*" was signed between a high State representative of a Beneficiary Country (+CFCU), a MS administration (often through PM office or MoFA) and a high level Officer from the Commission . The term "Contract" is better applied to the private sector, whereas Twinning relates to administrative and state cooperation. The Evaluators are of the opinion that Twinning should revert to the notion of "*Covenant*", which pertains better to the Twinning Instrument and to modify the next CTM version accordingly.

- **Integrate the Twinning Instrument better into the national public administration reform process.** AAs and PCAs are critical elements that must naturally be taken into consideration within the framework of the public administration reform process going on in the ENP Countries. In this sense, twinning projects aim to modify the legislative and regulatory system and to contribute to institutional capacity building in the beneficiary countries. They are also tools for accompanying public administration reform and must therefore be fully integrated into the reform process and even be an integral part of it. Twinning activities should never be an administrative "excrecence" of some sort imposed upon beneficiaries from outside. The Twinning Instrument must be recognised at the political level as the main instrument for institutional reform in all sectors.



## 7.5 IMPROVE TWINNING FEASIBILITY, IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

Further to the analysis, which has been conducted on the basis of the selected project sample for the 6 ENP Countries, **we recommend improving the project eligibility and implementation criteria substantially**. Indeed, we have found a general deficiency in the project selection process, which has led to implementation difficulties. Therefore greater attention must be paid to a number of criteria critical to successful twinning project performance both during the preparation phase as well as during implementation.

### *Clarification as to the terminology used*

*In our analysis, the term “**performance**” of twinning projects relates first and foremost to the “performance criteria”, which essentially encompass impact, sustainability and effectiveness.*

*In addition, the Evaluators would also like to introduce the term “feasibility” in order to draw attention to the conditions for successful project implementation, more particularly the necessary prerequisites (or conditionalities) to be fulfilled for ensuring better performance of the Twinning Instrument.*

Whatever management mode prevails – be it centralised, as is still the case in ENP-East, or decentralised as is the case in ENP-South – EUDs, PAOs and beneficiary administrations play a critical role, albeit to various degrees, in the feasibility of twinning projects.

These are the structures, in particular the PAOs, which promote the Twinning Instrument amongst the beneficiaries. “Concept fiches”, consisting of a number of eligibility criteria, have been designed and put in place in each ENP Country for facilitating the selection of the twinning projects proposed. After carefully examining those concept fiches, which differ from one country to another (when they exist), we find that generally they must be revised, fine-tuned and harmonised in order to ensure better feasibility of twinning projects and also a

better achievement rate for mandatory results. **The Evaluators firmly recommend revising the following five selection criteria:**

### *Feasibility*

#### **Strengthen project selection and implementation criteria:**

- 1. Improve compatibility of the needs expressed with twinning eligibility criteria*
- 2. Select only focused and realistic mandatory results*
- 3. Ensure that the prerequisites (“conditionalities”) are fulfilled*
- 4. Ensure that the absorption capacity of beneficiaries is real*
- 5. Ensure that the beneficiaries are involved*

#### **1. Improve compatibility of the needs expressed by means of twinning eligibility criteria**

The Evaluators have found that the twinning eligibility process had not always been conducted in a sufficiently rigorous manner. It was noted that twinning projects had been selected without insisting upon one of the fundamental twinning principles that is peer-to-peer institutional cooperation.

Besides, a few topics selected were sometimes quite remote from the twinning scope and priorities and therefore could have been dealt with through classical Technical Assistance. Another finding was that the needs expressed by the beneficiary institutions were not always sufficiently clear, realistic or, as was already indicated, compatible with twinning-relevant priorities.

It has also happened that Twinning served as a pretext for beneficiaries to obtain funding for procurement, i.e. equipment supply, for example in order to install laboratories, even if this equipment could be acquired through other financing sources. Besides, this also raises the issue of the level of commitment demonstrated by a beneficiary to Twinning (see hereinafter).

The Experts recommend that during the project selection and preparation phase both the EUDs and PAOs be a lot more rigorous in respect of twinning-related conditionalities. The recommendation is also to improve the format of the “project idea” or “project synopsis” that the beneficiary institutions have to fulfil in order to better identify their needs and their eligibility against twinning criteria. We have already proposed in Recommendation 2 to extend the Acquis concept for the ENP Countries and to include at least the following elements:

Twinning criteria relevant to EU Institutional Building issues:

- Legal harmonisation/approximation
- Institutional Capacity building
- Implementation of AA/CPA/ENPI Action Plans

- Accompaniment to structural reform processes
- Public sector modernisation
- Bringing ENP countries closer to EU values, practices, norms, standards

Twinning projects to be selected must include at least one of those elements. Upon selecting the projects, it will be more specifically up to the EUDs and PAOs to strengthen the project selection process on the basis of those criteria, either by including them and also checking their presence in the “concept fiche”, or by verifying their existence, relevance and accuracy during discussions with the beneficiaries. It could also be desirable to inform the beneficiaries better of, and prepare them better for, the Twinning Instrument and the “twinability” criteria.

## **2. Select only focused and realistic mandatory results**

This element is fundamental to substantially improving project feasibility. Far greater attention must be paid to the twinning eligibility and feasibility criteria.

During the field visits (See Field Note), we found that a few projects, albeit rarely, had been selected merely on grounds of expediency, i.e. whenever a need arose or even just to satisfy a specific need expressed by a beneficiary. The reason for this may be that twinning projects are still too often mixed up with classical Technical Assistance provided to the beneficiaries within the framework of international cooperation. In this case, they are not considered as bearing any specific characteristics.

During the first implementation phase, those needs were even generated on purpose in order to accelerate the Twinning Instrument’s introduction into some few countries. We also noticed a few cases where the stakeholders, both beneficiaries and PAOs, asserted that “mandatory results are mandatory only if they can be achieved”.

The achievement of results is far more demanding for twinning projects than for classical Technical Assistance. The “mandatory” aspect, which is typical of Twinning, really means achieving the planned result fully (100%) and not attaining it “if possible and/or as far as possible” as is the case for Technical Assistance. This point is fundamental because all the resources and activities implemented to achieve a project’s objectives stem from it.

On the basis of the filled-in questionnaires returned and the field visits, we found too large a number of projects with too many, overambitious, unrealistic and unachievable mandatory results for the planned implementation period (most often max. 24 months), even if those results fulfilled the eligibility criteria. We also found a significant number of projects whose implementation period had to be extended after they failed to achieve the results planned within the deadlines established from the start.

In one of the countries visited, we studied the case of a twinning project consisting of no less than 12 components and as many mandatory results. Three of the components could be considered as implemented in a satisfactory manner, the others only partly or not at all. However, those three components were not the most important ones to ensure success. The outcome was an enormous waste of resources and funding, which were hardly or poorly used, to say nothing of the non-obtained results.

Therefore it seems important to us that EUDs and PAOs/UGPs should more rigorously check project feasibility criteria and conditionalities under which mandatory results are defined. This is directly linked to the relevance criterion insofar as the achieved results correspond to those defined beforehand.

**We therefore recommend** that the EUDs and PAOs should see to the rigorous respect of the following conditionalities, which also means revising the “concept fiches” accordingly:

- ⇒ **Limit the overall number of mandatory results to max. 2-3 per project**
- ⇒ **Only select realistic, achievable mandatory results**
- ⇒ **Ensure that they can be achieved fully during the implementation phase**
- ⇒ **Make available the resources necessary to achieve those results accordingly**
- ⇒ **Better take into consideration Assumptions and Risks**
- ⇒ **Also ensure that the conditionalities have been well defined and are/will be respected**

- ✓ Limit the number of mandatory results to 2 or 3 per project: This may seem arbitrary. However, the more targeted a twinning project is (max. 2-3 components), the more chances to be successful it has. The most successful Twinning Projects are those which are most focused, in which case twinning resources are far better utilised towards the achievement of results.
- ✓ Only select realistic, achievable mandatory results: It is indispensable to check that the expected results are reasonably achievable, which means on the one hand that the conditions for achieving those results are in line with the project’s context and, on the other hand, that the activities implemented and the resources allocated are necessary and sufficient for achieving them. In addition, the “mandatory” character of the results must also be respected.
- ✓ Ensure that the results are achievable during the implementation phase: Careful attention must be paid so that the expected results may be achieved by project completion date. This means programming the project activities accurately according to the Work Plan on one hand and ensuring that the conditionalities (prerequisites) are in place before the start of the implementation phase on the other hand. “Risks and assumptions” related to activity implementation must also be checked and assessed carefully.
- ✓ Make available the resources necessary to achieve the results accordingly: It is important that the resources dedicated to the activities, expertise, logistics and budget should be proportionate to the mandatory results. This is to ensure that the nature and volume of the resources are necessary to achieve the results as planned.
- ✓ Take Assumptions and Risks better into consideration: this is directly linked to the feasibility of a project. Therefore special attention should be paid to the uncertainties and their potential consequences on the implementation phase and the achievement of mandatory results (this is very important in order to ensure Impact and Sustainability as far as possible).

- ✓ Also ensure that the conditionalities have been well defined and are/will be respected: Some results can be achieved only if the conditions necessary for their implementation are fulfilled. This point is developed further in the next section.

### **3. Ensure that the conditionalities are respected**

The Evaluators have found that a number of projects were still frequently implemented without the appropriate conditionalities in place. Moreover, it has also been observed that several project activities could be implemented only after others had been completed beforehand (sequencing), which was not always taken into account properly in the Work Plans. Finally, several activities having too low chances of being achieved were planned, which meant that the corresponding mandatory result(s) could be achieved only partly or not at all.

These conditionalities have had serious repercussions not only on project feasibility, but also on relevance issues. They are partly included in the “assumptions and “risks” as indicated in the logical framework. That is why the Evaluators recommend taking them into consideration more rigorously prior to project implementation.

One of these conditionalities also includes the careful attention that must be paid first of all to the local political and institutional context. It is very important to ensure and secure strong support for Twinning at the highest level, real political commitment to project implementation and the need to integrate Twinning into the on-going global public administration reform/modernisation process.

No less important is to ensure that the necessary legal framework for the Twinning Instrument’s successful performance exists beforehand. We have found that several projects left aside this fundamental aspect indispensable for the successful implementation of twinning projects.

The legal framework has been either ignored, or included as part of a project’s activities to be implemented. Therefore there is a significant risk of having the legal framework in place too late or not at all during the whole project implementation phase, which means that in turn the next activities cannot be implemented as planned. This is more particularly the case of a bill drafted by twinning experts and submitted to the Parliament for approval. As a result, the experts are not in a position to tell exactly when the bill will be passed into a law (assumption) and are even less in a position to commit themselves to the activities that could be implemented only after the bill has been passed into law.

Twinning must also respond to one of the aspects underpinning the strategic approach proposed and to one of the elements specified in the AAs, PCAs and/or ENP Action Plans, which can also be considered as a formal, mandatory conditionality, prior to project implementation.

Finally, the administrations must be ready to adopt and to be committed to Twinning. For this, they must have sufficient institutional capacity. This will be dealt with in the next section.

### **4. Ensure that the absorption capacity of beneficiaries is sufficient**

The Evaluators have found that the twinning projects that encountered most difficulties were those for which the BAs did not have sufficient implementation capacity under the appropriate conditions.

Very often the administrative organisation of a BA did not have any unit dedicated to the twinning project's purpose and did not even propose to set up such a unit or any corresponding institutional restructuring. This is tantamount to saying that it is necessary to link the organisational structure of the BA to twinning requirements. This should be either a prerequisite (conditionality) or a condition to verify before deciding whether to implement a project or not. It also shows the real political commitment towards the twinning instrument.

Apart from organisational questions, BAs very frequently happen to fail to have the available staff necessary and sufficient to offer an efficient counterpart to the expertise provided by the EU MS. In several cases, it was not even planned to have the BA commit or assign civil servants to twinning activities.

This could be linked to a recruitment and budgetary problem, even if obligations/commitments have been concluded on the basis of local staff availability when the "contract" is signed by the BA. Those obligations/commitments are often partly, or not at all, fulfilled afterwards, due to a shortage of resources or a lack of political decision-making/commitment. This also explains why those obligations/commitments must be decided at the highest level (government minister or higher).

#### *For example*

*We have found that in the case of an accreditation project (€ 2 million), which was not part of our sample, the BA had only 7 senior civil servants available, whose appointment to their duties had not yet been confirmed, nor their participation in the planned twinning activities. None of them could speak one of the EU official languages (English). None of them had sufficient knowledge of accreditation. However, several training activities were planned for approx. 20 senior civil servants.*

*No budget is yet available for paying their salaries and recruiting additional staff. No administrative structure capable of receiving this project has been planned. Although responding to one of the "priorities" of the ENP Action Plan, this twinning project stems more from an individual initiative put forward by a Head of Unit than from a ministerial political decision within the framework of administrative reform or modernisation and/or legal approximation.*

This example is probably far-fetched. However, our recommendation is that the EUDs and PAOs must **far more rigorously assess the real capacity of a BA to "receive" (absorb) a twinning project**. Absorption capacity is tightly linked to human resources that have been made available for the project. During the project identification phase, it is up to the EUDs and PAOs to check, by means of pre-established criteria, the availability, appointment and quality of the staff that will be made available for the twinning activities. Should those conditions not be fulfilled, as has already been proposed, it would be better to **intervene in two stages**, first with a twinning project dealing with capacity building and then with a

second project dealing with more sectoral and technical questions or with the legal framework (see hereinafter).

This condition is of course linked to the real commitment of the beneficiary administration, albeit not only (see next paragraph). More generally, we have found that often local staff was little motivated by twinning activities, with the exception of study tours. The explanation can be found in that the civil servants who take part in the twinning activities do not receive any additional compensation either from their home administration or the twinning project for their participation in the activities. In fact, as is the case with Twinning, their work is considered as that normally carried out by them every day. However, twinning activities add to their normal workload.

With the existing Twinning Instrument scheme, no compensation has been planned for local staff who take part in the project activities, whereas MS experts are paid on a daily basis at least the equivalent of one month's salary of any civil servant in most ENP Countries. It is not within our remit to issue specific recommendations on this issue. However, this "imbalance" deserved to be mentioned.

Finally, the absorption capacity demonstrated by a BA is also tightly linked to staff turnover, which is frequent and very high in several ENP Countries. We have found that in nearly half of the 18+2 twinning projects of our sample the staff was entirely replaced or appointed to other tasks before or after project completion. In one case, staff was even replaced after one year into the project implementation phase. This has a high impact on the *Effectiveness/Efficiency* and *Sustainability* of twinning projects, as almost all the effort contributed and expenses incurred during the first year are inevitably lost.

We therefore recommend that during the project preparation phase EUDs and PAOs ensure that the staff who are made available for the project should be available for a long time, at least for the whole project duration and beyond, i.e. after project completion. Only then will *Impact* and *Sustainability* be optimal. This commitment must be made by the BA very clearly, once again at the highest level, and must be mentioned in the contract before it is signed.

The Evaluators point out that with the very first generation of twinning projects implemented within the framework of the PHARE Programme (1998-2000) appointing the national counterparts to EU MS experts was required. As a result, local civil servants were "nominally" appointed and assigned to the twinning projects for their whole duration and their names were indicated, like those of experts, in the twinning covenants. This was valid for the RTA Counterparts, BC PLs, national component leaders, working group members, etc.

This is a conditionality to be strictly fulfilled, since there is no point agreeing upon mandatory results, unless the beneficiary administrations have the capacity of achieving them and make them sustainable. However, and this is the second part of our recommendation, in the event that absorption capacity should be insufficient, it is better to act in two stages, as already mentioned possibly by having two consecutive twinning projects in place,

- The first one dealing with the improvement of institutional capacity building of the Beneficiary Institution, once a needs assessment analysis had been thoroughly conducted and when achieved.

- The second one with more specific, technical priorities linked, for example, to the AAs, CPAs and/or ENP Action Plans or to other strategic issues, such as the DCFTA, or the adoption of directives, standards and norms, etc.

### *Example*

*When the EU accession process was launched for Romania, it very soon became obvious that the country's public institutions were not ready to ensure the transition. Charters, mandates, organisation, staffing, resources and procedures effective at line ministries did not correspond to those necessary to kick-start the accession process. The existing legal framework did not help to pursue that road either. As a result, Romania's public institutions did not have the capacity necessary to launch the necessary reform.*

*Therefore a first twinning project (light) was launched in 1998 in relation to the public administration reform strategy to be implemented towards accession, then a second project on public administration reform essentially for strengthening administrative capacities and creating EU Units or working groups within each of Romania's line ministries. In parallel, several twinning projects were also dealing with the legal and legislative framework.*

*It was only after this first stage that twinning projects on more technical and targeted issues were launched to respond to the accession criteria set in the 35EU Acquis chapters, in parallel with the setting-up of DIS/EDIS and the CFCU.*

## **5. Ensure that the BAs are fully committed**

This point is tightly linked to the above section. Absorption capacity must be considered in close relation to the involvement, willingness, involvement of the beneficiary to achieve the objectives and mandatory results.

We have found that the commitments made by the beneficiaries when signing the contract were not always or completely fulfilled. It is indeed very easy to commit oneself “on paper” or “thoughtlessly” to a number of prerequisites and conditionalities and then to ignore them for whatever reason once project implementation has started. The person who made those commitments may have been unable to fulfil them or the support expected from the highest levels (ministers) could not be provided or the administration could simply not fulfil all conditions necessary to implement the project. Even in good faith, it is not always possible for the national counterpart to make the staff or the budget available before or after the project, as initially planned.

The reality, or materiality, of those commitments is an indicator of the BA's involvement. Insofar as the demand-driven approach is applied, it is possible to infer a greater involvement of the beneficiaries in the project implementation process and achievement of results.

We recommend that during the identification phase EUDs and PAOs should far more rigorously ensure that the commitment of the beneficiaries and their contribution to the success of projects from which they benefit are real. In fact, this is tantamount to checking whether the criteria to ascertain absorption capacity are really fulfilled or whether the beneficiaries are able to fulfil their commitments not only on paper, but also with deeds.

It is necessary to assess the degree of commitment demonstrated by beneficiaries especially by verifying their willingness and capacity to provide the national counterparts as requested: availability of staff and premises for the project, easy access to telephone and internet lines, office equipment and furniture, etc., but also to earmark the necessary budget for the project, perhaps to proceed to the appropriate administrative restructuring, or to commit themselves to legal framework revisions in relation to the project.

Moreover, the first concern of RTAs upon their arrival in their respective ENP countries should be to confirm whether the commitments and obligations have been fulfilled and that all resources have been made available before their projects can start. Any delay will inevitably lead to other delays in activity implementation.

It is up to EUDs and PAOs to ensure that all commitments shall be fulfilled and that the stakeholders shall be those who are in a position to make this type of decision on the Government's behalf, which is tantamount to involving the highest leaders (ministers) directly. For this purpose, it is necessary to obtain the commitment of those decision-makers and inform them of the twinning procedures, prerequisites and conditions beforehand in order that the “*mandatory results*” may be conditional on “*mandatory commitments*”.

In the signed contract, the mandatory commitments should be clearly stipulated and the local staff who takes part in the twinning activities should be nominally appointed (and also duly informed of their appointment). Besides, Governments should also commit themselves to supporting, assisting, facilitating, informing and participating in project implementation and success. Only thus can the degree of commitment and willingness of BAs be measured.

Finally, it goes without saying that during the identification phase all information on the functioning of twinning projects should be widely disseminated and explained to as large an audience as possible. It is equally important for the decision-makers and government members concerned to be at least informed and also ideally to take an active part in project implementation.



The slide features a blue background with the European Union flag in the top left corner and a 'TWINNING' logo below it. The title 'ENP Twinning Evaluation' is in white, with 'Recommendation 5' in red below it. The main heading 'Improve Twinning impact, sustainability and feasibility' is in yellow. A list of seven bullet points, each with a white checkmark, is in white text. A yellow circular logo with 'PAO UGP' and 'EUD' is on the right side. The slide also includes a smaller EU flag logo in the bottom right corner.

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**Recommendation 5**

**Improve Twinning impact, sustainability and feasibility**

- ✓ Provide better information upstream of twinning implementation
- ✓ Select only realistic, feasible and focused projects
- ✓ Better assess the beneficiary institution needs and relevance to EU Institutional Building issues
- ✓ Better assess real absorption capacity of beneficiaries
- ✓ Take into account staff availability and turnover
- ✓ Check/request full commitment of the beneficiary institutions


## 7.6 IMPROVE THE TWINNING GOVERNANCE

The Evaluators have found in all the countries visited that PAOs played a fundamental role in project implementation. Their role has been “pivotal” to the whole Twinning Instrument put in place in each country as they have developed a privileged relationship with the beneficiary institutions. This assertion has been widely commented on in Chapter 5 and also in Conclusion 6.2.3. in Chapter 6.


The success and development of twinning activities in each of the ENP countries rests mostly upon the PAOs. Therefore the effort for improving the governance of the Twinning Instrument and projects must as a priority target those structures. This remains true either under a centralised management mode, or under a decentralised management mode. The governance capacity is nonetheless more developed in ENP-South countries where the decentralised management mode was put in place earlier and where most responsibilities normally assumed by EUDs were transferred to PAOs, while the Twinning Instrument has not yet reached maturity in ENP-East countries.

However, further to the field visits paid to the 6 ENP countries of the selected sample, we found relatively different situations in each of them as well as variable management and governance capacities. It must be noted that we selected the 6 neighbourhood countries where the Twinning Instrument was most advanced. The recommendations put forward apply even better to the other ENP countries where, on one hand, the instrument is less efficient, or not yet fully operational, and on the other hand, where the twinning-related activity is less developed.

The Twinning Instrument’s current governance is illustrated by the next two diagrams. There are 4 management levels:



This mechanism is accompanied by a more or less centralised level of responsibilities and management within the structures created to that effect in each country (PAOs).



During the field visits, the Evaluators could conduct in-depth discussions with the various EUDs and PAOs (See Field Note). Those discussions have highlighted a series of very important conclusions that we consider useful to point out and comment on here. The discussions have revealed a number of difficulties and malfunctions in the mechanisms put in place in each country, which are linked, on one hand, to the organisation in place and, on the other hand, to the capacity demonstrated by the various operators to fulfil their duties. On top of that there are a number of issues linked to twinning rules and procedures (see Common Twinning Manual). The issue related to twinning rules and procedures will be dealt with in the next paragraph. Finally, the Evaluators have indeed noticed that in all the ENP countries visited PAOs played a critical role, whatever the level of management decentralisation.

This mechanism is relatively complex and the Twinning Instrument's governance must be strengthened considerably. At the moment, the finding in respect of the situation at each responsibility level is as follows:

- Difficulty experienced by the Brussels-based team in monitoring all the countries, supervising and coordinating all operations, harmonising practices with a team too remote from the field and which should be strengthened to continue the development of twinning activities across the ENP Region.
- Generally efficient EUDs, although a few of them do not have the sufficient capacities to monitor project implementation, whatever the level of management centralisation/decentralisation, nor the appropriate staff who are not always trained adequately in the twinning rules and procedures, which has been the case for the newly recruited staff.

- PAOs facing difficulties in all the ENP countries visited, however, to various degrees and in various fields: often those difficulties are linked to a cruel lack of staff; to the inexperience of a team who has not been trained adequately in the twinning spirit and management practices; to an inadequate positioning within the local administration; to a perfectible organisation; to the more or less strict application of rules and procedures by the various units; or even to budgetary problems affecting their functioning. Recently, it was found that twinning practices differed from one country to another and were drifting away from Twinning Instrument's original scope and a tendency or strong desire to get more independence was also noticed: "Once the funds have been paid into our account, *it is our money and no longer the EU's. We can now do what we want with it!*". There have been conflicts between several PAOs and EUDs. "*The PAO denies the EUD the right to contact the beneficiaries directly*" or else "*the EUD seeks to influence the PAO's choice and should mind its own business*", to say nothing of personal conflicts.
  
- Overall, the EU MS are well prepared to Twinning procedures and fully understand the Twinning mechanism. However, several MS institution representatives (future Project Leaders or RTAs of the MS administrations and/or mandated bodies) applying for twinning projects and BCs are still too often poorly prepared, poorly informed, insufficiently trained in the twinning rules and procedures. As a result, they still encounter enormous difficulty in applying the twinning procedures, which they find too complex, too demanding, too cumbersome and too manifold. This is all the more true as EU MS and BCs hardly have any prior experience with Twinning.

Consequently, within the framework of the Twinning Instrument's on-going development across the ENP Region, i.e. the transition from a launching *phase 1* to the inception of a consolidating and widening *Phase 2*, together with a more strategic programming approach, our recommendation is, as a priority, to **strengthen institutional capacity building, overall performance and twinning governance capacity of PAOs**. However, as the situation is different in each PAO and in each ENP Country, we recommend the European Commission to proceed to a situation audit of each PAO, taking into consideration the different contexts of ENP-South and ENP-East.



The strengthening of PAO governance and institutional capacity should include the following tasks:

- Reconsider the positioning and institutional capacity of PAOs whenever necessary and suitable: PAOs must be closer to the ministerial decision-maker, which could perhaps be more inter-ministerial than under the supervision of a ministry managing external aid. Also provide staff with institutional capacity, to become a privileged and high quality interlocutor between the EUD, the ENP Country's government, the beneficiary administration and the EU MS.
- In most PAOs and EUDs, further to the situation audit that we propose, remedy the lack of staff; fill the vacant slots; perhaps revise their charters, duties and organisation; reconsider all the posts and profiles; reformat human resources according to the real needs; objectives and duties (in the sense of a more strategic programming approach for the twinning activities). This does not mean increasing the budgets allocated to PAOs, but rather making better use of the available resources.
- Remedy the provisional weaknesses of PAOs essentially through support projects, such as ITTSO (Azerbaijan) or SATTO (Armenia), not by substituting for PAOs, but rather by transferring the know-how and expertise to PAO staff.
- Strengthen the training of PAO staff, reintroduce and/or reassert the spirit and basic principles governing the Twinning Instrument in order to avoid the emergence of deviations and various practices; strengthen technical knowledge and mastery over twinning implementation procedures; provide capacities for the Instrument's strategic programming governance. Given the pervasive staff turnover in ENP countries (which is also valid for EUDs), training must become modular, "continuous training" to be replicated and repeated each and every year.
- Strengthen the communication and information capacity of PAOs at least upstream of project implementation, as has been strongly requested by the beneficiaries. The Beneficiaries must understand what their commitment to twinning activities really

means and understand the spirit, mechanism, commitments that Twinning entails. PAOs also have a duty to raise the awareness of decision-makers, senior civil servants and, to a wider extent, all the stakeholders closely and remotely concerned by the Twinning Instrument.

- More generally, strengthen the technical and sectoral capacities of PAO staff, especially as regards their fundamental intervention into the preparation phase: adoption of a strategic approach; upstream information support to beneficiaries; identification and selection of projects according to pre-established criteria (concept fiche); follow-up to - or participation in – the project fiche drafting process (through FWCs) according to the technical and sectoral competences demonstrated by PAO staff; supervision of the work carried out by EU MS and BCs on Work Plans; and finally the preparation of the twinning contracts .

As for EUDs, whenever necessary, it seems important, in our view, to strengthen the supervisory, coordination and operational follow-up and support role of PAOs by strengthening the capacity of units in charge of twinning activities, especially through further training activities, as was requested by most in-country EUDs (see the next paragraph).

#### **7.7 FURTHER IMPROVE MS EXPERTISE AND MANAGEMENT CAPACITY**

We have found from the filled-in questionnaires and the field visits that EU MS expertise was generally very much appreciated by the beneficiaries. EU MS partner selection has been rigorous and the RTAs proposed have hardly ever been replaced for incompetence or insufficient knowledge in the field(s) for which they were recruited. This has been analysed and commented on at length in Chapter 5 to this Report.

The RTA plays a central role in twinning project implementation. The projects that have been implemented successfully and have achieved their mandatory results as planned are those which were managed by the best RTAs. The EU MS PL (*who should be called “Project Director”*) is in fact far too remote from field realities and day-to-day governance and management issues. RTA Counterparts and BC PLs play a more minor role and act as the necessary interface between local administrations and the national context.

Actually, RTAs are recruited essentially on the basis of their “technical” and/or sectoral capacities against their project’s subject and also on the basis of their CVs and experience as civil servants and EU MS representatives. During the RTA selection process, the interviews with RTAs aim to check their competence and, to a lesser extent, to measure their capacity to adapt to a new environment.

Project management requires great competences. In the case of twinning projects, the stakes are often very high. So are the budgets, which may amount to several millions of euro. Twinning projects are complex and difficult to implement as they usually involve a lot of stakeholders and activities.

To implement a twinning project successfully, RTAs must fulfil at least 5 types of competence/knowledge:

- Have adequate “technical” knowledge closely related to the subject
- Be familiar with the local context, European affairs and neighbourhood-related issues
- Already know the basic principles and the functioning of a twinning project

- Have leadership skills and be a competent and organised manager
- Have the necessary interpersonal and formal communication skills

Generally, most RTAs are senior civil servants or members of mandated bodies who very often hardly have any relevant long-term experience abroad and any knowledge of the local context, who have never been “Project Leaders” even in their own country, who do not know anything about twinning projects and who have very insufficient organisation and management skills.

Conversely, it must be acknowledged that the “old” RTAs, selected for a second project, are far more operational for they benefit from their “field” experience acquired during the previous project implementation phase. However, according to the twinning rules and procedures, RTAs may implement only two projects in a row, as they remain their home organisation’s representatives and therefore must return there for a while at some point. It is nevertheless counterproductive to lose the competences of “old” RTAs.

Our recommendation is to **prepare better the staff** who will be appointed to the twinning projects, and more particularly RTAs and PLs. At the moment, only a two-day training session is foreseen in Brussels before they leave for their respective beneficiary countries. During these two days, the training session focuses mostly on best practices and testimonies of other RTAs. Other relevant information about Twinning is learnt through “on-the-job” training in the field. In the ENP Countries, the beneficiaries are better informed than trained.

We would also like to hereby specify that this preparation phase could or should be extended to other staff categories and even take place simultaneously: all our beneficiary interlocutors in the ENP Countries expressed the need to develop training activities either for themselves, or for other staff under their supervision: MS RTAs, MS PLs, EUD staff, PAOs, RTA Counterparts, BC PLs, beneficiaries, other stakeholders...

We do not intend to propose a Training Plan here. However, our recommendation is that the European Commission should further focus its effort on the development of a **training programme** that responds to the following objectives:

- Develop “technical” knowledge related to the subject of the twinning activities: we assume that the RTAs have and master the specific and sectoral knowledge, but they ought to transfer it to their counterpart during project implementation, as is also requested by PAOs.
- Be familiar with the local context and neighbourhood-related issues: quite a few RTAs and PLs have limited understanding of European affairs and hardly any knowledge about the local context and/or neighbourhood-related issues. PCAs and AAs do not mean much to them. Therefore a training module on neighbourhood-related issues must be organised in Brussels before RTAs leave for their respective ENP countries, possibly together with individual country presentations. This introduction to the local context and even to neighbourhood-related issues may be carried out every year immediately after the arrival of RTAs in their respective countries through training sessions conducted by other resident staff and/or experts. Whenever necessary, EUD, PAO and BA staff may participate in those sessions in addition to RTAs (which will also strengthen cohesion between stakeholders...).

- Know the basic principles and functioning of twinning projects and master twinning rules and procedures: this part of the training programme must be sufficiently well developed for new RTAs and PLs in Brussels before their departure, and not simply upon “good practices”, but rather upon a more comprehensive introduction to the rules and procedures, such as they are formulated in the Common Twinning Manual and its Annexes. “Old” RTAs could be recruited to deliver the training programmes, as well as Financial & Contracts Unit staff at EUD for regulatory and budgetary issues. Moreover, newly recruited EUD and PAO staff also need to be regularly trained in those areas.
- Help RTAs become good leaders and competent managers in addition to their individual skills: in short, RTAs spend 1/3 of their time resources on technical issues, 1/3 on management and 1/3 on interpersonal relations and official communication. RTAs often dedicate more time to organisation and management than to any other activity. This clearly shows how important it is for RTAs to master all day-to-day issues related to governance, twinning project management, organisation, activity implementation, reporting, task distribution, work programmes, recruitment of short-term experts, organisation of study tours, setting-up of working groups, various other day-to-day material issues, compliance with various rules and procedures, programming and management of all those activities (twinning budgets are established according to a specific mechanism that must also be mastered). Once again, “old” RTAs, Brussels HQ and EUD staff could conduct that training programme. PAO staff may either take part in, or benefit from, it. The initial training session must preferably be conducted in Brussels and could be continued in the ENP Countries, possibly with individual RTA coaching.
- Have the necessary interpersonal and official communication skills: this is also one important activity that RTAs must be able to master, which is not always the case, and for which they dedicate a great deal of their time resources: first of all, those skills include relations with direct beneficiaries, local administrations, government members and other “sectoral” stakeholders. Then, they must establish smooth relations with PAO teams, EUDs and even Brussels HQ staff. Contacts must also be developed with other RTAs and EC project managers, bilateral and multilateral donors and, of course, complementary instruments such as TAIEX and SIGMA. Finally, it is up to RTAs to organise and manage all the experts involved in their projects, to set up working groups and deal with trainees and trainers, etc. Therefore their job is very demanding, which also requires great communication and organisation skills. RTAs must therefore be prepared partly in Brussels and in each ENP Country. New RTAs could also be coached by old RTAs.

Beyond the communication aspect, RTAs must carry out communication and visibility activities to promote their projects. A specific budget is systematically provided to that effect. Therefore they must not only see to it that Steering Committees, kick-off meetings, launch events, closing conferences, seminars and media relations deliver the expected results and that relevant project information is disseminated effectively to the various target audiences, including local administrations and civil society. This aspect is developed further elsewhere in this report, but once again RTAs can benefit from the past experience of “old” RTAs and

from the active support from EUDs and Brussels HQ. Several of those actions can also be conducted in relation to TAIEX and SIGMA.

- Have linguistic skills: this is also one essential element that strongly facilitates relations and communication between the various stakeholders involved in Twinning. It is also important for conducting the training activities as planned in the project fiches, all the more so as a lot of information may get lost in costly simultaneous and/or consecutive translation. In fact, the ENP Region has 4 leading languages: Russian and English (ENP-East), Arabic, French and English (ENP-South). According to their final destination, RTAs are required to master one of both EU official languages, namely French or English. This requirement is also valid for short-term experts and for national counterparts (RTA Counterparts and BC PLs), which has not always been fulfilled, especially by BC PLs. Therefore languages may also be a real issue and an obstacle to successful project implementation.

We propose that great attention should be paid to the language-related issue and to undertake a few upgrading actions: (1) RTAs, whose native language is neither French, nor English, should, whenever appropriate, perfect their language skills before departure and then continue improving them after their arrival in their ENP countries, and also take a few Russian or Arabic lessons in order to learn the basics; (2) the national counterparts (RTA Counterparts and BC PLs) and possibly a few working group members should also take a few upgrading French or English lessons, whenever appropriate.

The extension of all training activities proposed above may be funded by the twinning budget and remains relatively affordable against the cost of other activities. This will have a significant impact on the effectiveness of twinning activities. Other tools, such as training manuals, websites, helpdesks and/or hotlines could be created to support MS RTAs and other twinning experts.



As a separate remark, we would like to point out that over the last few years there has been a tendency amongst MS administrations (Consortium Leaders) to hire RTAs of citizenships

different to theirs. Even though this practice is not forbidden *stricto sensu*, it can be interpreted as a deviation from the very spirit of the twinning rules and procedures. Hiring RTAs with a citizenship different from that of the Consortium Leaders should be considered only as a last resort.

## **7.8 REVIEW AND SIMPLIFY THE TWINNING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND SEVERAL PROCEDURES**

Twinning project management rests upon the general mechanism adopted for implementing the Twinning Instrument, on one hand, and upon the whole set of rules and procedures that appear in the Common Twinning Manual of 2009 and its annexes, on the other hand.

The twinning mechanism has been defined in detail in the Common Twinning Manual from pp. 9 to 28. It consists of a number of principles based upon cooperation between EU MS and BC public institutions, compliance with the EU Acquis, the appointment of an EU MS RTA, MS PL and their BA counterparts, the definition of mandatory results, the role of the Commission Services (HQ/EUD) and PAOs/UGPs. This is followed by Twinning's administrative and financial management rules and procedures from pp. 29 to 118 and also the Manual's annexes, which consist of 183 pages for the English-language version, i.e. a total of 300 pages dedicated to management procedures. That part of the Manual covers all the twinning process, from the project preparation phase, e.g. selection of proposals, content of projects, budget-related issues, to the project implementation phase and administrative and financial project management procedures.

The Common Twinning Manual applied first to the accession countries in 1998. Then after various updates and versions, it now includes one section common to all twinning projects and all twinning regions, but with specific procedures for IPA programmes on one hand and for the ENPI on the other hand. This Manual offers the advantage of keeping Twinning's fundamental principles applicable to all EU-funded relevant programmes and of compiling all twinning implementation rules and procedures into one single document.

It must be acknowledged that the twinning procedures applied to twinning projects are very detailed and manifold, even though some are less complex, for example those that are used for other types of EU-funded external programmes, which is the case of "tenders". These are not as detailed as twinning projects in terms of activities and their budget is limited to two categories of expense (as is the case for service contracts deriving from tenders): 1) fees (fee-based contracts), including all expertise costs and fees, per-diems, travels, as part of a daily lump sum, and 2) incidentals, covering all other expenses (training, translations, interpretation, equipment if any, local travels, etc.) also as part of a lump sum. On the contrary, grants awarded through "calls for proposals" are more detailed.

Although twinning rules and procedures are complex, they, however, have the advantage of being far more rigorous and therefore also facilitate a better use of resources, especially funding, which to some extent increases project *efficiency*. Besides, we have also observed an increasingly different interpretation of those rules and procedures from one interlocutor to another.

It was observed (See Chapter 5) that the decentralised project management mode could, to various degrees, generate risks of deviation from the Twinning Instrument's original scope and procedures and could also lead to the progressive, even if limited, emergence of different

twinning practices in each of the ENP countries, e.g. in Egypt and Jordan. This could also be observed in Azerbaijan, which is still under centralised management mode.

A vast majority of stakeholders, i.e. no less than 90 % of the answers to EQ9.1, whether they were EUD, PAO/UGP and BA staff, EU MS RTAs or PLs with the exception of a few EUD Finance and Contracts Units, declared that twinning rules and procedures (as per the Common Twinning Manual of 2009) were too bureaucratic, cumbersome, too complex, too manifold, too rigid, sometimes too costly and quite difficult to apply (see Section 5.1.1 and also Conclusions in Section 6.1.5). The Evaluators partly subscribe to this point of view.

Moreover, it has very often been noticed that a number of RTA Counterparts and BC PLs, who are the stakeholders directly involved in the twinning management process from preparation to completion, had neither been properly informed of, nor trained in, and had insufficient understanding of, the twinning principles and procedures. That can be confirmed through the personal experience made by the Evaluators, for whom it took at least one year to become acquainted with all those rules and procedures, e.g. after they attended as RTA or PL only one two-day training session on the subject, which was dedicated more to best practices than to the complexity of the rules and procedures.

It is not within the Evaluation Team's remit to audit the twinning rules and procedures, nor to revise the Common Twinning Manual. However, several recommendations can be formulated and taken into consideration by EuropeAid at a later stage, e.g. in the next revision of the Manual. Several of those recommendations even apply not only to the ENP Region, but also other regions (e.g. IPA).

Several recommendations concern the preparatory phase of the twinning projects:

- Limit the twinning fiche preparation phase. The content of project twinning fiches must be less detailed. The preparation period must be shortened (at least two years elapse from the concept fiche to the signature of the contract). In fact, a first draft concept fiche is worked out by the beneficiary institution and then is reviewed by the PAO and possibly the EUD. Afterwards, this first concept fiche is redrafted (often by an expert mobilised through an FWC) for the preparation of the twinning fiche and then is once again reviewed and redrafted by the MS when the proposals are being prepared. Finally, it is once again redrafted when the contract is being prepared. As a result, at least five project versions are drafted and redrafted to get to the final version. Reducing this procedure will also help reduce preparation costs. For example, it is not very useful to ask FWC experts to put forward detailed activities, prepare logical frameworks and propose comprehensive budgets with detailed activity breakdowns (which could be carried out far better by the EUD Contracts and Finance Units). It must be pointed out that this work will be used partly in the proposals submitted by the EU MS and will eventually be redrafted to prepare the work plans.
- Reduce the complexity and costs related to the project preparation phase. The twinning process is far too complex and involves a considerable number of players, which also extends and delays the preparation phase. As pointed out in Section 6.1.5 to this Report, at least 15 to 20 officials from the BCs, PAO, EC and MS intervene in the process several times, from the Concept Fiche drafting phase to the signature of the contract. That is an extremely time-consuming and costly procedure, which actually reduces project *efficiency (best use for money)*. The preparation of EC tenders


and calls for proposals is far simpler. It is also the case with other donor programmes. The number of preparation stages, stakeholders and e-mail exchanges between the various parties is far lower.

- Limit the detailed procedures and revise the cost assessment method. More specifically that regards budgeting during the activity and work plan preparation phase. That has been stipulated in Section 6.1.5. It is impossible, one or two years before a project starts, to quantify the detailed costs of each project activity to the nearest single component, or to provide precise figures as to the unit cost of each expense (copies, language services, hotel nights for EU MS experts, etc. for each activity). It would be appropriate to reintroduce the “lump sum” approach for those expenses, which will avoid too frequent budget reallocations in the future.
- For example, in the case of workshops, budget entries are usually too detailed and could be limited to the essentials. Most items could be funded under a lump sum in order to avoid the frequent use of side letters for very small amounts.
- Alleviate a number of rigid procedures. The overall twinning management system is very rigid and far too complex (request, proposal/concept fiche, twinning fiche, call for proposals, MS proposal, MS selection, work plan evaluation, contract, implementation, Audit). This mechanism should be simplified and several stages should be reduced or even suppressed. The gap between the project preparation (2 years) and completion phases should be better taken into consideration in a context where the EC N+3 financial rule is also effective.

Other recommendations or suggestions have been put forward by the Evaluators:

- Ensure better clarity of several twinning rules and procedures, above all, in their application
- Better train the direct stakeholders (RTAs, PLs, etc.) in the twinning rules and procedures
- Reduce management costs related to the implementation phase
- Seek greater flexibility in budget execution
- Continue making the appropriate adjustments in order to even better adapt the rules, procedures and Manual to the ENP context, of course without deviating from fundamental principles. That also regards an important point related to the “extension” of the EU Acquis concept as defined in the Manual
- Revise procurement procedures (if any) that support twinning activities, because at the moment that issue still remains a stumbling stone and leads to confusion and uncertainty as to the timely availability of project equipment
- Strengthen management capacities of PAOs/UGPs, also in terms of financial control

The opinion of the Evaluators on the issue related to the twinning governance system, the Common Twinning Manual and the application of the twinning rules and procedures is very contrasted. It is true that the application of rules and procedures leads to the very strong rigidity of project implementation, as they are complex and very costly. Conversely, it can be argued that they offer the advantage of great discipline, which facilitates the achievement of mandatory results as planned.



## 7.9 OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

The top 8 priority recommendations presented above are considered by the Evaluators as the most important and the most relevant. They deal with issues related to the Twinning Instrument's fundamental principles, such as the strategic approach, the EU Acquis, Twinning's definition, the commitment of national decision-makers, project feasibility, project impact and sustainability, governance, quality of EU MS expertise and the management system.

Several other recommendations have been briefly formulated hereinafter by the Evaluators. However, although not of all them can be considered "side recommendations", they either pertain to sectors or subjects related to those already mentioned, or focus on more specific issues or rather limited subjects. A few of them are even closely linked to those already issued.

### 7.9.1 Improve selection of Twinning vs. Technical assistance & other IB tools

This point has already been developed extensively in Sections 5.1.6 and 6.1.6 of this report. The finding is that in the eyes of several stakeholders the distinction between a twinning project and a technical assistance intervention remains relatively vague. Several of them have even declared explicitly that twinning projects deliver technical assistance outputs. In the same spirit, it is not always clear to the BAs and several PAOs/UGPs how to choose between Twinning and TAIEX or SIGMA.

The first component of this recommendation is to ensure that the selection between Twinning and Technical Assistance is made on a more appropriate basis. The question is to establish criteria to determine which of the two cooperation instruments is most suitable in a given situation. The distinction between these instruments remains unclear and marginal, as a TA project can be appropriate to solve an issue related to institution building and a twinning intervention can implement several activities pertaining to technical assistance.

The choice, if there is any choice, must go for Twinning if it responds to all the criteria defined in Recommendation 2 (See Section 7.2, essentially EU approximation), while Technical Assistance projects are more suitable for service contracts and deliverables. Above all, it is important to have no overlap or any waste of resources in relation to

different projects. Over the last few years, coordination between donors has improved considerably. It must continue and be strengthened upstream as part of a more strategic and joint approach shared by the donors.

The second component of this Recommendation is to strengthen the coherence, complementarity and coordination of twinning projects with TAIEX and SIGMA interventions. This is extremely important within the framework of a strategic, global approach, where complementarity of these three institution building tools must be found.

TAIEX is used more upstream of twinning activities, even for facilitating their preparation, and consists in short-term demand-driven assignments on various institution-building issues. SIGMA is used both upstream and during the implementation phase of governance and institution-building issues. Twinning deals with more significant, long-term projects on specific subject related to EU approximation.

We have also found that the three instruments have a particular role to play in a strategic approach, e.g. in preparing and implementing the CIB (ENP-East), in which a clear policy, objectives, priorities, clusters, activities and results have been defined. Within that framework, several TAIEX missions have been requested by the BAs through the PAOs in order to establish priorities or in relation to a particular sectoral point, internal reform, a legal issue, etc. Within the CIB, twinning projects look more like clearly targeted activities, the projects being a means to implement those activities. The overall coherence and complementarity of institution-building tools fit naturally within the framework of that approach.

Nevertheless, training and information sessions for PAOs and BAs on the usefulness and nature of these instruments still need to be conducted in order to find the right level of complementarity between the three institution-building vehicles.

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**Recommendation 9.1.**

**7. Twinning vs. Technical Assistance**

- ✓ TA or TWG ??? → not yet well understood by all Beneficiaries
- ✓ TA provides services ("deliverables")
- ✓ TWG consists in inter-institutional cooperation between MS civil servants working with BC counterparts with the aim to achieve mandatory results jointly agreed
- ✓ The difference between TA and TWG should be further clarified upstream to stakeholders/beneficiaries
- ✓ TWG eligibility criteria should be considered more strictly
- ✓ Whenever possible, the choice between TA and TWG should always be examined carefully in terms of adequacy and efficiency

Callouts: Mandatory results, PAO UGP

### 7.9.2 Further develop Communication & Visibility activities

We acknowledge the importance of communication activities that aim to disseminate relevant information on the Twinning Instrument, on one hand, and have also noted that insufficient attention has so far been paid by EUDs, PAOs/UGPs and even the projects to

the dissemination of information on the Twinning Instrument, on the other hand. Each project has a budget line dedicated to communication and visibility activities.

The Evaluators have also found (See Section 5.1.10) that with the exception of line stakeholders directly involved in twinning activities hardly anybody else had heard about the Instrument's existence. Several BAs indicated to the Evaluators that they had not received any specific information during the project identification phase. Finally, the stakeholders who have not been involved in twinning activities get acquainted with that information only when they are involved in a given project.

Our recommendation for the future is that more attention should be paid to communication and visibility activities not only within the projects, but also with the assistance of EUDs and PAOs/UGPs, which also have a budget line to that effect: inform the BAs upstream better, involve key decision-makers in the mechanism, plan communication actions with the media, disseminate relevant documentation, use the resources offered by Internet, disseminate visibility material and, above all, disseminate specific information on twinning activities more widely and involve as many line stakeholders as possible in the kick-off meetings, launch events, closing conferences and any other important events.



The slide features a blue background with the European Union flag in the top left and the ENP Twinning logo in the top right. The title 'ENP Twinning Evaluation Recommendation 9.2' is centered at the top. Below the title, the section '8. Communication & Visibility Actions' is highlighted in yellow. Three bullet points with checkmarks are listed: 'PAOs/UGPs should increase and repeat the number of C&V actions on the three institutional capacity building instruments, upstream of the programming phase', 'C&V aims to provide full information to stakeholders and also mobilise the support of senior officials to the twinning process', and 'C&V actions are often too limited and conducted too late in the project design phase'. At the bottom, there is a row of icons representing various communication and visibility actions: 'Kick off meetings' (orange circle), 'Seminars' (red circle), 'Media' (grey circle), 'Conferences' (yellow circle), 'Leaflets' (dark grey rectangle), 'Websites' (orange rectangle), and 'Publicity Materials' (white rectangle with the ENP Twinning logo).

### 7.9.3 Systematic and explicit uptake of Cross-Cutting Issues into project design


Further to Section 5.2.8 above, notwithstanding the positive assertion made by the beneficiaries interviewed about the uptake of Cross-Cutting Issues into project design, the Evaluators have expressed some serious concern about this. Moreover, it must be noted that EU development cooperation policies, programmes and projects, including Twinning, will increasingly require the uptake of Cross-Cutting Issues into project design to the best extent possible. However, Cross-Cutting Issues can be very sensitive in ENP BCs. As a result, twinning fiches very often cover the subject in a rather perfunctory manner.

We therefore suggest that the twinning fiche section normally dedicated to Cross-Cutting Issues systematically and explicitly includes a checklist of preparatory steps to take in order

to make sure that Cross-Cutting Issues will be dealt with during implementation, whenever possible and relevant. For example, during the preparation phase, twinning project designers must ensure that gender equality will be taken into account for BA participation in study tours (e.g. equal access based upon real BA needs and opportunities).

Eventually, it will be up to the PAO to monitor the progress made against the checklist and also to report any breach of the principles that underpin the Cross-Cutting Issues.

No twinning project should ever be allowed to start if Cross-Cutting Issues have not been explicitly dealt with during the design phase.



#### **7.9.4 (New idea) Develop regional networking**

The Evaluators have noticed the high level of commitment demonstrated by EUD and PAO/UGP staff to the twinning process in all the ENP Countries visited. Very interesting experience has been gained in each of the ENP countries visited. Best Practices have also developed separately as very precious references. Finally, we have noted the strong wish expressed by the line stakeholders to share their experience and to derive best practices, to engage in communication activities and also to benefit from experience developed elsewhere.

We have noted that several projects of similar nature were being implemented in various ENP Countries simultaneously and independently. For example, there is a large number of projects in the fields of statistics, customs, accreditation, standardisation, justice and home affairs, etc.

In our view, it is important to develop regional networking and to seize relevant opportunities in order to encourage various line stakeholders getting to know one another, sharing their experience and, above all, benefiting from projects implemented in another country in order to facilitate implementation of similar projects in their respective countries.

### **7.9.5 (New idea) Develop ex-post evaluation of twinning activities**

This is the last recommendation that we have considered worth mentioning. The Twinning Instrument is a tool that already has an impressive record in terms of results achieved, not only during the past accession process, but also in the ENP Region. However, its performance deserves to be assessed more systematically.

This recommendation goes of course beyond the audit that takes place at the end of each project. This ex post evaluation of the twinning projects against the 5+2 criteria could help find out under what conditions a given project has been implemented and, above all, to what extent the mandatory results have been achieved, and finally to assess its impact and sustainability.

Those project evaluations would also be very useful for a more global assessment of the Twinning Instrument itself, as was done here.

## 8. OVERALL CONCLUSION

This final conclusion follows on from the global evaluation of the Twinning Instrument's performance in the ENP Region that has just come to an end and whose results and recommendations have been extensively presented in this Final Report. At this stage of the evaluation and with the benefit of hindsight, we now have a clear and objective idea on the Twinning Instrument's performance and status in the ENP Region. Our overall conclusions on the Instrument in the ENP Region may be stated as follows:

- As regards the principles that have founded the Twinning Instrument, it must never be forgotten that Twinning is **merely an instrument, a tool**, which is part of a dynamic, a policy and an activity programme. Twinning is not just a means to an end, but also a tool necessary to implement the AAs, CPAs or CIBs.
- Second, the term “Twinning” derives from the word “twin”, which is the fundamental principle upon which the Instrument is based, i.e. cooperation between “twins”, and in this case, **cooperation between EU MS and BC public institutions**.
- The third fundamental principle lies in the term “**Institutional**” as in “Institutional Twinning Instrument”, which provides it with the **administrative cooperation** character.
- Given that this cooperation is proposed by the European Union, Twinning's main wider objective is for the ENP Region to **get closer to the EU**.
- Finally, the term “**project**” is related to the tool or instrument, which is at the core of Twinning in order to implement activities with a view to achieving results, which are considered “mandatory” and are jointly decided upon.

*“A twinning project is a tool funded out of the EU budget for institutional cooperation between EU MS administrations and those of ENP beneficiary countries pursuing the objective of getting closer to the European Union”*

It is with this in mind that we have conducted this evaluation. The Twinning Instrument was first of all conceived to facilitate EU accession for Candidate Countries, was then extended to the ENP Region Countries in order to bring them closer to our values, practices and functioning modes, which have been pooled together, or which even, according to some, have been disguised, under the term “EU Acquis”.

**The main conclusion of our evaluation is that overall the Twinning Instrument's extension to the ENP Region has been successful.** The results achieved against those initially sought have been significant and relevant within the framework of the Instrument's and the ENP Region's context.

Of course, the Twinning Instrument was not introduced into all ENP Countries in the same successful manner. The six countries of our sample (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) are those where the Instrument has been most advanced, while several other ENP Countries have only just started operations.

- The vast majority of results achieved through project implementation are very **relevant** against project objectives and the ENP. Only a few of them did not correspond to that format, given that the demand-driven approach was too

systematically and too widely applied and sometimes all the expected results could not be achieved at all.

- Twinning has proved to be an extremely *effective* instrument, more effective than other types of project, more particularly with the required achievement of mandatory results and the way to achieve them. That is a very important point of this evaluation. This *effectiveness* is strengthened insofar as the BA's absorption capacity is high.
- However, one of our findings has been that the means/resources allocated have not always been used optimally by a large number of projects and therefore those projects do not always have the necessary *efficiency*. More particularly, we have often noted a distortion between the resources mobilised and results, which could have been achieved more economically. That has been verified in the case of expertise when it was reallocated to other activities and also, above all, in the case of funding where savings could have been made. We have also noted the high cost of the project preparation phase.
- Most projects have had a relevant and irreversible *impact* in terms of results, effects on the institution-building process, modifications to the legal framework and approximation with EU values, norms, standards and practices. However, that *impact* may be considered as variable and even unsatisfactory in a few cases, when a BA's institutional capacity has been insufficient, when the necessary legal framework has not been put in place and also when the planned results are materially neither achievable, nor feasible.
- The same can be said about the *sustainability* of the results achieved. Moreover, the more significant the impact is, the more that impact affects *sustainability*. The results sought on twinning projects are related to fundamental values pertaining to the rule of law in the ENP Countries by affecting the legal framework and the institutional reform process, which can only be relevant and also, in the long term, irreversible. Subject to the points stated under *impact*, the effects/results generated by twinning projects can only be *sustainable* by essence.
- In the majority of cases, *coherence* and *complementarity* between the three institutional capacity building tools is adequately guaranteed in the various countries, although Twinning and TAIEX may sometimes have been mixed up by beneficiaries. *Coherence* and *complementarity* are weaker with projects funded by other donors. Moreover, several line stakeholders, more particularly beneficiaries, still mix up Twinning with classical Technical Assistance.
- All direct beneficiaries have acknowledged their overall satisfaction with EU-Funded Institutional Building tools, especially the Twinning Instrument. This is also the opinion of the Evaluators. *EU Added Value* provided by all twinning projects contributed effectively to the institutional capacity building, civil service modernisation and/or legal approximation effort in the ENP Region. The results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region must be considered as an integral part, even a master piece, of the overall benefits generated by the EU Cooperation Programmes to the Region.

- 90% of the stakeholders mentioned that **Cross-Cutting Issues** were taken into account for project design purposes, “whenever they were relevant”. These Cross-Cutting Issues are democracy and human rights, environmental sustainability, gender equality, HIV/AIDS. However, not all the projects reviewed have addressed those issues.
- Our understanding is that **Decentralised vs. Centralised Management** has not had any significant effect on the quality of twinning project management. However, EUD and PAO/UGP roles and mandates should be redefined/redistributed clearly. The success of the *Decentralisation Management Mode* rests upon the central role played by PAOs/UGPs, especially their ability to stimulate, promote, prepare, implement and follow up the twinning process.
- Our assessment is that **Communication and Visibility (C&V)** actions have not been developed sufficiently to support the Twinning Instrument’s status in the Region. C&V actions have too often been very limited and/or conducted too late in the project design phase. The Evaluators have very often noticed that a number of RTA Counterparts and BC PLs, who were directly involved in the twinning process from preparation to completion, had not been properly informed and had insufficient understanding of the twinning principles and procedures.

The following table presents a synthetic evaluation of the Twinning Instrument’s performance according to the 5+2+3 evaluation criteria selected:

<b>Relevance</b>	☺
<b>Effectiveness</b>	☺ ☺
<b>Efficiency</b>	☹
<b>Impact</b>	☺ ☹
<b>Sustainability</b>	☺ ☹
<b>Coherence/Complementarity</b>	☺
<b>EU Added Value</b>	☺
<b>Cross-Cutting Issues</b>	☺ ☹
<b>Centralised vs. Decentralised Management</b>	☺
<b>Communication &amp; Visibility</b>	☹

If overall the Twinning Instrument’s introduction into the ENP Region has been successful, there is still room for improvement, so as to consolidate the existing mechanism and continue its extension while ever better and greater performance is sought. There are 8 main recommendations that have been classified by priority, as follows:

- Keep the demand-driven approach and, above all, combine it with a global and coherent **strategic approach** associated with a policy having clear objectives and priorities, founded on the AAs, CPAs or even the CIBs (ENP-East).
- Revise and **extend the reference to the EU Acquis**, which is an accession-oriented term poorly adapted to the ENP context.
- Reconsider and adapt the concept/**definition of Twinning** to the ENP context so that it can best fulfil its aims.

- Better *involve political decision-makers* in the twinning process. Without their active support, a number of twinning projects could not achieve the planned results and were not integrated into a public administrative reform process.
- Improve the *feasibility* of sought results in terms of impact and sustainability. In other words, never impose unrealistic or unlikely results upon twinning activities against too far-reaching assumptions and risks. Moreover, it is better to develop the BA's institutional capacity (absorption capacity) through a first twinning project before they are asked to achieve results.
- Strengthen the *governance* of twinning projects, more particularly that of PAOs/UGPs, which play a central role in the Twinning Instrument's implementation.
- Although already excellent, *strengthen EU MS expertise*, not technically, but rather in terms of project management and communication skills.
- As soon as possible or whenever appropriate, proceed to the *revision of twinning rules and procedures* towards greater simplification, better efficiency and stronger adaptation to the ENP context.

This Chapter ends the evaluation of the Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region as of August 2011. The Evaluators are confident that the Twinning Instrument's capacity will continue improving and its performance growing against the objectives and results expected within the ENP framework.

## **ANNEX 1**

### **AGENDA OF MEETINGS WITH DIRECT STAKEHOLDERS**

## ANNEX 1 AGENDA OF MEETINGS WITH DIRECT STAKEHOLDERS

### 1) KYIV, UKRAINE – 3 – 8 APRIL 2011

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
4.04.11 Monday	10.00 – 11.30	Ms Laura Garagnani Head of Operations / EUD Cooperation Coordinator  <i>(no interpretation)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Hans Rhein, First Secretary – Head of Operations Section 3 – Energy, Transport, Environment</li> <li>• Mr Jose Roman Leon Lora, First Counsellor – Head of Section 2 – Economic Cooperation, Social &amp; Regional Development</li> <li>• Ms Eleonora Nikolaichuk, Sector Manager – Public Finance, Twinning, TAIEX &amp; SIGMA</li> <li>• Ms Stephanie Harter, Sector Manager – Civil Society &amp; Media</li> </ul> <p>Excused:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Michael Voegele, Head of Operations Section 1</li> </ul>	EU Delegation  <i>4-B Kruglouniversitetska str</i>
	12.00 – 13.00	Ms Tetyana Fuley Lawyer-Teacher – Head of the Theoretical Department – Chair of Jurisprudence / RTA Counterpart to the Twinning Project “Support to the Academy of Judges of Ukraine”  <i>(no interpretation)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Head of the International Department to the National School of Judges in charge of Testing</li> </ul>	National School of Judges of Ukraine  <i>2-A Solomyanska str.</i>  <b><u>Contact person:</u></b> <i>Ms Tetyana Pystovoitova</i> Tel. +38 067 974 50 44 E-mail: <a href="mailto:Fylei_T@ukr.net">Fylei T@ukr.net</a>
	14.00 – 15.00	Mrs Shuplina Project Leader of the Twinning Project “Support to the Academy of Judges of Ukraine”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Head of the International Department to the National School of Judges in charge of Testing</li> </ul>	National School of Judges of Ukraine  <i>2-A Solomyanska str.</i>

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
		Translator : Mr Artyom Klymenko – Tel : +38 063 610 68 96		<b><u>Contact person:</u></b> Ms Tetyana Pystovoitova Tel. +38 067 974 50 44
	15.30 – 17.00	Ms Nataliya Kyrychenko Deputy Director to the PAO – Main Department of the Civil Service of Ukraine (MDCSU) – Centre for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union + PAO Project Managers (see next column) + NCU Representative  <i>(no interpretation)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Nadiia Kyzyska, Twinning Project Manager – PAO – NAAU</li> <li>• Ms Iryna Luchynska, Twinning Project Manager – PAO – SAUID</li> <li>• Ms Olesya Tsykaliuk, Twinning Project Manager – PAO – Academy of Judges</li> <li>• NCU Representative (no card received)</li> </ul>	Twinning Programme Administrative Office (PAO) in Ukraine  <i>15 Prorizna str. , room 12</i>  <b><u>Contact person:</u></b> Ms Olesya Tsykaliuk Tel. +38 063 731 47 00
5.04.11 Tuesday	09.00 – 10.00	Mr Jose Roman Leon Lora, 1 <sup>st</sup> Counsellor – Head of Section 2 – Economic Cooperation, Social & Regional Development		EU Delegation 4-B Kruglouniversitetska str
	10.30 – 11.30	Mr Anatolii Zayets, 1 <sup>st</sup> Deputy Head to SAUID & Project Leader to the Twinning Project “Enhancing Performance of the State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Development (SAUID) in line with best European Practice”  Translator: Mr Artyom		The State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and national projects management  11 Velyka Zhytomyrska str.  <b><u>Contact person:</u></b> Ms Iryna Boyko Tel. +38 097 90 40 999

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
		Klimenko		
	12.00 – 13.00	Mrs Natalia Tymoshenko, RTA Counterpart to the Twinning Project “Enhancing Performance of the State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Development (SAUID) in line with best European Practice”  <i>(no interpretation)</i>		The State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and national projects management  11 Velyka Zhytomyrska str.  <b><u>Contact person:</u></b> <i>Ms Iryna Boyko</i> Tel. +38 097 90 40 999
	14.00 – 15.00	Mr Karl-Heinz Dübner, RTA to the Twinning Project “Enhancing Performance of the State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Development (SAUID) in line with best European Practice”  <i>(no interpretation)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr Markus Maurer, Director for Industrial Security, Data Protection, Legal Affairs, Vocational Training &amp; Further Education, Special Support Services – Federal Ministry of Economics &amp; Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany</li> </ul> <p>Also present were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Maria Leszynska, Lawyer – Head of Public Aid Group – Foreign Investment Department – Polish Information &amp; Foreign Investment Agency</li> <li>• Dr Jur. Ernst F. Röder, LLM – Expert</li> <li>• Ms Nadiya Tryshchuk, RTA Assistant – ITP (FDI Twinning Project – SAUID)</li> </ul>	The State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and national projects management  11 Velyka Zhytomyrska str. <b><u>Contact person:</u></b> <i>Iryna Boyko</i> Tel. +38 097 90 40 999
	16.00 – 17.00	Mr Andrei Spivak, Sector Manager for Justice, Security & Freedom – “Support to the Academy of Judges of Ukraine”, EU Delegation  <i>(no interpretation)</i>		EU Delegation  <i>4-B Kruglouniversitetska str</i>

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TIME</b>	<b>STAKEHOLDER</b>	<b>ALSO ATTENDED</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
6.04.11 Wednesd ay	09.15 – 10.30	Ms Eleonora Nikolaichuk, Sector Manager for Public Finance, Twinning, TAIEX & SIGMA – Twinning Coordinator		EU Delegation <i>4-B Kruglouniversitetska str</i>
	10.30 – 11.30	Mr Mihal Gorzynski, Sector Manager for Private Sector Development & Innovative Economy – “Enhancing Performance of the State Agency of Ukraine for Investment and Development (SAUID) in line with best European Practice”, EU Delegation  <i>(no interpretation)</i>		Delegation of the European Union  <i>4-B Kruglouniversitetska str</i>
	14.00 – 15.00	Mr Valeriy Kراسиuk RTA Counterpart of the Twinning Project “Strengthening Activities of the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine”  Translator: Mr Artyom Klimenko	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Viktor Gorytskyy, Deputy Chairman – Project Leader Counterpart – NAAU</li> </ul>	National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine  <i>18/7 Kutuzova str.</i>  <b><u>Contact person:</u></b> <i>Mr Valeriy Kрасиuk</i> Tel. +38 050 356 71 45

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
7.04.11 Thursday	10.30 – 11.30	PAO Project Managers  <i>(no interpretation)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• See Monday meeting 15.30-17.00</li> <li>• No NCU participation</li> </ul>	Twinning Programme Administrative Office in Ukraine  <i>15 Prorizna str., room 12</i>  <b>Contact person:</b> <i>Ms Olesya Tsykaliuk</i> Tel. +38 063 731 47 00
	14.30 – 16.00	Meeting with EUD Sector Managers involved in Twinning Project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Holger Rommen, Head of EUD Contracts &amp; Finance Section</li> </ul>	EU Delegation  <i>4-B Kruglouniversitetska</i>
	16.30 – 17.30	Ms Vitaliya Mudruk, EUD Sector Manager for Technical Barriers to Trade, Financial Services – “Strengthening the Activities of the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine”  <i>(no interpretation)</i>		EU Delegation  <i>4-B Kruglouniversitetska</i>
	18.00 – 18.30	H.E. Jose Manuel Pinto Teixeira, Head of Delegation – EU Ambassador to Ukraine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Eleonora Nikolaichuk, Sector Manager – Public Finance, Twinning, TAIEX &amp; SIGMA</li> </ul>	EU Ambassador’s Residence  <i>10 Kruglouniversitetska</i>
8.04.11 Friday	12.00 – 13.00	Mr Kurt Weisgram, RTA – National School of Judges of Ukraine		Hotel Dnipro  <i>1-2 Khreshchatyk str.</i>
	14:00 – 15:00	Mr Vishnevskiy, PAO Director	<b>CANCELLED</b>	PAO <i>15 Prorizna str.</i>

2) **RABAT, MOROCCO – 14 – 19 APRIL 2011**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TIME</b>	<b>STAKEHOLDER</b>	<b>ALSO ATTENDED</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
14.04.11 Thursday	16.00 – 18.30	Mr Mohamed Doubi Kadmiri PAO Director	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Farida Afkir, Twinning Project Manager</li> <li>• Mr Mohamed Rahoui, Twinning Project Manager</li> <li>• Mr Cyril Dewaleyne, Programme Officer - Capacity Building &amp; Legal Approximation / Regulatory Convergence - EUD to Morocco</li> </ul>	PAO/UGP Rue de Teflet 22 – Residence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Cooperation
15.04.11 Friday	09.00 – 11.00	Mr Abdellah Nejjar, Director to the DQSM (Direction for Quality & Market Surveillance – formerly aka DQN – Division for Quality & Normalisation)	Excused: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mrs Ghizlaine Zitouni, Head of Unit</li> <li>• Mr Brahim Yahyaoui, Head of Unit</li> </ul>	DQSM Angle Avenue Kamal Zebdi & Rue Dadi Secteur 21
	15.00 – 17.00	Mr Riache, RTA Counterpart	Excused: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Mohamed Bouselmane, Director (attends a conference on competition in Berlin, Germany)</li> </ul>	Ministry of Economic & General Affairs – Price Competition Division – Administrative Area, Agdal
18.04.11 Monday	11.00 – 13.00	Mr Tawfiq Boudchiche, International Cooperation & Economic Promotion Director	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Mohamed Mbarki, Director General to the Oriental Agency &amp; Project Leader</li> </ul>	Oriental Agency Rue Mekki Bitouri 12
	15.00 – 16.15	Mr Cyril Dewaleyne, Programme Officer - Capacity Building & Legal Approximation / Regulatory Convergence- EUD to Morocco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Corinne André, Head of Governance Section</li> <li>• Mr Paolo Zingale, Head of Contracts &amp; Finance</li> <li>• Mr Nicolas Bizel, Finance &amp; Contract Officer</li> </ul>	EUD Riad Business Centre, Aile Sud, Bld Er-Riad
	16.15 – 17.30	Mr Cyril Dewaleyne, Programme Officer - Capacity Building & Legal Approximation / Regulatory Convergence - EUD to Morocco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Corinne Andre, Head of Governance Section</li> <li>• Mr Paolo Zingale, Head of Contracts &amp; Finance Section</li> <li>• Mr Nicolas Bizel, Contracts &amp; Finance Officer</li> <li>• Mr Mohamed Doubi Kadmiri, PAO Director</li> <li>• Ms Farida Afkir, PAO Twinning Project Manager</li> <li>• Mr Mohamed Rahoui, PAO Twinning Project Manager</li> </ul>	EUD Riad Business Centre, South Aisle Sud, Bld Er-Riad

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TIME</b>	<b>STAKEHOLDER</b>	<b>ALSO ATTENDED</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
19.04.11 Tuesday	10.00 – 12.30	Mrs Saadia Alaoui Abdellaoui, Director of Studies & International Cooperation	<p>For the Customs &amp; Excise Duties Administration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr M’hamed Atiki, Head of the International Cooperation Division</li> <li>• Mr Aoufi Ouafik, Head of Unit – Value Control</li> <li>• Mr Abdesslam Lakbir, Head of the Prevention Division</li> <li>• Mr Ahmed Jaid, Head of Unit – Economic Regimes in Customs</li> </ul> <p>For the Project Administration Office (PAO)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Mohamed Doubi Kadmiri, PAO Director</li> <li>• Ms Farida Afkir, PAO Twinning Project Manager</li> </ul>	<p>Customs &amp; Excise Duties Administration (Administration des Douanes et Impôts Indirects)</p> <p>Annakhil Avenue, Riad Business Centre, Bld Er-Riad</p>

3) **AMMAN, JORDAN – 21 – 30 APRIL 2011**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TIME</b>	<b>STAKEHOLDER</b>	<b>ALSO ATTENDED</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
21-24. 04.11	Morocco Field Report, Preparation of Jordan Meetings, Azerbaijan Agenda Coordination, Telephone Briefing with EUD Egypt			
25.04.11 Monday	09.30 – 10.30	Mr Marwan Al-Refai Advisor to PAO for EC Programmes Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ms Muna Sarsak, PAO EC Programme Coordinator</li> </ul>	PAO for EC Programmes in Jordan – Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) – Jabal Amman, 3rd Circle
26.04.11 Tuesday	09.00 – 11.00	Ms Germana Topolovec, Attaché – Trade, Economic Affairs & Private Sector Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ms Nadine Sterckx, Finance Audit &amp; Contract Section</li> <li>Ms Isabelle De Goussencourt, Programme Manager – JHA, Security &amp; Migration</li> </ul>	EU Delegation to Jordan
	12.30 – 14.30	Mr Galeb Qasem, Director General to Jordan Customs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mr Emad Nosaeirat, Director to the DG Office + 3 Senior Customs Officers</li> </ul>	Jordan Customs
27.04.11	Jordan Field Report			
28.04.11 Thursday	08.30 – 10.30	Mr Mustafa A-Barari President of the Audit Bureau	+ Another 3 Civil Servants (2 men & 1 lady) – Quality Assurance, Performance & Environmental Audit, and Financial Audit	Audit Bureau
	11.30 – 13.30	Col. Eng. Odeh Al Khalaleh – RTA Counterpart – Director of the Forensic Labs Department, Public Security Directorate (PSD), Ministry of Home Affairs	+ 5 Senior PSD Officers	Forensic Laboratory Department – Ministry of Home Affairs
	14.00 – 15.00	Ms Germana Topolovec, Attaché – Trade, Economic Affairs & Private Sector Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ms Nadine Sterckx, Finance Audit &amp; Contract Section</li> <li>Ms Stine Hyldekjaer, Attaché – Support to the Action Plan – Trade, Economic Affairs &amp; Private Sector Development</li> </ul>	EU Delegation to Jordan
29.04.11	Finalisation of Field Reports for Morocco and Jordan – Preparation for Azerbaijan meetings – Draft Desk Report			

4) **BAKU, AZERBAIJAN – 03 – 08 MAY 2011**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TIME</b>	<b>STAKEHOLDER</b>	<b>ALSO ATTENDED</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
03.05.11 Tuesday	10.00 – 13.00	Mr Christophe Casillas, Project Manager / Twinning Coordinator to the European Union Delegation to Baku	Twinning Managers of the EUD Operations Section: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Fuad Huseynov, Sector Manager – JHA – EUD Baku</li> <li>• Mr Parviz Yusifov, Sector Manager – Finance – EUD Baku</li> </ul>	EUD – Landmark III
	14.00 – 15.00	Mr Lars Dal, Finance, Contracts & Audit Adviser – EUD Baku	Finance & Contracts Section to EUD: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr Stephen Stork, First Secretary – EUD Baku</li> <li>• Ms Fidan Kerimova, Financial Officer – EUD Baku</li> </ul>	EUD – Landmark III
	15.00 – 17.00	ITTSO & RTAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mrs Ruta Konstante, Team Leader, ITTSSO PAO TA in Azerbaijan (Human Dynamics)</li> <li>• Mr Jonas Cekuolis, Resident Twinning Adviser – Parliament</li> <li>• Mr Andrei Tretyak, RTA – Social Protection Enhancement (Ministry of Labour &amp; Social Protection)</li> <li>• Mr Leendert Kers, RTA – e-Audit (Ministry of Taxes)</li> <li>• Mr Sergey Tsvetarsky – RTA – Statistics (GosKomStat of Azerbaijan)</li> <li>• Dr Karl Kuhn – RTA – Occupational &amp; Health Safety Enhancement (State Labour Inspectorate)</li> </ul>	EUD – Landmark III
04.05.11 Wednesday	10.00 – 12.00	Mrs Ruta Konstante, Team Leader, ITTSSO PAO TA in Azerbaijan (Human Dynamics)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Lala Abasova, Deputy Team Leader, ITSSO PAO TA in Azerbaijan (Human Dynamics)</li> <li>• Sevinj Aliyeva, Operations Manager, ITTSSO PAO TA in Azerbaijan (Human Dynamics)</li> <li>• Nikolay Orlovskiy, Operations Manager, ITTSSO PAO TA in Azerbaijan (Human Dynamics)</li> </ul>	ITTSSO, MOED – Government House
	11.00 – 13.00	Mr Ruslan Rustamli, Deputy Head of the Department for Cooperation with International Organisations – Deputy Head of PAO - MOED	Excused: Mr Sahil Babaev, Head of PAO Mr Natig Madatov	MOED PAO, MOED – Government House
	14.00 – 15.00	Mr Christophe Casillas, Programme Manager – Twinning Coordinator, EUD Baku – Project Manager for		EUD – Landmark III

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
		the SSC – Statistics		
	15.00 – 16.00	Mr Sergey Tsvetarsky, RTA – SSC – Statistics	Mr Rahib Gojayev, Interpreter – EU Twinning Project “SSC – Statistics	GosKomStat, Inshaatchilar Avenue
	16.00 – 17.00	Mr Alkhan Hasan Mansurov – Head of Division – Coordination of Statistical Works – State Statistics Committee – Project Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Farhad Aliyev, RTA Counterpart</li> <li>• Mr Rahib Gojayev, Interpreter – EU Twinning Project “SSC – Statistics</li> </ul>	GosKomStat, Inshaatchilar Avenue
05.05.11 Thursday	10.00 – 11.00	Mr Jonas Cekuolis, RTA – Milli Mejlis (Parliament)		Milli Mejlis (Parliament House) Parliamentary Avenue 1
	11.00 – 13.00	Mr Safa Mirzayev, Secretary General to the Milli Mejlis – Head of Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Ruslan Ismayilov, Aide to the Secretary General to the Milli Mejlis</li> </ul>	Milli Mejlis (Parliament House) Parliamentary Avenue 1
	14.00 – 15.00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Fuad Bagirov, ROM – Parliament</li> <li>• Mr Aydin Huseynov, ROM – Standardisation</li> </ul>		EUD – Landmark III
	15.00 – 16.00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Fuad Huseynov, Sector Manager – JHA – EUD Baku</li> <li>• Ms Maryam Haji-Ismayilova, Sector Manager – Operations Section – EUD</li> </ul>		EUD – Landmark III
06.05.11 Friday	09.30 – 11.00	Mr Parviz Yusifov, Sector Manager – Finance – EUD Baku		EUD – Landmark III
	11.00 – 13.00	Mr Sabig Abdullayev, RTA Counterpart	<b>CANCELLED</b>	Standardisation, Metrology & Patents Committee – Mardanov Gardashlari Str. 124
	14.00 – 16.00	Mr Christophe Casillas, Programme Manager – Twinning Coordinator, EUD Baku	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Fuad Huseynov, Sector Manager – JHA – EUD</li> <li>• Mr Mikolaj Swietopelek Bekasiak, Sector Manager – EUD</li> <li>• Mr Lars Dal, Finance, Contracts &amp; Audit Adviser – EUD</li> <li>• Mrs Ruta Konstante, Team Leader, ITTSO PAO TA in AZ</li> </ul> Excused:	EUD – Landmark III / Debriefing

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Parviz Yusifov, Sector Manager – Finance – EUD</li> <li>• Ms Maryam Haji-Ismayilova, Sector Manager – Operations Section – EUD</li> <li>• Mr Fuad Huseynov, Sector Manager – JHA – EUD</li> <li>• Mr Ruslan Rustamli, Deputy Head of the Department for Cooperation with International Organisations – Deputy Head of PAO – MOED</li> </ul>	

5) CAIRO, EGYPT – 11 – 19 MAY 2011

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
12.05.11 Thursday	12.30 – 13.15	Mr Ahmed Badr, Programme Manager – MWRI (Water Resources) – EUD		EUD – Cairo 37 – Gameat El Dowal El Arabeya Street – El Fuad Office Building – 11th Floor – Mohandessin – Giza – Cairo Egypt
	13.15 – 14.00	Mr Felipe de la Motta, Programme Manager – PFM, Budget Support Operations & Macroeconomics – CAPMAS (Statistics) – EUD		EUD – Cairo
	14.00 – 14.45	Mrs Chiara Francini, Programme Manager – GAFI (FDI) – EUD		EUD – Cairo
	14.45 – 16.00	Mr Patrice Budry, Cooperation Attaché – Twinning Coordinator – EUD Cairo		EUD – Cairo
15.05.11 Sunday	09.00 – 11.00	Ms Dalia Salem, PAO Deputy Director  Mobile (Dalia Salem) - 0100 60 62 11		PAO - Egypt 9 Abd El Kader Hamza Street - Garden City, Apt.401-402 - Cairo Tel: 202 27 92 34 38
	11.00 – 12.30	Ms Riham Elezabi, Project Manager for CAPMAS (Statistics) – PAO		PAO
	12.30 – 13.30	Ms Zeinab Awad, former PAO Project Manager for GAFI (FDI) and ETA (Egyptian Tourism Authority)		PAO
	13.30 – 15.00	Ms Injie M. Kotb – Senior Project Manager (MWRI – Water Quality Management) & TAIEX NCP – PAO		PAO

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
	15.00 – 15.15	H.E. Gamal El-Bayoumi – Ambassador – Secretary General to the General Secretariat for the EU-Egypt Association Agreement to the Ministry of International Cooperation – PAO Director		PAO
	16.00 – 17.00	Mr Ahmed-Alain Elbeltagui, Programme Manager – EUD, Cairo		EUD – Cairo
16.05.11 Monday	10.00 – 11.20	Mr Amr El Ezabi, Chairman – Egyptian Tourism Authority (ETA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Mahmoud Abdel Wahab, Head of Tourism Products Department – Egyptian Tourism Authority (ETA)</li> <li>• Ms Jihan Ahmad Hanafy, Technical Member – ETA Chairman’s Office</li> <li>• Mr Mohamed Elshrkawy, Assistant for Tourist Products to the ETA Chairman’s Office</li> </ul>	Egyptian Tourism Authority (ETA), Misr Travel Tower, Abbassiya Square – Cairo
	11.30 – 14.00	Eng. El Sayed Yasser Ragheb, RTAC – Head of the Central Department for IT Training (Undersecretary) - CAPMAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr Eng. Bahy Eldin Mortagy – Deputy Chaiman of CAPMAS - Head of IT Sector and Twinning Project Leader</li> </ul>	Central Agency for Public Mobilisation & Statistics (CAPMAS)
17.05.11 Tuesday	10.00 – 11.00 <i>Actual times: 11.15 – 12.25</i>	Mr Essam A. Khalifa, MWRI BC PL – Minister’s Office Director for Research & Special Studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eng Mohamed El Fetyany – Planning Sector – MWRI Project Coordinator – Component Leader</li> </ul>	Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) 1 Gamal Abdel Nasser Street, Imbaba, Corniche, El Nile, Giza, Cairo
18.05.2011 Wednesday	09.00 – 10.00 <i>Actual times: 09.30-10.50</i>	Ms Lucia Santuccioni, DEVCO A6 – European Commission, Brussels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mrs Dalia Salem, PAO Deputy Director</li> <li>• Mr Robert Bonwitt, Head of Programme – SIGMA/OECD</li> </ul>	PAO
	11.00 – 13.00	Mr Mahmoud Mahgoub (MBA – Springfield - Boston) RTAC – GAFI FDI Promotion & Capacity Building Project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mrs Neveen El Shafei, Vice-Chairman for Policy Advocacy</li> </ul>	General Authority for Investment (GAFI) 3 Salah Salem St., Fairgrounds – Nasr City – Cairo – Egypt
	15.00 – 17.00	Debriefing at EUD Mr Patrice Budry, Twinning Coordinator – EUD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Chiara Francini – Programme Manager (GAFI)</li> <li>• Mr Ahmed-Alain Elbeltagui – Programme Manager (ETA)</li> </ul>	EUD

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Felipe de la Mota – Programme Manager (CAPMAS)</li> <li>• Mr Ahmed Badr – Programme Manager (MRWI)</li> <li>• Mr Maurizio Franz, Finance &amp; Contracts Unit</li> <li>• Mr Hubertus Temminck, Finance &amp; Contracts Unit</li> <li>• Mr Ivano Bruno, political Section</li> </ul>	

6) TUNIS, TUNISIA – 23 – 27 MAY 2011

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
23.05.11 Monday	15.00 – 16.30	Briefing Meeting Mrs Leila Rmadi Skhiri, PAO Deputy Director - Project Manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Salem Akrouf, Director General to the PAO</li> <li>• Mrs Marie-Hélène Enderlin, Programme Manager in charge of Institutional Support &amp; Justice – EUD Twinning Coordinator</li> <li>• Mr Moez M'Halla, PAO Project Manager</li> <li>• Mr Zied Mahjoub, PAO Project Manager</li> </ul>	UGP3A – 5, Rue Ryadh Mutuelleville – Tunis
	16.30 – 18.00	Mr Salem Akrouf, Director General to the PAO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mrs Leila Rmadi Skhiri, PAO Deputy Director - Project Manager</li> <li>• Mr Moez M'Halla, PAO Project Manager</li> <li>• Mr Zied Mahjoub, PAO Project Manager</li> </ul>	UGP3A – 5, Rue Ryadh Mutuelleville – Tunis
24.05.11 Tuesday	10.00 – 11.00	Mr Zouheir Ben Tanfous, President to the Court of Appeal – Project Leader – <i>Twinning Light</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Slim Medini, Assistant to Mr Ben Tanfous</li> </ul> Excused: Mrs Hasna Ben Slimane	Administrative Court – Rue Borjine – Montplaisir
	14.00 – 16.00	Mrs Leila Rmadi Skhiri, PAO Deputy Director - Project Manager ACAA & Modernisation of the State Tax Inspectorate		UGP3A
	16.00 – 17.00	Mr Zied Mahjoub, PAO Project Manager – Administrative Court		UGP3A
	17.00 – 18.00	Mr Moez Jaoua, PAO Project Manager – Modernisation of the State Tax Inspectorate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Zied Mahjoub, PAO Project Manager – Administrative Court</li> </ul>	UGP3A
25.05.11 Wednesday	09.00 – 10.00	Mr Francis Lemoine – EUD Programme Manager – Macroeconomic Support & Public Finance – Modernisation of the State Tax Inspectorate		EUD – Rue du Lac Biwa Les Berges du Lac
	10.15 – 11.30	Ms Monica Peiro Vallejo – EUD Programme Manager – Macroeconomic Support - ACAA		EUD

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TIME</b>	<b>STAKEHOLDER</b>	<b>ALSO ATTENDED</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
	11.30 – 13.00	Mrs Marie-Hélène Enderlin, Programme Manager in charge of Institutional Support & Justice – EUD Twinning Coordinator		EUD
	14.00 – 15.45	Mr Antonio Cortes Garcia, Attaché – EUD Finance, Contracts & Audit Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mrs Marie-Hélène Enderlin, Programme Manager in charge of Institutional Support &amp; Justice – EUD Twinning Coordinator</li> <li>• Ms Lamia Ben Haddada – Operations Section – Assistant to Mrs Enderlin</li> </ul>	EUD
	16.15 – 18.00	Mr Hamdi Guezguez, ACAA Project Leader – Director to the PCAM - Programme d'appui à la Compétitivité des entreprises et à la facilitation de l'Accès au Marché – Corporate Competitiveness & Market Access Support Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ms Hasna Hamzaoui - RTAC</li> <li>• Mr Kaab Bouguerra - Head of Quality Infrastructure</li> </ul>	Industry & Innovation Promotion Agency - Agence de Promotion de l'Industrie et de l'Innovation – 63, Rue de Syrie, 1002 Tunis Belvédère (8 <sup>th</sup> floor)
26.05.11 Thursday	09.00 – 10.30	Mrs Amel Medini – Secretary General to the Ministry of Finance of Tunisia & Project Leader – Modernisation of the State Tax Inspectorate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Ali Mekki – Director General to the Tax Studies &amp; Legislation (DGELF) – RTAC</li> <li>• Assistant to RTA &amp; RTAC</li> <li>• Quality Expert</li> <li>• Training Expert</li> <li>• Teleservices Expert</li> </ul>	Ministry of Finance – Place du Gouvernement – La Kasba
	15.30 – 17.00	Debriefing Meeting Mrs Leila Rmadi Skhiri, PAO Deputy Director - Project Manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mr Regis Meritan, EUD Head of Operations</li> <li>• Mrs Marie-Hélène Enderlin, Programme Manager in charge of Institutional Support &amp; Justice – EUD Twinning Coordinator</li> <li>• Ms Lamia Ben Haddada – Operations Section – Assistant to Mrs Enderlin</li> <li>• Mr Juan Marti Pique, 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary – EUD Contract &amp; Finance</li> <li>• Mr Antonio Cortes Garcia – Attaché – EUD Contracts &amp; Finance</li> </ul>	Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation (MPCI) 98, Avenue Mohamed V – Tunis

DATE	TIME	STAKEHOLDER	ALSO ATTENDED	VENUE
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Mr Salem Akrouf, Director General to the PAO</li><li>• Mr Moez M'Halla, PAO Project Manager</li><li>• Mr Moez Jaoua, PAO Project Manager</li><li>• Mr Zied Mahjoub, PAO Project Manager</li></ul>	

**ANNEX 2**

**EVALUATION QUESTIONS, JUDGEMENT CRITERIA AND  
INDICATORS**

## ANNEX 2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS, JUDGEMENT CRITERIA AND INDICATORS

The 10 Evaluation Questions (EQ) below were approved by A6 at the Inception Meeting of February 10th, 2011. The Judgement Criteria have now been formally separated from the indicators.

Each EQ covers one or more evaluation criteria and does not explicitly refer to any of them. The criteria are the very basis for the evaluation and the information and data collected for responding to each of the EQs will contribute to the overall assessment of the criteria in this Final Report.

The 10 criteria underpinning this Evaluation are:

- The 5 DAC-OECD project management criteria: *Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability*
- The 2 EC policy criteria: *Coherence/Complementarity* with TAIEX, SIGMA and other donors' interventions, and *Added Value of EC Interventions*
- 3 horizontal criteria: *Cross-Cutting Issues, Decentralised vs. Centralised Management and Communication & Visibility*

Judgement criteria are the factors for judging whether an EQ can be positively answered, drawing on objective findings, subjective assessments made by the Evaluation Team and the experience of project/sector managers, implementers and beneficiaries.

Although not necessarily exhaustive, the indicators have proved to be very useful and relevant inputs into the evaluation questionnaires.

### EQ 1

To what extent have the intervention logic, strategy and approach contributed adequately to the identified issues, global priorities, real needs and/or results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region?

#### Rationale

This question relates to the *Relevance* criterion and also, to some extent, to the *Sustainability* and *Coherence* criteria. In essence, *Relevance* is the extent to which institutional twinning activities are suited to the priorities and policies of a target group, recipient and donor.

It is crucial to find out to what extent the intervention logic, strategy and approach underlying twinning activities in the ENP Region have been consistent with the strategic priorities set in the AAs, CPAs, APs and NIPs as well as the ENPI. This question addresses to what extent the objectives of twinning activities are consistent with the beneficiaries' specific expectations, requirements, needs and/or priorities.

However, *Relevance* must be assessed throughout the lifecycle of twinning activities in case changes occur either in the nature of the issues originally identified or in the context – whether physical, political, economic, social, environmental, institutional or policy-wise – in which the twinning activities have been planned and implemented, which may require a change to the activity focus.

Consequently, *Relevance* also relates to the appropriateness of twinning activity *design* to the

issues that must be solved at two key stages: during the design phase and during the evaluation phase. We therefore propose to merge *Relevance* with project design and internal coherence under this criterion, as they tend to somewhat overlap.

Judgement Criteria	Indicators
<p>1.1 Whether the twinning intervention logic, strategy and approach have been well defined to contribute to the achievement of twinning objectives and mandatory results</p> <p>1.2 Whether the involvement of line stakeholders, including PAOs, BAs and MS partner institutions, in the project preparation phase was adequate and contributed effectively to project relevance - assessment of absorption &amp; delivery capacity, and political and institutional commitment</p> <p>1.3 Whether the demand-driven approach, when taken into account contributed, was part of a well-defined strategy and if yes whether it contributed to project relevance and achievement of objectives</p> <p>1.4 Whether the project preparation/ design phase was adequate to ensure the consistency of activities and outputs</p>	<p>1.1.1 Extent to which the choice of Twinning vs. Technical Assistance was justified</p> <p>1.1.2 Extent to which the twinning objectives remained valid against, and consistent with, the reference documents and instruments (AAs, CPAs, ENP APs, NIPs and CSPs)</p> <p>1.2.1 Extent to which line stakeholders, including PAOs and MS partner institutions, have been preparing for, and involved in the preparation of, the twinning activities (e.g. submission of twinning proposals, participation in calls for proposals, <u>absorption (&amp; delivery) capacity and political commitment assessments</u>, implementation capacities, pro-active measures, training).</p> <p>1.3.1 Extent to which the <u>demand-driven aspect</u> normally inherent to twinning projects has been combined with the need to act on the basis of a well-defined strategy (incl. incentives), e.g. specified in the EU Acquis, AAs, CPAs and/or ENP Action Plans:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Selection of the objectives, target sectors and direct beneficiaries.</li> <li>➤ Field(s) with more than one beneficiary involved in the same intervention.</li> <li>➤ Basis for establishing priorities in terms of objectives, sectors and beneficiaries</li> </ul> <p>1.4.1 Extent to which procurement opportunities have been considered within the twinning context</p> <p>1.4.2 Extent to which the twinning activities and outputs are consistent with the achievement of their immediate and overall objectives</p>

<p>with the twinning project objectives and impacts and effects</p> <p>1.5 Whether the feasibility and compatibility of twinning activities have been taken into account adequately during the project preparation/design phase</p>	<p>1.4.3 Extent to which the twinning activities and outputs are consistent with the intended impacts and effects</p> <p>1.5.1 Extent to which findings under twinning preparatory activities (policy assessments, sector reviews, needs assessments, gap analyses, pre-feasibility studies, communication and visibility workshops, preliminary TAIEX/SIGMA workshops, etc.) have been incorporated into final twinning documents (financing proposals, project fiches, mandatory results, programme estimates, etc).</p> <p>1.5.2 Extent to which inputs are realistic in terms of selection and quantity (staffing, budgeting, training participants, twinning partnerships, etc)</p> <p>1.5.3 Extent to which entries to the assumptions, risks and <u>conditionality</u> columns of twinning project logframes are consistent</p> <p>1.5.4 Extent to which the overall design of the logframes is appropriate (clarity, internal consistency of the stated Overall Objectives, Purpose, Results linked to Activities)</p> <p>1.5.5 Extent to which indicators of achievement (OVIs) were valid (well-targeted, widely approved, base-lined, time-based, etc</p> <p>1.5.6 Degree of flexibility and adaptability to respond to contextual changes (twinning activities may be very vulnerable to contextual changes)</p> <p>1.5.7 Extent to which major deviations from the original Twinning Instrument’s scope were noticeable</p>
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<b>EQ 2</b>	
To what extent have the twinning activities delivered the twinning mandatory results in the ENP Region? <i>Have the right things been done?</i>	
<b>Rationale</b>	
This question covers the <i>Effectiveness</i> criterion and also, to some extent, the <i>Impact</i> and <i>European Commission Added Value</i> criteria as well as, to a lesser extent, <i>Cross-Cutting Issues</i> (EQ 8). It is very important to find out what results and impacts have been achieved and to what extent they were consistent with the objectives set in the twinning documents. <i>Effectiveness</i> measures the extent to which the twinning activities implemented have achieved the stated objectives, more particularly the project purpose (immediate objective). In other words, <i>Effectiveness</i> may also be interpreted as “Have the right things been done?”	
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
2.1 Whether the right	2.1.1 Degree of achievement of objectives set in the AAs, PCAs,

<p>activities have been conducted to achieve the immediate objective (project purpose)</p> <p>2.2 Whether the twinning activities have transferred any institutional capacity to the BAs adequately</p>	<p>APs, NIPs, CSPs and overall ENPI strategy related to institutional capacity building in the ENP Region’s beneficiary institutions</p> <p><u>2.1.2 Extent to which twinning activities have made any difference at all</u> or to what extent have the institutional capacities of the targeted beneficiaries benefited from the twinning products and services that have been made available to them?</p> <p>2.1.3 Major implementation constraints on the achievement/non-achievement of the stated objectives</p> <p>2.2.1 Adequacy level demonstrated by the twinning instrument to respond to the capacity building needs in the ENP Region</p> <p>2.2.2 Extent to which the planned benefits have been delivered AND received, taking into account the perception of key beneficiaries, Commission HQ, EUDs, RTAs, PAOs, MS twinning partners, Steering Committees, Evaluation Committees, national government authorities and other stakeholders</p> <p>2.2.3 Extent to which twinning results have been used and/or their potential benefits have been obtained</p> <p>2.2.4 Adequacy of the twinning benefit indicators measuring the achievement of immediate objectives, i.e. the extent to which project management reacted promptly and effectively to any significant changes that occurred after the initial design phase was completed in order to revise the indicators that were no longer appropriate</p> <p>2.2.5 Extent to which behavioural patterns towards institutional capacity building have changed in the beneficiary institutions at various levels</p> <p>2.2.6 Extent to which the revised institutional arrangements have produced the planned improvements (e.g. in communication, productivity, capacity building, etc)</p> <p>2.2.7 Adequacy of assumptions and risk assessments at result level (e.g. unanticipated external factors played a role in the achievement/non-achievement of results, flexibility demonstrated by project management to adapt and achieve the objectives, adequate support from key stakeholders, including Commission HQ, EUDs, local government, etc).</p> <p>2.2.8 Extent to which responsibilities amongst the various stakeholders have been distributed in a balanced manner (e.g. should accompanying measures have been taken by the beneficiary authorities and, if yes, with what consequences?)</p>
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<p>2.3 Whether Cross-Cutting Issues were taken into account sufficiently during the implementation phase</p>	<p>2.2.9 Extent to which unplanned results may have affected the benefits received</p> <p>2.3.1 Extent to which any delivery shortcomings have resulted from a failure to deal with <u>cross-cutting issues</u> well enough during the twinning implementation phase (to be dealt with in EQ 8)</p>
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<b>EQ 3</b>	
To what extent have the twinning activities been delivered adequately to the ENP Region's beneficiaries? <i>Have things been done right?</i>	
<b>Rationale</b>	
<p>This question relates to the <i>Efficiency</i> criterion. In measuring the outputs – both qualitative and quantitative – against the inputs, it aims to find out to what extent things have been done right in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and thereby also addresses value-for-money aspects. In other words, it addresses the <u>best use of resources</u>. This analysis generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs in order to find out whether the most efficient decision as to the choice of the institutional building instrument has been made.</p>	
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<p>3.1 Whether the twinning activities have transformed the resources available (time, funding, etc) into achieved mandatory results</p> <p>3.2 Whether day-to-day management (budget, staff, information, activities, logistics, flexibility, risks, absorption capacity, political commitment, etc.) has been adequate in fulfilling the twinning project objectives</p>	<p>3.1.1 Extent to which twinning activities have transformed the available resources into the mandatory results</p> <p>3.1.2 Extent to which any reallocation of responsibilities could have improved twinning activity <u>performance</u></p> <p>3.2.1 Extent to which day-to-day twinning project management (budget, staff, information, activities, logistics, flexibility, risks, absorption capacity, political commitment, etc.) has been adequate in fulfilling the twinning project objectives</p> <p>3.2.2 Extent to which local institutions, target beneficiaries and other stakeholders have contributed to twinning activity preparation and implementation in a timely and result-oriented manner</p> <p>3.2.3 Extent to which the level of coordination and communication between the line stakeholders has been appropriate</p> <p>3.2.4 Extent to which Commission HQ/EU Delegation inputs (procurement, training, contracting either directly or via consulting firms) have contributed to twinning activity preparation and implementation in a timely and result-oriented manner</p>

<p>3.3 Whether the twinning project costs were justified against, and the budgets available, proportionate to the benefits generated (best value for money)</p> <p>3.4 Whether the quality of expertise available (incl. study tours) was sufficient</p>	<p>3.2.5 Extent to which the <i>Efficiency</i> indicators were suitable and, if not, whether management revised them during implementation</p> <p>3.3.1 Extent to which twinning activity costs can be justified against twinning benefits<sup>1</sup>, which they have generated, and also similar projects or alternative approaches, taking into account contextual differences</p> <p>3.3.2 Extent to which similar results could have been achieved at lower cost AND within the same amount of time</p> <p>3.4.1 Extent to which the expertise provided was well utilised</p> <p>3.4.2 Extent to which Twinning helped to provide adequate solutions and develop local capacities to define and produce the mandatory results</p> <p>3.4.3 Quality of the <u>monitoring</u> and <u>quality assurance</u> systems normally put in place (created or not, accuracy, flexibility, utility, adequacy of baseline information, etc)</p> <p>3.4.4 Quality Assurance system in place and degree of achievement</p> <p>3.4.5 Extent to which unplanned results emerged from twinning project implementation</p>
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#### EQ 4

To what extent have twinning activities contributed to capacity building, legal approximation (EU Acquis) and institutional modernisation in the ENP Region?

#### Rationale

This question is fundamental as it addresses the *Impact* criterion, which is also referred to as *Outcome*, and also to some extent, *Cross-Cutting Issues* (EQ 8) and *Communication & Visibility* (EQ 10). As such, it exposes the relationship between the overall and immediate objectives, i.e. the extent to which the capacity building benefits received by the target beneficiaries has had a wider overall effect on a larger number of persons, institutions, authorities and/or actors in a sector, region or even country as a whole. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The analysis of the *Impact* criterion will be qualitative and quantitative whenever is appropriate. However, it must be noted that any particular twinning project is just one contribution to the wider outcome.

In addition, the main assumption is that the Mandatory Results of twinning activities are hardly ever aimed at in principle. Twinning is not a mere disbursement process. The achievement, impact and sustainability of mandatory results must always be measurable and measured in due course so that a sensible, substantiated decision can be made as to the fate of a project: stop or continue? The impact could be measured by applying weighted grades to

<sup>1</sup> This comparison is widely known as “cost-effectiveness analysis”

each of the various stages reached by a given project in terms of impact.

Together with *Sustainability*, *Impact* is often considered as the most important criterion from a donor perspective. Therefore, this criterion will be rather comprehensively covered.

Judgement Criteria	Indicators
<p>4.1 Whether mandatory results have been achieved as planned and have contributed to the achievement of Overall Objectives</p>	<p>4.1.1 Extent to which the planned Overall Objectives have been achieved through twinning activity implementation</p> <p>4.1.2 Extent to which mandatory results have been achieved</p> <p>4.1.3 Extent to which the outputs have contributed or will likely contribute to the Overall Objective</p> <p>4.1.4 Extent to which economic and social effects resulting from the twinning activities have been spread against the achievement of Overall Objectives</p>
<p>4.2 Whether the results achieved by twinning activities have had, are having or shall have a wider effect on the beneficiary institution and/or the larger population in the target sector, region or ENP Country</p>	<p>4.2.1 Extent to which the benefits of the project have been received / absorbed by the target beneficiaries and also by the larger population in the target sector, region or country</p> <p>4.2.2 Wider/overall effect on the larger population in the target sector, region or country as a whole</p> <p>4.2.3 Extent to which newly acquired or strengthened institutional capacities have enhanced economic and social development in the ENP Region, e.g. identifiable benefits for public governance (e.g. modernisation), society (increased user-friendliness) and/or the economy</p> <p>4.2.4 Degree of direct beneficiaries' awareness about the benefits from twinning results, e.g. have additional civil service units been put in place, are they being put in place or have existing civil service units been restructured or redefined? Remark: we propose to analyse the various [vertical and horizontal] information and communication processes whenever and wherever is appropriate.</p> <p>4.2.5 Amount of new sectoral, horizontal, national and/or regional legislation and/or policy prepared or under way as a result of the twinning activities implemented in the ENP Region</p> <p>4.2.6 Level of flexibility demonstrated by donor management and government in responding to unanticipated external changes</p> <p>4.2.7 Extent to which unplanned impacts have affected the overall impact</p> <p>4.2.8 Extent to which the sought wider impact could have been</p>

<p>4.3 Whether Cross-Cutting Issues have been impacted by twinning project results</p>	<p>achieved any better otherwise</p> <p>4.2.9 Involvement of any civil society agency/ organisation (e.g. NGO) as stakeholders in the twinning activities</p> <p>4.3.1 Extent to which <u>cross-cutting issues</u> have been dealt with, whenever was appropriate (see EQ 8)</p>
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## EQ 5

To what extent are the results achieved by twinning activities likely to survive individual twinning project completion? *Are those results still operative after project completion?*

### Rationale

This question addresses the *Sustainability* criterion, which is usually considered as most important not only from a donor perspective, but also for all stakeholders. To some extent, this question also addresses *the EC-funded Institutional Twinning Instrument's Added Value to the institution capacity building effort (EQ7)* in the ENP Region. Like *Impact*, this criterion will therefore be extensively dealt with in the Final Report. *Sustainability* of the effects and results is primarily concerned with measuring to what extent the benefits of twinning activities are likely to continue after EU funding has stopped. This criterion also analyses whether the longer-term impact of twinning activities on the wider ongoing institutional capacity modernisation and approximation processes in the ENP Region are sustainable at all in a target sector, region and/or country.

### Judgement Criteria

### Indicators

5.1 Whether ownership of twinning objectives and achievements is ensured by the beneficiaries in a sustainable manner

#### Sustainable ownership of twinning objectives and achievements:

5.1.1 Extent to which the direct beneficiaries were consulted on the twinning objectives from the outset and agreed to them till project completion

5.1.2 Extent to which the direct beneficiaries have demonstrated or are demonstrating ownership, e.g. manuals of internal procedures and a "Train the Trainers" facility have been or will be designed and, if yes, follow-up system existing or envisaged

5.1.3 HR management procedures have been, are being or will be put in place for staff recruitment, replacement, turnover, career development and further training

5.2 Whether twinning achievements and positive results/outcomes/impacts have continued / are likely to continue after external funding ends

#### Long-term sustainability of twinning achievements:

5.2.1 Major factors that have influenced sustainability at various levels and stages

5.2.2 Extent to which the positive outcomes/impacts of twinning activities continued or are likely to continue after external funding ended or will end

<p>5.3 Whether policy support and responsibility of the twinning beneficiaries are sustainable in terms of continued political commitment and absorption capacity</p>	<p>5.2.3 Extent to which the long-term impact of twinning activities on the wider institutional reform process in the ENP Region is (likely to be) sustainable at sectoral, regional or national level</p> <p><u>Sustainable policy support and responsibility of the twinning beneficiaries:</u></p> <p>5.3.1 Effects of institutional, legal and policy changes (reform process) on a sector, region and/or country in the ENP Region as a result of twinning activities</p> <p>5.3.2 Extent to which the national sectoral and budgetary policies positively or negatively affected the twinning activities</p> <p>5.3.3 Degree of political commitment and absorption capacity demonstrated by government, public, business and civil society organisations</p> <p>5.3.4 Extent to which the twinning achievements are well perceived in terms of added value and are well accepted. This criterion also relates to the EC Commission's <i>Added Value</i>.</p>
<p>5.4 Whether institutional capacity newly acquired through twinning activities is sustainable</p>	<p><u>Sustainable institutional capacity:</u></p> <p>5.4.1 Extent to which the effects and results achieved by the twinning activities are embedded in the institutional structures of the ENP Region</p> <p>5.4.2 Institutional (likely) capacity demonstrated by beneficiaries to continue operating, managing, developing and fostering the flow of twinning benefits after funding has ended and activities have been completed</p> <p>5.4.3 Extent to which the technology used, the knowledge transferred and processes, products and services provided during preparation and implementation are realistic and consistent with existing needs, local culture, traditions and available skills</p> <p>5.4.4 Degree of stability and relevance demonstrated by horizontal civil service organisations (public institutions)</p> <p>5.4.5 Extent to which the transition (from operational, administrative and financial point of view) from one programme to another has been envisaged and new fields of intervention identified (this criterion may also be addressed under <i>Relevance</i>)</p>
<p>5.5 Whether sustainability of twinning activities is ensured from a</p>	<p><u>Financial and economic sustainability:</u></p> <p>5.5.1 Domestic funding strategy is in place or under way to continue the twinning achievements (existing or envisaged) and, if yes, at affordable costs (e.g. maintenance, replacement, insurance, disposables, further training, etc)</p>

financial and economic perspective	5.5.2 Analysis of comparative costs for similar interventions
5.6 Whether Sustainability will be affected by Cross-Cutting Issues	<p><u>Cross-cutting issues (see EQ 8):</u></p> <p>5.6.1 Extent to which cross-cutting issues may affect <i>Sustainability</i>, wherever and whenever appropriate</p>

<b>EQ 6</b>	
To what extent have the twinning activities been complementary with TAIEX and SIGMA and coherent with other institutional building instruments funded by the EU and other multi- and bilateral donors?	
<b>Rationale</b>	
This question addresses the <i>Coherence/Complementarity</i> criterion used for EU policy evaluation. This criterion may have several dimensions. We have decided to focus on the next two points:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coherence/complementarity within the Commission's development programme</li> <li>• Coherence/complementarity with the partner country's policies and with other donors' interventions</li> </ul>	
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
6.1 Whether TAIEX and SIGMA have facilitated the achievement of twinning objectives	<p>6.1.1 Extent to which TAIEX and SIGMA activities and outputs have logically facilitated the achievement of twinning objectives</p> <p>6.1.2 Mechanisms are operational or envisaged for optimising the additional and coordinated implementation of the various tools made available to the Twinning Instrument (twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA, short-term and long-term technical assistance, procurement)</p> <p>6.1.3 Extent to which the Twinning Instrument, TAIEX and SIGMA complement one another</p> <p>6.1.4 Extent to which the different levels of objective may contradict one another</p> <p>6.1.5 Duplications between twinning activities likely to affect credibility, interest and commitment and also to create unnecessary spending (waste of resources)</p>
6.2 Whether there is effective coherence/complementarity of twinning activities with the partner country's policies and other donors'	<p>6.2.1 Extent to which the Twinning Instrument, TAIEX and SIGMA complement or are complemented by the NIPS' other components, other donor interventions, etc.</p> <p>6.2.2 Presence or absence of any overlap between the twinning activities considered and other interventions in the partner country and/or other donors' interventions, particularly Member States</p>

interventions	
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<b>EQ 7</b>	
To what extent has the EU twinning intervention contributed successfully to a beneficiary's institutional building effort?	
<b>Rationale</b>	
<p>This question relates to any <i>Added Value</i> contributed or likely to be contributed by the Twinning Instrument to the institutional capacity building, civil service modernisation and/or legal approximation effort in the ENP Region. It is therefore very important for the Commission to be well informed of the benefits that its external cooperation programmes, in this occurrence the Institutional Twinning Instrument, have generated or are generating in a particular region of the world, i.e. the ENP Region in this occurrence. It is important for the Commission to fully understand to what extent its own expertise has been utilised to good effect and has played a good role model in capacity building. Obviously, this question also relates to <i>Impact</i>.</p>	
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
7.1 Whether the EC twinning activities have contributed successfully to a beneficiary's institutional building effort in the ENP Region	7.1.1 Extent to which the Commission intervention (Twinning, TAIEX & SIGMA) has contributed to a beneficiary's institutional building effort in terms of quality, efficiency and likely or desirable sustainability
7.2 Whether the EC twinning activities are well perceived in the ENP Region	7.2.1 Extent to which the twinning achievements are well perceived in terms of added value and are well accepted
7.3 Whether the EC HQ and EUDs have managed to bring together EU MS and BAs in the ENP Region	7.3.1 Extent to which the Commission Services, both HQ and EUDs, have demonstrated a capacity to bring Member States and beneficiaries together within the framework of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region

<b>EQ 8</b>	
To what extent has institutional twinning contributed to improving <u>cross-cutting issues</u> in the ENP Region?	
<b>Rationale</b>	

The European Development Consensus<sup>2</sup> identifies four “cross-cutting issues” of major importance to development cooperation:

- democracy and human rights
- environmental sustainability
- gender equality
- HIV/AIDS

Cross-cutting issues require action in multiple, often interconnected fields and should thus be integrated into all areas of donor programmes and be addressed in all political dialogue on development. Cross-cutting issues are laid down in a number of international conventions, declarations and treaties on development that are binding on EU countries and most beneficiary countries. The broad policy goals must be taken into account at all stages of the funding cycle and the EU cannot support action that may result in a beneficiary country infringing its obligations under the multi- and bilateral agreements.

Therefore, by including the most relevant cross-cutting issues in its development cooperation strategies, the EU intends to work out better development strategies and respond more effectively to particular circumstances in each target country/region.

Taking cross-cutting issues systematically into account helps the European Commission and other donors:

- To identify the key constraints affecting growth, poverty reduction, equity, opportunity, security and empowerment in a given sector, region or country
- To cooperate with national stakeholders on measures to address these issues
- To incorporate such measures into the domestic development strategy
- To monitor the outcomes of a policy of integrating cross-cutting issues.

Judgement Criteria	Indicators
8.1 Whether any Cross-Cutting Issue strategy/approach has been envisaged and/or put in place in each project	8.1.1 Existence or lack of cross-cutting issue strategy/approach in any of the ENP countries  8.1.2 Extent to which cross-cutting issues have been dealt with, whenever was appropriate
8.2 Whether twinning activities have contributed to improving Cross-Cutting Issues in the ENP Region	8.2.1 Extent to which twinning activities have improved the status of cross-cutting issues in the ENP Region at the level of domestic or sectoral policy  8.2.2 Extent to which twinning activities have tackled the constraints affecting growth, poverty reduction, opportunity, security and empowerment in any of the ENP Region countries  8.2.3 Extent to which better coordination and cooperation may be

<sup>2</sup> See the Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: “The European Consensus” (2006/C 46/01) and also [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/cross-cutting-issues/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/cross-cutting-issues/index_en.htm)

	<p>needed to further integrate cross-cutting issues in the overall intervention logic in respect of the twinning Instrument in the ENP Region</p> <p>8.2.4 Extent to which any delivery shortcomings have resulted from a failure to deal with cross-cutting issues well enough during the twinning implementation phase</p>
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<b>EQ 9</b>	
To what extent has the <u>decentralised vs. centralised management</u> of twinning activities contributed to the quality of results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region?	
<b>Rationale</b>	
This is a very important point as it addresses the asymmetrical character of twinning project management across the ENP Region. As ENPI-South and ENPI-East are asymmetrical in their respective institutional and management structure in respect of twinning, <u>this question aims to analyse the repercussions and impacts that decentralised vs. centralised management</u> (e.g. decentralised management impacts on Twinning project results) and institutional structure have or may have upon twinning project preparation, implementation and results (for more feedback information on those aspects, see Chapter 2 to this Report.	
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
9.1 Whether decentralised project management has effectively contributed to the quality of mandatory results achieved in the ENP Region	<p>9.1.1 Extent to which conflicts between EU and ENP procedures may influence the outcome of twinning activities</p> <p>9.1.2 Extent to which decentralised vs. centralised management positively or negatively affects the design, implementation, impact and sustainability of the twinning activities</p> <p>9.1.3 Extent to which decentralised vs. centralised management positively or negatively affects the coordination, cooperation and interface between line stakeholders (EUDs, PAOs, RTAs, Steering Committees, Evaluation Committees, direct beneficiaries, Commission HQ, etc)</p> <p>9.1.4 Extent to which decentralised vs. centralised management is perceived as a potential incentive, strength, benefit, opportunity, obstacle, weakness, threat or deterrent by the line stakeholders within the institutional twinning context (e.g. SWOT analysis)</p>
9.2 Whether the role played by the PAOs under decentralised vs. centralised management has contributed to the quality of mandatory	<p>9.2.1 Profile, status, mandate and role played by the PAOs under decentralised vs. centralised management</p> <p>9.2.2 Presence of long-term technical assistance and training to support PAOs and twinning preparation implementation</p>

results achieved in the ENP Region	
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<b>EQ 10</b>	
To what extent have the <u>communication &amp; visibility</u> activities promoted the Institutional Twinning Instrument across the ENP Region and thus contributed to the achievements of twinning activities in the Region?	
<b>Rationale</b>	
This question addresses all communication and visibility aspects of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region. Its objective is to find out to what extent C&V actions have been conducted efficiently and effectively to promote the twinning instrument across the line beneficiary institutions in the ENP countries. For this purpose, it is also important to find out what specific C&V activities have been carried out, whether the C&V actions undertaken have had the desired impact and who the beneficiaries and target audiences of C&V actions have been.	
<b>Judgement Criteria</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
10.1 Whether C&V activities have contributed to promoting the Twinning Instrument effectively and efficiently in the ENP Region	<p>10.1.1 C&amp;V activities and actions have been conducted in the ENP Region by line stakeholders and/or through long-term technical assistance</p> <p>10.1.2 Extent to which the level of coordination and communication between the line stakeholders has been appropriate</p> <p>10.1.3 Degree of twinning information dissemination amongst line stakeholders, potential line stakeholders and MS twinning partner institutions</p> <p>10.1.4 Degree of Member State awareness about the twinning activities in the ENP Region (briefings, correspondence, etc)</p> <p>10.1.5 Degree of awareness of the opportunities offered and requirements imposed by the EC-funded Twinning Instrument across the ENP Region's civil service spectrum</p> <p>10.1.6 External/internal popularisation and dissemination of twinning results have been carried out or are being envisaged</p> <p>10.1.7 Increased number of requests for participation in twinning activities submitted by institutions in a beneficiary ENP country.</p> <p>10.1.8 Increased effective participation in twinning activities by institutions in a beneficiary ENP country</p>
10.2 Whether C&V activities have contributed to the	10.2.1 Increased coordination and cooperation between line stakeholders

achievement of twinning activities in the ENP Region	<p>10.2.2 Extent to which an “enlarged” participation in the Steering Committee meetings could be an opportunity to better disseminate information on the projects, to ensure its promotion and to get the active support of stakeholders</p> <p>10.2.3 Extent to which C&amp;V actions have contributed to increasing <i>Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Sustainability, Added Value</i> and <i>Cross-Cutting Issues</i></p>
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## **ANNEX 3**

### **SELECTED SAMPLE OF 18 + 2 TWINNING PROJECTS IN 6 ENP COUNTRIES**

### ANNEX 3 SELECTED SAMPLE OF 18 + 2 TWINNING PROJECTS IN 6 ENP COUNTRIES

Country	Sector	Beneficiary	Status	Title	Leader	Partners	Budget-€	Application	Duration	Start	End
Azerbaijan	Trade & Industry	State Statistical Committee	Ongoing	Support to the State Statistical Committee (SSC) to reach EU standards in national accounts, non-observed economy, business statistics & producer price index	Germany	Bulgaria, Czech Republic	900,000	16/12/2008	24 months	23/11/2009	13/11/2011
Azerbaijan	Finance	State Committee on Standardisation, Metrology & Patents	Completed	Support to Azerbaijan in the fields of Technical Regulations, standards and conformity assessment	Germany	Austria	1,400,000	10/12/2007	24 months	28/10/2008	28/10/2010
Azerbaijan	JHA	Parliament (Milli Mejlis)	Ongoing	Support to the Azerbaijani Parliament (legal approximation with the EU)	Lithuania	-	950,000	31/10/2008	24 months	13/09/2009	13/09/2011
Ukraine	Trade & Industry	NAAU - National Accreditation Agency	Completed	Strengthening the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine	Netherlands	Sweden	1,400,000	26/04/2007	24 months	01/03/2008	01/02/2010
Ukraine	Finance	Centre for FDI Promotion under the State Agency for Investment & Innovation (SAUII)	Ongoing	Enhancing performance of Investment, the Ukrainian Centre for Foreign Investment Promotion in line with best European practices	Germany	Poland	1,400,000	15/01/2009	21 months	23/11/2009	01/09/2011
Ukraine	JHA	Academy of Judges of Ukraine	Ongoing	Support to the Academy of Judges of Ukraine	Austria	-	1,100,000	12/08/2008	24 months	09/07/2009	09/07/2011
Jordan	Trade & Industry	Customs Department	Completed	Support to the Customs Department in the implementation of the EU-Jordan AA	Italy	-	1,000,000	05/11/2004	15 months	09/10/2006	08/07/2008
Jordan	Finance	Audit Bureau	Completed	Institutional Strengthening of the Audit Bureau of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	United Kingdom	Germany	1,200,000	04/07/2005	25 months	04/06/2006	31/03/2008
Jordan	JHA	Public Security Directorate Secretariat	Completed	Strengthening the Public Security Directorate in the fight against terrorism and organised crime	United Kingdom	-	1,000,000	06/12/2007	18 months	07/09/2008	06/03/2010
Egypt	Trade & Industry	General Authority for Investment & Free Economic Zones	Completed	Institutional strengthening of the General Authority for Investments and Free Zones	Germany	Austria	1,500,000	11/04/2007	28 months	05/02/2008	05/06/2010
Egypt	Finance	CAPMAS – Central Agency for Public Mobilisation & Statistics	Completed	Institutional capacity building for the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) and developing the legal framework for statistics in Egypt	Denmark	-	1,600,000	05/11/2007	24 months	31/08/2008	30/08/2010
Egypt	Environment	Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation	Completed	Water Quality Management	Italy	France, Austria	1,300,000	01/01/2008	24 months	02/11/2008	01/11/2010
Tunisia	Trade & Industry	Ministère Industrie, Energie & PME	Completed	Accord dans le domaine de l'évaluation et de la conformité (ACAA)	France	-	1,320,000	06/07/2006	24 months	16/04/2007	15/07/2009
Tunisia	Finance	Ministère des Finances	Completed	Appui à la Modernisation de l'Administration fiscale	France	-	1,200,000	30/04/2007	24 months	04/02/2008	31/12/2009
Tunisia	JHA	Tribunal Administratif	Completed	Renforcement des capacités institutionnelles du Tribunal Administratif	France	-	250,000	14/01/2009	8 months	09/05/2009	04/01/2010
Morocco	Trade & Industry	Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie	Completed	Appui à la Direction de la Qualité et des Normes dans l'harmonisation et la mise en oeuvre de la législation	Netherlands	Germany	1,300,000	05/07/2007	24 months	03/11/2008	02/11/2010

Country	Sector	Beneficiary	Status	Title	Leader	Partners	Budget-€	Application	Duration	Start	End
Morocco	Trade & Industry	Customs Administration	Completed	Facilitation des procédures de commerce extérieur technique	Italy	-	690,000	25/04/2005	30 months	01/12/2005	30/04/2008
Morocco	Finance	Ministère des Affaires Générales et Economiques	Completed	Appui aux autorités en charge de la Concurrence	Germany	-	1,500,000	15/09/2006	34 months	01/09/2007	28/02/2010

At the Inception Meeting, in addition to the “Support to the Azerbaijani Parliament (legal approximation to the EU)”, were also discussed another two twinning projects whose titles may suggest more or less significant deviation from the Twining Instrument’s initial contextual scope.

Country	Sector	Beneficiary	Status	Title	Leader	Partners	Budget-€	Application	Duration	Start	End
Egypt	Other (Tourism)	Egyptian Tourism Authority	Completed	Institutional strengthening of the Egyptian Tourism Authority (ETA)	Austria	-	2,300,000	17/06/2006	28	22/04/2007	26/06/2009
Morocco	Other - Finance	Agence de Développement de l’Oriental (ADO)	Completed	Renforcement des capacités territoriales de l’Agence de Développement de l’Oriental	Spain	-	952,000	23/11/2007	24	26/09/2008	25/12/2010

**ANNEX 4**

**INTRODUCTION LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DIRECT  
STAKEHOLDERS**

## **ANNEX 4 INTRODUCTION LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DIRECT STAKEHOLDERS**

### **Draft letter to the European Union Delegations in the ENP Region – March 5th, 2011**

*(French and Russian version were also prepared)*

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Colleagues,

DEVCO's Multi-Country Programmes Unit A6 is conducting an evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument across the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) Region. This operation is supervised by Mr Jorge de la Caballeria and Ms. Nathalie Thiberge, who ensures overall coordination. The evaluation assignment has been entrusted to two independent experts: Messrs Gerard Bouscharain and Jean-Bernard Moreau. The Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA Contact Points at EUDs (TWG Contact Point) are responsible for coordination and support to this evaluation in the beneficiary countries. The preliminary findings of this evaluation shall be presented to the NCP meeting scheduled for mid-June 2011.

To date, after 8 years' implementation across the ENP Region, 156 twinning projects were launched in 12 ENP countries with an overall budget of roughly € 160 million. Consequently, time has now come to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region in order to, on the one hand, assess its performance and, on the other hand, formulate a number of recommendations aiming at extending and improving the Twinning Instrument. The evaluation is being conducted on the basis of methodological guidelines developed by the Joint Evaluation Unit for DEVCO projects and programmes.

For the purpose of this evaluation, we have selected 18+2 twinning projects (see attached) that have been, or still are, implemented in 6 ENP countries, namely Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, covering three major sectors: Trade & Industry, Justice & Home Affairs, and Finance. We consider this sample as the most representative possible of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the ENP Region.

The evaluation method includes the distribution of a questionnaire consisting of 10 evaluation questions to be answered by the various stakeholders. This questionnaire has been adapted to the very nature of each of the three projects selected per country and is attached to this e-mail message. We kindly ask the Twinning Contact Point and/or the Programme Manager, the PAO/UGP Director or manager, the RTA and/or Project Director (if still in the country), and the national direct beneficiary to fill in the questionnaire. In the meantime, we remain entirely available, should you have any further query on the above. You are most welcome to contact us at your best convenience at the coordinates indicated at the bottom of this message. The duly filled-in questionnaires must be returned to the Experts via the Twinning Contact Point, ideally by e-mail, in Word version and in English or French (possibly in Russian for the beneficiaries in Ukraine and Azerbaijan), at the latest by the dates indicated in the following calendar:

Ukraine: March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2011

Azerbaijan: April 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2011

Jordan: April 15<sup>th</sup>, 2011

Egypt: April, 29<sup>th</sup>, 2011  
Tunisia: April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2011  
Morocco: April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2011

The evaluation method also allows for field visits to be organised by the Evaluators in order to conduct a number of interviews aiming to complement the information already provided in the filled-in questionnaires and also, above all, to exchange and confirm the key findings that will be highlighted in the Final Evaluation Report. The Evaluators will greatly appreciate if the Twinning Contact Points could prepare the interview programmes with the various stakeholders directly involved in the three projects selected for each country (TWG Contact Point, PAO/UGP Programme Manager, possibly RTA or Project Director, and the direct beneficiary institution). We would also appreciate receiving the agenda of our visit before our arrival in each country. The field visits to be paid by both Evaluators (Gerard Bouscharain and Jean-Bernard Moreau) have been scheduled as follows:

Ukraine: 3-8 April 2011  
Azerbaijan: 2-8 May 2011  
Jordan: 25-30 April 2011  
Egypt: 14-19 May 2011  
Tunisia: 23-27 May 2011  
Morocco: 14-19 April 2011

The preliminary findings must be presented to Unit A6 and then to the Reference Group by end of May and shall most probably be discussed further at the NCP Meeting in mid-June. The very Final Report must be submitted in September and will be forwarded to Unit A6 and the Reference Group during the project closing seminar.

In the meantime, we remain entirely at your disposal for any further information or request you may have, thank you very much in advance for your great cooperation and look forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

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Jean Bernard Moreau  
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Tel: +32 499 29 23 76

Madame, Monsieur et chers collègues,

L'unité DEVCO A6, Programmes multi-pays, a décidé de mener une évaluation de l'instrument de jumelage dans toute la zone de voisinage. Cette opération est supervisée par Jorge de la Caballeria et Nathalie Thiberge qui en assure l'ensemble de la coordination. L'évaluation est confiée à deux experts indépendants, Gérard Bouscharain et Jean Bernard Moreau. La coordination et l'appui à cette évaluation est confiée dans les pays bénéficiaires aux Points de Contact Jumelages, TAIEX et SIGMA. Les premières conclusions de cette évaluation seront présentées à la réunion des Points de Contacts Nationaux (PCN) mi juin 2011.

Après 8 ans d'introduction des jumelages dans la zone de voisinage, 156 projets ont été lancés dans 12 pays, pour un montant de près de 160 millions d'euros. Le temps est donc venu de procéder à une évaluation complète des jumelages pour, d'une part, en juger la performance, et, d'autre part, formuler un certain nombre de recommandations pour l'extension et l'amélioration de cet instrument. Cette évaluation est menée sur la base des méthodes qui ont été développées par l'Unité Conjointe d'Evaluation des projets et programmes d'EuropeAid.

Nous avons sélectionné 18+2 projets de jumelage (cf liste en pièce jointe), répartis dans 6 pays (Ukraine, Azerbaïdjan, Jordanie, Egypte, Tunisie, Maroc,) couvrant les trois secteurs les plus importants (Commerce et industrie, justice et affaires intérieures, finances), comme étant l'échantillon le plus représentatif de l'ensemble de l'instrument de jumelage sur la totalité de la zone de voisinage.

La méthode d'évaluation inclut l'envoi d'un questionnaire comprenant 10 questions d'évaluation à renseigner par les différentes parties concernées. Ce questionnaire, adapté à la nature de chacun des 3 projets sélectionnés par pays, est joint au présent email. Nous demandons pour chaque projet sélectionné que le PC de jumelages ou/et programme manager, le responsable PAO/UGP, le CRJ ou Directeur de projet, et le bénéficiaire national direct renseigne ce questionnaire. Nous restons à votre entière disposition pour toutes informations complémentaires. Vous pouvez nous joindre à votre convenance aux contacts mentionnés à la fin de cet email. Ces questionnaires, doivent être retournés par email en pièces jointes, en version word, en langue française ou anglaise, via le PC de jumelages aux experts, impérativement et au plus tard selon l'échéancier suivant :

Ukraine : 28 mars 2011

Azerbaïdjan : 22 avril 2011

Jordanie : 15 avril 2011

Egypte : 29 avril 2011

Tunisie : 29 avril 2011

Maroc : 8 avril 2011

La méthode d'évaluation prévoit également des visites des évaluateurs sur le terrain afin de mener un certain nombre d'interviews pour compléter les informations obtenues par le questionnaire, mais surtout pour échanger et confirmer les points cruciaux de l'évaluation. Les PC de jumelages voudront bien préparer le programme des entretiens avec les différentes parties concernées par les 3 projets sélectionnés (PCN, programme manager, PAO/UGP, RTA ou directeur de projet -si présent- et le bénéficiaire direct) et le faire parvenir aux

évaluateurs préalablement aux visites. Ces visites de deux évaluateurs (Gérard Bouscharain et Jean Bernard Moreau) sont programmées aux dates suivantes :

Ukraine : 3-8 avril 2011  
Azerbaïdjan : 2-8 mai 2011  
Jordanie : 25-30 avril 2011  
Égypte : 14-19 mai 2011  
Tunisie : 23-27 mai 2011  
Maroc : 14-19 avril 2011

Les premiers résultats de l'évaluation devront être présentés à l'unité A6 puis au Groupe de Référence fin mai, puis probablement discutés au cours de la réunion des PCN. Le rapport complet et final est prévu courant septembre prochain et sera remis à A6 et au Groupe de Référence au cours du séminaire de clôture du projet.

Nous restons à votre disposition pour toute autre information ou demande de votre part.

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tel +33 6 09 94 26 71

Jean Bernard Moreau  
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tel+ 32 81 35 89 14

Дамы и Господа,  
Дорогие Коллеги,

Группа А6 Мульти-страновых Программ DEVCO руководит оценкой Институционального Инструмента Twinning в Регионе Европейской Политики Соседства (ЕПС). Господин Jorge de la Caballeria и Госпожа Nathalie Thiberge заведуют данными мероприятиями и отвечают за общее координирование. Оценочная деятельность была доверена двум независимым экспертам: Messrs Gerard Bouscharain и Jean-Bernard Moreau. Контактные лица для Twinning, TAIEX и SIGMA в EUD (Контактное лицо TWG) отвечают за координирование и поддержку данной оценочной деятельности в странах – бенефициариях. Предварительные результаты оценки должны быть представлены на совещании NCP, запланированном на середину Июня 2011 года.

На данный момент, после 8-ми лет внедрения в регионе ЕПС, 156 проектов twinning были запущены в 12-ти странах ЕПС, с общим бюджетом около 160 миллионов €. В результате пришло время для всесторонней оценки Институционального Инструмента Twinning в регионе ЕПС для того чтобы, с одной стороны, дать оценку результатам и, с другой стороны, разработать список рекомендаций для расширения и улучшения работы Инструмента Twinning. Оценочная деятельность основывается на методологических директивах, разработанных в Совместной Группе по Оценке для проектов и программ DEVCO.

С целью оценки деятельности, мы выбрали 18+2 проектов twinning (смотрите приложение), которые были, или еще находятся, внедренными в 6-ти ЕПС странах, а именно, Украина, Азербайджан, Иордания, Египет, Тунисия и Марокко, в трех главных областях: Торговля & Промышленность, Правосудие & Внутренние дела и Финансовая система. Мы считаем этот пример самым показательным примером работы Институционального Инструмента Twinning в регионе ЕПС из всех возможных.

Данный метод оценки включает распространение оценочной анкеты, которая состоит из 10-ти оценочных вопросов, на которые должны ответить различные заинтересованные стороны. Данная оценочная анкета была разработана со спецификой каждого из трех проектов, выбранных в каждой стране, и прилагается к данному e-мейлу. Мы просим Контактное Лицо Twinning и/ или Руководителя Программы, РАО/UGP Директора или менеджера, РТА и/ или Директора Проекта (если еще находится на территории страны) и национального прямого бенефициария заполнить оценочную анкету. Тем временем мы находимся в Вашем распоряжении, в случае возникновения вопросов по данному делу. Мы будем рады, если Вы обратитесь к нам, наши данные указаны в конце данного сообщения. Заполненные надлежащим образом оценочные анкеты должны быть высланы Экспертам через Контактное Лицо Twinning, желательно по e- мейлу, в документе Word, на Английском или Французском языках (возможно на Русском для бенефициариев в Украине и Азербайджане), к срокам, указанным ниже:

Украина: 28-е Марта 2011 г.

Азербайджан: 22-е Апреля 2011 г.

Иордания: 15-е Апреля 2011 г.

Египет: 29-е Апреля 2011 г.

Тунисия: 29-е Апреля 2011 г.  
Марокко: 8-е Апреля 2011 г.

Метод оценки также предусматривает визиты в страну, организованные Оценочными Экспертами, для проведения определенного числа интервью с целью дополнения информации, предоставленной в заполненных анкетах, а также с целью обмена ключевыми результатами, которые будут проиллюстрированы в Заключительном Оценочном Отчете. Оценочные Эксперты будут очень благодарны, если Контактные Лица Twinning подготовят встречи- интервью с различными заинтересованными сторонами, напрямую вовлеченными в три проекта, выбранные для каждой страны (TWG Контактное лицо, PAO/UGP Менеджер Программы, возможно, RTA или Директор Проекта, и прямое учреждение – бенефициар). Мы также будем благодарны получить план нашего визита до нашего прибытия в каждую страну. Визиты в страну, которые будут осуществлены обоими Оценочными Экспертами (Gerard Bouscharain и Jean-Bernard Moreau), расписаны следующим образом:

Украина 3-8 Апреля 2011 г.  
Азербайджан: 2-7 Мая 2011 г.  
Иордания: 25-30 Апреля 2011 г.  
Египет: 14-19 Мая 2011 г.  
Тунисия: 23-27 Мая 2011 г.  
Марокко: 14-19 Апреля 2011 г.

Предварительные результаты должны быть предоставлены Группе А6 и затем Референс - Группе к концу Мая, и скорее всего, будут рассмотрены далее на Заседании НСР в середине Июня. Заключительный Отчет должен быть предоставлен в Сентябре и будет направлен в Группу А6 и Референс – Группу в течение закрытия семинара по проекту.

Тем временем, мы находимся в Вашем распоряжении в случае, если у Вас возникнут вопросы или необходима дальнейшая информация.

Заранее благодарим Вас за Ваше сотрудничество и с нетерпением ожидаем Вашего ответа.

С уважением,

Gerard Bouscharain  
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Tel: +33 6 09 94 26 71

Jean Bernard Moreau  
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**ANNEX 5**

**EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (English, Russian & French)**

**ANNEX 5 EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH, RUSSIAN & FRENCH)**

**EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE**

**English version**

**RESPONDANT'S COORDINATES**

**Name:**

**Current Title:**

**Home Organisation / Institution:**

**E-Mail:**

**Telephone:**

**Twinning Project Name:**

**Role/position in the Twinning Project (+ dates):**

**Question 1:** To what extent have the intervention logic, strategy and approach contributed adequately to the results achieved by this Institutional Twinning project in your ENP country?

Judgement criteria:

1. **For each of the projects, why, how, through what process has the twinning project been selected?** Did it make any sense to carry out any sectoral approach (with several beneficiary institutions involved directly or indirectly in the same twinning project)? Please add the corresponding key indicators, if appropriate.
2. **Has the possibility to choose TA rather than twinning been carefully considered** (adequacy of the instrument to the needs and absorption capacity of the beneficiary institutions)? Please add the corresponding key indicators, if appropriate.
3. **Have your country's direct twinning beneficiary and PAO, been directly / indirectly involved in the preparation of the twinning activities (Project Fiche, Work Plan and Twinning Contract)?** If yes, to what extent / how active was the cooperation? Have they been prepared or have they received any training/advice prior to the twinning activities? If yes, what specific training activities have been conducted? Please add the corresponding key indicators, if appropriate.
4. **Have the objectives of the twinning activities remained unchanged or have they been improved against the reference documents, including the mandatory results initially specified in the Project Fiche, through the entire duration of the activities?** Please elaborate and add the corresponding key indicators, if appropriate.
5. **What is your opinion on the following points?**
  - Have there been / are there major deviations from the twinning project against the Twinning Instrument's approach, or not? If yes, please elaborate.
  - Should any twinning project systematically be linked to one or more EU Acquis chapters?
  - If yes, for this project, what Acquis chapter is referred to concretely?
  - For this project, do you think that part of the activities could have been carried out through classical Technical Assistance? If yes, what are they?

**Question 2:** To what extent have the twinning project activities delivered the twinning mandatory results in your ENP country? *Have the right things been done?*

Judgement criteria:

1. **Please list the mandatory results and indicate to what extent they have been reached.** Please add the corresponding key indicators of achievement and their respective success rates (%).
2. **Have the right activities been conducted to obtain the mandatory results?** Please add the corresponding key indicators of achievement and their respective success rates (%).
3. **To what extent have the twinning activities transferred any institutional capacity to your country's beneficiary institution?** Please elaborate and add the corresponding key indicators of achievement.

4. **Were the twinning project indicators adequate in measuring the achievement of immediate objectives?** Did any significant changes occur after the initial design phase was completed? If yes, did project management react promptly and effectively to these changes in order to revise the indicators that were no longer appropriate? Please elaborate and add the corresponding key indicators of achievement.
5. **What were the major implementation constraints that affected the achievement / non-achievement of the stated objectives?** Please mention these objectives and add their corresponding indicators of achievement.
6. **Have unplanned results positively / negatively affected the benefits received?** Please indicate what results?
7. **Have cross-cutting<sup>1</sup> issues been taken into account well enough during the twinning implementation phase?** Had they been mentioned initially in the Project Fiche and Work Plan? If not, why? If yes, please specify what cross-cutting issues?

**Question 3:** To what extent have the twinning project activities been delivered adequately to your ENP country's beneficiaries? *Have the activities been conducted correctly in terms of quantity, quality, timeliness and best value for money?*

Judgement criteria:

1. **Have all the outputs/results been achieved as planned?** Please indicate the quantitative indicators and their success rates (%) against the mandatory results.
2. **Do you think that the best quality of the outputs/results achieved was obtained against the expected results and mobilised resources?** Please indicate the qualitative indicators and their success rates (%) against the mandatory results.
3. **Have local institutions, target beneficiaries and other stakeholders contributed to twinning activity preparation and implementation in a timely and result-oriented manner?** Please elaborate on this contribution.
4. **In your opinion, can twinning activity costs be justified against twinning benefits, which they have generated (best value for money)?** Please compare with similar projects and/or alternative approaches, taking into account contextual differences.
5. **Was this project's total budget proportionate to the foreseen activities and expected results?** Was the project's total budget entirely consumed? If not, why and for which specific items?
6. **In your opinion, was the total budget for this project under- or over-estimated? If yes, to what extent? Please comment.**
7. **Was there any amendment made to reallocate funds from one or more activities to other existing or new activities? Did this affect the quality of delivery of these and other activities?**
8. **Did Commission HQ/EU Delegation/PAO inputs (procurement, training, contracting either directly or via consulting firms) contribute to twinning activity preparation and**

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<sup>1</sup> Cross-Cutting Issues are democracy and human rights, environmental sustainability, gender equality and HIV/AIDS anti-discrimination policies and measures.

**implementation in a timely and result-oriented manner?** Please elaborate on the level of support provided by these line stakeholders.

9. **Did the quality of the expertise made available respond to the level expected and the requirements to achieve the activities? Was a Quality Assurance system in place?** How was the quality of the expertise appreciated/perceived? Were the experts all civil servants or employees of mandated bodies in their EU countries? Are these experts prepared to deliver quality expertise responding to the beneficiary country's needs and expectations? To what extent have the beneficiaries been satisfied in relation to actions conducted both in the beneficiary countries and in the EU?

**Question 4:** To what extent have twinning project activities contributed to capacity building, legal approximation (EU Acquis) and institutional modernisation in your ENP country?

Judgement criteria:

1. **What are the main results of the project and how did they impact on the beneficiary institution's functioning?** Have these results brought about any organisational changes in terms of restructuring and training? Have any additional civil service units been created? Have there been any major changes to the existing working procedures? Please elaborate and provide relevant indicators.
2. **Have mandatory results been achieved together with significant and sustainable changes in the functioning of the beneficiary institution?** Would you be in a position to confirm that the results of the twinning project have brought about any substantial progress to the beneficiary institution, e.g. in terms of capacity building, Acquis transfer, legal approximation, structural reforms and political, economic, trade, finance and justice & home affairs? Please elaborate and provide the project's corresponding key indicators of achievement and their respective success rates (%).
3. **Have economic, trade, justice and social effects resulting from the twinning activities been spread against the achievement of Overall Objectives?** If yes, what changes have been brought about? Have unplanned impacts affected the overall impact? If yes, what are they? And with what implications?
4. **Have civil servants been trained to the introduction of these changes?** Did they change their working methods accordingly? Is the trained staff still in the positions for which they have been trained? Provide indicators (staff trained, staff still working...)
5. **Have cross-cutting issues been taken into consideration in this twinning project, whenever was appropriate?** Was there any substantial progress made? Please elaborate and provide the relevant indicators.

**Question 5:** To what extent are the results achieved by twinning **project** activities likely to survive individual twinning project completion in your ENP country? *Are those results still operative after project completion?*

Judgement criteria:

1. **Have positive results/outcomes/impacts of this twinning project continued, or are they likely to continue, after external funding ended or ends?** Please elaborate and provide the key indicators, if appropriate.

2. **Have the direct beneficiaries demonstrated ownership of the project outcomes?** Have the outcomes/results/changes been integrated for good and in a stable manner into the beneficiary institution's functioning? Is there any follow-up system in place or has this been envisaged? Please elaborate.
3. **As regards institutional capacity building, are the beneficiary institution's trained staff still in place? Are they working on subjects related to the changes introduced by the twinning project?** Have you noticed any turnover among this staff? Please provide relevant indicators. Have HR management procedures been, are they being or will they be, put in place for staff recruitment, replacement, turnover, career development and further training (e.g. "Training the Trainers" facility or "Manual of Internal Procedures" for dissemination and governance)?
4. **As regards Acquis transfer, legal approximation and/or and the law-making process supported by this twinning project, would you be in a position to confirm that this project has had any real, sustainable impact on the modifications introduced to the beneficiary institution's functioning?** Please indicate when the bill, if any at all, was drafted, voted into law by Parliament, enforced and also when it started to deliver its first intended results (during project implementation or after one, two or three years. Or never).
5. **What was the level of political commitment and absorption capacity demonstrated by government, public, business and civil society organisations?** Please elaborate.
6. **In the long term, what have the effects of institutional, legal and policy changes (reform process) been like on a particular sector or region in your country as a result of the twinning project activities?** Please elaborate and indicate what sector(s)/region(s)/activity(-ies).
7. **Is any domestic funding strategy in place or under way to continue the twinning achievements (existing or envisaged)?** If yes, at affordable costs (e.g. maintenance, replacement, insurance, disposables, further training, etc)?
8. **Has the transition (from operational, administrative and financial point of view) from one project to another been envisaged and have new fields of intervention been identified?**
9. **For ENP-East countries (e.g. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, etc), is there any Association Agreement currently being negotiated? Has the CIB been taken into account? What impact may this have on future programming and the twinning instrument?**

**Question 6:** To what extent have the twinning activities been complementary with TAIEX and SIGMA and coherent with other institutional building instruments funded by the EU and other multi- and bilateral donors?

Judgement criteria:

1. **Have there been any complementary actions/activities foreseen or implemented between this twinning project and TAIEX/SIGMA and/or other multi- and bi-lateral donors?** Please indicate if any at all.
2. **Was there any mechanism operational or envisaged for optimising the additional and coordinated implementation of the various tools made available to the Twinning**

**Instrument (twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA, short-term and long-term technical assistance, procurement)?**

3. **Did the PAO have one of their project managers specifically responsible for TAIEX and/or SIGMA?** Did he/she have a direct relationship with his/her colleagues at EUD/DG Enlargement to discuss the various TAIEX interventions?
4. **In your opinion, has there been any overlap between the Twinning Instrument's activities and TAIEX/SIGMA?** Is it fair to say that complementarity between these instruments could be improved? If yes, please indicate in what areas.

Additional point:

- **What is your opinion about activities, such as study tours to EU Member States, stakeholder participation in regional events, etc.)?** Would you be in a position to confirm that these activities are necessary, complementary and coherent with the other twinning activities? Do these activities bring about any benefit to the direct beneficiaries? Do they bring any additional benefit to the project? May they be regarded as too costly? How could we measure the result of these activities? What indicator(s) could be appropriate?

**Question 7:** To what extent has the EU twinning intervention contributed successfully to a beneficiary's institutional building effort in your country?

Judgement criteria:

1. **Would you be in a position to confirm that the Twinning Instrument is a valuable tool to develop administrative cooperation between EU Member States and ENP Beneficiary Countries for improving the institutional capacity of the beneficiary administration?** Does the Twinning Instrument bring about results that other donors' forms of support simply can't afford? Please elaborate.
2. **Have the Commission Services, both HQ and EUD, demonstrated a capacity to bring Member States and beneficiaries together within the framework of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in your country?** If yes, with what implications? Please elaborate or give examples of what particular aspect could be improved.

**Question 8:** To what extent has institutional twinning contributed to improving cross-cutting issues in your country?

Judgement criteria:

1. **Has there been any cross-cutting issue strategy/approach envisaged on this twinning project?** If yes, for which of the cross-cutting issues? With what (intended) implications?
2. **Have twinning activities improved the status of cross-cutting issues in your country at the level of domestic or sectoral policy?** If yes, how? If not, why?

**Question 9:** To what extent has the decentralised vs. centralised management of twinning activities contributed to the quality of results achieved by the Institutional Twinning Instrument in your country?

Judgement criteria:

1. **Has decentralised vs. centralised management positively or negatively affected the design, implementation, impact and sustainability of the twinning activities?** Is the beneficiary institution prepared to implement the EU Decentralised Implementation System (DIS)? Has the beneficiary institution got the full capacity to implement such complex instruments as EU-funded twinning projects? What are the remaining obstacles to DIS adoption? Please elaborate.
2. Description of beneficiary institutions:  
**What is there real political commitment from the line Ministries?** For example, did the beneficiary Ministry take part in, or was it represented to, the Steering Committee, Evaluation Committee and in the Follow-up Meetings?
3. Description of the PAO:  
**What is your opinion on the status, mandate and role played by the PAO under decentralised vs. centralised management?** Would you be in a position to confirm that the PAO's role should be increased and its functioning improved? Has there been any conflict between EU and beneficiary country procedures? Did the PAO Directors have a political or rather technical profile/background?
4. **In the case of European public institutions, was project twinning management ensured by intermediary operators or directly by the EU MS partner institution?** What is the degree of political impulse? Have there been any prior bilateral cooperation relations between the twinning partners? Should any bilateral relations at a later stage be anticipated (after project completion)? Please elaborate.

<p><b>Question 10:</b> To what extent have the communication &amp; visibility activities promoted the Institutional Twinning Instrument across the ENP Region and thus contributed to the achievements of twinning activities in your country?</p>
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Judgement criteria:

1. **Have C&V activities and actions been foreseen in the twinning project fiche?** If yes, what are they? In your opinion was there enough C&V activities and awareness included in this project?
2. **Have the project's C&V activities promoted the Twinning Instrument in your country?** Has any Communication Plan been prepared during the inception phase and regularly been updated during the implementation phase? Please elaborate on the impact of the Communication Plan?
3. **Are stakeholders, national and international, regularly informed of the projects in the pipeline and of the projects awarded, on any progress made by these projects?** Are regular briefing meetings organised with stakeholders in order to inform on the latest developments regarding ongoing projects and projects under way
4. **An "enlarged" participation in the Steering Committee couldn't be the opportunity to better disseminate information on the project, to ensure its promotion and to get the active support of stakeholders?**

5. **Has the number of requests for participation in twinning activities submitted by national institutions increased in your country as a result of C&V activities?** Has effective institutional participation in twinning activities increased in your country? Please elaborate.

**ОЦЕНОЧНАЯ АНКЕТА**  
**Russian Version**

**ДАННЫЕ РЕСПОНДЕНТА В АЗЕРБАИДЖАНЕ:**

**Имя / фамилия:**

**Текущая должность:**

**Местная Организация / Учреждение:**

**E-Mail:**

**Телефон:**

**Название Проекта Twinning:**

- Поддержка ГосКомСтату Азербайджана по достижению Европейских стандартов в национальных счетах, ненаблюдаемой экономике, деловой статистике и индексе цен производителей
- Поддержка Азербайджану в области технических урегулирований, стандартов и оценки соответствия
- Поддержка Парламенту Азербайджана (законодательное сближение с Европейским Союзом)

**Место / должность в Проекте Twinning (+ сроки) :**

**Вопрос 1:** В какой степени интервенционная логика, стратегия и подход соответственно способствовали и повлияли на результаты, которые были достигнуты с помощью Институционального Проекта Twinning в Вашей ЕПС стране?

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Для каждого проекта, по какой причине, каким образом, с помощью какого процесса проект twinning был выбран?** Было ли обоснованным использовать какой-либо секторальный подход (с несколькими учреждениями - бенефициариями, напрямую или косвенно вовлеченными в тот же проект twinning)? Укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели, если необходимо.
2. **Была ли тщательно рассмотрена возможность выбора между ТА и twinning** (соответствие инструмента потребностям и поглощающая способность учреждений – бенефициариев)? Укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели, если необходимо.
3. **Были ли прямые бенефициарии и РАО (Офис Управления Программой) Вашей страны вовлечены напрямую / косвенно в подготовку мероприятий twinning (Проектное Предложение, Рабочий План и Договор Twinning)?** Если да, в какой степени / насколько активно было сотрудничество? Были ли они подготовлены или получили ли они какой-либо тренинг/ обучение до начала мероприятий twinning? Если да, какие именно тренинги были проведены? Укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели, если необходимо.
4. **Остались ли задачи мероприятий twinning неизменными или улучшились по сравнению с начальными документами, включая обязательные результаты, указанные первоначально в Проектном Предложении, в течение всего периода мероприятий?** Опишите и укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели, если необходимо.
5. **Каково Ваше мнение по следующим пунктам?**
  - Были ли/ присутствуют ли в проекте twinning серьезные отклонения от подхода Инструмента Twinning? Если да, опишите.
  - Должен ли любой проект twinning систематически отражать одну или более глав Acquis EC?
  - Если да, для данного проекта, укажите, на какую именно из глав Acquis ссылка?
  - Для данного проекта, считаете ли Вы, что часть деятельности могла бы быть проведена с помощью классической Технической Помощи? Если да, какая?

**Вопрос 2:** В какой степени деятельность по проекту twinning обеспечила обязательные результаты twinning в Вашей стране ЕПС? *Были ли произведены правильные действия?*

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Приведите список обязательных результатов и укажите в какой степени они были достигнуты.** Укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели выполнения и их степень реализации. (%).
2. **Были ли проведены правильные действия для достижения обязательных результатов?** Укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели выполнения и их степень эффективности. (%).

3. **В какой степени деятельность twinning передала любой институциональный потенциал учреждению – бенефициарию в Вашей стране?** Опишите и укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели выполнения.
4. **Были ли показатели проекта twinning достаточными, соответствующими в процессе определения степени выполнения срочных результатов?** Произошли какие-либо существенные изменения после того, как первоначальная стадия разработки была закончена? Если да, приняло ли руководство проекта быстрые и эффективные меры в виду этих изменений по пересмотру показателей, которые более не соответствовали? Опишите и укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели выполнения.
5. **Каковы были основные ограничения при внедрении, которые повлияли на достижение/ невыполнение установленных задач?** Укажите задачи и соответствующие ключевые показатели выполнения.
6. **Незапланированные результаты позитивно/ негативно повлияли на полученные результаты?** Укажите какие результаты.
7. **Были ли приняты во внимание в достаточной мере «перекрестные вопросы» (cross-cutting)<sup>2</sup> в течение стадии внедрения twinning?** Были ли они первоначально отмечены в Проектном Предложении и Рабочем плане? Если нет, по какой причине? Если да, укажите, какие «перекрестные вопросы».

**Вопрос 3:** В какой степени действия по проекту twinning были соответствующим образом предоставлены бенефициариям Вашей страны ЕПС? *Была ли деятельность осуществлена правильно с точки зрения количества, качества, сроков и оптимального способа применения средств?*

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Были ли достигнуты все задачи/ результаты как запланировано?** Укажите качественные показатели и их степень эффективности (%) по обязательным результатам.
2. **Думаете ли Вы, что лучшее качество полученных задач/ результатов было достигнуто по ожидаемым результатам и мобилизованным ресурсам?** Укажите количественные показатели и их степень эффективности (%) по обязательным результатам.
3. **Местные организации, прямые бенефициарии и другие заинтересованные стороны внесли ли вклад по подготовке и внедрению деятельности twinning вовремя и целенаправленно?** Опишите.
4. **По Вашему мнению, может деятельность twinning быть подтверждена с точки зрения результатов twinning, к которым она привела (оптимальное применение средств)?** Сравните с похожими проектами и/ или альтернативными подходами, принимая во внимание различия в контексте.

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<sup>2</sup> Сквозные вопросы это демократия и права человека, экологическая устойчивость, гендерное равенство и ВИЧ/ СПИД анти-дискриминационные политика и действия.

5. **Был ли общий бюджет проекта пропорционален определенной деятельности и ожидаемым результатам?** Был ли потрачен полностью бюджет данного проекта? Если нет, то по каким причинам и на какие определенные меры?
6. **По Вашему мнению, был ли общий бюджет на данный проект недооценен или переоценен? Если да, в какой степени? Прокомментируйте.**
7. **Были ли внесены поправки по перераспределению фондов от одного или более мероприятий к другим существующим или новым? Повлияло ли это на качество выполнения этих или других действий?**
8. **Комиссия НQ/ Делегация ЕС/ вклад РАО (снабжение, тренинг, контрактные соглашения напрямую или через фирмы- консалтинг) повлияли на подготовку и внедрение деятельности twinning вовремя и целенаправленно?** Опишите уровень поддержки, полученный от данных линейных заинтересованных сторон.
9. **Качество экспертной оценки ответило ожидаемому уровню и требованиям в выполнении мероприятий? Система по Обеспечению Качества была использована?** Как было воспринято качество экспертной оценки? Были ли все эксперты гражданскими служащими или сотрудниками органов ЕС в своих странах? Подготовлены ли эти эксперты выполнять качественную экспертизу, отвечающую требованиям и ожиданиям страны – бенефициария? В какой степени бенефициарии были удовлетворены в отношении действий и в странах – бенефициариях, и в ЕС?

**Вопрос 4:** В какой степени деятельность по проекту twinning повлияла на наращивание потенциала, сближение правовых норм (EU Acquis) и институциональную модернизацию в Вашей ЕПС стране?

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Каковы основные результаты проекта и как они повлияли на работу учреждения – бенефициария?** Принесли ли эти результаты какие-либо организационные изменения с точки зрения реструктуризации и тренинга? Была ли создана какой-либо дополнительная гражданская единица? Были ли внесены серьезные изменения в существующие рабочие процессы?
2. **Были ли достигнуты обязательные результаты одновременно со значимыми и устойчивыми изменениями в работе учреждения – бенефициария?** Можете ли Вы подтвердить, что результаты проекта – twinning принесли устойчивый прогресс учреждению – бенефициарию, например, с точки зрения наращивания потенциала, перевода Acquis, сближения правовых норм, реформ в структуризации, и с точки зрения политической, экономической, торговой, финансовой, законодательной и внутренних дел? Опишите и укажите соответствующие ключевые показатели проекта и их степень эффективности (%).
3. **Экономические, торговые, законодательные и социальные результаты от деятельности twinning повлияли на достижение Общих задач?** Если да, какие изменения были получены? Незапланированные результаты повлияли на общий результат? Если да, какие? И с какими последствиями?
4. **Были ли гражданские служащие обучены с целью введения данных изменений?** Изменили ли они свои рабочие методы соответствующим образом? Находятся ли до

сих пор обученные служащие в должностях, для которых их обучили? Укажите показатели (обученные сотрудники, продолжающие работу сотрудники...)

5. **Были ли приняты во внимание «перекрестные вопросы» в данном проекте twinning, когда было необходимо?** Был ли сделан значительный прогресс? Опишите и укажите соответствующие показатели.

**Вопрос 5:** В какой степени результаты, достигнутые с помощью деятельности по проекту twinning, могут привести к выполнению индивидуального проекта twinning в Вашей ЕПС стране? *Эти результаты все еще действуют после окончания проекта?*

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Позитивные результаты/ следствие/ влияние данного проекта twinning существуют, или будут продолжены, после того, как внешнее финансирование закончилось или заканчивается?** Опишите и приведите ключевые показатели, если необходимо.
2. **Прямые бенефициарии получили результаты по проекту?** Результаты/ изменения / выводы были хорошо и стабильно интегрированы в работу учреждения – бенефициария? Существует ли какая-то система проверки или было ли это обсуждено? Опишите.
3. **Относительно институционального наращивания потенциала, еще есть обученные сотрудники в учреждении – бенефициарии? Работают ли они над вопросами, которые касаются изменений, введенных проектом twinning?** Вы заметили какой-то оборот среди этих сотрудников? Приведите соответствующие показатели. Были ли введены, вводятся или будут введены процессы руководства Отдела Кадров (HR) для принятия на работу сотрудников, замены, оборота, развития карьеры и дальнейшего обучения (например, метод «Обучение и Трейнеры» или «Руководство по Внутренним процессам» для распространения и руководства)?
4. **Относительно перевода Acquis, сближения правовых норм и процесса разработки законов, поддерживаемых проектом twinning, могли бы Вы подтвердить, что проект реально и в значимой степени повлиял на изменения, введенные в работу учреждения – бенефициария?** Приведите пример когда законопроект, если таковой существовал, был разработан, проголосован Парламентом, введен, а также, когда начал приносить первые результаты (в течение внедрения проекта или через 1,2 или 3 года. Или никогда).
5. **Каков был уровень политической поддержки и поглощающей способности, продемонстрированные правительственными, общественными, деловыми и гражданскими организациями?** Опишите.
6. **С точки зрения долгосрочной перспективы, институциональные, правовые и политические изменения (процесс реформ) повлияли на частный сектор или регион в Вашей стране в результате деятельности по проекту twinning?** Опишите и укажите сектор(а)/ регион(ы)/ деятельность.
7. **Существует ли какая-либо местная финансовая стратегия, или находится на стадии разработки, с целью продолжения достижений twinning (существующих или намеченных)?** Если да, по допустимым средствам (например, средства, замена, страховка, материалы, дальнейшие тренинги и т.д.)?

8. **Переход (с точки зрения операционной, административной и финансовой) от одного проекта к другому был намечен и новые области интервенции были определены?**
9. **Для Южных стран ЕПС (например, Украина, Азербайджан и т.д.), были ли рассмотрены какие-либо Соглашения об Ассоциации? Был ли принят во внимание СІВ? Какое влияние может это оказать на дальнейшие программы и инструмент twinning?**

**Вопрос 6:** В какой степени действия twinning дополняли TAIEX и SIGMA и были связанными с другими институциональными инструментами, финансируемыми ЕС и другими много- или двусторонними финансирующими структурами?

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Были ли предусмотрены или введены какие-либо дополнительные действия посредством данного проекта twinning и TAIEX/ -сторонним и SIGMA и/ или другими много- и двусторонними финансирующими структурами? Укажите, если таковые есть.**
2. **Был ли предусмотрен какой-либо операционный механизм или намеченный механизм для оптимизации дополнительного и координированного внедрения различных средств для Инструмента Twinning (twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA, срочная и долгосрочная техническая поддержка, снабжение)?**
3. **Были ли в РАО один или более менеджеров по проекту ответственными именно за TAIEX и/ или SIGMA? Сотрудничал/а ли он/ она напрямую с его/ ее коллегами в EUD/DG Расширение для обсуждения различных интервенций TAIEX?**
4. **По Вашему мнению, было ли какое-либо совпадение между деятельностью Инструмента Twinning и TAIEX/SIGMA? Правильно ли сказать, что взаимодополнение данных инструментов может быть улучшено? Если да, укажите в каких областях.**

Дополнительный вопрос:

- **Каково Ваше мнение относительно деятельности, такой как обучающие туры в страны-члены ЕС, участие заинтересованных сторон в региональных мероприятиях и т.д.? Можете ли Вы подтвердить, что данная деятельность необходима, дополняет и связана с другой деятельностью twinning? Приносят ли данные действия какой-либо результат прямым бенефициариям? Каким образом мы можем определить результат данных действий? Какие соответствующие показатели можно использовать?**

**Вопрос 7:** В какой степени внедрение twinning ЕС успешно повлияло на укрепление институционального потенциала бенефициария в Вашей стране?

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Могли бы Вы подтвердить, что Инструмент Twinning является ценным средством для развития административного сотрудничества между странами- членами ЕС и странами – бенефициариями ЕПС для улучшения институционального потенциала**

**руководства бенефициария?** Приносит ли Инструмент Twinning результаты, которые другие формы финансовой поддержки просто не могут предложить? Опишите.

2. **Действия Еврокомиссии, в частности Штабквартира и/ или Делегация, продемонстрировали способность объединить страны-члены и бенефициариев вместе в рабочих рамках Институционального Инструмента Twinning в Вашей стране?** Если да, с какими последствиями? Опишите или приведите примеры, какой именно аспект был улучшен.

**Вопрос 8:** В какой степени институциональный twinning внес улучшения в «перекрестные вопросы» в Вашей стране?

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Была ли намечена какая-либо стратегия/ подход по «перекрестному вопросу» в данном проекте twinning?** Если да, по которому из «перекрестных вопросов»? С какими (намеченными) последствиями?
2. **Улучшили действия twinning статус «перекрестных вопросов» в Вашей стране на уровне национальной или секторальной политики?** Если да, каким образом? Если нет, по какой причине?

**Вопрос 9:** В какой степени децентрализованный менеджмент twinning в сравнении с централизованным повлиял на качество результатов, полученных с помощью Институционального Инструмента Twinning в Вашей стране?

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Децентрализованный менеджмент в сравнении с централизованным позитивно или негативно повлиял на разработку, внедрение, влияние и устойчивость результатов деятельности twinning?** Учреждение – бенефициарий готово для внедрения Децентрализованной Системы ЕС (DIS)? Использовало ли учреждение – бенефициарий в полной мере внедрения таких сложных инструментов, как финансируемые ЕС проекты twinning? Каковы действующие ограничения на пути к внедрению (DIS)? Опишите.
2. **Описание учреждений-бенефициариев:**

**Каково настоящее политическое участие со стороны линейных Министерств?** Например, Министерство – бенефициарий принимало участие, или представлено, в Руководящем Комитете, Оценочном Комитете или на Повторных Встречах ?

3. **Описание РАО:**

**Каково Ваше мнение по статусу, мандату и роли, которую сыграл РАО под руководством централизованным в сравнении с децентрализованным?** Могли бы Вы подтвердить, что роль РАО была повышена и его работа улучшена? Возникали разногласия в процессах ЕС по сравнению с процессами страны бенефициария? Есть ли у Директоров РАО политический или технический опыт?

4. **В случае общественных организаций ЕС, был ли менеджмент проекта twinning обеспечен операторами – посредниками или напрямую ЕС MS органом – партнером?** Каков процент политического импульса? Были ли до двустороннего

сотрудничества отношения между партнерами twinning? Можно ли ожидать дальнейшие двусторонние отношения (после выполнения проекта)? Опишите.

**Вопрос 10:** В какой степени коммуникации и узнаваемость (Communication & Visibility) повлияли на продвижение Институционального Инструмента Twinning в Регионе ЕПС, и таким образом, повлияли на достижения посредством деятельности twinning в Вашей стране?

Оценочный критерий:

1. **Были ли действия и деятельность C&V предусмотрены в проектном предложении twinning?** Если да, какие именно? По Вашему мнению были ли количество действий C&V и осведомленность достаточными в данном проекте?
2. **Деятельность C&V по проекту продвинула Инструмент Twinning в Вашей стране?** Был ли какой-либо Коммуникационный План разработан в течение первоначальной стадии и обновлялся в течение стадии внедрения? Опишите влияние Плана Коммуникации.
3. **Заинтересованные стороны, национальные и международные, осведомлены о проектах в разработке или окончанных проектах, о прогрессах по этим проектам на постоянной основе?** Организованы ли регулярные совещания брифинг с заинтересованными сторонами с целью осведомления по последним разработкам относительно текущих проектов и поступающих проектов ?
4. **Расширенное участие в Руководящем Комитете могло бы стать возможностью лучшего распространения информации по проекту, обеспечить его продвижение и получить активную поддержку со стороны заинтересованных лиц?**
5. **Увеличилось ли число заявок со стороны национальных организаций на участие в деятельности twinning в Вашей стране в результате C&V?** Увеличилось ли институциональное участие в деятельности twinning в Вашей стране? Опишите.

**QUESTIONNAIRE D'EVALUATION**  
**French Version**

**COORDONNEES DE LA PERSONNE INTERVIEWEE :**

**Nom:**

**Titre actuel:**

**Organisation / Institution d'origine:**

**Adresse e-mail:**

**Téléphone:**

**Nom du projet de jumelage:**

- 
- 
- 
- 

**Rôle/poste dans le projet de jumelage (+ dates):**

**Question 1:** Dans quelle mesure la logique d'intervention, la stratégie et l'approche ont-elles contribué adéquatement aux résultats obtenus par le projet de Jumelage Institutionnel dans votre pays de la Région de Voisinage?

Critères de jugement:

1. **Pour chacun des projets, pourquoi, comment et à travers quel processus le projet de jumelage a-t-il été sélectionné?** Cela avait-il du sens d'effectuer une approche sectorielle (avec plusieurs institutions bénéficiaires impliquées directement ou indirectement dans le même projet de jumelage) ? Veuillez ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents.
2. **La possibilité de choisir l'assistance technique plutôt que le jumelage a-t-elle été sérieusement considérée** (adéquation de l'instrument par rapport aux besoins et à la capacité d'absorption des institutions bénéficiaires) ? Veuillez ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents.
3. **Le bénéficiaire direct du jumelage et l'UGP de votre pays ont-ils été directement/indirectement impliqués dans la préparation des activités de jumelage (Fiche Projet, Plan de Travail et Contrat de Jumelage) ?** Si oui, dans quelle mesure cette coopération a-t-elle été active ? Ont-ils été préparés ou ont-ils reçu une formation ou des conseils préalablement aux activités de jumelages ? Si oui, quelles ont été ces activités de formation spécifiques qui ont été menées ? Veuillez ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents.
4. **Les objectifs des activités de jumelage sont-ils demeurés inchangés ou ont-ils été améliorés au regard des documents de référence, y compris les résultats obligatoires spécifiés au départ dans la Fiche Projet, durant toute la mise en œuvre du projet ?** Veuillez développer et ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents.
5. **Quel est votre avis concernant les points suivants?**
  - Y a-t-il eu / existe-t-il ou non des déviations importantes décelées dans le projet de jumelage au regard de l'approche proposée par l'Instrument de Jumelage ? Si oui, veuillez développer.
  - Tout projet de jumelage devrait-il être systématiquement lié à un ou plusieurs chapitres de l'Acquis de l'Union Européenne?
  - Si oui, à quel chapitre de l'Acquis ce projet fait-il concrètement référence ?
  - Pour ce projet, croyez-vous qu'une partie des activités aurait pu être réalisées grâce à une assistance technique classique ? Si oui, pour quelles activités du projet en particulier ?

**Question 2:** Dans quelle mesure les activités du projet de jumelage ont-elles produit les résultats obligatoires de jumelage dans votre pays de la Région du Voisinage? *Les activités mises en œuvre étaient-elles les bonnes ?*

Critères de jugement:

1. **Veuillez énumérer les résultats obligatoires et indiquer dans quelle mesure ils ont été atteints?** Veuillez ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents et leurs taux de succès/réalisation respectifs (%).
2. **Les activités réalisées étaient les bonnes afin d'obtenir les résultats obligatoires?** Veuillez ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents et leurs taux de succès/réalisation respectifs (%).

3. **Dans quelle mesure les activités de jumelage ont transféré de la capacité institutionnelle à l'institution bénéficiaire de votre pays ?** Veuillez développer et ajouter les principaux indicateurs principaux pertinents.
4. **Les indicateurs du projet de jumelage étaient-ils adéquats pour mesurer la réalisation des objectifs immédiats ?** Des changements/mutations significatifs se sont-ils produits une fois la phase de préparation initiale terminée ? Si oui, la direction du projet a-t-elle réagi rapidement et efficacement afin de revoir les indicateurs qui n'étaient plus appropriés ? Veuillez développer et ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents de réalisation et leurs taux de réalisation respectifs (%).
5. **Quelles ont été les contraintes principales quant à la mise en œuvre du projet et qui ont affecté la réalisation ou la non-réalisation des objectifs établis ?** Veuillez mentionner ces objectifs et ajouter les principaux indicateurs pertinents.
6. **Des résultats non-planifiés ont-ils affecté positivement ou négativement les éléments positifs reçus ?** Veuillez indiquer quels résultats.
7. **Les questions transversales<sup>3</sup> ont-elles été suffisamment bien prises en considération durant la phase de mise en œuvre du projet de jumelage ?** Avaient-elles été mentionnées initialement dans la Fiche Projet et le Plan de Travail ? Si non, pourquoi ? Si oui, veuillez spécifier quelles étaient ces questions transversales.

**Question 3:** Dans quelle mesure les activités du projet de jumelage ont-elles été livrées correctement aux bénéficiaires de votre pays ? *Ces activités ont-elles été menées correctement en termes de quantité, qualité, de ponctualité et meilleur rapport qualité-prix ?*

Critères de jugement:

1. **Tous les résultats/extrants ont-ils été réalisés comme prévus ?** Veuillez mentionner les indicateurs quantitatifs et leurs taux de succès respectifs (%) au regard des résultats obligatoires.
2. **Croyez-vous que la meilleure qualité des extrants/résultats a été obtenues au regard des résultats attendus et des ressources mobilisées ?** Veuillez mentionner les indicateurs qualitatifs et leurs taux de succès respectifs (%) au regard des résultats obligatoires.
3. **Les institutions locales, les bénéficiaires-cibles et les autres parties prenantes ont-elles contribué à la préparation et à la mise en œuvre des activités de jumelage de manière ponctuelle et orientée vers le résultat ?** Veuillez développer en ce qui concerne cette contribution.
4. **A votre avis, le coût des activités de votre projet de jumelage se justifie-il au regard des éléments positifs qu'elles ont générés (meilleur rapport qualité-prix) ?** Veuillez comparer avec des projets identiques et/ou des approches alternatives, tout en tenant compte des différences contextuelles.
5. **Le budget total de ce projet de jumelage était-il proportionné aux activités prévues et aux résultats espérés ?** Le budget total du projet a-t-il été entièrement consommé ? Si non, pourquoi et pour quels composants particulières ?

<sup>3</sup> Les questions transversales sont les suivantes : démocratie et droits humains, durabilité environnementale, égalité hommes-femmes et mesures et politiques antidiscriminatoires envers les sidéens.

6. **A votre avis, le budget total du projet a-t-il été sous-évalué ou surévalué ?** Si oui, dans quelle mesure ? Veuillez commenter.
7. **Y a-t-il eu des modifications visant à réallouer des fonds d'une ou plusieurs activités vers des activités autres et/ou nouvelles ?** Si oui, ceci a-t-il affecté la qualité de la réalisation de ces activités et/ou des nouvelles activités ?
8. **Les intrants du QG de la Commission / de la DUE / de l'UGP (fournitures, formations, contrats soit directement ou via des cabinets de consultants) ont-ils contribué à la préparation et à la mise en œuvre des activités de jumelage de votre projet de manière ponctuelle et orientée vers le résultat ?** Veuillez développer quant au niveau de soutien apporté par ces parties prenantes.
9. **La qualité des experts disponibles répondait-elle au niveau espéré et aux exigences afin de mener à bien les activités ? Un système d'Assurance Qualité était-il en place ?** De quelle manière la qualité des experts a-t-elle été appréciée/perçue ? Les Experts étaient-ils tous des fonctionnaires ou des employés d'autorités publiques dans leurs pays de l'Union Européenne ? Les experts sont-ils préparés à livrer un travail de qualité qui répond aux besoins et aux attentes des bénéficiaires ? Dans quelle mesure les bénéficiaires ont-ils été satisfaits des actions menées chez eux et dans l'Union Européenne ?

**Question 4:** Dans quelle mesure les activités de ce projet de jumelage ont-elles contribué à renforcer la capacité institutionnelle, au rapprochement juridique (Acquis de l'UE) et à la modernisation institutionnelle dans votre pays ?

Critères de jugement:

1. **Quels sont les principaux résultats du projet et quel impact ont-ils eu sur le fonctionnement de l'institution bénéficiaire ?** Ces résultats ont-ils permis d'amener des mutations/changements organisationnels en termes de restructuration et de formation ? De nouvelles unités de service public ont-elles été créées ? Y a-t-il eu des mutations/changements importants quant aux procédures de travail existantes ? Veuillez développer et fournir les indicateurs pertinents.
2. **Les résultats obligatoires ont-ils été obtenus en même temps que des mutations/changements importants et durables dans le fonctionnement de l'institution bénéficiaire ?** Seriez-vous en mesure d'affirmer que les résultats du projet de jumelage ont suscité un progrès significatif au sein de l'institution bénéficiaire, par ex. en ce qui concerne le renforcement des capacités, la transposition de l'Acquis de l'UE, les réformes structurelles et les affaires politiques, économiques, commerciales, financières, juridiques et intérieures ? Veuillez développer et fournir les principaux indicateurs de réalisation pertinents pour ce projet ainsi que leurs taux de succès respectifs (%).
3. **Les effets sur l'économie, le commerce, la justice et le social résultant des activités de jumelage ont-ils été répandus au regard de la réalisation des Objectifs Généraux du projet de jumelage ?** Si oui, quels changements/mutations ces effets ont-ils amené ? Des impacts imprévus ont-ils affecté l'impact général du projet de jumelage ? Si oui, quels sont-ils ? Et quelles en sont les implications ?
4. **Les fonctionnaires des bénéficiaires ont-ils été formés à l'introduction de ces changements/mutations ?** Ont-ils modifiés leurs méthodes de travail en fonction ? Le personnel formé occupe-t-il toujours les places pour lesquelles il a été formé ? Veuillez fournir les indicateurs pertinents (personnel formé, personnel toujours en place à ce jour, etc.).

5. **Les questions transversales ont-elles été prises en considération dans ce projet de jumelage, à chaque fois que cela était approprié ? Y a-t-il eu des progrès réalisés ?** Veuillez développer et fournir les indicateurs pertinents.

**Question 5:** Dans quelle mesure les résultats obtenus grâce aux activités du projet de jumelage pourraient survivre dans votre pays, une fois le projet terminé ? *Ces résultats sont-ils toujours opérationnels après que le projet a pris fin ?*

Critères de jugement:

1. **Les résultats/extrants/impacts positifs de ce projet de jumelage ont-ils continué, ou est-il vraisemblable qu'ils continuent, une fois que le financement a ou aura pris fin ?** Veuillez développer et fournir les indicateurs principaux, si possible.
2. **Les bénéficiaires directs se sont-ils approprié les fruits du projet ?** Les extrants/résultats/changements ont-ils été intégrés pour de bon et de manière stable dans le fonctionnement de l'institution bénéficiaire ? Veuillez développer.
3. **En ce qui concerne le renforcement de la capacité institutionnelle, le personnel de l'institution bénéficiaire formé grâce au jumelage est toujours en place ? Est-il toujours en train de travailler sur des sujets liés aux changements introduits grâce au projet de jumelage ?** Avez-vous remarqué une rotation importante du personnel au sein de l'institution bénéficiaire ? Veuillez mentionner les principaux indicateurs pertinents. Des procédures de gestion des ressources humaines ont-elles été, sont-elles en train d'être, ou seront-elles, mises en place afin d'assurer le recrutement, remplacement, la rotation, le développement de carrière et la future formation du personnel (par ex. un programme de « Formation des Formateurs » ou un « Manuel de Procédures » pour la diffusion et la gouvernance) ?
4. **En ce qui concerne la transposition de l'Acquis de l'UE et/ou le processus législatif soutenu grâce au projet de jumelage, seriez-vous en position d'affirmer que ce projet a eu un impact réel, durable sur les mutations/modifications introduites dans le fonctionnement de l'institution bénéficiaire ?** Veuillez indiquer à quel moment le projet de loi, pour autant qu'il en ait un, a été rédigé, voté au Parlement, mis en œuvre et également à quel moment cette nouvelle loi a commencé à produire ses premiers effets (durant la mise en œuvre du projet ou après un, deux ou trois ans? Ou jamais ?).
5. **Quel a été le niveau d'engagement politique et de capacité d'absorption manifesté par les institutions gouvernementales, les administrations publiques et organisations d'affaires et de la société civile ?** Veuillez développer.
6. **Sur le long terme, quels ont été les effets des mutations/changements institutionnels, juridiques et de politique (processus de réformes) sur une région ou un secteur particulier de votre pays grâce aux activités du projet de jumelage ?** Veuillez développer et indiquer quels sont ces secteur(s)/région(s)/activité(s) ?
7. **Y a-t-il une stratégie de financement en place ou en passe de l'être afin de rendre pérennes les réalisations (existantes ou envisagées) du jumelage?** Si oui, à des coûts raisonnables (par ex. maintenance, remplacement, assurance, jetables, formations complémentaires, etc.) ?

8. **La transition (d'un point de vue opérationnel, administratif et financier) d'un projet à l'autre a-t-elle été envisagée et de nouveaux domaines d'intervention ont-ils été identifiés ?**

**Question 6:** Dans quelle mesure les activités du projet sont-elles complémentaires avec TAIEX et SIGMA et cohérentes avec d'autres instruments de renforcement de la capacité institutionnelle financés par l'UE et d'autres bailleurs de fonds multi- ou bilatéraux ?

Critères de jugement:

1. **Des actions/activités complémentaires ont-elles été prévues ou mises en œuvre entre le projet de jumelage et TAIEX/SIGMA et d'autres bailleurs de fonds multi- et bilatéraux ?** Veuillez indiquer lesquels s'il y en a.
2. **Y avait-il un mécanisme opérationnel ou envisagé afin d'optimiser la mise en œuvre complémentaire et coordonnée des divers outils disponibles pour l'Instrument de Jumelage (jumelage, TAIEX, SIGMA, assistance technique court-terme/long-terme, fournitures) ?**
3. **L'UGP disposait d'un chef de projet chargé spécialement de TAIEX et/ou de SIGMA ?** Etait-il/elle en relation directe avec ses collègues à la DUE/DG Elargissement pour discuter des diverses interventions TAIEX ?
4. **A votre avis, y avait-il un doublon/chevauchement entre les activités de l'Instrument de Jumelage et TAIEX/SIGMA ?** Est-il juste de dire que la complémentarité entre ces instruments pourrait être améliorée ? Si oui, veuillez indiquer dans quels domaines ?

Question supplémentaire:

- **Quel est votre avis concernant des activités telles que des voyages d'études dans les Etats-membres de l'UE, la participation à des événements régionaux, etc. ?** Seriez-vous en position d'affirmer que ces activités sont nécessaires, complémentaires et cohérentes avec les activités de jumelage ? Ces activités génèrent-elles un plus pour les bénéficiaires directs ? Apportent-elles un plus supplémentaire au projet ? Peuvent-elles être considérées comme trop coûteuses ? De quelle manière pourrions-nous mesurer le résultat des ces activités ? Quels indicateurs de succès pourraient être pertinents ?

**Question 7:** Dans quelle mesure l'intervention de jumelage de l'Union Européenne a-t-elle contribué avec succès à l'effort de renforcement de la capacité institutionnelle d'une institution bénéficiaire dans votre pays ?

Critères de jugement:

1. **Etes-vous d'accord pour affirmer que l'Instrument de Jumelage est un outil précieux pour développer la coopération administrative entre les Etats-membres de l'Union Européenne et les Pays Bénéficiaires de la Région du Voisinage et ce afin d'améliorer la capacité institutionnelle de l'administration bénéficiaire ?** L'Instrument de Jumelage apporte-t-il des résultats que les outils d'autres bailleurs de fonds ne peuvent simplement pas se permettre ? Veuillez développer.
2. **Les Service de la Commission, à la fois le QG et la DUE, se sont-ils montrés capables de mettre les Etats-membres et les bénéficiaires sur la même longueur d'ondes dans le**

**cadre de l'Instrument de Jumelage dans votre pays ?** Si oui, quelles en sont les implications ? Veuillez développer ou fournir des exemples d'aspects particuliers qui pourraient être améliorés.

**Question 8:** Dans quelle mesure le jumelage institutionnel a-t-il contribué à améliorer les questions transversales dans votre pays ?

Critères de jugement:

1. **Une stratégie/approche quant aux questions transversales a-t-elle été envisagée pour ce projet de jumelage ?** Si oui, de quelles questions transversales s'agit-il ? Quelles en sont les implications (voulues) ?
2. **Les activités de jumelage ont-elles amélioré le statut des questions transversales dans votre pays au niveau de la politique intérieure ou sectorielle ?** Si oui, de quelle manière ? Si non, pourquoi ?

**Question 9:** Dans quelle mesure la gestion décentralisée vs. centralisée des activités de jumelage a-t-elle influé sur la qualité des résultats obtenus par l'Instrument de Jumelage Institutionnel dans votre pays ?

Critères de jugement:

1. **La gestion décentralisée vs. centralisée a-t-elle affecté positivement ou négativement la préparation, la mise en œuvre, l'impact et la durabilité des activités de jumelage ?** L'institution bénéficiaire a-t-elle été préparée à mettre en œuvre le Système de Mise en Œuvre Décentralisée (DIS) des projets ? L'institution bénéficiaire dispose-t-elle de la pleine capacité pour mettre en œuvre des instruments aussi complexes tels que les projets de jumelages financés par l'UE ? Quels sont les derniers obstacles à l'adoption de ce Système ? Veuillez développer.
2. Description des institutions bénéficiaires:  
**Quel est l'engagement politique réel des ministères concernés ?** Par exemple, le Ministère bénéficiaire a-t-il pris part, ou s'est-il fait représenter, au Comité de Pilotage, au Comité d'Evaluation et aux Réunions de Suivi ?
3. Description de l'UGP:  
**Quelle est votre avis sur le statut, le mandat et le rôle joué par l'UGP dans le cadre d'une gestion décentralisée vs. centralisée des jumelages ?** Seriez-vous en position d'affirmer que le rôle de l'UGP devrait être renforcé et son fonctionnement amélioré ? Y a-t-il eu le moindre conflit entre les procédures de l'UE et celles du pays bénéficiaires ? Dans votre pays, le Directeur de l'UGP a-t-il un profil politique ou plutôt technique ?
4. **Dans le cas des institutions publiques européennes, la gestion des projets de jumelage était-elle assurée par des opérateurs intermédiaires ou directement par l'institution partenaire de l'Etat-membre de l'UE ?** Quel est le degré d'impulsion politique ? a-t-il eu des relations de coopération bilatérales entre les partenaires du jumelage ? Des relations bilatérales devraient-elles être prévues ultérieurement ? Veuillez développer.

**Question 10:** Dans quelle mesure les activités de communication et de visibilité ont-elles contribué à promouvoir l'Instrument de Jumelage Institutionnel à travers la Région de Voisinage et de cette manière à la réalisation des activités de jumelages dans votre pays ?

Critères de jugement:

1. **Des activités de communication et de visibilité ont-elles été prévues dans la fiche projet de jumelage ?** Si oui, quelles sont-elles ? A votre avis y a-t-il eu suffisamment d'activités de communication et de visibilité comprises dans ce projet ?
2. **Les activités de communication et de visibilité ont-elles contribué à promouvoir l'Instrument de Jumelage dans votre pays?** Le Plan de Communication a-t-il été préparé durant la phase de lancement et mis à jour régulièrement durant la mise en œuvre du projet de jumelage ? Veuillez développer les aspects liés à l'impact du Plan de Communication.
3. **Les parties prenantes, nationales et internationales, sont-elles régulièrement informées des projets en voie d'appels à proposition et des projets attribués, ainsi que des progrès réalisés par ces projets ?** Des réunions d'information sont-elles organisées régulièrement par les parties prenantes afin de les informer des derniers développements concernant les projets en cours et ceux en réparation ?
4. **Une participation « élargie » au Comité de Pilotage ne pourrait-elle pas représenter une bonne occasion de mieux disséminer les informations sur le projet, en assurer la promotion et obtenir le soutien actif des parties prenantes ?**
5. **Le nombre des demandes de participation aux activités de jumelage introduites par les institutions nationales a-t-il augmenté dans votre pays grâce aux activités de communication et de visibilité ?** La participation institutionnelle réelle aux activités de jumelage a-t-elle augmenté dans votre pays. Veuillez développer.

**ANNEX 6**

**QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED (Y/N) FROM STAKEHOLDERS**

## ANNEX 6 QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED (Y/N) FROM STAKEHOLDERS

### UKRAINE

#### 1) Academy of Judges of Ukraine

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD Sector Manager: **Yes**

PAO : **Yes**

#### 2) National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine (NAAU)

RTA: **No**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD Sector Manager (: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

#### 3) State Agency of Ukraine for Investment & Development (SAUID)

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD Sector Manager: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

### MOROCCO

#### 1) Department for Standardisation and Promotion of Quality (DQN)

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **No**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

#### 2) Facilitation of Foreign Trade Procedures for Customs

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO): **Yes**

#### 3) Capacity Building for Morocco's Competition Authorities

RTA: **No**

RTA Counterpart: **No**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

#### 4) Agency for the Oriental Region

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO : **Yes**

### JORDAN

#### 1) Customs Department

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **No**

#### 2) Audit Bureau

RTA: **Yes**

RTA **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **No**

### **3) Public Security Directorate in the Fight against Terrorism & Organised Crime**

RTA: **No**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

## **AZERBAIJAN**

### **1) Statistics**

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

### **2) Standardisation**

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **No**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

### **3) Parliament**

RTA: **Yes**

RTA: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

## **EGYPT**

### **1) CAPMAS (Statistics)**

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart : **Yes**

EUD: **No**

PAO: **Yes**

### **2) GAFI (Investment)**

RTA: **No**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **No**

PAO: **No**

### **3) Water Quality Management (MWRI)**

RTA: **Yes**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

### **4) Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA)**

RTA: **No**

RTA Counterpart: **No**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **No**

## **TUNISIA**

### **1) Administrative Court (Twinning Light)**

PC: **No**

PLC: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO: **Yes**

**2) ACAA**

RTA: **No**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **Yes**

PAO/UGP3A: **Yes**

**3) Tax Inspectorate**

RTA: **No**

RTA Counterpart: **Yes**

EUD: **No**

PAO/UGP3A: **Yes**

**ANNEX 7**

**A. TRAINING QUALITY ASSURANCE FORM – AZERBAIJAN**

**B. QUARTERLY 4 TRAINING EVALUATION GRIDS**

EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
AIDCO TRAINING UNIT

FOR SERGEY  
Example  
of questionnaire  
1

Reaction Sheet

Please complete this form at the end of the course, so that

- You can provide feedback on the learning event you have participated in.
- The Training Unit can continually develop and improve this and other events.

Event title.....  
Event dates.....  
Trainer 1: .....  
Trainer 2: .....  
Trainer 3: .....

Part I: Assessment of the course

1. What were your main objective for this particular training event? (One answer only)  
Tick one of the following:

- 1.1  To be better informed on a subject that is directly useful for my current job  
1.2  To be better informed on a subject that is not directly useful for my present job but should be important for my job in the near future  
1.3  To help me change job in the Commission  
1.4  To improve my culture/knowledge on general issues related with development and external cooperation  
1.5  Other (Specify) .....

2. How well were your expectations met?  
Tick appropriate answers:

- 2.1  The course corresponded to my expectations  
2.2  The course did not correspond to my expectations for the following reasons:  
2.2.1  The subject matter differed from what I had expected.  
Specify: .....  
.....  
2.2.2  The approach adopted by the trainers was not well adapted to my needs  
Specify: .....  
.....  
2.2.3  I realise that I was lacking some prerequisite training/experience for attending Profitably this course  
Specify: .....  
.....

3. How well were the announced event objectives met?  
Choose one among the following:

- 3.1  Fully  
3.2  The course failed to meet the following objectives:  
Specify and explain: .....  
.....  
.....

**Part III Overall rating and miscellaneous**

12. What is your overall rating for this course ? 1 2 3 4

13. How did you find out about this course?

- 13.1  Catalogue
- 13.2  Europaplus
- 13.3  Line Manager
- 13.4  Recommended by a colleague
- 13.5  Other. *Please state source:* .....

14. Would you recommend this course to others? YES NO


15. What other comments do you have on any aspect of this course?

*Thank you for taking the time to complete this sheet. If you would like an individual response to your comments, please provide your name and a contact number/address below*

Name. .... Contact Address/Number:.....

## ANNEX 4 TO QUARTERLY PROJECT REPORT N°3

### Evaluation Grids



#### Mission Evaluation Grid

**Project:** Twinning Contract AZ08/ENPPCA/FI/06  
**Beneficiary:** State Statistical Committee (SSC) of the Republic of Azerbaijan  
**Activity No:**  
**Subject:**  
**Date of the evaluation:**  
**Location:** State Statistical Committee; Baku

	Very good	Good	Mean	Poor	Very poor
	5	4	3	2	1
<b><u>Organizational</u></b>					
<i>Meeting facilities:</i> meeting hall, coffee breaks, equipment etc.					
<i>Agenda:</i> Relation to the mission goals					
<i>Agenda:</i> Effectiveness (time use)					
<b><u>Presentations</u></b>					
<i>Clearness of purpose: Were the presentations focused on the topics of interest from the agenda and clear enough?</i>					
<i>Informativeness: Did they bring enough information on the discussed topics?</i>					
<b><u>Discussions</u></b>					
<i>Involvement of the participants: Were the discussions lively and involved all participants?</i>					
<i>Conclusions/Solutions: Did the discussions ensure reaching the goals of the mission?</i>					
<i>Competence: Are the experts enough competent on the topics from the agenda</i>					
<b><u>Translation</u></b>					
<b><u>Recommendations</u></b>					



EU Twinning project „Support to the State Statistical Committee”

## Evaluation Questionnaire

**STUDY TOUR TO COUNTRY, DATE – DATE**  
**Country – Project Title**

Please answer the following questionnaire by ticking the corresponding circle in the evaluation scale:

1. Did the study tour programme meet your expectations?

<input type="button" value="yes"/>	(+2) (+1) (0) (-1) (-2)	<input type="button" value="no"/>
------------------------------------	-------------------------	-----------------------------------

2. Were you satisfied with the quality of the presentations?

<input type="button" value="yes"/>	(+2) (+1) (0) (-1) (-2)	<input type="button" value="no"/>
------------------------------------	-------------------------	-----------------------------------

3. Did the study tour content address your areas of professional interest?

<input type="button" value="yes"/>	(+2) (+1) (0) (-1) (-2)	<input type="button" value="no"/>
------------------------------------	-------------------------	-----------------------------------

4. Do you think you have increased your professional knowledge by participating in the study tour?

<input type="button" value="yes"/>	(+2) (+1) (0) (-1) (-2)	<input type="button" value="no"/>
------------------------------------	-------------------------	-----------------------------------

5. Will you be able to use this knowledge in your work?

<input type="button" value="yes"/>	(+2) (+1) (0) (-1) (-2)	<input type="button" value="no"/>
------------------------------------	-------------------------	-----------------------------------

6. Has the study trip provided you with ideas to develop strategies relevant to \_\_\_\_ ?

**yes**

(+2) (+1) (0) (-1) (-2)

**no**

7. Which topics were of special interest to you?

.....

.....

.....

.....

8. What additional topics would have been useful to include and should be included in another study tour?

.....

.....

.....

.....

9. Did you have sufficient opportunity to express your points of view and experiences during the study tour?

**yes**

(+2) (+1) (0) (-1) (-2)

**no**

10. Do you have any suggestions or remarks concerning an improvement of the study tour or the usefulness of carrying out a similar type of event on another topic for your work?

.....

.....

.....

.....

***Thank you for participating in the evaluation!***

**ANNEX 8**

**DONOR COORDINATION ACTIVITIES BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE**



Date 13.01.2011

### **Note for the File**

## **– Donors Coordination Activities carried out in 2010**

### **A. Donors coordination meetings organised in 2010:**

The following mainstream area meetings were organized:

- 20.04.2010: Democratic Structures and good governance
- 24.06.2010 Socio-Economic reform and sustainable development, trade and investment, regulatory approximation and reform
- 10.12.2010 Socio-economic stream
- 10.12.2010 Democratic Structures and good governance

The following sub-thematic area meetings were organised

- 24.11.2010 Energy (including renewable energy)
- 08.12.2010 Standardisation

A NFF was prepared for all donor coordination meetings.

### **B. Development partners matrix table updating exercise**

Following the first matrix completion exercise in November 2009, the matrix was updated in July 2010.

### **C. Follow-up actions in 2011**

#### **Tentative schedule of next coordination meetings:**

- 17.02.2011 Democratic issues and Good Governance (organised by the OSCE)
- 14.03.2011 Socio-economic stream
- March 2011 Energy
- April 2011 PFM

#### **Next donor matrix table updating exercises:**

- 31.01.2011 Updating of the Democratic issues and Good Governance (by OSCE):
- 17.01.2011 (deadline to send information): Updating of the socio-economic stream matrix:
- 31.01.2011 (circulation of table): Updating of the socio-economic stream matrix:

**ANNEX 9**

**PROJECT-CONCEPT-FICHE-TEMPLATE-UKRAINE-PAO**

## TWINNING PROJECT CONCEPT

### **I. Brief description of institution/organisation that wants to participate in the Twinning Programme**

1. Full name of institution/organisation
2. Subordination
3. Status of organisation (public/private establishment, educational institution, etc)
4. Main objectives (briefly)
5. Management structure of your institution/organisation (number of departments /offices and their interaction)
6. Number of employees (excluding support staff) in organisation
7. Total number of personnel who speak a foreign language at communication level
8. Responsible person for implementation of the Twinning Programme (surname, name, patronymic, title and contact information)
9. Does your institution/organisation have the ability to provide facilities (premises, office, equipment for the permanent presence of foreign adviser(s)/expert(s) ?

### **II. Brief description of proposed Twinning Project**

Title	Description
Proposed project title	
Tentative overall project aim	
Tentative project aims	
Tentative results	
Interaction with the main documents between the EU and Ukraine	
Reason for project implementation	
Related technical assistance	

**Information on new Twinning Project Concepts**

<b>N°</b>	<b>Public Body</b>	<b>Proposed Project Title</b>	<b>Priority of the Topic</b>	<b>Related Technical Assistance Projects</b>	<b>Other related items</b>
			<b>1. Association Agenda</b> <b>2. National Strategies</b>		<b>1. Premises Availability</b> <b>2. Command of English (number of staff)</b> <b>3. Twinning Ability</b>
<b>1</b>					
<b>2</b>					
<b>3</b>					
<b>4</b>					
<b>5</b>					
<b>6</b>					
<b>7</b>					
<b>8</b>					
<b>9</b>					

**ANNEX 10**

**TWINNING PROJECT SYNOPSIS EVALUATION GRID ITTSO-PAO –  
AZERBAIJAN**

**TWINNING EVALUATION GRID**  
for assessment of twinning project synopsis

Completed by: [name]

Date: 21 June 2012

<b>1. TWINNING CONCEPT</b>

<b>2. ELIGIBILITY</b>
<b>2.1. Relation with the PCA, NIP 2007-2010, ENP Action Plan and Annual Plan</b>
<b>2.2. Integration of <i>acquis communautaire</i> elements and/or EU best administrative practices</b>
<b>2.3. "Public sector" nature of the beneficiary</b>
<b>2.4. Existence of potential twin organisation in the MS</b>

*Scoring: 1 to 5 where 1 - non-eligible, 2 – unclear, 3 – questionable, 4 –good, and 5 – excellent*

<b>3. CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL</b>
<b>3.1. Maturity of the request</b>
<b>3.2. Clarity and coherence of objectives</b>
<b>3.3. Inclusion of elements of structural reform</b>
<i>Scoring: 1 to 5 where 1 - non-eligible, 2 – unclear, 3 – questionable, 4 –good, and 5 – excellent</i>

<b>4. COMMITMENT</b>
<b>4.1. Maturity of the request</b>
<b>4.2. Integration of the project within the institution own strategy</b>
<b>4.3. Potential synergy with the country agenda reform</b>
<i>Scoring: 1 to 5 where 1 - non-eligible, 2 – unclear, 3 – questionable, 4 –good, and 5 – excellent</i>

**ANNEX 11**

**EC PPT ENP TWINNING EVALUATION FINAL 14 06 2011**



This Project is funded by the European Union




This Evaluation is implemented by HTSPE Limited

## FIRST EVALUATION OF THE TWINNING INSTRUMENT IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD REGION

**PROVISIONAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

NCP meeting, 16-17 June 2011

Gerard Bouscharain  
Jean-Bernard Moreau



## ENP Twinning Evaluation



### PROVISIONAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### CONTENTS

1. Evaluation Scope and Method
2. Facts and Figures
3. Findings and Results
4. Recommendations

The views expressed in this PowerPoint presentation are the sole responsibility of the HTSPE Experts and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission, nor those of any of the national authorities across the ENP Region.  
The European Commission is the European Union's Executive Body



## ENP Twinning Evaluation



### Scope of the Evaluation

- ✓ Evaluate the institutional Twinning Instrument implemented in the ENP Region
- ✓ Identify lessons learnt, best practices and key recommendations for future EU-funded Twinning activities



## ENP Twinning Evaluation



### 16 ENP Partner Countries



**ENP-East**

- Belarus
- Ukraine
- Moldova
- Georgia
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan

**ENP-South**

- Syria
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Israel
- Palestinian Territories
- Egypt
- Libya
- Tunisia
- Algeria
- Morocco

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**



After 7 years implementation  
in the ENP region, time has come for  
a comprehensive evaluation  
of the Twinning Instrument

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**



**Sampling Approach**

Our main concern has been to make the Twinning Project sample as representative as possible

Sample:

6 Countries	3 Sectors	18 Projects + 2
Ukraine	Trade & Industry	3 projects per country
Azerbaijan	Finance	1 project per sector
Jordan	Justice & Home Affairs	
Egypt		
Tunisia		
Morocco		+2 non-priority projects

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**

**Method for data collection and analysis**



Based upon the Joint Evaluation Unit Methodology

- ➔ Review of all documentation available
- ➔ 7 (5+2) evaluation criteria
- ➔ Application of 10 evaluation questions to the 18+2 projects
- ➔ Submission of evaluation questionnaires to 80 stakeholders, including EUD, PAO-UGP, RTAs and Beneficiaries
- ➔ Approx. 100 interviews in the 6 selected countries
- ➔ Data processing, review of results, analysis
- ➔ Highlight of main findings, conclusions and recommendations

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**



**FACTS & FIGURES**

**Since 2004...**

- ➔ 156 twinning projects launched in 12 ENP Countries
- ➔ for an overall budget of € 160 million
- ➔ focusing on Institutional Capacity Building
- ➔ and legal harmonisation/approximation
- ➔ mainly in the Finance, Trade and Industry, Justice and Home Affairs sectors (54% of total)

(February 2011)

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
FACTS & FIGURES

To the question,  
what is your opinion on the twinning instrument ?

**“Twinning is a unique & extremely valuable instrument”**

**100 % positive answers**

from BENEFICIARIES  
PAO/UGP  
RTAs  
EUD

Twinning = Accelerator of Reform



**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
FACTS & FIGURES

To the question, what is a Twinning ?

An instrument/tool to....



- “...Reach the Acquis” (30% of answers)
- “...Adopt/approximate laws, norms” (25%)
- “...Facilitate trade” (20%)
- “...Implement the AA or PCA actions plans” (15%)
- “...Bring ENP countries closer to EU values” ( 10%)
- “...Accompany national structural reform” (0%???)

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
FACTS & FIGURES

**High Quality of MS Expertise**



90 % positive answers from beneficiaries

✓ Especially when RTA/CRJ has

- Technical Expertise
- Management Skills
- Communication Skills



**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
FACTS & FIGURES

**Other comments...**

- ✓ Lots of beneficiaries declared to be insufficiently informed of the existence of the Twinning Instrument  
70 % positive answers
- ✓ The reference to the EU Acquis is not evenly understood among stakeholders (EUD/PAO-UGP/beneficiaries)  
70 % positive answers
- ✓ Various opinions and proposals are expressed by stakeholders to improve some of the twinning procedures  
90 % positive answers for improvement



**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**FACTS & FIGURES**

... **Other comments**

- ✓ Study Tours: high expectation to expose nationals to EU best practices and for networking *100 % positive answers*
- ✓ Complementarity of twinning activities with other donors' intervention + TA/EX/SIGMA *90 % positive answers*
- ✓ Uptake of Cross-Cutting Issues into Project Design *90 % positive answers when relevant*
- ✓ Twinning vs. Technical Assistance *50 % misunderstanding by beneficiaries*

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**Provisional Findings**

During a first phase

**The Demand-Driven Approach Has been applied....**

- ➔ To better respond to the needs of beneficiary institutions...
- ➔ But also to launch the twinning process in the ENP region

PAO UGP

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**Provisional Findings**

**Key Conditions for Success**

**Twinning Projects are successful when:**

- ✓ Responding directly to beneficiary needs
- ✓ Realistic, feasible and focused on specific issues
- ✓ Beneficiary institutions are fully committed
- ✓ Sufficient absorption capacity by the beneficiary
- ✓ High quality of EU MS expertise

**ENP Twinning Evaluation**  
**Provisional Findings**

**High influence of political context on the impact of Twinning Activities**

- ➔ The Twinning Instrument is a tool for accompanying national reform that should not be imposed upon the beneficiaries from outside
- ➔ The more integrated a twinning project is at the highest political level, the more successful its outcome is likely to be
- ➔ The more an administration is involved at senior-level, the more significant the impact of twinning activities is likely to be

## ENP Twinning Evaluation Provisional Findings

The Twinning Instrument rests upon the central role played by PAO/UGP...  
in supporting Beneficiary Institutions

→ From identification to contracting phase  
 → From project start to completion  
 → Whether in a Decentralised or Centralised Implementation System

## ENP Twinning Evaluation Provisional Recommendations

### 1. The Demand Driven Approach

Continue the Demand-Driven Approach together with a more...  
**Strategic Approach**

Twinning Phase 1  
 Twinning Phase 2

## ENP Twinning Evaluation Provisional Recommendations

### 2. Improve twinning "governance"

Overall twinning coordination and supervision of 12 (out of the 16) ENP countries  
 EUD: in-country implementation of twinings, supervision and support to PAO/UGP  
 Implementation of twinning activities and support to Beneficiary Institutions

Twinning strategy and programming

## ENP Twinning Evaluation Provisional Recommendations

### 3. PAO/UGP performance and institutional capacity must be reviewed and/or strengthened

In most ENP countries visited,

Audit strengths & weaknesses  
 Review role & mandates  
 Resources, incl. staffing  
 Accompanying measures

ENP Twinning Evaluation  
Provisional Recommendations

**4. Improve Twinning impact, sustainability and feasibility**

- ✓ Provide better information upstream of twinning implementation
- ✓ Select only realistic, feasible and focused projects
- ✓ Better assess the beneficiary institution needs and relevance to EU Institutional Building issues
- ✓ Better assess real absorption capacity of beneficiaries
- ✓ Take into account staff availability and turnover
- ✓ Check/request full commitment of the beneficiary institutions

PAO UGP

ENP Twinning Evaluation  
Provisional Recommendations

**5. Further improve MS Expertise**

Technical Expertise  
Management Skills  
Communication Skills

- ➔ Still remain language barriers and the need for better exposure to local context
- ➔ Need to extend and improve training for new RTAs, PLs
- ➔ Creation of dedicated material, such as training manuals, websites, hotline....

ENP Twinning Evaluation  
Provisional Recommendation

**6. Twinning Management System and some procedures should be reviewed and simplified**

- ✓ Reduce the Twinning project fiche design phase
- ✓ Reduce level of details on the Twinning Fiche and simplify the drafting process
- ✓ Reduce project fiche preparation duration and costs

Manual

ENP Twinning Evaluation  
Provisional Recommendations

**7. Twinning vs. Technical Assistance**

- ✓ TA or TWG ??? ➔ not yet well understood by all Beneficiaries
- ✓ TA provides services ("deliverables")
- ✓ TWG consists in inter-institutional cooperation between MS civil servants working with BC counterparts with the aim to achieve mandatory results jointly agreed
- ✓ The difference between TA and TWG should be further clarified upstream to stakeholders /beneficiaries
- ✓ TWG eligibility criteria should be considered more strictly
- ✓ Whenever possible, the choice between TA and TWG should always be examined carefully in terms of adequacy and efficiency

Mandatory results

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### 8. Communication & Visibility Actions

- ✓ PAOs/UGPs should increase and repeat the number of C&V actions on the three institutional capacity building instruments, upstream of the programming phase
- ✓ C&V aims to provide full information to stakeholders and also mobilise the support of senior officials to the twinning process
- ✓ C&V actions are often too limited and conducted too late in the project design phase









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### 9. Other comments, lessons learnt, new ideas

- ➡ Take advantage of similar twinning projects implemented in other ENP and/or IPA countries (e.g. project fiches, Thesaurus...) and...
- ➡ Develop regional networking between ENP countries to benefit from similar twinning experience already implemented elsewhere
- ➡ Develop systematic ex-post Twinning evaluation (Project-Country-Programme)

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

